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Abstract 
This thesis deals with the analysis of certain issues and problems arising in the 
application of EC merger control. Its central objective is to analyse and assess the 
legal framework of EC merger control and its application by the Commission. The 
focus is on substantive issues and particularly on the market test of the ECMR and its 
application in certain difficult market situations resulting from mergers, such as 
collusive and non-collusive oligopolies. Vertical effects as well as situations of 
mergers giving rise to risks of both unilateral and coordinated effects are also 
examined. The analysis covers also issues of market definition and remedies. 
Although the focus is on substantive issues the thesis includes also references to basic 
procedural rules under the ECMR and judicial review, in order to give a complete 
picture of the system of EC merger control. The analysis takes into account the results 
of the recent reforms in EC merger control as well as the developments in other 
jurisdictions, particularly in the US. 
In order to better explain complex competitive issues and the results of the recent 
reforms to the ECMR the thesis uses as tools three past Commission decisions under 
the ECMR and one US decision. 
The final conclusion reached by the analysis is that more flexibility in the application 
of the framework by the Commission than currently exists is required in order EC 
merger control to be able to effectively deal with all anticompetitive scenarios arising 
from mergers. 
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1.1 The concept of merger control in the EU 
Merger control in the EU is a legal process established by Council Regulation 
4064/89 ("the old Merger Regulation") for regulating major cross-border merger 
activity in the EU territory. The old Merger Regulation provided the European 
Commission with sole jurisdiction (the "one-stop-shop" principle) to deal with all 
"concentrations" falling within the scope of the Regulation', which included apart 
from mergers also acquisitions and other forms of concentrations 2. For these 
concentrations the merging firms were obliged to notify the merger, prior to its 
implementation3 to the Commission, which would examine the impact of the 
transaction on competition and would either clear, sometimes conditionally, or 
prohibit it4. 
The old Regulation covered concentrations "with a Community dimension"5, 
namely concentrations with combined aggregate worldwide turnover of more than 
¬5,000 million, or aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of the undertakings 
concerned of more than E250 million. The establishment of turnover thresholds as the 
sole criteria of a "community dimension" made it possible to capture within the scope 
of the Regulation, apart from transactions between EC-based undertakings or those 
1 According to Recital 26 of C. R. 4064/89 the Commission had exclusive competence to apply this Regulation. 
This was subject to exception in referral cases under Article 9 whereby the Commission, after receiving a request 
by an interested Member State, could refer a notified concentration to the competent national authorities. 
The substantive requirements for referral concerned the existence of a threat on a market within a Member State 
as a result of the concentration. The system of referrals was preserved in the New Merger Regulation with some 
changes (see also in the next chapter dealing with procedural issue of the Merger Regulation). 
2 According to Recital 26 of C. R. 4064/89 the Commission "... should be given exclusive competence to apply this 
Regulation, subject to the review by the Court of Justice". 
3 Recital 17 of C. R. 4064/89. According to this Recital during the review of the merger by the Commission the 
transaction was under suspension. 
4 Recitals 14-16 of C. R. 4064/89. 
s Recital 11 of C. R. 4064/89. 
6 Article 1 of C. R. 4064/89. 
1 
involving at least one EC-based undertaking, also transactions involving only 
undertakings located outside the Community7. 
The establishment of merger-control procedures was necessary to ensure that the 
process of corporate reorganisations in the form of large cross-border concentrations, 
which was taking place after the dismantling of internal frontiers within the 
Community, would not result in a lasting damage to competition. Such 
reorganisations were generally beneficial for the European industry and economy but 
Community law had to deal also with certain concentrations that impeded effective 
competition in the common market or in a substantial part of it9. 
Thus, Regulation 4064/89 entered into force to exercise effective control in terms 
of competitive effects of all concentrations having Community dimension10. The 
creation of a new and specific legal instrument was deemed necessary because 
Articles 85 (now 81) and 86 (now 82), were not sufficient to effectively deal with all 
types of concentrations". 
The Regulation 4064/89 was replaced as of 1 May 2004 by Council Regulation 
139/2004 ("the new Merger Regulation", "new Regulation" or "ECMR"), which 
made important procedural and substantive changes in EC merger control without 
however altering its basic structure and scope'2. 
The new Regulation considers as the basic cause of corporate reorganisations the 
completion of the internal market and the economic and monetary union, the 
enlargement of the European Union and the lowering of international barriers to trade 
7A number of concentrations involving only firms located outside the Community were reviewed by the 
Commission in this context [e. g. Case IV/M. 37 Matsushita/MCA [1992] 4 CMLR M36; IV/M. 877 
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas [1997] OJ L336/16, [1997] 5 CMLR 270; COMP/M. 2220 GE/Honeywell, (Decision 
of 3 July 2001)]. 
The idea behind reviewing transactions involving foreign firms is mainly based on the "effects doctrine" of 
public international law, which for transactions under the EC Merger Regulation was interpreted by the European 
Court in Gencor v. Commission as follows: "Application of the Regulation [in such cases] is justified under public 
international law when it is foreseeable that a proposed concentration will have an immediate and substantial effect 
in the Community". 
However, the application of this rule by the Commission in transactions involving foreign firms has not always 
been received well by the political and competition authorities of the countries in which these firms were based, 
particularly the US. For a more detailed analysis and discussion on the extraterritorial application of the Merger 
Regulation see A. Jones and B. Sufrin EC Competition Law, (2nd Ed. ), Oxford University Press, 2004,1255-1265; 
D. G. Goyder EC Competition Law, (4t° Ed. ) 2003,503-504. 
This thesis contains extensive analysis of one such case, Alcoa/Reynolds, a merger involving two US 
companies. However, the focus of the thesis's analysis is not on issues of the extraterritorial application of the EC 
Merger Regulation, but on substantive issues related to the competitive assessment. 
8 Recitals 3 and 5 of C. R. 4064/89. 
9 Recitals 4 and 5 of C. R. 4064/89 
10 Recital 7 of C. R. 4064/89. 
11 Recital 6 of C. R. 4064/89. 
12 The issue is discussed in more details in chapters 2 and 3 of the thesis. 
2 
and investments13. Moreover, the new Regulation, as before, covers the same 
concentrations in terms of type and magnitude 14, while similar to the past it seeks the 
prohibition of mergers that may "significantly impede effective competition in the 
15 common market" even if the latter term has acquired a broader content. 
The maintenance of effective competition however is not an end in itself. Policy- 
makers in the EU have on several occasions made clear that by maintaining effective 
competition they seek to protect consumer welfare, which is the ultimate goal of EC 
merger control16. Consumer welfare generally stands for benefits to consumers'7, such 
as low prices, high-quality products, a wide selection of goods and services and 
innovation 18. Effective competition, compared with monopoly, benefits consumers 
because it offers lower prices, better products, wider choice and more new products 19. 
Thus, merger control seeks to ensure that mergers will not impede effective 
competition within the Community and thus consumers will not be deprived of the 
above benefits. 
13 Recital 3 of C. R. 139/2004. 
14 Recital 10 and Articles 1 and 3 of C. R. 139/2004 dealing with the concept of concentrations and the aggregate 
turnover thresholds for concentrations falling within the scope of the Regulation do not differ from the respective 
Recital 11 and Articles I and 3 of C. R. 4064/89. 
15 Compare Recitals 24 and 25 of C. R. 139/2004 with Recital 14 of C. R. 4064/89. The basic difference between the 
two Regulations lies on the applicable market test for establishing significant impediment to effective competition 
in the common market. Under C. R. 4064/89 the establishment or strengthening of a dominant position as a result of 
the concentration was the sole source of competitive harm. Under C. R. 139/2004 cases beyond market dominance 
could also suffice for establishing competitive harm. This issue is central in the thesis and is explained and 
discussed in detail in several of its chapters. 
16 According to the European Commissioner for Competition Mario Monti, "... preserving competition is... not an 
end in itself. The ultimate policy goal is the protection of consumer welfare" (see Mario Monti, Europe's Merger 
Monitor The Economist, 9 November 2002). See also Mario Monti "The Future for Competition Policy in the 
European Union" Speech at Merchant Taylor' s Hall, 9 July 2001 ("[T]he goal of competition policy, in all its 
aspects is to protect consumer welfare by maintaining a high degree of competition in the common market... "). 
Reference to the consumer welfare could be also inferred from Recital 4 of the Preamble of Merger Regulation: 
"[The corporate reorganisations] should be welcomed as... capable ... of 
improving the conditions of growth and 
raising the standard of living in the Community". 
1' The term "consumer welfare" is an economic concept, which is part of what is known as welfare economics 
concerned with the efficiency of the firm, the market and/or the economy. Consumer welfare (or consumer 
surplus) is usually compared by economists with producer welfare (or producer surplus), which refers to benefits 
to producers, and with total welfare, which stands for the sum of consumer and producer benefits (For a formal 
presentation of these economic concepts, see Massimo Motta, Competition Policy, Cambridge University Press, 
2004,39-100). 
These concepts are particularly important for competition policy because any intervention by competition 
authorities in that area depends on the adopted welfare standard. In EC merger control the adoption of the 
consumer-welfare standard requires that any efficiencies produced by the merger be at least partly passed to 
consumers through lower prices. Otherwise, if the merger results in higher prices, it will be prohibited 
notwithstanding the potential increase in profits for the merging firms as a result of the merger. 
The selection of an appropriate welfare standard for merger control purposes is discussed in detail in the 
analysis of merger-related efficiencies later into the thesis. 
18 See para. 8 of the Commission Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation 
on the control of concentrations between undertakings OJ [2004] C31/03- 
19 Ibid. 
3 
For identifying anticompetitive mergers the ECMR contains a market test 
applying to all mergers falling within its scope. Regulation 4064/89 established the 
"dominance test" according to which: 
"... a concentration which creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective 
competition in the common market or in a substantial part of it would be significantly impeded shall be 
declared incompatible with the common market' 20. 
This test was replaced in Regulation 139/2004 by another test: 
"a concentration which would significantly impede effective competition in the common market or in 
a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, 
shall be declared incompatible with the common market'21 
The new "substantial-impediment-of-effective-competition" (SIEC) test has broader 
scope by capturing certain mergers in oligopolistic markets, which result in unilateral 
anticompetitive effects and which apparently were not covered by the old test22. 
The application of the market test involves complex analysis of an economic 
nature based on market evidence. The process starts with the definition of a relevant 
product and geographic market (or markets) where the merger is most likely to raise 
competitive concerns. Then, the Commission, which enjoys broad discretion in the 
assessment of market evidence23, examines the impact of the merger on competition 
in that market (or markets). It does so by comparing the competitive conditions that 
would result from the merger with the conditions that would have prevailed without 
the merger24. In this assessment economic theories of competitive harm, such as the 
dominant-firm model and the oligopoly model, are used. However, unlike cases under 
Articles 81 and 82 where the assessment is based on evidence about past or current 
market conditions and firm behaviour, the assessment of mergers is inherently a 
question of prediction. In particular, the Commission using all the available 
information is required to predict the future market developments by prohibiting those 
mergers that are likely to impede competition in the market. However, even the latter 
20 Recital 14 of C. R. 4064/89. 
21 Article 2(2) of C. R. 139/2004. 
22 See Recital 25 of C. R. 139/2004. However, the European Commission does not consider that there is an 
expansion in the scope of the substantive test in the New Merger Regulation but attributes the different wording 
used in the new test to the scope of clarification rather than of the addition of powers (see European Commission 
"New Merger Regulation Frequently Asked Questions" Press Release of 20 January 2004). The issue is discussed 
in details in other chapters of the thesis where analysis of substantive issues with respect to the ECMR is made. 23 See infra. According to Recital 33 of the ECMR the Commission has the task of taking all decisions necessary 
to establish whether or not concentrations with a Community dimension are compatible with the common market 
as well as decisions designed to restore the situation prevailing prior to the implementation of a concentration 
which has been declared incompatible with the common market. 24 See para. 9 of the Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers. 
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mergers may be finally cleared if the parties during the negotiations with the 
Commission offer commitments sufficient to address the competitive problem. 
Available statistics show that EC merger control is not an anti-mergers regime, 
since the large majority of mergers examined under this process have been cleared 
unconditionally25. This view is further reinforced by the fact that in the ECMR there is 
no presumption that a merger is incompatible with the common market, whatever 
levels of market shares result, or whatever the size of the undertakings concerned. The 
test of compatibility is based firmly on competition criteria and this definitely favours 
permitting mergers, which are considered by economic theory as generally beneficial 
to competition and the economy26. 
1.2 Problems in the application of merger control 
The Commission enjoys broad discretion in the competitive assessment of 
mergers and is entitled to make all necessary decisions to ensure that the mergers will 
not harm competition in the Community27. For more effectively achieving this 
objective, the Commission is granted by the ECMR broad investigative powers 
concerning the collection of information and other evidence relevant with the 
appraisal of the concentrations 28. 
This appraisal of concentrations according to Article 2 of the ECMR takes into 
account the following factors: 
"a. the need to maintain and develop effective competition within the common market in view of, 
among other things, the structure of all the markets concerned and the actual or potential competition 
from undertakings located either within or outwith the Community; 
b. the market position of the undertakings concerned and their economic and financial power, the 
alternatives available to suppliers and users, their access to supplies or markets, any legal or other 
barriers to entry, supply and demand trends for the relevant goods and services, the interests of the 
intermediate and ultimate consumers, and the development of technical and economic progress 
provided that it is to the consumers' advantage and does not form an obstacle to competition". 
25 According to the Commission's statistics for the period 1990-2003, the notified cases under the ECMR were 
2399 of which only 18 were prohibited, while 169 were cleared with commitments either on the first or on the 
second stage of the examination. Also 81 notifications were withdrawn. 
26 Mergers generally create more efficient firms by means amongst others of lower production costs, broader 
product lines, innovative products and more efficient management of resources. They are also broadly used by 
firms seeking to expand in new product and geographic markets, while they can offer solutions to failing firms. 
Failing firms by selling their businesses may escape an otherwise inevitable liquidation, which would have apart 
from losses for their owners and shareholders also adverse social effects such as permanent job losses. These 
issues will be examined in more detail in the discussion on merger-related efficiencies later into the thesis. 
27 Recital 33 of C. R. 139/2004. The Commission's powers are discussed in details in chapter 2 of the thesis. 
28 Recitals 38 and 39 of C. R. 139/2004. According to Article 11 of C. R. 139/2004, the Commission has the power to 
request from undertaking, associations of undertaking and/or persons to provide information about the merger. 
According to Article 13, the Commission may also conduct inspections of undertakings and interviews with 
persons. The Commission may also request information from Member States, while according to Article 14 may 
impose fines or periodic penalty payments on persons and undertaking failing to cooperate. 
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A merger by eliminating a competitor reduces competition in the market and the 
Commission's task is to examine whether the competitor loss is compensated by the 
development of more aggressive competition between the firms remaining in the 
market post-merger or whether the merger results in a situation where the merging 
parties acting either unilaterally or in coordination with the remaining competitors are 
capable of increasing prices or reducing output. In any case, the Commission seeks to 
safeguard that the level of competition in the market post-merger will remain 
sufficient to ensure consumer welfare. 
The appraisal of mergers is complex and difficult and therefore the Commission 
has issued a number of Notices which provide guidance on the issue. The most 
important are the Notice on market definition29, the Guidelines on the assessment of 
horizontal mergers30 and the Notice on remedies31. All these Notices seek to clarify 
issues about fundamental areas of merger control, such as market definition, the 
application of the market test, and the remedies, which refer to means for restoring 
effective competition in anticompetitive mergers. 
However, the application of merger control by the Commission has in several 
cases caused criticism covering a wide range of issues. The Commission has been 
criticised for sometimes defining insufficiently narrow markets, making wrong and 
inconsistent competitive assessments and/or adopting problematic decisions 
concerning remedies. 
a. Problems in the Commission's market definitions 
Market definition seeks to identify in a systematic way the competitive 
constraints faced by the undertakings concerned32 and in merger control is a necessary 
step in the assessment of the market power of the merging firms. In practice the task 
of market definition using available market evidence results in the identification of a 
relevant market (or markets) in which the merging firms' market power will be 
assessed33. After the relevant market has been defined, the market test of the Merger 
29 OJ [1997] C372/5, [1998] 4 CMLR 177. 
30 OJ [2004] C31/03. 
31 OJ [2001] C68/3. 
32 Paragraph 2 of the Notice on the relevant market. 
33 The criteria and methodologies used in market definitions for merger control purposes are examined in chapter 3 
of the thesis and in more details in the chapters dealing with the analysis of the cases of aluminium industry, which 
6 
Regulation will be applied in that market in order to help the Commission to 
determine whether the merger will result in harm to competition or not. Competitive 
harm had for many years, as explained above, been synonymous to the establishment 
or strengthening of a dominance position, but now under the new market test the focus 
is on mergers resulting in "substantial impediment to effective competition", a 
concept in which however dominance remains central element. The criticism often 
raised against the Commission's practice is that market definition is sometimes used 
to facilitate the adoption of an already predetermined decision on the approval or 
rejection of the merger, which is not always based on market criteria. 
In particular, given that market shares play a central role for establishing 
dominance, some commentators have argued that the Commission often seeks the 
definition of narrow relevant markets, which produce high market shares that are 
indicative of the parties' dominant position34. However, such an approach by the 
Commission would result in overestimation of the merging firms' market power and 
thus in the prohibition of pro-competitive mergers. 
In addition, the Commission has often been criticised for using outdated35 and 
sometimes arbitrary36 methodologies in the market definition and for making only 
limited use of tools provided by economic theory37, which are generally considered as 
providing more concrete evidence for defining markets. 38 
as will be explained below are used in the thesis as tools for studying the practical application of EC merger 
control. 
34 Camesasca and Van Den Bergh cite allegations that for a long time the outcome of the market definition 
exercise in EC competition law had been predetermined by a desire of European regulators to prohibit (or, 
alternatively, allow) business behaviour rated as potentially distortive (or supportive) of the competitive process 
(see Peter D. Camesasca and Roger J. Van Den Bergh "Achilles Uncovered: revisiting the European 
Commission's 1997 Market definition Notice" Antitrust Bull. 2002,143,144). See also D. G. Goyder op. cit. 7,354. 
("Often it is the parties who are seeking for a broader market definition in which the combined market shares will 
be lower, while the MTF seeks a narrower market in order that market shares can be established which are 
substantial"). 
35 Tools such as functional interchangeability, product characteristics, price levels and third-party views have been 
broadly used by the Commission for defining the relevant product market (see Simon Baker and Lawrence Wu 
"Applying the Market Definition Guidelines of the European Commission" E. C. L. Rev. 1998,273,280). These 
tools though are not considered as very reliable because they do not provide quantitative evidence about 
substitution between products. In the recent years, particularly after the publication of its Notice on the relevant 
market, which imported the use of vigorous economic tools such as the SSNIP test, the Commission makes rarer 
use of these factors. 
36 For instance, Simon Baker refers to some "rules of thumb", which the Commission applies in market definition. 
These "rules" have the ability to provide quick, predictable and generally accurate indicators of the appropriate 
market definition to adopt. However, the blind application of these rules could lead to arbitrary market definitions, 
which are not consistent with the scope of the assessment of market power. Baker refers to the "merchant market 
rule" applied by the Commission according to which all the sales made by suppliers to customers to whom they are 
linked by full or partial ownership ("captive sales") are excluded from the relevant product market which includes 
only those sales made to independent third parties ("merchant market sales") (see Simon Baker "The Treatment of 
Captive Sales in Market Definition: Rules or Reason" 24 E. C. L. Rev. 2003,161). This issue is examined in details 
later in the thesis. 
37 Such a situation occurs particularly in geographic market definition, where according to available statistics the 
Commission often relies on very simple and "crude" evidence, such as trade flows and comparisons of price levels 
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The above criticisms are indirectly fuelled also by the inherent difficulties 
surrounding the task of defining markets and which increase the risk of failures in that 
area for any competition authority. In particular, a relevant market for merger control 
purposes is an artificial construct whose definition is based largely on quantitative 
criteria proposed by economic theories and which seeks only to identify the merging 
firms' market power. In this sense a relevant "antitrust" market is different to an 
economic market, which refers to the traditional concept of market. Given that the 
economic theory has not thus far drawn the fine line between pro-competitive and 
anticompetitive market power and that there is no consensus between economists and 
competition scholars about the best applicable methodology of defining antitrust 
markets, it is inevitable that the Commission's market definitions under the ECMR 
often attract criticism focusing on the applied criteria and methodologies whatever 
they are39. 
b. Problems in the competitive assessments 
The criticism of the Commission's practice concerning competitive assessments 
refers amongst others to erroneous analyses of oligopolistic markets, use of outdated 
economic theories, refusal to consider efficiencies, erroneous analyses of market 
evidence, and use of non-economic considerations in the assessment of mergers. 
In five cases, in particular, the Commission's failures were confirmed by the 
European Court: 
In French Republic v. Commission (Kali&Salz)40, the first judgment delivered by 
the Court of Justice under Regulation 4064/89, the Court annulled a Commission 
decision that the acquisition of the former East German potash producer MdK by 
Kali&Salz would create or strengthen a position of collective dominance. The Court 
held that the Commission's factual analysis and assessment were flawed and thus, the 
and makes only rare use of the more reliable economic methodologies (see European Commission, DG Enterprise 
"The Internal Market and the Relevant Geographic Market" Final Report, February 3,2003,47-48). 
38 The concept of the "relevant market" is an economic one and therefore in many cases, particularly when 
differentiated products are involved, the use of highly sophisticated economic and econometric analysis is 
necessary for proper definition (see Richard Whish, Competition Law, (5`h Ed), London: Butterworths, 2003, at p. 
24). As a result, when the market definition relies on market evidence such as the trade flows or the comparisons 
of price levels mentioned above, which are not based on rigorous economic methodologies, then the risk of error is 
higher. 
39 These issues are addressed in detail in chapter three where the Commission's practice when defining markets is 
examined and also in chapters 4-7 where the approach by other jurisdictions, particularly the US, as well as by 
economic theory are examined. 
40 Joint Cases C-68/94 and 30/95 [1998] ECR 1-1375. 
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Commission had failed to convincingly prove the establishment or strengthening of 
collective dominance from the merger41. 
Similarly, in Airtours v. Commission42, the Court of First Instance (CFI) annulled 
the Commission's prohibition of the Airtours/First Choice43 merger. The Commission 
had considered that the merger would result in a situation of tacit collusion by the 
merging firms and two other competitors in the UK market for short-haul foreign 
package holidays. The CFI found that the Commission's decision was "vitiated by a 
series of errors of assessment as to factors fundamental to any assessment of whether 
a collective dominant position might be created"44. 
In Schneider Electric v. Commission45 the CFI annulled the Commission's 
decisions in Schneider/Legrand46 which had prohibited the merger of two French 
suppliers of low-voltage electricity distribution equipment, and ordered Schneider to 
divest Legrand. The CFI annulled the decisions on both procedural and substantive 
grounds. Regarding substantive grounds, the Court was highly critical of the 
Commission's economic analysis that led to the establishment of a dominant position 
by the merged entity in all markets outside France. 
In Tetra Laval BVv. Commission47 the CFI annulled the Commission's decisions 
in Tetra Laval/Sidel48 which had prohibited the merger of two producers of packaging 
materials and ordered the separation of the two companies. The Court held that the 
Commission failed to demonstrate that the transaction would create or strengthen a 
dominant position on any relevant market. As in the Airtours and Schneider 
judgments, the Court carried out a long and detailed factual analysis, ultimately 
finding that the Commission's decisions were based on insufficient evidence and 
some errors of assessment. 
Lastly, in Babyliss SA v. Commission49 the CFI partly annulled the Commission's 
decision to authorise the SEB/Moulinex5° merger decision with regard to the markets 
41 Ibid. para. 49. 
42 Case T-342/99, Airtours Plc v. Commission [2002] ECR 11-2585, [2002] 5 CMLR 317. 
43 Case IV/M. 1524 Airtours/First Choice OJ [2000] L93/1, [2000] 5 CMLR 494. 
44 Op. cit. 43, at para. 294. 
45 Case T-310/01 Schneider Electric v. Commission [2002] ECR 11-4071, [2003] 4 CMLR 768 (annulment of 
prohibition decision); Case T-77/02 Schneider Electric v. Commission [2002] ECR II-4201 (annulment of 
divestiture decision). 
46 Case COMP/M. 2283 Schneider/Legrand (Decision of 10 October 2001) 
47 Case T-5/02 Tetra Laval v. Commission [2002] ECR 11-4381, [2002] 5 CMLR 1182 (annullment of prohibition 
decision); Case T-80/02 Tetra Laval v. Commission [2002] ECR II-4519, [2002] 4 CMLR 1271 (annulment of 
divestiture decision). 
48 Case COMP/M. 2416 Tetra Laval/Sidel (Decision of 30 October 2001). 
49 Case T-114/02 Babyliss SA v. Commission [2003] ECR 11-1279; [2004] 5 CMLR 1 
50 Case IV/M. 2621, SEB/Moulinex (Decision of 8/1/2002) 
9 
of Italy, Spain, Finland, the United Kingdom and Ireland. The Court considered that 
the Commission had not established "... to the requisite legal standard the correctness 
of its theory of the range effect, which it [had] used to justify the absence of serious 
doubts in [these] countries... "51 
Apart from these cases in which the European Court was involved, there are 
several other Commission decisions, which attracted criticism, GE/Honeywe1152 and 
Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas53 to name two high-profile ones. In GE/Honeywell the 
Commission's analysis of "bundling", which finally led to the abandonment of 
GE/Honeywell merger, was considered by some commentators, particularly in US, as 
based on outdated theories54. The Commission was also criticised for caring too much 
about the protection of competitors than about the protection of competition55 and for 
giving little attention to the efficiencies that would have been created by the merger56. 
In Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas, a merger, which went to the brink of prohibition, the 
Commission's analysis was also criticised by US commentators57 as being wrong and 
politically motivated by seeking to protect the interests of the European aircraft- 
construction consortium Airbus against the US-based rival Boeing. 
The stage of the competitive assessment, as with market definition, also entails 
itself objective difficulties. In particular, the factors taken into account in the 
competitive assessment include amongst others, the level of market shares of the 
merging parties and their competitors, the number of competitors, the existence of 
barriers to entry in the market, the level of market transparency, the level of market 
growth and the level of capacity utilisation of the firms. These and many other factors 
related to the specific markets, as will be explained in detail later in the thesis, are 
examined by the Commission, but the significance of each of these factors is not and 
can not be determined ex ante, since it depends on the specific market conditions. 
Moreover economic theory on which the assessment of market factors is based has not 
thus far provided in all cases clear answers but only indications about which of these 
51 Op. cit. 49, paras. 363-365. 
52 Case COMP/M. 2220 GE/Honeywell (Decision of 3 July 2001). 53 Case IV/M. 877 Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas [1997] OJ L336/l6 5 CMLR 270. 
54 See e. g. William Kolasky, then Deputy Assistant Attorney General, US Department of Justice, Antitrust 
Division "Conglomerate Mergers and Range Effects: It' sa Long Way from Chicago to Brussels" Speech before 
George Mason University Symposium, Nov 9,2001. 
55 See, e. g. Eleanor Fox "We Protect Competition, You Protect Competitors" 26 World Competition 2003,149. 
56 On the issue see also A. J. Padilla "The 'Efficiency Offence Doctrine' in European Merger Control", in Antitrust 
Insights, NERA Economic Consulting, July/August 2002. 
S' See e. g. Thomas Boeder and Gary J. Dorman "The Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Merger: the Economics, 
Antitrust Law and Politics of the Aerospace Industry" SPG Antitrust Bull. 2000,119. 
10 
factors are indicative of market power. As a result, it is reasonable that many 
Commission's decisions particularly in important cases attract the criticism of those 
parties (merging firms or competitors) who are not satisfied with these decisions58. 
c. Problems in the decisions on remedies 
According to the Commission's statistics, between 1990 and 2003 at least 169 
mergers were cleared conditionally, namely after the parties submitted commitments 
to address the Commission's competitive concerns. Also, for certain of the prohibited 
mergers under the ECMR the prohibition occurred because the merging parties and 
the Commission were unable to agree on appropriate remedies59 to the competitive 
problems 60 . 
These statistics reveal the increasing importance of remedies in merger control. 
Merger remedies are measures taken to restore effective competition in markets 
threatened by anticompetitive mergers. However, a valid decision on remedies, that is 
a decision sufficient to restore effective competition, is largely dependent upon a valid 
identification in the competitive assessment of the competitive problems from the 
merger. Procedural issues play also an important role concerning remedies, since in 
the context of merger control there are strict deadlines for the submission and the 
examination of the parties' commitments. Under C. R. 4064/89 the deadlines were 
considered by critics as excessively strict, which prevented the proper submission and 
examination of commitments61. C. R. 139/2004 relaxed these deadlines, thus offering 
more flexibility, but the new deadlines will still not enable firms to feel absolutely 
comfortable62. 
However, the strict deadlines, is not the only issue of concern. The Commission 
has occasionally been criticised63 for lack of transparency in its decisions, the 
58 The issues raised in this paragraph are central into the thesis and will be adequately analysed and discussed in 
many of its chapters. 
59 The terms "remedies", "commitments" and "undertakings" are used in this thesis interchangeably. 
60 Examples of cases, which were withdrawn for this reason, include Volvo/Scania (Case COMP/M. 1672 [2001] 
OJ L143/74), GE/Honeywell, Schneider/Legrand and INA/AIG/SNFA (Case IV/M. 3093). 
61 The issue is examined in details in the next chapter of the thesis. 
62 Ibid. 
63 See e. g. Antoine Winckler "Some Comments on Procedure and Remedies under EC Merger Control Rules; 
Something Rotten in the Kingdom of the EC Merger Control? " 26 World Competition, 2003,219, at p. 219. 
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imposition of disproportionate remedies, and the lack of due process and judicial 
review. 
1.3 The Commission's response 
Generally speaking the criticism of the Commission in respect of the application 
of the ECMR concerns both substantive and procedural issues. In terms of substance, 
the Commission is asked to improve its performance in merger analysis by making 
more use of modern economic tools. In terms of procedure the Commission is asked 
to adopt more flexible procedural rules and more transparent and consistent 
application of these rules. 
The Commission's recent responses to the criticism had three directions: 
a. Legislative changes through the adoption of a new Merger Regulation, which 
comprises more flexible procedural rules and a new substantive test. These 
developments do not establish a new merger policy but mostly seek to solve existing 
problems and to clarify certain ambiguous issues. 
b. Changes in the Commission's internal structure, such as the creation in 2003 of a 
post of Chief Competition Economist in the Directorate-General for Competition and 
the abolishment of Merger Task Force 
c. Issue of the Commission's Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers, 
seeking to clarify the Commission's policies64. 
Furthermore, the adoption by the CFI of a new fast-track procedure will enable the 
Court to get more involved in merger review process65. 
Although these changes will improve the effectiveness of EC merger control, it is 
nevertheless certain that many of the current difficulties in the analysis of mergers 
will remain. The basic reason, as explained above, is that in certain areas such as 
market definition neither economic theory nor competition authorities have thus far 
found satisfactory solutions. Thus, even under the new Merger Regulation problems 
will still arise. 
If one adds to the above, the fact that the analysis of mergers requires the 
examination of each case separately, taking into account the specific market 
64 The issue of guidelines on the assessment of vertical and conglomerate mergers is also expected for the near 
future. 
65 These new procedural rules along with the Court's general role in EC merger control are discussed in detail in 
the next chapter. 
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conditions of the time of the merger for which references to previous decisions are of 
little importance, it is easily understandable that merger control will always be a 
difficult task. 
However, without examining its practical application, it is difficult to assess the 
utility of the legal framework and therefore this thesis, whose main purpose is to 
assess the merger control regime of the EU, focuses on issues of practical application. 
1.4 The scope of the thesis 
This thesis is about certain issues arising in the application of EC merger control 
and uses selective Commission decisions in aluminium industry mergers as tools for 
studying these issues. 
The proposition which will be tested in the analysis, is that the application of 
merger control is a dynamic process, which to be effective requires a) a flexible but 
crystal-clear, in terms of scope and proceedings, legal framework that enables 
competition authorities to effectively deal with all the competitive issues arising from 
mergers in the complex global economic environment; and b) a flexible application of 
the framework in a manner that allows for maximum protection of the interests of the 
consumers in the Community without harming corporate reorganisation. 
The decision to focus on certain issues was taken exactly as a means to test the 
flexibility and the effectiveness of European competition authorities. Difficult issues, 
such as oligopolies and market definition in differentiated products, are particularly 
useful in this respect because their analysis and assessment are potentially more 
effective without the use of inflexible analytical methods (e. g. "checklist" approach to 
oligopolies), which are static, but with the use of more flexible ones (e. g. the search 
for "maverick" firms), which take into account dynamic developments in the market. 
The latter methods are arguably more effective because they search deeper in the 
market to disclose the forces determining the development of competition, unlike 
static methods, which merely record existing market trends. 
The details of how the author of the thesis apprehends the concepts of "dynamic 
merger control" and "flexibility in the framework and its application" will be 
explained in detail in the course of the analysis of the framework and its application 
throughout the chapters of the thesis and will also be discussed in the conclusions. 
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The final aim of this discussion is to contribute to the never-ending dialogue for the 
improvement of the effectiveness of merger control in the EU. 
The thesis has therefore several aims, which however, are all subordinate to one 
basic and ultimate aim. The subordinate aims are the following: 
a. to present a number of difficult issues, which, when arising, may lead to 
controversial merger decisions that put into doubt whether merger control is exercised 
properly. Issues, such as the oligopoly problem, market definition in differentiated 
products, and remedies are examined in this context; 
b. to analyse and assess the Commission's approaches to those issues. This helps to 
assess the Commission's general performance in the context of merger control. 
Certain Commission decisions in selected mergers of aluminium industry are used to 
serve this purpose; 
c. to examine how alternative economic theories and methodologies can help to deal 
with those issues. In this context, the selected mergers, in addition to the assessment 
of the Commission's policies, are also used as tools for discussing the practical 
application of alternative theories and methodologies, which could potentially help to 
improve the effectiveness of the current system of merger control in the EU; 
d. to assess through analysis of its practical application the legal framework of merger 
control in the EU, in terms of coverage of all the competitive issues, flexibility and 
effectiveness. Extensive comparisons with the respective US framework and its 
practical application take place in this context as a means to more effectively assess 
the EU framework; 
e. to analyse and assess the recent developments in EC merger control with the 
introduction of the "substantial-impediment-of-effective-competition" (SIEC) test, 
which replaced the dominance test, and the new procedural rules. Does the new 
framework improve the effectiveness of EC merger control? In this context, the 
selected Commission's decisions, in which the old framework was applied, are used 
as tools for discussing the changes in EC merger control that the new framework 
brings with it. The new framework does not constitute a radical departure from the old 
framework but imports certain improvements into the latter and therefore the selected 
cases are particularly useful for discussing the areas where the new rules imposed 
changes and the impact of these changes on the effectiveness of EC merger control. 
Moreover, in order to meet this objective the thesis selected merger decisions that 
gave rise exactly to issues that were targeted also by the recent reforms to the Merger 
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Regulation. Lastly, the relevant discussion includes also comparisons between the EC 
tests (old and new) and the US "substantial-lessening-of-competition" (SLC) test, 
whose adoption instead of SIEC had been examined during the negotiations between 
Member States and the Commission about the new Merger Regulation. 
All these five aims are subordinate to the basic and ultimate aim, which is 
twofold: 
a. to assess whether merger control in the EU achieves its main goal to protect 
effective competition and consumers in the territory of the Community; and, 
b. to put forward proposals for the improvement of the framework of merger control 
and the Commission's practice to the direction of the more effective protection of 
effective competition and consumers. 
1.5 The methodology of the thesis 
To attain its aims this thesis involves legal, economic and market research. The 
legal research covers the framework of substantive merger control in the EU, the 
approaches of the European Commission and the Courts on the examined competitive 
issues, and the equivalent frameworks and policies in other jurisdictions, particularly 
in the US. The economic research covers the economic theories underpinning the 
legal approaches to the competitive effects of mergers and also other economic 
theories offering alternative solutions. The market research concerns competition in 
certain markets of the aluminium industry, which are used as tools for studying the 
application of EC merger control. 
The analysis of the competitive issues, which involves extensive references to 
economic theories and market data, takes place from the perspective of a competition 
lawyer -not an economist- whose role is not to apply economic theories but to use the 
results of their application to put forward legal arguments favouring or opposing a 
merger. The assessments of economic theories made in the thesis are, therefore, based 
on the utility of those theories for the above-mentioned purpose, while their 
assessment from an economics perspective is left to the economists. However, even 
limited, assessments of the examined economic theories based on the views of 
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economists also take place, as a means to reinforce the credibility of the legal 
arguments, which use these theories. 
The step-by-step methodology for attaining the thesis's aims is as follows: 
First, the merger cases to be used as tools for studying the practical application of 
the EC merger control are selected. This methodological approach, to focus on 
specific mergers, is deemed more appropriate for studying the practical application of 
merger control and for better understanding the analysis of complex competitive 
issues. Moreover, this method is particularly useful for effectively clarifying the 
argument advanced by this thesis about flexible and dynamic merger control, which 
refers exactly to issues of practical application. 
Second, the selected cases give rise to issues of competition that are useful for 
checking the flexibility and effectiveness of EC merger control. Issues such as the 
collective dominance doctrine of the EU are amongst those to be examined. The 
selected cases are past but recent Commission's decisions under C. R. 4064/89 and 
concern the aluminium industry. The fact that these cases refer to the old framework 
does not reduce the significance of the analysis, since all the examined issues are of 
general interest, which are not connected to any framework (e. g. economics of tacit 
collusion or of non-collusive oligopolies). Moreover, many of these issues belong to 
difficult areas of merger control, such as the oligopoly problem, which due to their 
nature will remain in the centre of interest even under the new legal framework of 
C. R. 139/2004. 
Third, the aluminium industry is selected because the competitive conditions in 
certain of its markets allow for the discussion of the specific issues targeted by the 
thesis. Moreover, aluminium is a mature industry, very important for the development 
of the global economy and with a long history. Due to these features the industry 
demonstrates a satisfactory level of transparency concerning firms and competition in 
its markets and this helps in the collection of information that is necessary for 
analysing and assessing the application of EC merger control in the industry. 
Fourth, the selected mergers are those of Alcoa/Reynolds66, Rexam/ANC67 and 
Schmalbach-Lubeca/Rexam68, and the specific markets to be analysed on the basis of 
66 Case COMP/M. 1693, OJ L58 [2002] 5 CMLR 475. 
67 Case IV/M. 1939, Decision of 19 July 2000. 
68 Case IV/M. 2542, Decision of 28 Sept. 2001. 
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utility for the thesis's objectives are those of smelter-grade alumina (Alcoa/Reynolds 
Metals), beverage cans (Rexam/ANC and Schmalbach-Lubeca/Rexam), and primary 
aluminium (Alcoa/Reynolds). 
Fifth, smelter-grade alumina is selected for the additional reason that it was 
examined also by the US competition authorities in the context of Alcoa/Reynolds 
review. Moreover, the US authorities applied both the unilateral and multilateral 
effects doctrine of the US merger guidelines and this is an additional advantage to the 
discussion. The market of primary aluminium is included in the thesis, even though it 
was not examined by the EU and US competition authorities in Alcoa/Reynolds 
review. The reason of its inclusion is because it helps in the discussion of vertical 
aspects of mergers and newer theories of competitive harm. 
Sixth, a market research is carried out by the author of the thesis to disclose 
sensitive firm data, which as business secrets were not included in the published 
decisions for the selected markets69. The disclosure is necessary for the discussion of 
the competitive issues and the assessment of the Commission's decisions. The market 
research focuses on the competitive conditions in the markets at the time of the 
Commission's review of the cases and does not take into account later market 
developments. This is so because the thesis's research seeks to assess the 
Commission's handling of the available market evidence at the time of the review of 
the cases, which will help to assess the Commission's application of the ECMR. The 
market research seeks also to collect additional information, which could help to 
assess the Commission's analysis as well as to discuss the application of alternative 
economic or competitive theories. The sources of information include, apart from the 
firms involved in the mergers, institutions, organisations and journals specialising in 
the aluminium industry or having involvement in the examined mergers, such as the 
London Metal Exchange, the Financial Times, the International Aluminium Institute, 
the American Antitrust Institute, the American Metal Market, and the US Security and 
Exchange Commission. 
Seventh, the analysis of the cases involves analysis and assessment -on the basis 
of effective competition and consumer protection- of the Commission's approaches 
on the competitive issues, discussion on alternative approaches to the market evidence 
69 According to Recital 42 of C. R. 139/2004, all the Commission's decisions under the Regulation, which are not of 
a merely procedural nature, should be widely publicised. However, information covering business secrets of the 
firms are sealed from publication in order to protect the interests of these firms. 
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based on the use of other economic and competitive theories, comparisons with other 
jurisdictions, and proposals. Analysis and assessment of the legal frameworks (old 
and new) of merger control in the EU and comparisons with the US framework also 
take place. 
Eighth, the thesis culminates with the conclusions on the analysis and the 
proposals for the improvement of the legal framework to the direction of more 
effectively protecting competition and consumers in the EU. 
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 deals with procedural issues of merger control and judicial review. 
Although the focus of the thesis is on substantive issues, the reference to procedure 
and judicial review was deemed necessary because these issues are closely related to 
the competitive assessment. 
Further, Chapter 3 deals with the presentation of the basic Commission's practice 
concerning competitive assessments. In particular the focus is on market definition, 
analysis of competitive effects and remedies. Chapter 3 also briefly presents 
aluminium industry and the mergers, which will be used by the thesis as tools. 
Chapter 4 deals with the analysis of SGA market in the Commission's decision in 
Alcoa/Reynolds where a number of competitive issues are examined. In particular, the 
focus is, amongst others, on the market definition, which involved the treatment of 
captive production; the Commission's analysis of single dominance; risks of broad 
collusion; and remedies for curing single dominance and collusion. 
Chapter 5 deals with the analysis of the US decision about SGA market in 
Alcoa/Reynolds. This chapter includes analysis of the practical application of the US 
merger control regarding unilateral and coordinated effects and extensive comparisons 
between the US and EU market tests and practices. 
Chapter 6 deals with the analysis of the market of primary aluminium in 
Alcoa/Reynolds. The main focus at this chapter is on vertical aspects of mergers. 
Chapter 7 comprises analysis of beverage cans market, which was examined by 
the Commission in Rexam/ANC and Schmalbach-Lubeca/Rexam. The two cases are 
interrelated, since the latter case concerns the divestiture of assets in Rexam/ANC. In 
this chapter the Commission's doctrine on tacit collusion and the new doctrine on 
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non-collusive oligopolies are amongst the issues examined. Market definition in 
differentiated products, remedies for curing collusion and theories on remedies are 
also dealt with. 
Lastly, Chapter 8 contains a summary of the examined issues, the conclusions of 
the analysis and the thesis's proposals for improving the framework of merger control 
in the EU. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Merger control in the EU: basic procedural rules and judicial review 
2.1 Introduction 
Merger control comprises a procedural part referring to the merger review 
process, and a substantive part dealing with the competitive assessment of mergers. 
Although the focus of the thesis is on the substantive part, a reference to the procedure 
is also necessary because it is closely related to the effectiveness of substantive 
merger control. 
In particular, substantive merger control can not succeed without, for instance, the 
existence of rules safeguarding the ability of competition authorities to gather all the 
necessary information about the merger and its impact on competition. Also, the 
Commission must be given sufficient time to properly assess the available evidence, 
and sufficient powers to address competition concerns, while the law must also 
protect the rights of the parties throughout the procedures. Lastly, transparency and 
predictability of the proceedings must also be protected as enhancing the credibility of 
the decisions and legal certainty. 
This chapter analyses the procedural rules about the basic stages of EC merger 
control: pre-merger notification, the two-stage examination of mergers, and the 
enforcement of the decisions. References to the judicial review of the Commission's 
decisions are also made. The analysis is followed by comments and in certain cases by 
comparisons with corresponding US policies. 
2.2 The merger review process in the EU 
The merger review process comprises three possible stages: 
a. notification of the concentration; 
b. Phase-I investigation; 
c. Phase-II investigation. 
20 
The three stages are presented and analysed below, while additional references 
are made about the enforcement of the final decision (defined as Phase III) and the 
role of the Member States. 
2.2.1 Notification of the concentration 
Concentrations must be notified to the Commission "prior to their 
implementation and following the conclusion of the agreement, the announcement of 
the public bid, or the acquisition of a controlling interest". The ECMR does not 
provide any notification deadline. This is a new policy established in the latest 
reforms to the ECMR, which replaced the old one-week deadline for prior notification 
"from the conclusion of the agreement, or the announcement of the public bid, or the 
acquisition of the controlling interest". The one-week deadline was reasonably 
characterised as excessively strict for the undertakings even if the Commission had 
applied it flexibly and had refrained from imposing fines when a notification was late 
for "technical" reasons2. 
Furthermore, the ECMR now allows for even more flexibility by providing that 
notification "may also be made where the undertakings concerned demonstrate to the 
Commission a good faith intention to conclude an agreement or, in case of a public 
bid, where they have publicly announced an intention to make such a bid, provided 
that the intended agreement or bid would result in a concentration with a Community 
dimension"3. Under the old policy notification in such cases was not possible. 
Lastly, the notifying parties can also benefit from pre-notification contacts with 
the Commission where the two sides in a strictly confidential environment have the 
possibility to discuss jurisdictional and other legal issues. These contacts also serve to 
discuss issues, such as the scope of the information to be submitted, and to prepare for 
the upcoming investigation by identifying key issues and possible competition 
concerns at an early stage4. 
1 Article 4 ECMR. 
2 See also in the comments on the merger review process infra. 
3 Article 4(1). 
The Commission has issued "Best Practices on the conduct of merger control proceedings" where amongst others 
provides information about the purposes, timing and extent of the pre-notification contacts. 
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The official notification takes place mainly through the completion and 
submission to the Commission of Form CO5. 
Form CO requires the parties to supply a considerable amount of information 
including amongst others the identification of the relevant product and geographic 
markets as well as of "affected" markets6. For these markets the parties should 
provide detailed information about the conditions of competition and the main 
competitors. Such information is necessary to help the Commission assess within the 
short time limits the competitive effects of the merger7. However, collecting all the 
information required within strict time limits is often difficult and therefore the 
Commission has the power to grant waivers to the parties in the pre-notification 
Phase8. 
The Commission has also established a simplified notification form9 and 
procedure1° for mergers that can be expected not to give rise to competitive concerns. 
For these cases the Commission will adopt a "short-form" decision. 
For the Commission to be able to proceed to a decision on the case the 
notification should be completed in all material respects, otherwise it will be declared 
"incomplete"' 1. In the latter case, the Commission must inform the parties without 
delay and the notification will not become effective until the date on which the 
complete information is received by the Commission. In practice, declaration of 
incompleteness will be less likely if the parties start extensive pre-notification 
contacts with the Commission, which will help them to successfully complete the 
s The content of the current Form CO can be found in the Annex of Commission Regulation 802/2004 (OJ [2004] 
L133/1). The latter Regulation (hereinafter also "the Implementing Regulation" or "IR") sets out certain important 
procedural aspects of the operation of EC merger control, such as the mechanisms and content of notifications and 
the calculation of time limits. 
In respect of the notification forms, apart from Form CO, the new IR provides also a Short Form for 
notifications of concentrations that are unlikely to raise competition concerns, as well as an RS Form, which 
contains the information required for a reasoned submission for a pre-notification referral under Article 4(4) and 
(5) of Council Regulation 139/2004. 
6 Affected markets, according to section 6 of Form CO, are those in which the horizontal overlaps as a result of the 
concentration will lead to a combined market share of 15% or more. As regards vertical effects, section 6 provides 
that affected markets refer to a situation where "one or more of the parties to the concentration are engaged in 
business activities in a product market, which is upstream or downstream of a product market in which any other 
party to the concentration is engaged, and any of their individual or combined market shares is 25% or more, 
regardless of whether there is or is not any existing supplier/customer relationship between the parties to the 
concentration". 
7 On the issue see also, see also E. Navarro, A. Font, J. Folguera and J. Briones, Merger Control in the EU, Oxford 
University Press, 2002,12.18. 
8 Thus, Article 4(2) of IR empowers the Commission, applying the principle of proportionality, to dispense with 
the obligation on the parties to provide some of the information or documents required by the notification form. 
This concerns information, which is requested by Form CO or the Short Form but is not necessary for the 
examination of the case. 
9 This is the Short Form annexed to the IR. 
10 OJ [2000] C217/32, [2000] 5 CMLR 774. 
11 Article 5(2) of IR. 
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notification form 12. The supply of incorrect or misleading information in the 
notification form can be penalised by fines13. 
The ECMR provides for automatic suspension of a concentration before 
notification and until it has been declared compatible with the common market14. 
However, where appropriate the Commission may grant derogation from the 
provisions on suspension subject to conditions'5. 
2.2.2 The Phase-I investigation 
In the Phase-I investigation, which follows the submission of a complete 
notification, the Commission uses the information from Form CO, the results of its 
own brief market investigation, the negotiations with the parties and the submissions 
of interested third parties to determine whether the concentration falls within the 
scope of the Merger Regulation and, if so, whether it gives rise to competitive 
concerns in which case further proceedings will be required. In practice, however, the 
large majority of the cases falling within the scope of the Regulation are pro- 
competitive and are cleared in Phase I. 
In more detail, the culmination of Phase I leads to a decision under Article 6 of 
the ECMR, according to which the concentration: 
a. is outside the scope of the Merger Regulation 16; or 
b. falls within the scope of the Regulation, but does not raise serious doubts as to its 
compatibility with the common market 17 ; or 
c. falls within the scope of the Regulation and as modified by the parties no longer 
raises concerns as to its compatibility with the common market. The decision in this 
case will be cleared and may be subject to conditions and obligations 18; or 
d. falls within the scope of the Regulation but raises serious doubts as to its 
compatibility with the common market. In this case the Commission will open a 
Phase-II investigation 19. 
12 See at para. 7 of the Commission Best Practices. 
13 Article 14(1) of the ECMR. 
14Article 7. In respect of a public bid or of a series of transactions in securities, by which control is acquired from 
various sellers, Article 7(2) of ECMR states that the concentration could be implemented provided that the 
Commission is notified and that the acquirer does not exercise the veto rights attached to the securities in question 
or does so only to maintain the full value of its investments based on a derogation granted by the Commission. 
15 Article 7(3) of ECMR. 
16 Article 6(1)(a). 
17 Article 6(1)(b). 
18 Article 6(2). 
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Under the new policy Phase I must be completed within 25 working days from 
the day following that of the receipt of the complete notification with the potential of 
an extension to 35 working days in case of a referral to a Member State or of a 
submission of commitments aiming at rendering the concentration compatible with 
the common market20. Under the old policy these deadlines were one month and six 
weeks respectively21. 
In respect of Phase I, one should particularly focus on decisions clearing 
concentrations under conditions and obligations, which seek to ensure that the 
undertakings concerned fulfil the commitments they submitted to the Commission 
during Phase I22. The examination of commitments during that Phase -taking place 
under very strict time limits and with the Commission lacking the guarantees of the 
in-depth investigation of Phase II- can often be risky23. Therefore, Article 19(1) of the 
new Implementing Regulation ("IR"), in order to allow the Commission more time to 
examine the proposed commitments, provides that the latter should be submitted to 
the Commission within no more than 20 working days from the receipt of notification. 
In that case the Phase-I deadlines will be extended from 25 working days to 35 
working days24. 
The parties can also submit commitments on an informal basis even before 
notification 25. 
Moreover, the commitments submitted in Phase I must provide a sufficient degree 
of detail to enable their full assessment. Given the time limits and the limited scope of 
the Commission's investigation in that Phase, commitments will be accepted only if 
they provide a straightforward answer to a readily identifiable competition concern26. 
19 Article 6(1)(c). 
20 Article 10(1) of Council Regulation 139/2004. 
21 Article 10(1) of Council Regulation 4064/89 
22 See para. 33 of the Notice on Remedies acceptable under C. R. 4064/89 (OJ [2001] C68/3). 
23 See also Navarro et al. op. cit. 7,13.25. 
24 Article 10(1) of ECMR. Under the old legal status the period for the submission of commitments in Phase I was 
three weeks and this would lead to an extension of Phase I from a month to six weeks. 
However, it must be noted that the deadlines of Phase I are binding on the parties in the sense that the Commission 
is not obliged to take commitments into consideration in Phase I if the parties submit them after expiry of that 
time-limit. The rationale of this provision is that the Commission should have sufficient time to examine the 
commitments and decide whether they are sufficient to render the merger compatible with the common market. 
On the other hand, the Phase-I deadlines are not binding on the Commission and therefore the latter can consider 
commitments submitted after the deadlines if it believes that the circumstances of the case allow for a proper 
assessment of the commitments within a short period. 
The Commission's power to consider commitments submitted after the deadlines was confirmed by the CFI in 
its recent decision in Babyliss v. Commission (Case T-114/02 Babyliss SA v. Commission [2003] ECR 11-1279; 
12004] 5 CMLR 1 paras. 136-140). 
3 See para. 33 of the Notice on remedies. 
26 See paras. 34 and 37 of the Notice on remedies. 
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In any case, the Regulation provides that the Commission may revoke a decision if the 
parties commit a breach of an obligation attached to the decision27, or, as an 
alternative, the Commission may order the commencement of Phase 1128. 
2.2.3 The Phase II investigation 
Phase II concerns the in-depth investigation of concentrations having been found 
in Phase I to potentially give rise to serious concerns as to their compatibility with the 
common market. The Phase-II investigation seeks to confirm the existence of the 
above concerns through a more detailed and exhaustive investigation of the 
concentration. 
During Phase II the Commission enjoys broad investigative powers, which 
include the power of the Commission to request information from persons and 
undertakings or association of undertakings29 or to carry out inspections to the 
premises of the undertakings concerned30. Failure of the undertakings to cooperate 
with the Commission in its investigation can be associated with the imposition of 
fines and penalties31, while the parties will have the right to appeal to the Court of 
Justice against the relevant Commission's decisions32. 
The important document of Phase II is the Statement of Objections ("SO") where 
the Commission sets out its objections to the notified concentration. The document is 
addressed to the merging parties and "other involved parties" and potentially in a non- 
confidential version to interested third parties33. The Merger Regulation makes clear 
that the merging parties should be given time to submit their views on the objections 
against them34 and that the Commission shall base its decision only on objections on 
which the parties have been able to submit their observations 35. The issue is important 
because it concerns the parties' rights of defence, which must be fully respected in the 
proceedings36. 
27 See Art. 6(3) of the ECMR. 
28 See Art. 6(4) of ECMR. 
29 Article 11 of ECMR. 
30 Article 13 of ECMR. 
31 These fines and penalties are imposed in accordance with Articles 14 and 15 of ECMR. 
32 Articles 11(3) and 13(4) of ECMR. 
"Article 13(2) of IR. 
74 Article 18(1) of ECMR. 
33 Article 18(3) of ECMR. 
36 Article 18(3) of ECMR. 
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The CFI in Schneider Electric SA v Commission37, which annulled the 
Commission's decision to prohibit the Schneider/Legrand38 merger, stressed the 
importance of respecting the parties' rights of defence. The Court found that the 
Commission's prohibition was based on concerns, which had not been mentioned in 
the SO, and which therefore the parties did not have the opportunity to answer39. 
On the issue of parties' rights the Article 18(3) of the ECMR provides also that 
"... access to the files shall be open at least to the parties directly involved" provided 
that the legitimate interest of undertakings not to have their business secrets disclosed 
are respected. Such access is given to the parties after the issue of the SO40. However, 
in order to increase the transparency of the proceedings, the Best Practices issued 
recently by the Commission, allow the parties the opportunity to review submissions 
of third parties received during the investigation as well as other key documents (e. g. 
market studies) immediately after the initiation of proceedingsal. 
Moreover the ECMR establishes a general right of hearing for the notifying 
parties, other interested parties and third parties "at every stage of the procedure up to 
the consultation of the Advisory Committee"42 . The Implementing Regulation 
provides details of how the right to be heard can be exercised, as well as about the 
arrangement of formal hearings43. Further, the Best Practices provide for the 
organisation of State of Play meetings between the Commission and the parties at key 
stages of the investigation 44. These meetings are held on a voluntary basis and involve 
the mutual exchange of information between the parties and the Commission. 
Also, in accordance with relevant provisions of the ECMR and the IR, which 
refer to the participation of third parties45, the Best Practices provide for the 
organisation of "triangular" meetings with the participation of the parties, the 
Commission, and interested third parties46. These meetings will help the Commission 
to clarify substantial issues before deciding to issue the SO. 
37 Case T-310/01 Schneider Electric v. Commission [2002] ECR 11-4071, [2003] 4 CMLR 768 (annulment of 
prohibition decision); Case T-77/02 Schneider Electric v. Commission [2002] ECR 11-4201 (annulment of 
divestiture decision). 
38 Case COMP/M. 2283 (Decision of 10 October 2001). 
39 The detailed argumentation of the Court on the issue can be seen in paras. 437-462 of the decision, which 
annulled the Commission's prohibition. 
40 Article 13(3) of JR. 
41 See paras. 45-46 of the Best Practices. 
42 Article 18(1) of EMCR. 
e3 See Chapter IV (Articles 11-16) of IR. The healings are conducted by the Hearing Officer in full independence. 44 Paras. 30-33 of the Best Practices. 
45 Article 18(4) of the ECMR and Article 16(l)-(2) of JR. 46 Paras. 38-39 of the Best Practices. 
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Further, the Commission consults closely and constantly with the competent 
authorities of the Member States throughout the procedure47. The main means of 
collaboration is through the Advisory Committee comprising representatives of the 
Member States48. The Commission is obliged to consult the Committee before 
adopting any decision ending the Phase II investigation and also in case of the 
imposition of fines or periodic penalty payments49. The opinions of the Advisory 
Committee are not binding on the Commission, but the latter takes them into account 
before adopting a final decision50. 
Decisions in Phase II 
The possible decisions at the end of Phase II, according to Article 8 of the 
ECMR, are as follows: 
a. The concentration may be declared compatible with the common market 
unconditionally51. However, such unconditional clearance is rather rare and this is 
quite normal given that Phase II investigation starts only after the Commission 
identified serious doubts in Phase 152. 
b. The concentration may be declared compatible with the common market, subject to 
commitments and obligations53. These cases concern concentrations, which were 
modified by the parties in order to get clearance, and the commitments and 
obligations imposed by the Commission seek to ensure that the parties will carry out 
these modifications. 
c. The concentration may be declared incompatible with the common market 
54 
The legal test of compatibility is provided by Article 2(2) of the ECMR, according 
to which a concentration will be declared compatible with the common market if it 
"... would not significantly impede effective competition in the common market or in 
47Article 19 of ECMR. This consultation starts from the moment of the notification of the concentration and is 
particularly important during the second stage, where concentrations that may have significant competitive effects 
in the territory of some or all the Member State are examined. 
48 The Advisory Committee was established in accordance with Article 19(3) of C. R4064/89. 
49 Article 19(3). 
so Article 19(6). 
31Article 8(1). However, the decisions in such cases covers restrictions directly related and necessary to the 
implementation of the concentration. 
52 According to the Commission' s statistics between 1990 and 2003, only 23 cases were cleared without 
commitments at the end of Phase II. 
s; Article 8(2). The decision shall also cover restrictions directly related and necessary to the implementation of the 
concentration. 
54 Article 8(3). 
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a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a 
dominant position". This legal test is new and was inserted to the Merger Regulation 
in the latest reforms. An analysis and discussion on the content of that test as well as 
about the old dominance test takes place in chapter 3 of the thesis. 
Further, in accordance with Article 8(4), the Commission may take measures to 
restore effective competition in cases where concentrations have been declared 
incompatible with the common market following their implementation or where 
concentrations have been implemented in contravention with a crucial condition 
imposed on them by the Commission. The restorative measures include the 
dissolution of the concentration or, if this is not possible, any other measure. 
The Commission may also take interim measures to restore or maintain effective 
competition in case where a concentration has been implemented before a decision as 
to its compatibility with the common market has been taken, or has been implemented 
in violation of a condition imposed by the Commission, or has been implemented and 
is declared incompatible 55. 
The Commission may also revoke a decision clearing the merger on the basis of 
incorrect information for which the parties are responsible or where it has been 
obtained by deceit or in case of breach of an obligation56. 
In case of revocation or if the parties breach a condition imposed on them for 
gaining clearance in Phase I or II, the time limits for coming to a decision in Phase II 
are suspended and the Commission will re-examine the case adopting a new 
decision57. 
Lastly, the Commission's decisions under Article 8 are notified to the parties 
and the competent authorities of the Member States without delay58. 
Deadlines of Phase II 
The new deadlines for the completion of Phase II resulting from the latest reforms 
to the ECMR are as follows59: the old deadline of four months is replaced by 90 
working days, with the potential of further extension by 20 working days if requested 
ss Article 8(5). 
56 Article 8(6). 
57 Article 8(7). 
58 Article 8(8). 
59 Articles 10(3) of ECMR. 
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by the notifying parties or by the Commission with the agreement of the parties. In 
addition, the new policy provides for extension by 15 working days after the 
completion of the 90-days period if the parties submit their commitments after the 54th 
working day that followed the initiation of Phase II. The period set for Phase II starts 
the date on which the proceedings were initiated. 
Further, suspensions of the Phase-II deadlines are provided for the period where 
the Commission has had to request information by decision pursuant to Article 11 or 
to order an inspection by decision pursuant to Article 1360. 
The deadlines of Phase II are generally strict taking into account that the 
investigation is in-depth and involves scrutiny of complex cases. Moreover, the 
process has in many cases a highly adversarial nature, particularly concerning the 
selection of the appropriate remedies for addressing the identified competitive 
concerns, and this makes the deadlines even stricter61. 
In respect of commitments the IR, in accordance with the new rules, provides 
that the parties must submit their commitments within no more than 65 working days 
from the date on which the proceedings were initiated, while in case of an extension 
of Phase II, the period of 65 working days will be extended by the same number of 
working days62. In addition, as mentioned above, in case commitments are submitted 
after the 55h day, the period of Phase II may be extended by 15 working days namely 
from 90 to 105 working days. 
However, the examination of remedies is a complex task. First, the Commission 
must send to the parties the SO. Then, the parties must reply to the SO and design and 
propose commitments sufficient to address the competition concerns of the 
Commission as identified in the S063. The selection of the appropriate commitments 
is often difficult and takes time, while the parties must also provide details about their 
implementation 64. Then, the Commission will market-test the proposed commitments, 
after consulting with the Member States and in some cases with the authorities of non 
Member States, to see if they are acceptable65 and will either clear or block the 
60 Article 10(4) of ECMR. 
61 See also Antoine Winckler "Some Comments on Procedure and Remedies under EC Merger Control Rules: 
Something Rotten in the Kingdom of EC Merger Control? " 26 World Competition, 2003,219,223-225. 
62 Articles 19(2) of IR. Under the old IR (Commission Regulation 447/98), which was following the old deadlines 
of Council Regulation 4064/89) the commitments had to be submitted to the Commission within not more than 
three months from the initiation of Phase II. 
63 Paragraph 42 of the Notice on remedies. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Paragraph 43 of the Notice on remedies. 
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merger. All this process needs to be completed within the strict deadlines of Phase H. 
Given that there are fixed deadlines for the submission of commitments, while there is 
no deadline for the submission of SO it is likely the dates of the submissions of SO 
and the commitments to be very close to each other particularly in complex cases. 
Such a potential, however, could create problems to the notifying parties, which 
would have very little time to their disposal to design sufficient commitments to 
address the Commission's concerns as expressed in SO66. 
In the past there were cases where the parties withdrew notification because they 
were unable to finalise commitments sufficient to address the Commission's concerns 
within the existing deadlines67. Also, in Schneider/Legrand68 the Commission 
rejected a second proposal of commitments by the parties on grounds of insufficient 
time for their examination. The Commission also rejected the parties' proposal for 
extension of time of Phase II because it did not see any exceptional circumstances 69. 
However, the Commission's decision was annulled by the CFI on grounds, amongst 
others, that the parties' rights of defence had been violated because the parties had not 
been put in position to submit in good time proposals for divestiture sufficiently 
extensive to resolve the competition problems identified by the Commission70. 
A potentially preferable solution to the problem could come from a "stop-the- 
clock" agreement between the Commission and the parties, which would enable 
suspension of Phase-II deadlines during the examination of commitments' suitability. 
The Merger Regulation partly adopts such a solution by providing for the potential of 
a 20-days extension in Phase II following agreement between the parties and the 
Commission or a 15-days extension in case of commitments negotiation. These 
developments offer some flexibility without however solving all the problems as will 
be argued below. 
66 The parties have already from the negotiations with the Commission before the submission of the SO some 
knowledge of the Commission's competitive concerns and have therefore more time to prepare their commitments. 
However, from a legal aspect the parties are obliged to address competition concerns as prescribed in the SO in 
order to get clearance of their merger and therefore they have to wait until the submission of the SO before the 
finalise their proposed commitments. Thus, if the date of the submission of SO is close to the deadline for the 
submission of commitments it is likely particularly in complex cases that the parties may not have enough time to 
respond properly through the submission of commitments to the SO. On this issue see also Michael Kekelekis 
"The 'Statement of Objections' as an Inherent Part of the Right to be Heard in EC Merger Proceedings: Issues of 
Concern" 25 E. C. L. Rev. 2004,518,523-4. 
67 One such case was Warner/EMI (Case COMP M. 1852). See also Richard Whish, Competition Law, (5th Ed. ) 
Butterworths, 2003, at 853. 
68 Case COMP/M. 2283 (Decision of 10 October 2001). 
69 See also Whish op. cit. 67; Winckler op. cit. 61. 70 Case T-3 10/01 Schneider Electric v. Commission [2002] ECR 11-4071, [2003] 4 CMLR 768 para. 460. 
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2.2.4 Phase III 
Phase III concerns the implementation of the Commission's final decisions on 
notified concentrations under the Merger Regulation. This Phase applies in cases 
where the merger has been cleared subject to conditions and obligations either in 
Phase I or in Phase II. In these cases the Commission needs to safeguard the 
compliance of the parties with the conditions and obligations imposed on them. 
The focus is particularly on the divestiture of assets, which aims at restoring 
effective competition in the markets of concern. In respect of these assets the 
Commission must ensure their independence, economic viability, marketability and 
competitiveness of their sale to an appropriate buyer71. For this purpose, the 
Commission may approve the appointment of a trustee, proposed by the parties, to 
oversee their compliance with such preservation measures (the so-called "hold- 
separate trustee")72. Moreover, the Commission may approve the appointment of a 
"divestiture trustee"73 with responsibility to oversee the implementation of the 
divestiture itself. The powers of this trustee concern not only the control of the 
suitability of the purchaser proposed by the parties for the divestiture assets, but also 
the search for an acceptable purchaser in case the parties are unable to find such a 
purchaser within the prescribed time limits. However, the final decision on the 
purchaser to be selected is on the Commission. 
The implementation Phase is important because it concerns the realisation of the 
remedies, which are directed to the restoration of effective competition in markets 
where serious competitive concerns have been identified by the Commission. If that 
Phase is not successfully completed, then the central goal of merger control, namely 
the protection of effective competition in the territory of the Community, will not be 
fully met. The Merger Regulation therefore provides the Commission with power to 
stop the implementation of the concentration in a case where the parties breach crucial 
conditions and obligations imposed on them in the decision approving the 
concentration 74. In particular, the Commission may require the dissolution of the 
concentration or take interim measures in a case where the latter was implemented in 
71 See Navarro et al., op. cit. 8,13.101. 
72 See para. 52 of the Notice on remedies. 
73 See paras 54 of the Notice on remedies. 
74 See Article 8 of ECMR. 
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contravention of a crucial conditions. Moreover, in the presence of a breach of an 
obligation the Commission may revoke its decision76. In both cases (breach of 
condition and/or obligation) the Commission may also fully reassess the cases, 
without being bound by the deadlines of Phase II77. 
However, as will be seen in details in the analysis of aluminium markets later in 
the thesis, the Commission's policies in the implementation Phase potentially raise 
certain questions about their effectiveness, particularly concerning the divestiture of 
assets. In particular, the Commission's approvals of purchasers as suitable do not 
seem to be always satisfactory. 
2.2.5 Relations with Member States 
Although the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to deal with concentrations 
having Community dimension, it nevertheless has to cooperate with Member States 
on several issues concerning the application of Merger Regulation. Thus, the 
Commission must send copies of the notification and other important documents of 
the case to the competent authorities of the member States78 and carry out the 
procedures set out in the regulation in close and constant liaison with these 
authorities79. Also in Phase II the Commission is required before adopting a final 
decision to consult an Advisory Committee on concentrations consisting of 
representatives of the competent authorities of the Member States80. However, the 
Commission is not bound by the opinion of the Advisory Committee. 
Further, the Commission and Member States are involved in referral cases under 
Articles 9 and 22(1) of the ECMR, which cover referrals from the Commission to the 
81 Member States and from the Member States to the Commission respectively. 
75 Article 8(4)-(5) of ECMR. 
76 Article 8(6) of ECMR. 
"Article 8(7) of ECMR. As can be inferred from the above, the terms conditions and obligation are distinct ones: 
conditions mean all the measures contained in a commitment that structurally change the market (e. g. divestiture); 
obligations mean all the implementing steps necessary to properly fulfil the various commitments (e. g. 
appointment of a trustee with an irrevocable mandate to sell the business) (see para 12 of the Notice on remedies). 
Article 19(1) of ECMR requires the Commission to submit within three working days to the competent 
authorities of the Member States copies of the notification and as soon as possible copies of the most important 
documents of the case including those refer: ing to the commitments proposed by the parties. 
79 Article 19(2) of ECMR. Member States have the right to make known their views at any stage of the 
proceedings. The Commission's decisions, if challenged by Member States, will stand unless or until they are 
overruled by the CFI or the ECJ. This was the ruling of CFI in Case T-52/96 Sogecable v. Commission [1996] 
ECR 11-797. 
80 Article 19(3)-(7) of ECMR. 
81 In particular, Article 9 of ECMR provides for the potential of a referral by the Commission to a Member State 
that a Member State in the following case: 
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Lastly, the Member States, in accordance with Article 21(4) of the ECMR, may 
deviate from the "one-stop-shop" principle by taking appropriate measures to protect 
their "legitimate interests"82. These measures involve action to control certain aspects 
of a concentration that affect the territory of the Member State concerned. 
2.2.6 Some comments on the merger review proceedings in the EU-comparison with 
the US model 
The European legislators understood the multiple benefits of corporate 
reorganisation for the promotion of the competitiveness of the European industry and 
economy and designed the merger review proceedings in a way favourable to 
concentrations. Thus, in principle, there is no presumption against concentrations in 
EU law. However, given that a minority of concentrations have harmful effects to 
competition, the European legislators sought also to establish an effective legal 
framework that will stop these few anticompetitive transactions without, though, 
harming the majority of transactions that are pro-competitive. 
The favourable treatment of concentrations by the Merger Regulation is clearly 
visible at least concerning the following issues: 
a. The establishment of a single notification for concentrations "with a Community 
dimension" allows companies involved in large transactions to avoid multiple filings 
83 
with national jurisdictions within the EU and to notify only to the Commission. 
a. the concentration threatens to affect significantly competition in a market within that Member State, which 
presents all the characteristics of a distinct market; 
b. the concentration affects competition in a market within that Member State, which presents all the 
characteristics of a distinct market and which does not constitute a substantial part of the common market. 
If the above criteria are met Article 9 provides that the Commission will either deal with the case itself 
applying the ECMR or will wholly or partly refer the case to the national authorities concerned for application of 
the national competition law. 
Further, Article 22(1) provides that the Commission acting at the request of member States may examine a 
concentration with no Community dimension. In order to be examined by the Commission such a concentration 
must have impact on trade between Member States and threaten to significantly affect competition within the 
territory of the Member State or States making the request. If these conditions are met, the Commission applying 
the provisions of the Merger Regulation will assess the case. 
82 The "legitimate interests" of the Member State should be compatible "with the general principles and other 
provisions of Community law". Article 21(4) provides three types of interests that are considered legitimate: public 
security, plurality of the media and prudential rules, while the recognition of any other public interest as a 
"legitimate" one is also possible if that interest is compatible with the general principles and other provisions of 
Community law. 
83 According to Sir Leon Brittan Q. C., now Lord Brittan, who was the European Commissioner for Competition 
when the C. R. 4064/89 was adopted: "... All mergers with a Community dimension will benefit from the one-stop- 
shop regime. We have clarified and simplified the law in an area, which was full of uncertainties and 
complications. A large European merger which had to be hawked around several European capitals for approval 
and consideration also had to be given to the precise scope of Articles [81] and [82] [EC] in this field, on the basis 
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b. The short and fixed deadlines for the completion of the various stages of the 
Commission's investigation leads to an early termination of the proceedings, thus 
enabling the firms involved in the majority of cases to proceed fast to the 
implementation of their transaction. The existence of fixed deadlines enhances also 
legal certainty, which is also in the benefit of firms84. 
c. The provisions concerning suspension or extension of the proceedings do not cause 
long delays, since the Commission's standard practice seems to be to seek early 
termination. 
d. In order to avoid unnecessary delays the parties are also encouraged to carry out 
pre-notification contacts with the Commission, which help for the proper preparation 
of the file. 
e. The concentration is exclusively assessed for its impact on competition and no 
other criteria apply85. 
f. The test of compatibility takes into account all the possible factors relating to the 
impact of the concentration on the relevant markets and there is no presumption of 
illegality based for instance solely on the level of market shares or the size of the 
merged entity86. 
g. Each and every merger notified to the Commission results in the adoption and 
publication of a reasoned decision. 
The measures taken to detect and block anticompetitive concentrations include the 
following: 
of two judgments of the European Court. Now we have the policy right and we have clarified the procedures and 
the substantive rules" (see Sir Leon Brittan Q. C., now Lord Brittan, "The Law and Merger Control in the EEC" 5 
E. L. Rev., 1990,351,357). According to the Recital 12 of C. R. 139/2004 multiple notification "... increases legal 
uncertainty, efforts and cost for undertakings and may lead to conflicting assessments". 
84 On the issue, see also Rachel Brandenburger and Thomas Janssens "European Merger Control: Do the Checks 
and Balances Need to be Reset? " in International Antitrust Law and Policy, Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 
2001,135,160,163-4). 
8$ This can be seen in Article 2(1) of ECMR, which sets the relevant criteria for the appraisal of concentrations. 
According to Lord Brittan "... the [Merger] Regulation gives clear primacy to the competition criterion with only 
the smallest nod in the direction of anything else" (see Sir Leon Brittan Q. C., now Lord Brittan "The Early Days of 
EC Merger Control" in EC Merger Control: Ten Years On, International Bar Association, London, 2000,. 3). 
According to the incumbent European Commissioner for Competition, Mario Monti "Above all, we have put in 
place a merger control system, which is characterised by the complete independence of the decision-maker, the 
Commission, and by the certainty that mergers will be exclusively assessed for their impact on competition" 
(Mario Monti "Merger Control in the European Union: A Radical Reform', Speech at the European 
Commission/IBA Conference on EU Merger Control, Brussels, 7 November 2002). The issue of the assessment 
criteria of concentrations will be discussed in the analysis of the cases later into the thesis and also in the 
conclusions. 
86 See also Cook & Kerse EC Merger Control, (P Ed. ), Sweet & Maxwell, 2000,6. This issue will be clarified in 
the analysis of issues of substantive merger control throughout the subsequent chapters of the thesis. 
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a. All parties to concentrations under the ECMR are required to send a detailed Form 
CO, which contains details about the concentration and its impact on competition, 
thus helping the Commission to detect anticompetitive mergers; 
b. All transactions falling within the scope of the ECMR are subject to scrutiny by the 
Commission; 
c. The Commission is given broad powers in the collection of market evidence about 
the impact of the concentrations on competition. 
d. The Commission is given broad decision-making power. Thus, the Commission can 
approve unconditionally, subject to conditions and obligations or prohibit 
concentrations falling within the scope of the ECMR. However prohibition is the last 
resort, and is used only after all possibilities of settlement of the case have been 
exhausted. 
Although the application of the Merger Regulation by the Commission was 
widely regarded as having been highly successful87, problems had often arisen 
concerning certain procedural rules, mostly the deadlines for notification and Phase-I 
and II investigations. These problems, as shown above, led the Commission to amend 
the relevant provisions of the Merger Regulation by dropping the notification 
deadlines and allowing more flexibility in the deadlines for Phases I and II. 
However, for Phase II it seems that even the new deadlines, by providing for 
extension from 90 to 105 working days for the examination of commitments 
submitted after the 54`h working day from the initiation of Phase II, and also an 
extension by up to 20 days after the 90th day with the consent of the notifying parties, 
do not depart significantly from the old deadlines. Thus, the new deadlines may still 
not be sufficient to address all the problems posed by the increasing complexity of the 
in-depth investigations and the examinations of the commitments. 
The increasing complexity of investigations concerns not only the increasing size 
of the undertakings concerned and the affected markets but also the increasing use of 
sophisticated economic tools in merger analysis (e. g. merger simulation) for which the 
88 collection of large amount of firm and market data is required. 
87 See e. g. "The Review of the Merger Regulation", 32nd Report of the House of Lords Select Committee on the 
European Union, HL Paper 165, Session 2001-2002, para. 21 ("The Merger Regulation has become one of the 
cornerstones of EC competition law and many witnesses (from business to regulators) have spoken to us about 
how highly they regard the Regulation and what a success its operation has been. The Committee recognises the 
good role of the Commission in applying the ECMR"). See also Nicholas Levy "EU Merger Control: From Birth 
to Adolescence" 26 World Competition,. 2003,195, at 200-201. 
88 The old four-month timetable for Phase II had also been considered as often being inadequate to meet the 
requirements of the in-depth investigation of Phase II (see also Winkler op. cit. 59,224; Werner Berg and Patrick 
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In respect of commitments, both the notifying parties89 and the Commission had 
under the old system complained of serious time constraints in the submission and the 
examination of the commitments respectively90. The new deadlines are not much 
more flexible than the old ones and therefore similar complaints may appear also in 
the future. 
A last but potentially most important reason showing that the new Phase-II 
deadlines may not be adequate concerns the new substantive test of the Merger 
Regulation. As will be seen in detail in the chapters to follow, the new test is broader 
than the old test, since it includes within its scope also unilateral effects (or non- 
collusive oligopolies). The new test allows also for a more flexible approach to broad 
oligopolies, which are beyond duopolies that were traditionally the main source of 
concern for the Commission in situations of collective dominance. Lastly, the new test 
potentially allows also for the establishment of both unilateral and coordinated effects 
in the same merger as does the US merger law. This is so because under the new test 
the focus is on significant impediment to effective competition as a result of the 
merger and leaves to the Commission the decision on what forms impediment of 
competition will take: Unilateral effects and of what form? Coordinated effects? 
Both? This situation is different than under the old test where the Commission 
focused only on the establishment of dominance. Under the new test the Commission 
has to carry out broader and more detailed investigations to establish all possible 
anticompetitive effects of the merger and not only dominance, while the examination 
of commitments may also become in certain case more complex. Thus, even the new 
fixed timetables of Phase II may raise barriers for the in-time completion of the 
Commission's investigations. 
In this context, would it have been a more appropriate solution to abandon the 
fixed deadlines in Phase II and adopt an even more flexible approach, such as that 
followed in US concerning the Second Request, the US equivalent of Phase II, which 
is open-ended? The Commission has in several instances stressed the significance of 
fixed deadlines in merger review for enhancing legal certainty and the predictability 
of the proceedings, but, on the other hand, it has to be mentioned that Phase II applies 
Ostendorf "The Reform of EC Merger Control: Substance and Impact of the Imposed new Rules" 24 
E. C. R. Rev. 2003,504, at 598). 
89 See for instance the notifying parties' complaints for the Commission's refusal to examine the proposed by the 
arties modified commitments due to the lack of sufficient time for market testing in Schneider/Legrand case. 
See the Commission's Green Paper on the Review of Merger Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 at para. 208. 
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only to a small minority of cases examined under the Merger Regulation. Also, that, 
as mentioned above, the increased complexity of the Phase-II cases and the broader 
scope of the market test require additional efforts for the identification of the 
competitive problems and the selection of the appropriate remedies, and the existence 
of fixed deadlines may raise obstacles to these efforts, thus endangering the effective 
application of merger control. Therefore, the examination of an alternative solution 
for Phase II should not in the thesis view be excluded. 
However, to decide whether an open-ended Phase-II investigation such a solution 
reference to the US experience on the issue would be illustrative. 
2.2.6.1 The US merger review system 
The merger review proceedings in US start, as in Europe, with the pre-merger 
notification in accordance with the Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) Act, which came into 
force in 197691. The HSR Act currently establishes a notification requirement for all 
transactions with a value in excess of $50 million92. The HSR Act establishes no 
deadline for notification but requires the latter to take place prior to the 
implementation of the agreement. The HSR filing form, unlike Form CO in Europe, 
does not require the parties to describe markets, competition, competitors and 
customers but only to submit certain specifically defined documents that are most 
likely to relate to the competitive effects of the transaction93. 
After the submission of a complete notification the competition agencies, DOJ or 
the FTC, have 30 days, in which to file a response, or 15 days if the controlling party 
91 The HSR Act added section 7A to Section 7 of Clayton Act (15 U. S. C. Sec. 18a). 
92 The HSR was amended in 2000 when, amongst others, the threshold for notifiable transactions was increased 
from US$15 million to US$50 million. For more information about the new valuation rules see Malcolm R. 
Pfunder "Valuation Issues under the Amended Hart-Scott-Rodino Act and Rules" 16-SPG Antitrust, 2002,37. 
Further amendments to the HSR were adopted in 2004. These amendments concerned the treatment by HSR of 
non-corporate entities and certain technical corrections in other rules of HSR. 
91 The requirement of only limited information in the initial filing form is based on the idea that the vast majority 
of the thousands of cases notified annually in accordance with the HSR Act do not raise competitive concerns. 
Item 4(c) of the form contains the most important list of documents relating to the potential competitive effects of 
the merger and which must be provided with the initial filing. The list includes a number of pre-existing 
documents, such as all studies, surveys, analyses or reports prepared by or for any officer or director for the 
purpose of evaluating or analysing the acquisition with respect to market shares, competition, competitors, 
markets, potential for sales growth or expansion into product and geographic markets. However, the requirements 
for documents in Item 4(c) have been characterised vague and subject to various interpretations and there have 
been suggestions for amending Item 4(c). 
On the issue see also the Final Report of the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee (ICPAC) 
to the Attorney General for Antitrust of the US, 2000, at 118; also William Baer and Deborah Feinstein "Item 4(c): 
The Next Step in HSR Reform" 16-SPG Antitrust, 2002,43. 
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is making a cash tender offer94. If there is no decision by these agencies during that 
period -the equivalent of Phase-I period in Europe- the parties can proceed with the 
implementation of their agreement. Conversely, if the agencies find that the merger 
potentially raises competitive concerns, they will open a Phase-II investigation by 
submitting to the parties a mandatory Second Request (SR) for further informations. 
The investigation on the case following the submission of the SR is in practice 
open-ended. The basic reason is that SRs are broadly drafted to ensure access to a 
wide array of potentially relevant information and thus the compliance of the parties 
with the SRs is often difficult and takes long time96. The US competition agencies 
justify the very detailed nature of the SR by the fact that they lack access to 
information about the industry, the proposed transaction, and other key facts, since the 
information provided by the parties with the initial filing is very limited97. The 
agencies also stress the fact that according to the US legislation, unlike the ECMR, 
they are not entitled to block a problematic merger themselves, but must ask a federal 
court to enjoin the transaction98. As a result, the agencies must have as much 
information as possible in order to convince the court99. 
Lastly, the agencies use as an additional reason for the detailed nature of SR the 
fact that merger analysis under the US merger guidelines focuses on dynamic 
competition considerations for which the collection of large amounts of data and 
information are required1°°. However, certain opponents of the SR view it as a 
discovery process where agency lawyers typically take the `shotgun' approach, asking 
for everything they think might be interesting or useful, to avoid missing anything 
and, frequently, to buy time1°1. 
Thus, although the US agencies are required to file a response to the SR within 20 
days from the submission of the required information by the parties, the whole 
94 15 U. S. C. § 18(b)(1)(B). 95 The agencies may also ask the parties to provide additional information voluntarily within the initially 30-day 
review period. See also the ICPAC Report op. cit. 93,119. 
96 See also ICPAC ibid., 122. 
97 See also ibid. 
98 Ibid. About this issue see also the analysis about US merger control in subsequent chapter, as well as later in this 
chapter. 
99 More detailed reference to the role of the court in merger review process in US is made in chapter 5 of the thesis. 10°See William Baer "Reflections on Twenty Years of Merger Enforcement under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act" 65 
Antitrust L. J., 1997,825,843. 
101 See Joe Sims & Deborah P. Herman "Me Effect of Twenty Years of Hart-Scott-Rodino on Merger Practice: A 
Case Study in the Law of Unintended Consequences Applied to Antitrust Litigation" 65 Antitrust L. J., 1997,865, 
877. 
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process lasts for months because the parties are unable to comply quickly with the 
SR' 02. 
In practice, however, according to available statistics, the second stage 
investigations in US are completed on average in about four months, similarly to 
Phase-II investigations in Europe103. Moreover, the US agencies have adopted policies 
requiring the production of documents in stages, such as the "quick look" policy, 
according to which the agencies focus on issues determinative in concluding that the 
transaction likely does not raise anticompetitive concerns' 04. If they can reach such a 
conclusion full-document production is not required. Such policies help that that in 
most cases the parties comply only partially with the SRs and the transactions are 
resolved with relatively modest document productions'°5. 
However, there have been cases in which the provision of enormous number of 
documents was required to satisfy the agencies'°6 and also cases where the overall 
process lasted for a year or longer 107. 
2.2.6.2 The US experience and the adoption of an open-ended Phase II in Europe 
The complaints of the notifying parties in many cases of unduly burdensome SR 
proceedings has led in US to discussions for the abandonment of this open-ended 
process and the adoption of a new system. The European model of fixed timetables 
was amongst those proposed. However, the International Competition Policy 
Advisory Committee (ICPAC), which was formed by the US DOJ to report on 
international antitrust matters, in its Final Report of February 2000108 concluded that 
in the US reality the adoption of such timetables would cause practical difficulties 109. 
The US concerns were based mostly on the following issues: 
a. the existence of a fixed timetable for the completion of Phase II would make the 
parties to delay compliance with the SR in order to thwart the agencies' efforts to 
effectively review the transactions; 
102 See ICPAC op. cit. 93,131. 
103 Ibid 
104 Ibid.. 122-123. 
105 Ibid. 
106 By way of example in the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger the parties submitted to US authorities 
approximately 5,000 boxes of documents containing 5 million pages. In contrast, in Europe the documents 
submitted to the Commission by the parties were numbered only in thousands (source: ICPAC, op. cit. 93, at 139). 107 Ibid... 131. 
108 Op. cit. 93. 
109 However, the Report referred to the positive European experience about fixed timetables (see at p. 132). 
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b. the existence of a fixed timetable for the completion of Phase II would require the 
existence also of a fixed deadline for compliance with the SR, which according to 
ICPAC would eliminate much of the flexibility that parties enjoy under the current 
system in restructuring and implementing their transactions; 
c. the risk of enforcement errors would increase, because the agencies would be 
forced to act under time pressure' 10. 
Although the experience from the use of fixed timetables in the EU has been 
largely positive, one can not deny that even in the more flexible new Phase-II 
deadlines may still prove inadequate in some cases. Even if the Commission does not 
follow during Phase II the US practice of requesting huge amounts of information and 
data from the firms, it nevertheless seems that the increasing complexity of the Phase- 
II investigations along with the increasing sophistication of economic tools of analysis 
used in such cases may require the extension of that Phase beyond the existing 
deadlines. The adoption of a new market test with broader scope in the Merger 
Regulation points also in that direction, since the Commission's analysis in addition 
to cases of dominance will have to deal also with unilateral effects. 
Thus, although this thesis does not support the adoption of the open-ended US 
model it nevertheless believes that the Commission should be given the power at the 
request of the parties or in agreement with them to extend in some difficult cases the 
Phase-II investigations beyond the existing deadlines and for a period sufficient to 
enable the completion of the investigation. This solution should be provided only for 
exceptional cases where difficulties arise for the completion of the investigation or the 
proper submission and examination of the commitments within the existing deadlines 
and extensions provided by the Merger Regulation. The initiative should belong to the 
parties or to the Commission but with the agreement of the parties 1 ý. 
The potential for further extension in difficult cases will benefit both the parties 
and the Commission. The parties will benefit because they will have more time to 
convince the Commission, particularly through the submission of potentially more 
sophisticated commitment packages or through the presentation of sophisticated 
economic models in support of their views. The parties also will have fewer reasons to 
1 10 For more details see at pp. 132-3 of the Report. 
111 The parties could request further extension in order, for instance, to prepare a more effective package of 
commitments. The Commission could also request further extension for instance in order to have sufficient time to its disposal, to market test a more sophisticated commitment package. The period for which further extension is 
requested will be specified in the request. 
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doubt about the Commission's final decisions because they will know that their case 
was examined thoroughly and they were given all the chances to defend their 
positions. Thus, the need to appeal to the Court against the Commission's decision, 
and the financial costs and time-loss that are associated with such a move, will also be 
reduced' 12. The Commission from its side would have more time at its disposal to 
safeguard the full completion of its investigation thus avoiding potential assessment 
errors. 
For further extending Phase II there will be no need to abandon the existing 
timetables but only to make a special provision in the Merger Regulation. This thesis 
believes that it is better granting further extension for the completion of Phase II in 
order to more effectively deal with objective difficulties arising in the context of 
merger review and the broader market test than to strictly stick to the existing 
timetables and potentially make errors in assessment. 
Moreover, this thesis argues for the more frequent use of dynamic competition 
analysis in merger review. Dynamic analysis is more complex than static analysis, 
takes more time to complete, but offers more effective competitive assessments. A 
dynamic analysis does not rely solely on static factors such as market shares or 
"checklists" for concluding on the competitive effects of a merger but goes deeper 
into the competitive process by analysing the post-merger firms' behaviours 
("maverick firms", raising-rivals'-costs strategies etc) or the potential impact of the 
merger on prices (e. g. merger simulation), thus enhancing the credibility of the 
competitive assessments113 . Dynamic analysis 
is more complex and difficult because 
it requires the collection of large volumes of data and information about firms and 
markets but it nevertheless can offer very useful evidence to competition authorities 
particularly in difficult cases114. The thesis therefore believes that the law should 
allow for certain cases the further extension of the existing timetables as a means to 
promote more effective competitive assessment based on dynamic analysis. 
Although an alternative solution for prolonging the Phase-II investigation would 
be through the more extensive use of stop-the-clock provisions without altering the 
112 Cases such as that of Schneider Electric/Legrand where the parties took the Commission to the Court 
complaining amongst others that they were not given enough time to submit their response to the Commission's 
objections to the merger could have been avoided under the proposed system. 113 Some illustrations of how the thesis apprehends dynamic merger analysis will be presented in the course of the 
analysis of the aluminium markets in subsequent chapters. 
114 See for instance the details about the application of merger simulation or the maverick-firms methodology in 
subsequent chapters of the thesis. 
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fixed timetables, this thesis believes that such a solution would be less effective 
because it would put at risk the certainty and predictability of the process, which is a 
big success of the current system. On the other hand, by providing for only 
exceptional cases the potential of further extension on the Phase-II investigations, the 
benefits from the fixed timetable will not be abandoned, while the flexibility of the 
new rules will help to avoid complaints, particularly by the parties, for incomplete 
assessment of their arguments due to the lack of time. 
2.3 Judicial review of the Commission decisions 
According to Article 21(2) of the ECMR the Commission's sole jurisdiction to 
take decisions under the Regulation is subject to review by the Court of Justice' 15. The 
Court reviews both procedural and substantive issues of merger control, while it deals 
also with damages proceedings against the Commission 116. 
The involvement of the Court has been relatively rare but not insignificant. The 
rareness of the judicial involvement has been largely attributed to the existence of 
lengthy procedures, which prevented the exercise of effective judicial control within 
reasonable time. This problem was solved through the introduction of "fast track" 
procedures in 2001, which shortened the timeframe of judicial review 117. 
In the cases where the Court was involved important procedural and substantive 
issues were raised and dealt with, such as the protection of the parties' rights of 
defence' , the meaning of control, the application of the 
Merger Regulation to 18 
situations of collective dominance, the nature of commitments, and the conglomerate 
t effects t9. 
1 15 Also Article 16 of ECMR refers to the review by the Court of penalties imposed by the Commission. Articles of 
the EC Treaty concerning judicial review of Community acts and Community institutions for failure to act, such as 
Article 230 also apply. 
116 Actions for damages are based on Article 215 of the EC Treaty. Two such cases for which judgments are 
pending are those of My Travel v. Commission (Case T-21/03) and Schneider v. Commission (Case T-35/03) which 
were launched against the Commission following the annulment by the CFI of the Commission's prohibitions of 
Airtours (MyTravel)/First Choice (Case IV/M. 1524 OJ [2000] L93/1, [2000] 5 CMLR 494) and 
Schneider/Lengrand (case COMP/M. 2283) mergers. 
"70J [2000] L 322/4. These "fast track" (expedite) procedures allow for a judgment by the Court within 12 
months. This new type of expedite procedures was designed to deal with cases of an urgent nature, mergers 
amongst them. For more details see Kyriakos Fountoukakos "Judicial Review and Merger Control: The CFI's 
Expedite Procedure" Commission's Competition Policy Newsletter, 2002,7. 
118 Schneider Electric v. Commission [2002] ECR 11-4071, (2003] 4 CMLR 768. 
119E. g. Joint Cases C-68/94 and 30/95 France Republic v. Commission (Kali&Salz) [1998] ECR 1-1375; Case T- 
102/96 Gencor v. Commission [1999] ECR 11-753, [1999] 4 CMLR 971. 
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In most cases, the Court's involvement helped to clarify certain issues for which 
the Merger Regulation did not provide clear answers, but in its latest batch of 
important decisions (Airtours v. Commission120, Schneider Electric v. Commission 121 9 
Tetra Laval v. Commission122 and Babyliss SA v. Commission'23) the Court seemed 
also to target the Commission's discretion in the assessment of economic evidence. In 
particular, in these cases the Court annulled the Commission's decisions to prohibit or 
authorise the mergers on grounds, amongst others, of significant assessment errors 
about economic evidence 124. 
The Court interventions in the above cases fuelled the debate about the role of 
judicial review in merger enforcement in the EU. 
According to one view, the Court intends to limit or at least control the 
Commission's powers concerning substantive merger control 125. Another view 
suggests that if the Court reopens economic assessments in future cases the 
Commission's ability to exercise the powers given to it by the Merger Regulation will 
be significantly compromised 126. Similarly, it has been argued that an increased 
involvement of the Court in merger review will be practically ineffective, since even 
under the "fast track" procedures, a final decision is delivered in several months, 
which -added to a waiting time of several months for the adoption of the 
Commission's decision- constitutes an excessively long period for the merging 
parties 127. However, an opposite view contends that the involvement of the Court 
needs to be increased because under the current system, the merging parties are not 
sufficiently protected128 . 
It is submitted that the Court's role in EC Merger Control cannot be ignored or 
minimised since the Merger Regulation clearly provides the Court with authority to 
120 Case T-342/99, Airtours Plc v. Commission [2002] ECR 11-2585, [2002] 5 CMLR 317. 
121 Case T-310/01 Schneider Electric v. Commission [2002] ECR 11-4071, [2003] 4 CMLR 768 (annulment of 
prohibition decision); Case T-77/02 Schneider Electric v. Commission [2002] ECR 11-4201 (annulment of 
divestiture decision). 
122 T-5/02 Tetra Laval v. Commission [2002] ECR 11-4381, [2002] 5 CMLR 1182 (annullment of prohibition 
decision); Case T-80/02 Tetra Laval v. Commission [2002] ECR 11-4519, [2002] 4 CMLR 1271 (annulment of 
divestiture decision). 
123 Case T-114/02 Babyliss SA v. Commission [2003] ECR II-1279; [2004] 5 CMLR 1 
124 The three cases are examined in details in other parts of the thesis. 12$ See also Whish op. cit. 67,858. Also All Nikpay and Fred Houwen "Tour de Force or a Little Local Turbulence? 
A Heretical View on the Airtours Judgment" 24 E. C. L. Rev. 2003,193,196. 
126 See Andrew Scott "`Winter Talk by the Fireside? ': Tacit Collusion and the Airtours Case" J. B. L. 2003,298, 
310. 
127 See Kenneth R. Logan, Ethan E. Litwin and Olivier N. Antoine "Two Comments: Is `Fast Track' Judicial 
Review Fast Enough? Are There, Based on the US Experience, Land Mines in the Modernisation Proposal? " in 
International Antitrust Law and Policy, Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 2002,115,120-122. 
128 Brandenburger and Janssens op. cit. 84,181. 
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review all the Commission's decisions under the Regulation. On the other hand, the 
law provides the Commission with authority to decide in its own discretion on all 
issues relating to the application of the Regulation. Thus, it is crucial for the 
effectiveness of EC merger control the Court to exercise its authority without 
undermining the authority of the Commission. 
The increased involvement of the Court in merger enforcement can have both 
positive and negative effects. 
The positive effects include the provision of an independent check of the 
exercise of the Commission's discretion under the ECMR. The Commission reviews 
every year hundreds of cross-border European mergers that have significant impact on 
the European industry and economy. Given the number and importance of the 
examined cases and the wide Commission's discretion in investigations and decision- 
making, it is necessary for the existence of effective judicial review that will check 
how this discretion is exercised. The judicial involvement in merger control until 
recently was relatively rare focusing mostly on clarifying legal issues but the CFI's 
decisions in A irtours, Schneider, Tetra Laval and Babyliss showed that there was need 
also for a full check of the Commission's decisions under the Regulation including the 
economic assessments. Thus, increased Court involvement in EC merger control will 
help protect better firms from errors committed by the Commission in the competitive 
assessment and at the same time will force the Commission to work harder with the 
129 competitive assessments in order to avoid errors that would harm firms. 
Another positive effect from increased Court's involvement would be the 
provision of solution to difficult legal issues which the Commission itself could not 
solve for various reasons. Thus the strict language of the old dominance test of the 
ECMR raised barriers to the application of that test to oligopolies and it was only the 
involvement of the Court that fully settled the issue' 30. Similarly under the new 
substantive test of the ECMR, the Court may again be called to settle legal issues 
concerning the new unilateral effects doctrine. In any case, the increased involvement 
of the Court increases legal certainty in EC merger control. 
129 According to some views the CFI's decisions in Airtours, Schneider and Tetra Laval were the main reason 
behind the Commission's decision not to oppose the Carnival/P&O Princes (Case COMP/M. 2706 decision of July 
24,2002) merger. On the issue see Logan et al op. cit. 127,119. 130The Court's decisions in France Republic v. Commission (Kali&Salz) (Joint Cases C-68/94 and 30/95 [1998] 
ECR 1-1375). Gencor v. Commission (Case T-102/96 [1999] ECR 11-753, [1999] 4 CMLR 971) and Airtours 
above dealt with the application of the market test of ECMR in oligopolies. 
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Regarding economic assessments, which have been the biggest source of 
controversy, the Court's involvement can be positive only if it can correct manifest 
errors in the Commission's assessments otherwise there is increased risk of negative 
effects in the application of merger control. This will be so due to the nature of 
economic assessments, which belong to an area that is beyond legal analysis. While 
legal analysis focuses on the application of law to the facts, economic analysis 
concerns the fact-finding process, which in merger control involves use of economic 
theories and econometrics. The Court, by checking the Commission's fact-finding 
process, acts as an economic expert and finally comes up with a second decision 
potentially different from that of the Commission concerning the competitive effects 
of the merger. Such an approach though does not safeguard more reliable merger 
control because it is questionable whether the Court has sufficient economic expertise 
or the resources to provide more reliable competitive assessments given the 
Commission's extensive involvement in merger analysis and its highly specialised 
staff, which includes prominent and experienced economists131. In addition to the 
above, the nature of the competitive assessment, as a difficult analysis of complex 
market conditions, raises additional barriers to the Court's ability to act as an 
economic expert overshadowing the Commission. Thus, the final result of the 
frequent Court's interference with economic assessments would be the issue of two 
different decisions on the competitive effects of the same merger, a situation that 
could result in confusion and legal uncertainty. Also in that way, the Commission's 
authority, under which the large majority of mergers under the ECMR are dealt with 
as opposed to the very limited number that is reviewed also by the Court following an 
appeal by the parties, would be undermined, thus shaking the credibility of the entire 
EC merger control system. 
For these reasons, it is submitted that while the Court cannot be barred from 
exercising its authority in merger cases whenever it deems it necessary, it should 
nevertheless refrain from interfering with economic assessments when there are no 
manifest errors in the Commission's assessments. Of course what constitutes a 
manifest error justifying the Court's involvement this is an issue of interpretation but 
the general idea should be that this involvement should not take such a form as to 
131 For a good analysis of the role of European Court as an economic expert and the consequences for EC merger 
control see David J. Gerber "Courts as Economic Experts in European Merger Law" in International Antitrust Law 
and Policy, Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 2003,475. 
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challenge the Commission's authority under the ECMR. However it seems that the 
Court itself is aware of the risk its decisions to be mistakenly considered as substitute 
to those of the Commission, thus undermining the latter's authority and therefore in 
certain more recent decisions have sought to address these concerns. In particular, in 
Petrolessence v. Commission132 the CFI stated: "... review by the Community Courts 
of complex economic assessments made by the Commission in exercising the 
discretion conferred on it by Regulation No 4064/89 must be limited to ensuring 
compliance with the rules of procedure and the statement of reasons, as well as the 
substantive accuracy of the facts, the absence of manifest errors of assessment and of 
any misuse of power. In particular, it is not for the Court of First Instance to substitute 
its own economic assessment for that of the Commission". 
However, the Commission from its side should also take all measures to ensure 
that its economic assessments are well founded and that there are no obvious reasons 
forcing the Court to interfere. Also, the Commission should take all measures to 
ensure that the parties' rights of defence are observed during the proceedings in 
compliance with the Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which provides for a fair trial and public 
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal. Although 
the Commission is not a "tribunal" within the meaning of Article 6 since its decisions 
are subject to a full and independent review by the Community Courts 133, it is 
nevertheless obliged to respect article 6 in the exercise of its powers. The Commission 
should pay particular attention to this issue because in certain of its recent decisions 
that were annulled by the CFI134, the Court's criticism concerned exactly violation of 
the parties' rights of defence. 
Another issue related to the Court concerns whether the adoption of the US 
system instead of that currently existing in the EU would be more appropriate to 
safeguard more transparent and reliable merger control. Under the current EC merger 
control system the Commission acts as both investigator and decision-making body. 
In particular, the Commission carries out market investigations on the mergers 
notified to it under the ECMR and decides whether to approve these mergers or not. 
The Commission decisions are subject to judicial review following appeal by the 
'32Case T-342/00 Petrolessence v. Commission (Judgment of 3/4/2003) [2003] 5 CMLR 9, para. 101 133 This was ruled by the ECJ in Van Landewyck v. Commission (Cases C-209 to 215,218/78 [1980] ECR 3125, 
[1981] 3 CMLR 134. 
34 See e. g. Schneider Electric v. Commission [2002] ECR II-4071, [2003] 4 CMLR 76 
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parties'35. In the judicial review the Court first analyses whether the Commission has 
followed the rules of due process whilst conducting its control and secondly whether 
these facts are sufficient to establish the conditions to declare a proposed merger 
incompatible with the common market136. Conversely in the US the Federal agencies 
(FTC and DOJ) have no power to prohibit the merger on their own but they have to 
seek a Court order137. The Court's involvement has been considered in US as a factor 
reinforcing transparency and legal certainty in merger control since the Court hearings 
are open to public while the Court's involvement constitutes an independent check to 
the acts of competition agencies 138. 
However, in reality the US system is not in effect different from the EU one 
because the Court's involvement is rare and thus, the merger policy in the US is 
almost exclusively in the hands of competition agencies, as is the case with the 
Commission in Europe. In particular, all mergers raising no competition concerns, 
that is, the vast majority of mergers notified to the agencies, can proceed immediately. 
If the agencies believe that a merger is anticompetitive and threaten to take legal 
action against the parties to block it, the parties either negotiate a settlement of the 
case (through what is called a "consent decree") "fixing" the competitive problem or 
abandon the transaction 139. Only if the negotiations for settlement fail and the parties 
do not abandon the merger will the agencies take the case to the Court seeking to 
obtain a preliminary injunction. In the stage of injunction, the judge decides in 
summary proceedings, which do not in involve an in depth assessment of the case, 
whether or not the merger can be completed'40. That injunction decision is usually 
accepted by both sides as the final say on the case 141. Thus, in the US almost no case 
gets to the stage of full litigation and the Supreme Court has not decided a merger 
case on the merits since 1974. 
From the above references it becomes clear that in the US, like in the EU, the 
competition agencies play a central and determinative role in merger policy and the 
135 Article 21(2) ECMR 
'36Herwig C. H. Hofmann "Good Governance in European Merger Control: Due Process and Checks and Balances 
under Review" 24 E. C. L. Rev. 2003,114,120. 
137 See also in chapter 5. 
138 See Thomas E. Kauper "Merger Control in the United States and the European Union: Some Observations", 74 
St John's L. Rev. 2000,305,314. 
139 Ibid. 
140 See Emil Paulis "Checks and Balances in the EU Antitrust Enforcement System' in International Antitrust Law 
and Policy, Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 2002,381,393. 
141 Ibid. 
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Court's involvement is not so important 142. Therefore it is submitted that there is no 
actual reason to adopt in the EU the US system, since there are no big differences. 
Instead, the focus should be on the improvement of the transparency of the 
Commission's policies and practices and on safeguarding that the parties are given 
timely access to judicial review. 
The issue recently of the Commission guidelines on the assessment of horizontal 
mergers constitutes a positive step towards improving transparency of the 
Commission practices under the ECMR. These guidelines along with existing 
Commission Notices on the relevant market definition and the Notice on the remedies 
constitute crucial steps and the guidelines on the assessment of vertical and 
conglomerate mergers, which will be issued in the near future, constitute serious 
improvements in the area of transparency in EC merger control'43. In the US such 
guidelines explaining the agencies decision-making practice in the assessment of 
merger exist for a long time and the Commission's move to issue such guidelines also 
in the EU eliminates an existing gap in legislation in the two jurisdictions. Moreover, 
the reinforcement of the Commission staff with experienced economists and the 
strengthening of the role of the Hearing Officer constitute additional recent steps to 
the direction of the improvement of transparency in EC merger control. Lastly, the 
entry into force, as mentioned above, of fast track procedures in the CFI creates more 
favourable conditions for the more frequent Court's involvement in the merger review 
process. For all these reasons, it is submitted, that the current EU system safeguards a 
satisfactory level of transparency and legal certainty and there is no need for a switch 
to the US system. 
142 The available statistics in the US and EU speak for themselves. In 2001 in the US, the FTC and DOJ announced 
that they were prepared to go to litigation to block an overall 55 mergers. Of these cases the court finally reviewed 
only I case issuing a preliminary injunction. All the other cases were either abandoned or restructured during 
settlement negotiations between the agencies and the parties. Although in accordance with the US legislation, the 
settlement agreement in such cases has to gain the approval of the Court to be valid, in reality such an approval is 
mostly typical. The issue is examined in more detail in chapter 5. 
In the EU in 2001 the Commission reviewed 335 merger cases and cleared 299 outright. In the remainder the 
Commission cleared 28 cases at the end of Phases I and 11 23 of which subject to commitments, while it prohibited 
the remaining 5 transactions, resulting in 3 appeals to the CFI. 
143 These issues will be clarified in the chapters to follow. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Basic stages in merger analysis-The Aluminium industry as a tool of 
study 
3.1 Introduction 
Merger analysis comprises three basic stages: the relevant market definition, the 
assessment of the competitive effects, and the remedies. 
Relevant market definition has a product and geographic dimension and seeks to 
determine the markets which will be significantly affected by the merger. Then, the 
Commission carries out an analysis and assessment of the competitive effects of the 
merger in these markets. If the Commission finds that the merger raises competitive 
concerns, it will prohibit it unless the merging parties propose commitments sufficient 
to address the Commission's concerns. In all other cases the mergers will be cleared. 
The Commission's analytical methodologies during each of the three stages are 
presented in this chapter. This general presentation will set the basis for the discussion 
of more complex issues in the chapters to follow. 
This chapter includes also a presentation of aluminium industry and of the 
specific mergers and markets, which will be used by the thesis as tools for studying 
and analysing the practical application of EC merger control. This chapter provides 
answers about the reasons that led to this particular selection and preliminary brief 
references to the competitive issues arising out from the analysis of the specific 
mergers and markets. The analysis of these markets will take place in the chapters to 
follow. 
3.2 Basic stages in merger analysis 
3.2.1. The relevant market definition 
According to the Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers, market 
definition seeks to "identify in a systematic way the immediate competitive 
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constraints facing the merged entity"'. The reference to competitive constraints is 
related to the concept of an "antitrust" market as opposed to an "economic" market. 
The classical notion of an economic market is thought of as the area in which buyers 
and sellers of the good come into contact with each other to transact their business2. 
Such a definition however, is not useful for antitrust purposes where the focus is on 
the firm's ability to exercise market power. 
The exercise of market power is harmful to competition and consumers because, 
amongst others, it leads to less output and higher prices3. The relevant antitrust market 
therefore includes only those products and areas which enable competition authorities 
to conclude whether the merged entity as a result of the merger will be able to 
exercise market power or whether it will be constrained by the behaviour of its 
competitors4. 
A proper market definition is therefore crucial to a valid competitive assessment 
of the merger. The task, though, is not easy since relevant antitrust markets are 
artificial constructions which are sensitive to the methodology used for the definition: 
the application of different methodologies can result in different relevant markets 
even for the same case5. Further, if the relevant markets are defined too narrowly, 
mergers beneficial to consumers may be blocked, while if the relevant markets are 
defined too widely, mergers harmful to consumers may be cleared6. On the other 
hand, market definition is closely related to the applicable market test for the 
competitive assessment [such as dominance, substantial lessening of competition 
(SLC) and substantial impediment to effective competition (SIEC)7] and therefore it is 
Commission Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers [2004] OJ C31/5, at para. 10. 
2 See Fault and Nikpay The EC Law of Competition, Oxford University Press, 1999, at paras. 1.131-1.133. 
3 The Commission Guidelines op. cit. I consider in para. 8 market power as the ability of one or more firms "... to 
profitably increase prices, reduce output, choice or quality of goods and services, diminish innovation, or other 
wise influence parameters of competition". 
See also Fault and Nikpay op. cit. 2. 
The results of the application of different methodologies for defining markets are examined in the analysis of 
beverage can market in chapter 7 of the thesis. It is shown there that depending on the applicable methodology, the 
product market definition can result in different relevant markets even for the same case. 
A very narrow relevant market would produce very high market share and concentration levels, which could be 
used by competition authorities as reasons for blocking the merger. Conversely, a very wide relevant market would 
produce low market share and concentration levels thus reducing the possibility the merger to be blocked. In the 
case of excessively narrow markets, the market power of the firms is overstated, while in the case of excessively 
wide markets the market power is understated (see also Alistair Lindsay, The EC Merger Regulation: Substantive 
Issues, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003, at 2.01). 
7 The "dominance" or the "substantial-lessening-to-competition" (SLC) tests are the legal standards against which 
the mergers are judged. The dominance test is prominent in EC merger control, while the SLC is used in USA, 
Australia and UK. The content of dominance and the SLC tests as well as of the new European SIEC test is 
explained in detail below and in subsequent chapters of the thesis. 
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often designed to facilitate the application of that test8. If one adds to the above the 
fact that there is no widely accepted and completely reliable model for properly 
defining the relevant markets, then the task of the definition becomes often 
controversial. 
The Commission being aware of the difficulties associated with market definition 
published in 1997 a Notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of 
Community law9 providing guidance about its policies and methodologies concerning 
market definition. The Notice reflects the Commission's established practice and the 
case law of the ECJ. 
The Notice refers to the product and geographic dimension of the relevant market 
and defines the former as follows: 
"A relevant product market comprises all those products and/or services in which the undertakings 
concerned are involved in the supply and demand of products or services, in which the conditions of 
competition are sufficiently homogeneous and which can be distinguished from neighbouring areas 10 because the conditions of competition are appreciably different in those areas". 
The geographic market is defined as follows: 
"Geographic market comprises the area in which the undertakings concerned are involved in the supply 
and demand of relevant products or services, in which the conditions of competition are sufficiently 
homogeneous and which can be distinguished from the neighbouring geographic areas because, in 
t 
particular, conditions of competition are appreciably different in those areas" 
1. 
The above definitions are not very precise and do not contain the operational 
mechanism by which the relevant market is to be defined. They only contain general 
legal principles on which the definition of the product and geographic market will be 
based 12. From the Commission's practice it could be inferred that product market 
comprises those products that are substitutable for the consumers with the substitution 
being determined with reference to the characteristics of the product, its use, and its 
price. For geographic market, homogeneity of the competitive conditions is the central 
issue for which a number of criteria, such as the distribution of market shares in 
8 The Commission has sometimes been criticised for allegedly seeking to define narrow relevant markets that will 
produce substantial market shares, which are very important for establishing market dominance (see also 
D. G. Goyder, EC Competition Law, (4th Ed)., 2003, at p. 354. However, such an approach if true is not consistent 
with a merger analysis based solely on market conditions, as required by the Merger Regulation and particularly, 
Article 2 thereof. This criticism will be examined in more details in subsequent thesis's chapters. 
9 [1997] OJ C372/5, [1998] 4 CMLR 177. 
10 Para. 7 of the Notice. This definition is based on the case law developed by the ECJ in the Hoffman-La Roche 
case (Case 85/76 Hoffman-La Roche & Co AG v. Commission [1979] ECR 461; [1979] 3 CMLR 211). 
" Ibid. para. 8. This definition was given by the ECJ in the United Brands case (Case 27/76 United Brands v. 
Commission [1978] ECR 207; [1978] 1 CMLR 429. 
12 See also E. Navarro, A. Font, J. Folguera and J. Briones, Merger Control in the EU, Oxford University Press, 
2002, at 5.11. 
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different areas, the existence of entry barriers, and the price levels in different areas, 
are amongst those taken into account in the definition. 
Further, since the focus is on the competitive constraints, the Notice recognises 
three such constraints: demand substitution, supply substitution, and potential 
competition. 
Demand substitution determines the range of products, which are viewed as 
substitutes by the consumers 13. The Commission's practice is to rely largely on the 
SSNIP test14 for determining the level of demand substitution. This test seeks to trace 
the consumers' response to a hypothetical small but permanent price increase (usually 
of 5%-10%) imposed on the product or area in question's. If consumers switch to 
other products or areas in sufficient numbers to render the price increase unprofitable, 
then additional products and areas will be included in the test. This process will 
continue until a set of products or areas is found where the hypothetical price increase 
is profitable. This set will constitute the relevant product or geographic market 
16 
Demand substitution is in the centre of market definition in merger cases. 
Supply substitution refers to the possibility of an undertaking, which does not 
currently sell the product or in the area in question, to start selling in the short term 
that product or in that area, without having to incur significant costs, in case of a 
hypothetical price increase17. Supply substitution is taken into account only when its 
effects are equivalent to those of demand substitution in terms of effectiveness and 
immediacy 18. However, the Commission does not usually take into account supply 
substitution when defining the market, although it will form part of the subsequent 
analysis of potential competition 19. 
Potential competition concerns the possibility of reaction by neighbouring product 
or geographic markets in case of higher prices in the base market. Such a reaction, 
compared with supply substitution, takes more time to occur, while it may be 
associated with significant costs. However, the boundaries between supply 
13 Para. 15 of the Notice on market definition. 
14 Ibid. 
is Ibid. para. 17. 
16 For more information about the SSNIP test see Pietro Crocioni "The Hypothetical Monopolist Test: What it Can 
and Cannot Tell you" 23 E. C. L. Rev., 2002,354. The application of this test is discussed also in other chapters of 
the thesis. 
17 See paras. 20-23 of the Notice. 
1s Para 20 ibid. 
19 Ibid. Para 23. Supply-substitutability is not taken into account in the market definition when it is associated with 
switching costs and long lead time. In such cases supply-substitution is examined at a later stage in the competitive 
assessment. 
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substitution and potential competition are not always clear, while the Commission's 
Notice states that potential competition will not be taken into account in market 
definition but will be examined in the analysis of the competitive effects of the merger 
along with entry 20. 
The evidence that the Commission uses to assess the extent to which substitution 
will take place is both quantitative and qualitative and its use depends on issues of 
availability and the features and conditions of the specific markets21. However, the 
Notice does not refer to the level of substitutability which would be required to meet 
the standard. From the Commission's practice it can be inferred that complete 
substitutability is not required. Unless the products are totally homogeneous there will 
be no perfect substitutes22. Further, due to the increasing importance of SSNIP test in 
market definition it seems that all the types of evidence mentioned in the Notice are 
often used only to help tracing consumer reaction to a hypothetical price increase23. 
Lastly, given that merger analysis examines the competitive effects likely to arise in 
the future, the Commission is required to emphasise criteria such as time horizon and, 
concerning geographic market definition, to pay particular attention to issues of 
market integration in the territory of EU24. 
The list of evidence about product market includes25 amongst others functional 
interchangeability, uses and characteristics of products, evidence of substitution in the 
recent past, quantitative tests specifically designed for the purpose of defining markets 
(cross-price elasticities, price correlation etc), views of customers and competitors, 
consumer preferences, switching costs, and price discrimination between different 
categories of customers. 
In respect of geographic market, the relevant list includes26 past evidence of 
diversion of orders to other areas, views of customers and competitors, current 
geographic patterns of purchases, trade flows/pattern of shipments, local barriers and 
switching costs. 
20 Para. 24 of the Notice. 
21 Ibid. paras. 36-52. 
u Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EC Competition Law, (2"d Ed. ) Oxford, 2004, at p. 53. 
"Ibid. at p. 43. 
24 See also "Market Definitions in the Media Sector. Comparative Analysis", October 2003, published on the 
website of the DG Competition of the European Commission, at 1.53. 25 See in paras. 36-43 of the Notice on market definition. 
21 Ibid. paras. 44-52. 
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The Commission's practice when defining product markets27 is to start, on the 
basis of preliminary information, with the establishment of a broad market or a 
number of markets within which the competitive constraints of the merging firms will 
be assessed. Then, the Commission, after carrying out a more in-depth investigation 
and analysis, will be able to determine between few alternative product markets the 
one, which will be the relevant product market. 
Similarly, concerning geographic market definition, the Commission will start 28 
with a preliminary definition on the basis of broad indications about the distribution of 
market shares of the parties and their competitors as well as preliminary analysis of 
pricing and price differences at national and EU or EEA level. Then, using available 
evidence, the Commission will proceed with a more detailed analysis, which will help 
it to conclude on the specific market, which will become the relevant geographic 
market. 
The task of defining markets is crucial for the final outcome of the competitive 
assessment, but, nevertheless, its role should not be overestimated, since competition 
authorities have the means of correcting errors made in the market definition. For 
instance, if the market has been defined too narrowly, thus excluding neighbouring 
products or areas exercising significant constraining influence, the Commission has 
the opportunity to take these products and areas into account in the competitive 
assessment through the analysis of entry. The most important thing is therefore for 
competition authorities to ensure that their final decision on the merger takes into 
account all the factors constraining the merging firms29. However, a proper market 
definition constitutes a big step in that direction. 
The role of market definition was well summarised by EU Commissioner for 
competition Monti: 
"... "[M]arket definition is a cornerstone of competition policy, but not the entire building. Market 
definition is a tool for the competitive assessment, not a substitute for it. What is ultimately important 
is to understand the nature of the competitive situation facing the firms involved.. . in a proposed 
merger. The market definition is the first -and very important- step in the analysis"30. 
3.2.2 The competitive assessment 
27 Ibid. paras. 25-27. 
29 Ibid. paras. 28-32. 
29 On the issue see also Faull and Nikpay op. cit. 2, at 1.144-1.145. 
30 Mario Monti "Market Definition as a Cornerstone of EU Competition Policy", Speech in Workshop on Market 
Definition, Helsinki, October 5,2001 
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The competitive assessment of the merger follows market definition. The 
Commission compares the competitive conditions expected to result from the notified 
merger with the conditions that would have prevailed without the merger to find 
whether the merger is compatible with the common market31. The legal test of 
compatibility is in Article 2(2) of the Merger Regulation, which states: 
"A concentration which would significantly impede effective competition in the common market or in 
a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation of strengthening of a dominant position, 
shall be declared incompatible with the common market". 
This test replaced in the latest reforms the dominance test that existed under 
C. R. 4064/89. Under the old test a concentration would be declared incompatible with 
the common market if it would create a dominant position as a result of which 
effective competition would be significantly impeded in the common market or in a 
substantial part of it. 
The new test constitutes a shift from market dominance to significant impediment 
to effective competition ("SIEL"), a concept which however still includes market 
dominance as the main source of competitive harm. The apparent difference is that it 
is not the unique source as before. The dominance test has been applied to cases of a 
dominant position held by a single firm or by more firms (collective dominance) 
through express or tacit collusion32. The new test applies to all the above cases and 
also to situations of non-collusive oligopolies apparently not covered by the 
dominance test33. 
The legal concept of a dominant position has been developed in the case law of 
the ECJ in accordance with Article 82 of the Treaty. According to the Court 34: 
"[A] dominant position... relates to a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which 
enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by giving it the 
power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of 
its consumers". 
According to the above definition, for meeting the legal standard of dominance, it 
has to be proved that an undertaking has an appreciable influence on the conditions 
31 See para. 9 of the Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers. 
32 See also the Press Release of the European Commission of 20 January 2004, "New Merger Regulation 
Frequently Asked Questions". The issue is discussed in details in other chapters of the thesis. 
33 See also in Recital 25 of C. R. 139/2004. This issue is discussed in details in the chapters to follow. 
30 Case 27/76 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v. Commission [1978] ECR 207, 
[1978] 1 CMLR429. 
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under which competition can develop and is capable of acting largely in disregard of 
that competition35. 
The competitive assessment of mergers requires economic analysis focusing on 
the potential increase in market power as a result of the merger and therefore there is 
also a need to set out the economic parameters of the concept of dominance. 
According to the Commission's practice, single-firm dominance relies largely on 
the dominant-firm economic model, which provides for a firm with large market share 
-normally above 50%- capable of controlling prices, and a number of smaller 
competitors, the competitive fringe, with insignificant market power36. Market shares, 
are not the only factor taken into account in merger analysis, but they are nevertheless 
crucial for establishing single-firm dominance under the Merger Regulation37. 
The concept of collective dominance, as applied by the Commission and 
confirmed by the ECJ, reflects the economic theories of express and tacit collusion 
(the so-called coordinated effects), according to which a merger may harm 
competition by facilitating collusive behaviour between the merging firms and its 
competitors in order to raise prices above the competitive level38. 
Non-collusive oligopoly, the third category of competitive harm imported by the 
new test, concerns situations described in economics as unilateral (or non- 
coordinated) effects. In certain oligopolistic markets mergers involving the 
elimination of important competitive constraints that the merging firms previously 
exerted upon each other, along with a reduction as a result of the merger of the 
competitive pressure on the remaining competitors, may result in higher prices even 
when there is little likelihood of coordination between the members of the oligopoly39. 
The treatment of unilateral effects in EC merger control before the adoption of 
the new SIEC test had been controversial. According to some views, the dominance 
test also covered unilateral effects, while according to others it did not40. The 
Commission had initially supported the former view41 but since the issue had never 
35 See also Faull and Nikpay op. cit. 2,4.140-4.146. 
36 See also ibid. The market of smelter-grade alumina, which is examined in the next chapter of the thesis shows in 
detail how the Commission's doctrine of single-firm dominance operates. 
37 See also the Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers at para. 25. 
38 Important Court cases, which determined the content of the concept of collective dominance include Kali&Salz 
(Cases C-68/94 and 30/95 France v. Commission [1998] ECR 1-1375, [1998] 4 CMLR 829), Gencor v. 
Commission (Case T-102/96 [1999] ECR II-753, [1999] 4 CMLR 971), and Airtours v. Commission (Case T- 
342/99 [2002] ECR 11-2585). The issue is examined in details in other chapters of the thesis. 
39 See also the Commission Guidelines at paras. 25-26. 
40 Detailed discussion on the issue is made in chapter 7 of the thesis. 
41 See Mario Monti "Merger Control in the European Union: A Radical Reform", Speech at the European 
Commission/lBA Conference on EU Merger Control, Brussels, 7 November 2002). 
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been directly considered by the Community Courts and the situation had caused 
confusion and legal uncertainty42 it decided to replace the dominance test with a new 
test -the SIEC- that would clearly include in its scope unilateral effects43. However, 
the Commission generally considers44 that compared with the old dominance test the 
new test is not broader in scope and that its adoption was only due to the need to 
address the uncertainty about non-collusive oligopolies. In any case, what is 
absolutely clear is that the substantive test of the ECMR now covers all 
anticompetitive scenarios resulting from mergers including non-collusive 
oligopolies45. 
In the competitive assessment, the focus is mostly on horizontal effects even if 
vertical effects or conglomerate effects are not ignored46. 
The criteria for the assessment are described in Article 2(1)(a)-(b), which requires 
the Commission to take into account: 
a. "the need to maintain and develop effective competition within the common market in view of, 
amongst other things, the structure of the markets concerned and the actual or potential competition 
from undertakings located either within or outwith the Community; 
b. the market position of the undertakings concerned and the economic and financial power, the 
alternatives available to suppliers and users, their access to supplies or markets, any legal or other 
barriers to entry, supply and demand trends for the relevant goods and services, the interests of the 
intermediate and ultimate consumers, and the development of technical and economic progress 
provided that it is to the consumer advantage and does not form an obstacle to competition". 
In the application of the assessment criteria, the treatment of efficiencies has 
been controversial. The ECMR does not explicitly refer to efficiencies but the 
reference in Article 2(1)(b) to "the development of technical and economic progress" 
has been widely considered as setting the legal basis for such consideration 
47. 
However, Article 2(1)(b) sets also the condition that the technical and economic 
progress must "be to consumers' advantage and... not form an obstacle to 
competition" 
42 The confusion and uncertainty arose out following the CFI decision in Airtours (op. cit. 38) in which issues of 
collective dominance were examined. The Court's analysis gave the impression that non-collusive oligopolies 
were not covered by the dominance test. This issue is discussed in chapter 7 of the thesis. 
43 See in Recital 25 of C. R. 139/2004. 
44 See e. g. the Commission's Press Release of 20 January 2004, op. cit. 135. 
45 See also ibid. 
46 The large majority of cases examined under the Merger Regulation deal with horizontal effects. This is in 
accordance with the prevalent economic theories of competitive harm, which consider horizontal mergers as the 
main source of such harm. However, vertical or conglomerate effects are not ignored either. The Commission in 
Form CO requires from the notifying parties to provide information also about the vertical effects of their mergers, 
while conglomerate effects are also examined. 
47 See also Navarro et al. op. cit. 11,11.05. 
57 
The Commission in practice, even if it has recognised that the Merger Regulation 
provides for the examination of efficiencies48, has thus far followed a rather cautious 
or even hostile policy on the issue. In particular, the Commission has been hesitant in 
accepting efficiency claims as a rebuttal against a finding of dominance, while in 
certain cases it has added efficiencies to the factors contributing to market dominance, 
thus fuelling arguments for the existence of an "efficiency offence" doctrine in 
European merger control49. 
The cautious Commission's treatment of efficiencies under the dominance test 
could be justified in the light of the dominance doctrine and the economic theory. 
According to the latter, the stronger the anticompetitive effects of the merger, the less 
likely are the efficiencies to outweigh these effectsSO. The dominance test, by 
requiring high market shares levels, requires also strong anticompetitive effects 
otherwise the merger will be cleared. Thus, if such effects are established, proof of 
overwhelming efficiencies will be required to outweigh them, something which does 
not facilitate raising a successful efficiency defence. 
In any case, even if the Commission, applying the dominance test, has not 
explicitly cleared a merger on grounds of efficiencies, there is nevertheless certain 
evidence, that efficiencies have played a role in its competitive assessmentsst. 
However, the new substantive test of ECMR requires a more systematic approach 
to efficiencies, because the standard for establishing anticompetitive effects is now 
lower, which means that efficiencies become more important. In particular, the 
doctrine of non-collusive oligopolies does not require dominant market shares for 
establishing anticompetitive effects and thus the existence of moderate efficiencies 
could in appropriate circumstances outweigh these effects thus justifying the 
48 According to Commissioner Monti, op. cit. 41 "Article 2(l)(b) of the Merger Regulation provides a clear legal 
basis" for taking efficiencies into account. 
49 See Atilano Padilla 'The 'Efficiency Offence Doctrine" in European Merger Control", Antitrust Insights, NERA 
Economic Consulting, July/August 2002. Commissioner Monti has denied that such doctrine exists (see Mario 
Monti op. cit. 41 ("there is no such a thing as a so-called 'efficiency offence' in EU merger control law and 
practice". 
° According to the Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers para. 84, it is highly unlikely that a merger 
leading to a market position approaching that of a monopoly can be declared compatible with the common market 
on the grounds that efficiency claims would be sufficient to counteract its potential anticompetitive effects. 
SI Cases where efficiencies have been considered include amongst others Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland (Case 
IV/M. 53 (1991) [1991] OJ L334/42; [1992] CMLR 778); Nordic Satellite Distribution (Case IV/M. 490 (1995); 
[1996] OJ L53/20; [1995] 5 CMLR 258); Mannesman/Valourec/Ilva (Case IV/M. 315 [1994] OJ L102/15 [1994]; 
4 CMLR 529 (see also Miguel de la Mario "For the Customers' Sake: The Competitive Effects of Efficiencies in 
European Merger Control", European Commission, Enterprise Directorate-General, Enterprise Papers No 11, 
2002,28-29; Peter Camesasca "The Explicit Efficiency Defence in Merger Control: Does it Make the Difference" 
20 E. C. L. Rev., 1999,14. 
According to Richard Whish, the Commission, in the presence of significant efficiencies, may have refrained 
from establishing a dominant position (see Richard Whish Competition Law, (4'h Ed. ), Butterworths, 2003,779). 
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clearance of the merger. The Merger Regulation, therefore, along with a new market 
test now contains specific reference to efficiencies. In particular, Recital 29 explicitly 
states that efficiencies will be taken into account in the analysis and that, if they are 
sufficient to counteract the effects on competition and particularly the potential harm 
to consumers, the merger will be cleared as compatible with the common market. 
However, the Commission did not alter Article 2(1)(b), which means that efficiencies 
will still be covered under the term "technical and economic progress". 
Guidance on the criteria and methodologies used by the Commission in the 
analysis of the competitive effects of mergers and efficiencies is provided in the latest 
Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers S2. The document, whose 
provisions will be analysed in detail in the chapters to follow, is particularly useful for 
clarifying issues of the Commission's practice and helps to legal certainty. However, 
the competitive assessment of mergers by focusing on the analysis of complex market 
conditions remains a difficult task whose results depend on the specific facts of each 
case and therefore the utility of the Guidelines should not be overestimated. 
3.2.3 Remedies 
The competitive assessment culminates with either approval or prohibition of the 
merger. However, the decision approving the merger is often subject to conditions. 
These are cases where the Commission found that the merger raised competitive 
concerns but decided to clear it after the merging parties submitted satisfactory 
commitments aiming at restoring competition. 
The Commission's policy concerning commitments was clarified in the Notice 
on Remedies published on December of 200053. The Notice reflects the Commission's 
evolving experience with the assessment, acceptance and implementation of remedies 
under the Merger Regulation, while it was also significantly influenced by a study on 
the divestiture process published in 1999 by the US Federal Trade Commission 
("FTC")54. The latter study included an evaluation of the success of divestitures 
ordered by the FTC from 1990 through 1994. This ex post evaluation of divestitures 
52 See paras. 76-88 of the Guidelines. 
53 Notice on Remedies acceptable under Council regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 and under Commission Regulation 
(EC) No 447/98, [2001] OJ C68/3 ("Notice on Remedies"). Following the adoption of a new substantive test in 
ECMR a new Notice on Remedies should be expected in the near future/ sa The text of the study is available on the website of FTC, www. ftc. gov 
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revealed problems and inadequacies, which helped in improving the methods and 
policies of competition agencies about remedies. 
The Commission's practice in analysing the proposed remedies could be 
summarised as follows5 
a. The Commission first examines whether these remedies eliminate clearly and on a 
permanent basis the competitive problem identified by it in its analysis of the 
merger56. In this context the Commission normally examines every aspect of the 
merger including the structure and the special characteristics of the relevant markets57; 
b. The Commission then looks to whether these remedies can be implemented 
effectively and within a short period58; and 
c. The Commission prefers remedies not requiring monitoring once they have been 
implemented59. 
In respect of remedies types, the Commission shows strong preference towards 
structural remedies, which are considered as more appropriate to restore 
competition60. Structural remedies refer to the sale of assets and are more appropriate 
to restore competition because they can immediately alter the market structure by 
eliminating horizontal overlaps, while they do not require the adoption of monitoring 
measures 61. 
Conversely, behavioural remedies, such as the promise not to abuse a dominant 
position created as a result of the merger, will generally not be accepted by the 
Commission62. 
In any case, the ultimate issue in the examination of remedies is whether they are 
capable of rendering the merger compatible with the common market, and in this 
context all available solutions will be thoroughly examined63. If the available 
55 See also Lindsay op. cit. 6,9.03. 
56 According to para. 6 of the Notice on remedies the parties must show clearly that the remedy restores conditions 
of effective competition in the common market on a permanent basis. 
57 See also Goyder, op. cit. 8,. 383. 
58 Para. 10 of the Notice. 
59 Ibid. 
60 This preference is in accordance with the CFI decision in Gencor v. Commission (Case T-102/96 [1999] ECR II- 
753, para. 316) where a principle was established that the basic aim of commitments is to ensure competitive 
market structures. See also para. 9 of the Notice. 
61 See also para. 9 of the Notice. 
62 See also ibid. A relatively rare case where the Commission accepted commitments of behavioural nature was 
that of SEB/Moulinex (Case IV/M. 2621, Decision of 8/1/2002) where the Commission considered that the trade 
mark licensing was sufficient to restore competition and did not order any structural remedies. The CFI, which 
examined the case following an appeal by an interested third party, upheld the Commission's decision stressing 
that it is not so important the remedy type as it is to ensure that the selected remedy fully eliminates the 
competitive concerns, (Case T-114/02 Babyliss SA v. Commission [2003] ECR 11-1279; [2004] 5 CMLR 1, 
ýara. 170). 
Ibid. See also Jones and Sufrin op. cit. 22,982. 
60 
remedies are not sufficient to eliminate the identified competition problems and thus 
to render the merger compatible with the common market, then the merger will be 
prohibited". 
However, the Commission cannot impose remedies but decides on the basis of the 
proposals submitted by the parties. It is the responsibility of the parties to show that 
the proposed remedies are sufficient to fully eliminate the competitive problem65. 
3.3. Aluminium industry as a tool of study and analysis of competitive issues- 
mergers and markets to be examined in the thesis 
The aluminium industry is huge and strategically important. Aluminium products 
can be found almost everywhere: from the construction of space vehicles and cars to 
the production of beverage cans and food containers. This shows the significance of 
the industry for the global economy. 
Aluminium metal results from a complex and costly process. Alumina, the 
critical raw material, is produced from bauxite ore. Bauxite occurs naturally in the 
earth and is extracted from open-cast mines. The refining of alumina takes place in 
refineries located close to bauxite mines. Then, alumina is shipped to aluminium 
smelters where it is used through an energy-intensive process to form the aluminium 
metal. The aluminium produced is primary aluminium, which is then subject to 
further fabrication and turns into various semi-finished and finished products such as 
sheets, plates, foils and cables66. 
Primary aluminium constitutes the basic product of the industry and its prices at 
the global level are largely determined in the transactions of the London Metal 
Exchange (LME). 
The aluminium industry comprises numerous markets some of which are 
concentrated, while some others not. This thesis has selected three past merger 
decisions of the European Commission involving firms acting in the aluminium 
markets to use them as tools for studying the effectiveness of EC merger control. 
These mergers are Alcoa/Reynolds67, Rexam/American National Can ("ANC")68, and 
64 Para. 31 of the Notice. 
65 See para. 6 of the Notice on remedies. 
66 More information about the production process of aluminium and the various product markets can be found on 
the website of International Aluminium Institute, www. world-aluminium. ore 67 Case COMP/M. 1693, OJ L58 [2002] 5 CMLR 475. 
68 Case IV/M. 1939, Decision of 19 July 2000. 
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Schmalbach-Lubeca/Rexam69. However, the analysis does not cover all the markets 
examined by the Commission in these mergers but only those giving rise to the 
specific issues targeted by the thesis. The final list of markets to be analysed includes 
smelter grade alumina ("SGA') (Alcoa/Reynolds), primary aluminium 
(Alcoa/Reynolds), and beverage cans (Rexam/ANC and Schmalbach-Lubeca/Rexam). 
The method and structure of the analysis followed by the thesis for each of these 
markets is different due to the existence of different characteristics in each case. 
The analysis of the SGA market is split in two parts, due to the existence of two 
decisions about this market, one of the European Commission and one of the US 
competition authorities. 
The first part, which is dealt with in chapter 4, deals with the analysis of the 
Commission's decision and includes also the presentation of the results of the market 
research carried out by the thesis. These results are compared with those of the 
Commission and discussion on the competitive issues takes place. The second part, 
which is included in chapter 5, deals with the analysis of the US decision. In this case, 
the comparison is mostly between the US and the European decisions as well as 
between the frameworks of merger control in the two jurisdictions. The results of the 
market research of the thesis are also used to clarify market issues. 
Concerning primary aluminium, that market was not examined either by the 
Commission or the US DOJ in the context of the review of Alcoa/Reynolds merger, 
possibly because the combined market share of the parties in that market was very 
low. However, the thesis's investigation disclosed interesting evidence, which is 
sufficient for discussing vertical aspects of mergers and particularly, raising-rivals'- 
costs strategies. Thus, primary aluminium is included in chapter 6 of the thesis, while 
the analysis and discussion is based on market evidence collected by the thesis and 
with references to both the European and the US approaches concerning vertical 
aspects of mergers. 
In respect of the beverage can market, the analysis is based on the Commission's 
decisions in Rexam/ANC and Schmalbach-Lubeca/Rexam and takes place in chapter 7. 
The two cases are interrelated since Schmalbach-Lubeca/Rexam refers to the 
acquisition by Schmalbach-Lubeca of Rexam's assets, which the latter was forced by 
the Commission to sell for gaining approval of its merger with ANC. In these two 
69 Case IV/M. 2542, Decision of 28 Sept. 2001. 
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cases the Commission's findings are compared with those of the thesis's market 
investigation and discussion on the competitive issues also takes place. 
A brief presentation of all the selected markets along with reference to the 
specific issues to be examined in each of them follows below: 
3.3.1 The markets of smelter-grade alumina ("SGA') and primary aluminium 
SGA and primary aluminium are interlinked. Primary aluminium is the basic 
product of aluminium industry with SGA being the critical raw material used for its 
production. Similarly, the unique use of SGA is for the production of aluminium. 
The SGA market 
SGA was one of the markets of concern in Alcoa/Reynolds, a merger following 
the acquisition of the US company Reynolds Metals by the also US company Alcoa. 
EU and US competition authorities both examined the deal. 
The European Commission concluded that the merger would give rise to a 
dominant position of Alcoa in the market of "merchant SGA", which excluded SGA 
for captive use by integrated firms. The relevant geographic market according to the 
Commission included only the Western world excluding countries of the former 
Eastern block. 
This thesis in analysing the Commission's decision focuses first on the 
"merchant sales" rule, which is often applied by the Commission in market definitions 
and results in narrow relevant markets. In respect of the geographic market definition 
in this case, the thesis discusses also the relationship between globalisation and 
geographic market definitions in merger control. 
Further the Commission's analysis included dynamic competition considerations, 
such as the strategic use of idle SGA capacity by Alcoa to reinforce its dominant 
position. The thesis uses the opportunity to demonstrate the utility of dynamic merger 
analysis. 
Also, the Commission's analysis by establishing only single-firm dominance in 
this case ignored the risks of collusion, which also existed in the SGA market, as 
clearly recognised by the US decision. The thesis uses the opportunity to discuss 
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potential inadequacies of the European doctrine of collective dominance, when 
dealing with broad oligopolies. 
Lastly, the Commission's decision on the remedies in this case was not, in the 
thesis's view, completely satisfactory. The firm, which was finally selected to acquire 
a crucial refinery of Reynolds, did not seem to meet the requirements of an upfront 
buyer. The thesis uses the opportunity to discuss issues of proper remedy selection 
and application. 
On the other hand, the US decision found both unilateral and coordinated effects 
in Alcoa/Reynolds. The US decision also defined a broader relevant product and 
geographic market. The thesis uses the opportunity to compare the unilateral and 
coordinated effects' doctrines in the EU and the US, as well as the frameworks of 
merger analysis in the two jurisdictions. 
The market for primary aluminium 
In respect of the primary aluminium market, which was not examined by either 
competition authority in the context of Alcoa/Reynolds review, the thesis uses it to 
discuss vertical aspects of mergers, and in particular the raising-rivals'-costs theories. 
The thesis also compares the European and US policies with respect to vertical 
aspects of mergers and discusses the utility of safe harbours in merger control. 
3.3.2 The market of beverage cans 
The market of beverage cans is part of the beverage packaging market, which in 
turn is part of consumer packaging. Beverage packaging includes mainly aluminium 
and steel cans, glass and plastic bottles, and paper. All these materials compete 
against each other for market shares. 
Beverage cans constitute the biggest of the downstream aluminium markets and 
along with aluminium foil, which is used widely for food wrapping, constitutes the 
aluminium-packaging sector70. The biggest rival of aluminium cans are steel cans. 
The mergers examined in the thesis are those of Rexam/ANC and Schmalbach- 
Lubeca/Rexam. As explained above, the two cases are interlinked since the latter case 
70 See Paul Solman "European Can Take-up Advances" in FT Survey: Aluminium 2000, Oct. 25,2000. 
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refers to the acquisition of assets sold by Rexam for gaining the approval of the 
Commission for its merger with ANC. 
In Rexam/ANC the Commission's investigation concluded that the merger would 
create a duopoly by the merged entity and its immediate competitor Continental Can 
Europe (Schmalbach-Lubeca) in the beverage can market of North Europe and single 
firm dominant position in the same market of South Europe. 
This decision raised a number of issues: 
First, the relevant product market included aluminium and steel cans and 
excluded plastic (PET) and glass bottles. The thesis uses the opportunity to discuss 
market definition when differentiated products are involved. 
Further, the Commission's decision on the duopoly raises the issue of the outer 
boundaries of collective dominance with respect to tacit collusion. In particular, the 
Commission established duopoly in a market where only three competitors would 
remain post-merger. The thesis discusses whether the third firm could have also been 
included to the collusive oligopoly, thus forming a collective dominance by three 
firms. 
The number of the remaining competitors, only three, in this case helps also 
discussing the potential application of the non-collusive oligopoly test. 
Further, in Schmalbach-Lubeca/Rexam, the Commission approved the sale of 
Rexam's assets to Schmalbach-Lubeca. In Rexam/ANC the Commission had ordered 
these assets to be sold to prevent the creation of the duopoly between Rexam and 
Continental Can Europe, the old name of Schmalbach-Lubeca. The thesis discusses 
whether it is an appropriate remedy to break a duopoly by selling assets from the one 
duopolist to the other. 
Lastly, other issues examined by the thesis in this case include buyer power and 
price discrimination, while the theories of "mavericks" which refer to firms capable of 




The market for smelter-grade alumina (SGA) in the Alcoa/Reynolds 
decision 
4.1 Introduction 
The market of smelter-grade alumina (SGA) was examined in the Commission's 
Alcoa/ReynoldsI decision. The merger was notified to the Commission on 18 
November 1999. By decision dated 20 December 1999, the Commission opened a 
Phase-II investigation, which culminated with a decision clearing the merger subject 
to conditions on May 3,2000. The decision identified competitive concerns in three 
markets, but the thesis focuses on SGA where the Commission found that the merger 
would result in a dominant position by the merged entity. 
The Alcoa/Reynolds merger gave rise to a number of issues relevant to the 
objectives of this thesis. More specifically, the definition of a narrow product market 
("merchant SGA market" excluding captive SGA production) and of a narrow 
geographic market ("western world" excluding countries of Eastern Europe, countries 
of the former Soviet Union and China) illustrate the issue of "narrow" or "broad" 
relevant markets and their impact on competitive assessments in merger control. 
Further, the SGA market apart from issues of single dominance raises also issues of 
coordinated effects. Although the Commission did not refer to such effects, the US 
decision, which analysed the same market in the same merger found such effects. The 
SGA market is, therefore, a good illustration of the limitations of the old dominance 
test of the ECMR and the need for the adoption of a broader test, such as the SIEC, 
which is the new substantive test of the ECMR. It also provides a means for 
comparing the EU and the US substantive merger-control systems and their 
application. 
1 Case COMP/M. 1693, Decision of 3 May 2000. 
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Moreover, the Commission's analysis in SGA involved dynamic competition 
considerations by reference to Alcoa's ability to act strategically against its 
competitors. The US analysis of coordinated effects referred to the possibility that 
Reynolds was pre-merger the market's maverick, a concept also related to dynamic 
analysis of mergers. By presenting the SGA market, therefore, the thesis intends to 
show the advantages of dynamic merger analysis over static analysis, which is based 
on structural features, such as market shares and concentration, and regarding 
oligopolies on checklists. 
Lastly, in respect of remedies, the Commission's divestiture decision and its 
implementation in Alcoa/Reynolds raised certain questions about its effectiveness, 
which allows for general discussion of the Commission's policies concerning 
remedies in the context of EC merger control. 
This chapter contains the analysis of the EU decision. The analysis of the US 
decision is dealt with in the next chapter. 
4.2 The relevant product market 
Smelter-grade alumina (SGA) was the relevant product market2. For coming to 
this conclusion the Commission followed a three-stage analysis. 
First, alumina was defined as a distinct market by reference to previous case law3. 
Second, the Commission examined smelter-grade alumina (SGA) and chemical- 
grade alumina (CGA), the two basic alumina types, and found these products were in 
separate markets by reasons of supply substitutability: the two products derive from 
the same four-stage production process, which results in the production of SGA used 
in the smelting of aluminium metal. CGA is an intermediary product of the SGA 
production process and is used in chemical applications. Switch of CGA production 
towards SGA is difficult because it requires the installation of additional equipment. 
Moreover CGA may cost twice as much as SGA and thus a shift of production 
towards SGA may result in an economic penalty. The Commission's investigation 
brought up no historical evidence that CGA capacity had ever been shifted in 
2 Paras. 9-17 of the decision. 
3 The Commission referred to Cencor/Shell, Decision of 29 August 1994 (OJ C271,29.9.1994 p. 3) and 
Alcoallnespal. Decision of 24 October 1997 (OJ C29,27.1.1998, p. 7). 
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significant quantities to make SGA. Moreover, the two products did not have the 
same end uses. 
Third, the Commission concluded that the relevant product market should include 
only SGA sold to third parties ("merchant" or "surplus" SGA) and exclude SGA used 
internally by integrated firms4. The basic Commission's argument was that internally 
(or "captively") used SGA could not be made available to buyers on the merchant 
market even if SGA prices were to increase significantly. 
Integrated firms would never divert production of SGA away from their own 
captive use because in such a case their smelters would run at less than full capacity, 
which would result in a non-recoupable cost penalty. Aluminium sells at roughly 
eight times the price of SGA and the Commission's investigation found that the cost 
of diversion for integrated firms was always higher than the possible benefits obtained 
from increased SGA sales. The Commission's investigation also found that during 
times of tight SGA supply there were no instances where any integrated manufacturer 
shifted supply away from its captive use in favour of the merchant market. As a result, 
the Commission excluded captively-used SGA from the relevant market. 
The Commission examined also the parties' allegation that regarding merchant 
market, which comprises spot sales as well as medium and long-term contracts, long- 
term SGA contracts (duration of between 5-20 years) should be excluded because 
these arrangements made enormous quantities of alumina unavailable to third parties. 
The Commission, rejecting the allegation, argued that long-term alumina contracts 
did not insulate buyers or sellers from industry price fluctuations because a large 
amount of price flexibility was built into these contracts. It stressed the dependence of 
SGA prices upon aluminium prices in the London Metal Exchange ("LME") and that 
announcements of reductions or restarts in aluminium production affected also the 
SGA prices. The Commission also referred to the fact that around 40% of all medium 
and long-term contracts contained put/call clauses linked to LME and annual price 
renegotiations, which meant that the prices of these contracts were influenced by the 
developments in the merchant market. Thus, the Commission included long-term 
SGA contracts in the relevant product market. 
4 Integrated firms, as will be explained in details below, are firms which use their SGA production in their smelters 
to produce aluminium metal. Thus, these firms do not sell SGA in the open SGA market or sell there only the part 
of their SGA production that exceeds the needs of their smelters. The SGA finally sold in the merchant market in 
such cases is called "surplus" SGA. 
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4.2.1 Captive sales and market definition: some observations 
The treatment of captive sales is the basic issue concerning product market 
definition here. 
The issue has practical importance, since the inclusion of captive sales in the 
product market expands that market, while the exclusion makes it narrower and this 
obviously affects the calculation of market shares, a major indicator of market power. 
The treatment of captive sales affects also the decision on the remedies, which in turn 
may also have competitive impact on closely related upstream or downstream 
markets, as will be explained in chapter 6 of the thesis. 
The Commission's traditional approach is to exclude captive sales from the 
relevant market. However, there are indications that this approach may change. 
In more detail, in Mitsui/CVRD/Caemi5 the Commission explained its view for 
the distinction between "captive" sales and "merchant" sales, as follows: 
"[O]nly 'merchant' sales appropriately reflect the actual market power of those suppliers active on the 
merchant market, because `captive' sales correspond to quantities which are not really put on the 
market, which are not available for non-integrated... producers and for which no real competition takes 
place". 
Similar reasoning, namely the lack of availability to buyers in the merchant market, 
was followed, as shown above, for the exclusion of captive SGA from the relevant 
product market in Alcoa/Reynolds. 
The string of similar Commission's decisions includes6 amongst others, 
Mannesmann/Boge? Accor/Wagon Lits8, UnileverFrance/Ortiz Miko 119 and recently 
Shell/DEA'O. 
In the latter case", the Commission not only excluded "captive sales" from the 
relevant market of ethylene, but also went on to the definition of a "net merchant 
market" for ethylene. The latter market did not include "merchant market" purchases 
made by suppliers in the merchant market. Also, in that case the Commission, as with 
SGA, included in a single market spot sales and long-term agreements. 
$ Case IV/M. 2420 Decision of 30/10/2001. 
6 See also Thomas Kauper "The Problem of Market Definition Under EC Competition Law" 20 Fordham Intl 
Law Journal, 1997,1682,1749-1750. 
7OJC215/08,1991. 
8 Commission Decision No. 92/385/EEC, OJ L204/1,1992. 
9 OJ C55/05,1994. 
10 Case COMP/M. 2389, [2001] OJ C202/18 (CEC). 
" See also Simon Baker "The Treatment of Captive Sales in Market Definition: Rules or Reason" 24 E. C. L. Rev. 
2003,161. 
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However, exceptions to the rule on captive sales were found in more recent cases, 
one of which was UCB/Solutia'2. The relevant product market was that of polyester 
resins for powder-coating ("PE PCR") and the Commission found that some PE PCR 
suppliers were vertically integrated downstream and that they were not selling their 
production on the free market. Although the Commission recognised that in such 
circumstances it usually restricts its assessment to the free market, it went on to say 
that in that case, "... the competitive pressure exerted by the vertically integrated 
suppliers downstream should be taken into account for assessing the PE PCR 
markets" and that "... the coating products of these suppliers are in direct competition 
with those of the polyester powder coatings manufacturers who buy on the merchant 
market". 
The Commission further explained: 
"As resins represent half of the production costs of polyester powder coatings, the cost of PE PCR has 
a large impact on the competition in the polyester powder coatings market and therefore on the demand 
for PE PCR. This implies that internal sales of vertically integrated PE PCR suppliers should be 
considered to have a restraining effect on the behaviour of the suppliers selling on the merchant 
market". 
This policy change by the Commission may be attributed to the CFI's decision in 
Schneider Electric v. Commission13. In that case the CFI analysed the market for 
electrical distribution panels where there were in existence vertically integrated 
suppliers and others that were not. The Commission following its standard policy had 
excluded captive sales by vertically integrated suppliers from the relevant market, but 
the Court found that the two categories of suppliers were in fact competing with each 
other either directly or indirectly. Thus, the Commission's definition, by excluding 
captive production, had under-estimated the market power of vertically integrated 
suppliers and had over-estimated the market power of non-vertically integrated ones. 
In the US a more flexible approach is followed on the issue. The 1984 Merger 
Guidelines, which still apply to vertical mergers, reads: "Captive production and 
consumption of the relevant product by vertically integrated firms are part of the 
overall market's supply and demand"14. Under the 1992 Horizontal Merger 
12 Case COMP/M. 3060 (Decision of 31-01-2003). Also in ADM/VDBO (Case COMP/M. 3188, Decision of 
31/07/2003) the treatment of captive sales was not solved at the stage of the market definition but in the calculation 
of market shares. In particular, in the market of bulk refined seed oil, the Commission took both captive and 
merchant markets in the calculation of market shares because all the main players in the market were characterised 
by high level of vertical integration and also because captive and merchant markets were highly dependent at that 
stage of industry development. 
'3Case T-3 10/01 Schneider Electric V. Commission [2002] ECR 11-4071, [2003] 4 CMLR 768. 
14 § 2.23. It is further explained that "[Vertically integrated firms] may respond to an increase in the price of the 
relevant product in either of two ways. They may begin selling the relevant product or, alternatively, they may 
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Guidelines, the issue of the treatment of captive production does not arise at the stage 
of the relevant market definition, but at the stage where firms selling in the relevant 
market are identified". Vertically integrated firms are included... "to the extent that 
such inclusion accurately reflects their competitive significance in the relevant market 
prior to the mergers16. 
The practice followed by US agencies when applying this provision is to examine 
whether and to what extent, captive producers are likely to exert a competitive impact 
on the relevant market, either by selling the relevant product or by increasing 
production of both the relevant product and downstream products17. 
This will not necessarily lead to the inclusion of captive production in all cases. If 
for instance, an integrated producer in the face of a post-merger price increase is 
unable or unlikely to sell the relevant product to independent purchasers in a timely 
fashion, perhaps because of difficulties in establishing a distribution system or 
qualifying products with customers, then captive production will not be included in 
the relevant market 18. 
The US courts, similarly to the agencies, have left the issue open, and make 
decisions taking into account the specific facts. 
In the landmark case United States v Alcoa 19, where the market under 
examination was that of aluminium ingot, the Supreme Court included in the relevant 
market Alcoa's own production, which was not sold as ingot but was further 
fabricated by the firm. The Court explained: 
"The part of its production, which Alcoa itself fabricates, does not of course ever reach the market as 
ingot... However, ... the 
ingot fabricated by Alcoa had a direct effect upon the ingot market. All ingot - 
with trifling exemptions- is used to fabricate intermediate or end products; and therefore all 
intermediate, or end, products which Alcoa fabricates and sell, pro tanto reduce the demand for ingot 
itself.. . We cannot therefore agree that the computation of the percentage of 
Alcoa' s control over the 
ingot market should not include the whole of its ingot production". 
In more recent decisions the US Courts have recognised that "when a customer 
can replace the services of a wholesaler with an internally-created delivery system, 
this "captive output" (e. g. the self-production of all or part of the relevant product) 
continue to consume all of their production but increase their production of both the relevant product and contracts 
in which the relevant product is embodied". See also Thomas E. Kauper op. cit. 6,1749. 
§ 1.31. 
16 See ibid. 
17 The process of identification takes place at the stage where market shares are calculated. See also Kevin Arquit 
"Perspectives on the 1992 US Government Horizontal Merger Guidelines" 61 Antitrust L. J. 1992,121,126. 
18 See also ibid. 
19 United States v Aluminium Co. of America, 148 F. 2d, 416 (2r Cir. 1945); other cases involving captive 
production considerations include Spectrofuge Corp. v Beckman Instruments, Inc. 575 F. 2d. 256 (5'h Cir. 1978); In 
re Intl Tel. & Tel. Corp., 104 F. T. C. 280,410-11 (1984). 
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should be included in the same markets20. Conversely, in FTC v Cardinal Health21, 
amongst others, the Court refused to include direct sales by drug manufacturers in the 
relevant market, which finally included only prescription drugs distributed by drug 
wholesale companies. The Court relied on customers' views. Customers had testified 
that they would not increase their direct purchases from manufacturers or consider 
self-distribution in the event of anti-competitive practices. Other decisions have also 
refused to include captive production in the relevant market22. 
This thesis would argue that effective merger control is necessary and that the 
issue requires careful examination because captive sales offer useful evidence for the 
ability of firms to exercise market power. 
For instance, such sales could under certain circumstances exercise significant 
disciplinary pressure on "merchant sales", because, amongst others, it may be easier 
for firms making only "captive sales" to enter into the "merchant market" than firms 
starting from scratch23. There are also cases where firms may be perfectly willing to 
divert "captive sales" to the "merchant market", if it is more profitable for them to do 
so, and other cases where there is downstream competition between "merchant 
customers" and "captive customers"24. In the latter cases, the price set in the 
downstream market by "captive customers" may limit the extent to which prices could 
profitably be raised to customers in the "merchant market". 
Furthermore, the US Court's view in Alcoa that the sales of the downstream 
product produced by captive suppliers of the raw material finally reduce demand for 
the raw material in the merchant market is also relevant. A consequence of this view 
may be that captive supplies constitute for vertically integrated firms a de facto 
alternative to the merchant market. 
Conversely, there is no doubt that captive sales offer to the vertically-integrated 
firms advantages, which are often very significant and prevent these firms from 
diverting captive production to the merchant market in case of higher prices there. 
More specifically, captive production offers all the advantages of vertical integration, 
such as stable flows of raw materials, protection from the price fluctuations often 
occurring in the merchant market and economies of scale. In other words, captive 
20 See FTC v Cardinal Health, Inc. 12 F. Supp. 2d (D. D. C. 1998). 
21 Ibid.. 
22 See e. g. Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp. 665 F. 2d 10,14 (2"d Cir. 1981) (captive production excluded because 
captive sellers lacked capacity to increase in-house work in the event market produced profit opportunities). 23 See Baker op. cit. 11. 
24 Ibid. 
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production is a source of efficiencies for the vertically integrated firm. The potential 
of diversion of captive production to the merchant market in such cases could result in 
an economic loss if, for instance, the firm was forced due to the diversion to shut 
down part of its downstream production, which would mean loss of sales and extra 
. costs from the shutdowns 
According to one view26, the application of the SSNIP test could be used to solve 
the problem. If the test shows that customers will switch to captive production in case 
of a price increase in the merchant market, then the market is wider. If they do not, the 
market must include only merchant sales. This view points also to the possible 
existence of switching costs27 that may not justify the switch from suppliers of captive 
production. 
An opposite view argues that captive sales must be given equal treatment with 
merchant sales even if the application of the SSNIP test indicates exclusion because 
captive production is part of the market balance and any change in that production 
unrelated to a change in demand, will affect the product prices28. 
It is submitted that there should be no mechanistic approach on the treatment of 
captive sales, but rather a decision based on the specific facts of each case29. If the 
facts show that captive sales affect market balance and prices then they should be 
included in the relevant market, otherwise they should be excluded. However, it 
seems that in most cases captive sales must be included in the relevant market and 
particularly when vertically integrated firms have significant presence as sellers in the 
merchant market, because these firms may try to raise merchant prices to harm buyers 
competing with subsidiaries of integrated firms downstream. One such case, as will be 
explained below, is that of Alcoa. 
4.2.2. The relevant product market of SGA 
25 See also Robert Pitofsky "New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust" 90 Colum. L. Rev. 
1990,1805, at 1851. 
26 See Faull and Nikpay, The EC Law of Competition, Oxford University Press, 1999, para. 1.143. 
27 Switching costs arise when customers who have purchased from one supplier face real or perceived costs when 
switching to a rival's product even if the two fines' products are functionally identical (see Andrea Lofaro and 
Derek Ridyard "Switching Costs and Merger Assessment-Don't Move the Goalposts" 24 E. C. L. Rev. 2003,268). 
28 See Denis "An Insider Look at the New Horizontal Merger Guidelines" 3 Antitrust, 1992,6, at 7 ("Vertically 
integrated firms are as important to the pre- and post-merger competitive interaction as firms selling into the 
merchant market and should be given equal weight in identifying market participants. If any portion of productive 
capacity, captive or not, were withdrawn from production without a change in demand for the relevant product, the 
price of the relevant product would rise") 
9 See also Baker op. cit. 11,164. 
73 
The Commission's decision to consider SGA and CGA as separate markets was 
justified: the lack of demand substitution was very obvious, since the two products 
were used as raw materials in specific industrial applications where no substitutes 
existed, while for the lack of supply substitution the Commission's arguments were 
supported by historical market evidence, which offered credibility. Besides, the 
Commission since the ECJ's decision in Commercial Solvents30 has ruled that raw 
materials may constitute by themselves distinct product markets. 
Regarding the treatment of captive sales and of long-term SGA contracts, some 
comments should be made: 
4.2.2.1 Internally used and merchant alumina: parts of the same market or separate 
markets? 
Some additional information collected by this thesis will help to clarify certain 
issues about captive sales in the SGA market. 
Firms operating in that market are integrated or non-integrated. Integrated firms 
own both alumina refineries, which produce SGA, and aluminium smelters, which use 
SGA as a raw material to produce aluminium. Non-integrated firms operate only 
aluminium smelters and satisfy their SGA needs through purchases from the merchant 
market. 
Concerning integrated firms, not all firms are self-sufficient concerning SGA, but 
certain of them, such as the Alcan and Pechiney have -or at least had in the period 
under examination in Alcoa/Reynolds- SGA deficit, which means that these firms are 
partly dependent on the merchant market for SGA supplies31. Conversely, other 
integrated firms, such as Alcoa, Reynolds and Kaiser demonstrate alumina surplus, 
which is sold to firms with deficit or others with no production, on the merchant 
market32. 
Although there is generally mutual dependency between suppliers and buyers - 
due to the unique usage of SGA in the production of primary aluminium of which 
SGA is an indispensable raw material- in fact buyers are weaker. This is so because it 
30 Cases 6 and 7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano Spa and Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Commission [1974] 
ECR 223, [1974] 1 CMLR 309; See also Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin EC Competition Law: Text, Cases and 
Materials (2nd Ed. ) Oxford University Press, 2004,313. 
31 See also in paragraph 35 of the Commission's decision. 
32 See infra. 
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is more costly to leave smelting (aluminium) capacity idle than refining (SGA) 
capacity33 and also because alumina deteriorates in storage -it soaks up water34- and 
thus smelters cannot use periods of low prices to store SGA for usage in periods of 
tight supply and high prices. Thus smelters are dependent upon suppliers for stable 
flows and "in time" deliveries of SGA. 
In respect of captive production, there is available market evidence indicating 
against the Commission's decision to exclude that production from the relevant 
product market. More specifically, the Commission's basic argument for exclusion 
was, as shown, the lack of availability of captive SGA to buyers even if SGA prices 
were to increase significantly. While the argument was potentially valid, it will be 
nevertheless shown by this thesis that captive SGA determines how much SGA will 
be sold on the merchant market, thus affecting the supply/demand balance and prices 
in the latter market and therefore, as such, captive SGA should have been included in 
the product market. In other words, this thesis argues that the application of SSNIP 
alone in this case was not illustrative of the competitive significance of captive SGA 
production and that other market factors should have also been taken into account. 
The (real) market scenario supporting this view is the following: 
First, companies with surplus SGA production, such as Alcoa, could affect prices 
in the merchant market by undercutting SGA supplies there. The prices of SGA would 
go up and this would raise the costs of independent smelters (the buyers of merchant 
SGA), thus undermining the latter's ability to compete in the downstream market of 
primary aluminium. Independent smelters would face more significant problems if the 
SGA price increases occurred in periods of low aluminium prices when profit margins 
are necessarily low". Regarding suppliers, they would benefit from higher prices 
from the SGA remaining in the markets after the cuts, while due to the fact that the 
most of these firms are vertically integrated they would acquire cost and, thus, 
33 See para. l3 of the Commission's decision. According to a market report by European Aluminium Association 
dated October 2000, smelters in the western world were operating at around 96% of capacity at the end of the last 
decade, while a another report about Indian aluminium sector (www. investsmartindia. com) , dated August 
28, 
2000, referred to 98%. 
34 See also Gillian 0' Connor "Global Crisis will Delay Expected Recovery: Although the Industry is Confident in 
the Short-term that Causes Concern" in FT Survey: Aluminium 2001, Oct. 31,2001. 
35 As we will see below when analysing post-merger competition the cost of alumina hardly represents more than 
25% of total cost of smelters and, therefore, smelters are not extremely sensitive to alumina prices. Nevertheless, 
the impact of a big increase in SGA prices on smelters' operation may be significant if that increase takes place in 
period of low aluminium prices or, better, if the increase is combined with downward pressure on aluminium 
prices due to simultaneous restarting of idle smelting capacity by integrated firms such as Alcoa, which are also 
sellers of alumina in the merchant market. Then independent smelters would face significant financial problems, 
because they would suffer from increased costs of production due to higher SGA prices and lower profits margins 
in the aluminium market. 
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competitive advantage against their non-integrated competitors downstream. 
Moreover, if higher SGA prices were combined with low aluminium prices`', it is 
apparent that certain independent smelters due to the profit squeeze might face the 
potential of leaving the market, which is also beneficial for integrated firms. 
Suppliers in the merchant SGA market would have therefore better results if they 
were capable of influencing supply/demand balance and thus the primary aluminium 
prices and in this respect the captive SGA production, particularly that of Alcoa, 
would play a central role. To understand why a reference to the balance of powers 
between firms in both the SGA and primary aluminium markets is required. 
Table 1 below depicts the situation in the merchant SGA market in the western 
world, which as will be shown below was the relevant geographic market for SGA in 
Alcoa/Reynolds. Source of the information is the American Antitrust Institute 
("AAI")37, a non-profit Washington D. C. -based organisation, which appealed to the 
US competition authorities against the approval of the Alcoa/Reynolds merger. 
Table 1*: Forecast Net production of Western Third-part 
metallurgical alumina for 2001 
Company forecast Net production 
`000 tonnes) 
Market Share 
Alcoa 6,2100 43.0% 
Kaiser 1,800 11.4% 
Reynolds 1,200 7.6%, 
Glencore 1,200 7.6% 
Nalco 1,000 6.3% 
Algroup 775 4.9% 
Jamaican Government 580 3.7% 
Fri guia 560 3.5% 
('VG 260 1.6% 
Ormet 100 0.6% 
Other 1,525 9.7,,,, 
Total 15,800 100.0% 
Alcoa was the largest SGA seller in the merchant market with 43% pre-merger 
and 50.6% post-merger market share. 
Further, table 2 below depicts the situation in the downstream market of primary 
aluminium: 
"' Aluminium is a global commodity whose prices are determined in the transactions of London Metal Exchange 
(LME). The prices, as with other commodities, are very volatile and are strongly dependent upon supply/demand 
balance. Little changes in equilibrium cause relatively big changes in the metal's prices. This will be shown in 
more details in the analysis about that market in next chapter. 
37 The Institute published on February 23,2000, a study titled "Anticompetitive effects of the proposed acquisition 
of Reynolds Metals by Alcoa". 
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Table 2: Aluminium production 1999 ('000 tonnes) 




Alcan 1,661 1,490 
Reynolds 1,118 1,065 
Billiton 886 890 
Pechiney 828 827 
Hydro 745 749 
Comalco 659 654 
Aluminium Bahrain 537 515 
CVG 520 482 
Kaiser 510 413 
VAW 421 421 
Dubai 424 433 
CIS countries*' 3,337 
World total*' 21,822 20,655 
Source: CRU International 'I ones per year 
"1 1998 '2 Source: International Aluminium Institute 
According to table 238, Alcoa was by far the largest aluminium firm in 1999 with 
a total market share reaching 3.8mt or 18.3% of annual primary production and 
4.256mt or 19.5% of annual production capacity following Reynolds's acquisition. 
Alcoa had also 456,000t (4,256,000-3,800,000) of its aluminium capacity idled, while 
Alcan had 171,000t and Kaiser 97,000t. 
Idle ("or excess") primary capacity offers, as will be explained in the competitive 
assessment, significant advantages to the few firms owning it. Most smelters cannot 
afford it since they have to run at full capacity to be cost-efficient39. 
Also tables 1 and 2 show that the major SGA suppliers (with the exception of 
Glencore) had also strong interests in the aluminium market where they were also 
major players. Alcoa was the market leader in both markets and its position would be 
further strengthened after Reynolds's acquisition. 
Alcoa, by combining its strong position in the SGA merchant market and its idle 
aluminium capacity, could apply the abovementioned strategy to increase SGA prices 
and at the same time prevent price increases in the metal market. This could be done 
if Alcoa restarted its idle aluminium capacity and at the same time withdrew from the 
merchant SGA market the SGA amounts required for the new aluminium production. 
Thus, higher aluminium supply would keep aluminium prices stable, while the 
shortage in the SGA merchant market would exert upward pressure on SGA prices. 
38 The figures in tables I and 2 do not coincide in terms of time, but they are nevertheless representative of the 
market situation as no major changes between 1999 and 2001 occurred in the industry. 
39 According to Tsukasa Furukawa, a market analyst, the world operating-rate of aluminium capacity in 1999 and 
2000 was 91.5% and 92.6% respectively (see Tsukasa Furukawa "Aluminium Supply, Demand Seen Rising" 
American Metal Market, Oct 15,1999). In addition, a chart included in a market report of European Aluminium 
Association (update of October 2000) shows that the rate approached or exceeded 95% during 1999 and 2000, 
mostly due to the strong demand at the time. 
77 
In more detail, 800,000t (or 5% of the western market) of SGA, otherwise sold on 
the merchant market, would be required for the restart of 400,000t of Alcoa's idle 
aluminium capacity40. Such a volume would be sufficient to affect significantly both 
SGA and aluminium prices. A similar scenario was confirmed by a real market event 
examined by the Commission in Alcoa/Reynolds concerning an explosion at 
Gramercy refinery of Kaiser, a major SGA seller in the merchant market. The 
explosion, which occurred in 1999, removed from the SGA market for a period of 
almost two years 1,000,000t of SGA or 7% of the western-world production. As a 
result, SGA merchant prices rose by more than 100% within a few months after the 
explosion and this affected also the prices of aluminium, which increased 
significantly41. Compared to Gramercy Alcoa's scenario would most likely have 
smaller impact on SGA prices, since the restart would remove from the market 
800,000t and not 1,000,000t of SGA, but the impact would still be significant. 
Then, the restart of aluminium capacity would increase the metal supply thus 
preventing metal prices from rising at least as much as SGA prices. The Gramercy 
event, partly confirmed also this scenario. On January 2000,7 months after the 
explosion and with SGA being higher by more than 100%, Alcoa announced its 
decision to restart 200,000t of aluminium capacity. Following Alcoa's announcement, 
SGA prices climbed further, while aluminium prices, which had previously also risen, 
fell sharply for a few months, but rose again due to the strong demand for the metal at 
that period caused by the favourable situation of the global economy42. This 
potentially means that under less favourable market conditions for the metal, the 
decline in its prices might have been sharper or last for longer. 
The above analysis shows that captive SGA could be used to affect developments 
in the merchant SGA market. However, captive SGA itself is also dependent upon the 
merchant market. This is quite obvious, since internally used alumina is not utilised in 
a different process than alumina sold to the merchant market. Both "aluminas" are 
raw materials of primary aluminium and are therefore affected by the conditions in 
the aluminium market. If there is increased demand for aluminium, integrated firms 
40 For the production of lt of aluminium approximately 2t of alumina are required. Alcoa could also find these 
800,000t by increasing it SGA production in order not to harm merchant market, but since the focus is on 
anticompetitive effects, such a scenario is not examined here. 
41 See also the Commission's analysis for the event in the Alcoa/Reynolds decision in paras. 24-25. 42 The impact from Alcoa's announcement is examined in more details below and in the chapter of the thesis 
dealing with market of primary aluminium, where reactions by competitors and an assessment of the effectiveness 
and the profitability of the strategy is made. 
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with surplus production, could internalise more SGA to increase production in their 
smelters. If there is decreased metal demand, these firms could reduce production in 
their smelters and release more SGA in the merchant market. Thus, internally used 
alumina does not insulate its producers from the market conditions and prices nor do 
the merchant SGA and aluminium markets insulate their participants from the 
conditions regarding internally-used SGA. 
Another factor supporting the inclusion of captive SGA in the relevant market 
was recognised by the Commission itself 3: in the part of the decision dealing with 
entry and expansion in SGA merchant market the Commission stated that all 
expansion projects underway between the years 1999-2004 were mainly intended to 
cover the internal needs of major integrated producers. The most of these integrated 
firms before starting the expansion projects were facing small or bigger deficits in 
alumina supplies. Therefore, they were buying the extra volumes needed from the 
merchant market. The expansion projects announced by these firms would help them 
to limit or eliminate their dependence on the merchant market. 
From the Commission's analysis it is apparent that captive alumina could serve as 
a de facto substitute for the merchant alumina for a category of buyers. The fact that 
captive SGA would not be readily available to these buyers but only after a relatively 
long period (2-3 years) -due to the requirement for lengthy expansion of their current 
capacity44 and the existence of significant switching costs45- does not change the 
picture about the availability of captive SGA. This is so because SGA sales are 
dominated by medium and long term agreements. In this context, the ability of buyers 
to readily switch to substitute products, which along with the absence of switching 
costs are normally amongst the factors examined for the inclusion of two products in 
the same market, could be applied with relative flexibility by competition 
authorities46. Besides, the Commission's Notice on the relevant market, unlike US 
Merger Guidelines, does not define exactly what is meant by "short-term" in 
43 See para. 35 of the decision. 
4° See also the analysis of SGA entry and expansion below. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Although the relevant market definition does not take into account potential competition, and entry and 
expansion analyses refer exactly to such competition, it is nevertheless useful to include in market definition 
certain SGA expansion projects. This is because apart from the fact that market conditions concerning SGA favour 
long-term agreements, which constitute the main source of competition between firms, certain expansion projects 
had already been announced and others were underway at the time of the analysis of the merger, which means that 
SGA production under these projects were already considered as part of the market equilibrium even if SGA 
would be available to buyers 2 or 3 years later. On the issue see also E. Navarro, A. Font, J. Folguera and J. 
Briones, Merger Control in the EU, Oxford University Press, 2002, at 5.31-5.39. The authors refer by way of 
example to the aircraft industry. 
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switching47. In any case the existence of expansion projects by buyers in the merchant 
market aiming at increasing their SGA captive production could constitute real market 
evidence, usually fundamental for market definition48, indicating that merchant and 
captive SGA are substitutes or at least that captive SGA constrains the ability of 
suppliers in the merchant market to exercise market power. 
For all the abovementioned reasons and taking into account the preceding 
discussion on the treatment of captive sales in market definition this thesis submits 
that captive SGA should have been included in the relevant market in Alcoa/Reynolds, 
because in that way the market definition would have been better reflective of the 
competitive constrains. The Commission's argument for the unavailability of captive 
SGA to buyers in the merchant market, which was the main reason for excluding 
captive SGA from the relevant market, was based on the application of the SSNIP test 
and on the views of customers and competitors. However, both these bases, arguably, 
did not demonstrate the whole market picture. 
In more detail, as discussed above, the role of captive production cannot be fully 
determined by SSNIP test, because even if captive production would not be made 
available to buyers in the merchant market in case of higher prices there, it can 
nevertheless affect supply/demand balance and therefore prices. First, any reduction 
in SGA captive production unrelated to the market demand, will affect SGA prices in 
the merchant market49. Second, as will be explained in detail later into this chapter, 
the application of SSNIP in the SGA markets where prices are very volatile does not 
produce safe conclusions about the reaction of firms to price increases. In such 
markets it is difficult to establish a benchmark price and appropriate price-increase 
range and for the application of the SSNIP. Third, the crucial issue in the thesis's 
view in this case was the fact that vertically integrated firms, such as Alcoa, had a 
strong presence also in the merchant SGA market and strong interests in the 
downstream market of aluminium -a much more important market than SGA- where 
these firms were competing for market shares with the buyers of SGA. Thus, it is 
reasonable to argue that vertically integrated firms would use the merchant SGA 
market to control the behaviour of their non-integrated competitors in the primary 
47 See Navarro et al. ibid., 5.36. 
48 Para. 38 of Notice on the Relevant Market. 
49 A reduction in captive production could occur, for instance, if captive production is high-cost and it is more 
profitable for the firm to buy SGA on the merchant market. Then, the increase of demand in the merchant market 
following the shutdown of the in-house production will raise prices in that market. 
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aluminium market. Fourth, the views of competitors and customers, which argued for 
a distinction between captive and merchant SGA, were not in the thesis's view a 
strong argument of the Commission because, as explained, the analysis of entry and 
expansion about the SGA market showed that captive production was for many firms 
an alternative to the merchant market. 
For these reasons, this thesis argues that the US decision on Alcoa/Reynoldsso, 
which included in the relevant market of SGA both captive sales and the merchant 
market, was more appropriate. 
Nevertheless, even if captive sales in the Commission's decision were to be 
excluded from the relevant market, they should have been taken into account along 
with Alcoa's idle aluminium capacity at the stage of the competitive assessment as 
factors reinforcing Alcoa's ability to establish dominant position in the merchant SGA 
market51. Unfortunately the Commission did not refer to the issue at all. 
4.2.2.2 The treatment of long-term contracts 
The decision to include long-term contracts in the merchant market was not fully 
explained by the Commission. The argument that these contracts did not insulate 
buyers or sellers from industry price fluctuations because a large amount of price 
flexibility was built into these contracts, was vague and did not deal with the issue of 
availability to buyers, which were examined in the case of captive SGA. If availability 
had been taken into account, as the parties argued, the Commission would have had to 
exclude long-term contracts from the relevant market, since the SGA sold under these 
contracts would not be made available to buyers in case of higher SGA prices. 
The Commission, instead, focused on the fact that these contracts were part of the 
overall market balance and therefore they were connected to the developments in the 
market particularly in the area of prices. However, the same argument, as shown 
above, could have been used for the inclusion also of captive SGA in the relevant 
market. For this reason, the best solution, arguably, would have been to treat long- 
term contracts and captive SGA similarly, and under the specific circumstances to 
include both in the relevant product market. 
50 See in the next chapter. 
51 See also, Faull and Nikpay, op. cit. 26,1.143. 
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However, this different treatment and particularly the exclusion of captive SGA 
might have been related to the calculation of the parties' market share: The parties' 
market share in the merchant market was according to the Commission 45%-55%S2. If 
captive SGA had been included in the relevant market, their share would have been 
less than that53, while if long-term contracts had also been excluded, the parties would 
have had a market share of 25%-35%sa. Thus, one could argue that the Commission 
selected the market where the parties would have the highest market share, which 
could facilitate the establishment of a dominant position. The finding of a market 
share very close to or above 50% is generally in itself sufficient for the establishment 
of a dominant positions, while a market share of between 30%-40% is much less 
likely to lead to such a position. 
However, Alcoa/Reynolds is not the only case where the Commission potentially 
used market definition as shorthand for dominance. For instance, in Shell/DEAS6, a 
more recent case, which was discussed above, the Commission, went even further. In 
that case, as shown, the relevant market of concern was that of ethylene and the 
Commission not only excluded captive sales, but also defined the relevant market as 
that of "net merchant market sales", which did not include "merchant market" 
purchases made by suppliers in the merchant market. Long-term ethylene contracts, 
which have many common features with SGA long-term ones, were included in the 
relevant market because "... different treatment of contracts based only on their 
pricing formula would lead to inconsistent and arbitrary results... "57. About the 
relationship between captive sales and long-term ethylene contracts, the Commission 
stated: 
"[I]f... intra-group supplies of ethylene are replaced by long-term supply agreements with third 
parties.. . the 
former captive use is accounted for the merchant market and may generate additional 
market share. However, such additional shares may not necessarily be considered as a full reflection of 
new market power"5g. 
52 See in para. 21 of the Commission's decision. 
53 The analysis of DOJ for the same case, which defined an all-SGA market, refers to a post-merger market share 
of 38%. However, the relevant geographic market used by DOJ was worldwide, in contrast with the Commission's 
definition, which considered a geographic market as including only the western world. 
S4 Para. 16 of the decision. 
ss See paral7 of the Commission's Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers. 
36 Case COMP/M. 2389, [2001] OJ C202/18 (CEC). 
57 Ibid. at para. 26. 
sa Ibid. para. 31. 
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The Commission's market definition in Shell/DEA was criticised as "flawed" and 
the Commission was accused of building a joint dominance case and securing 
undertakings, which would not have been justified otherwise59. 
4.2.3 Conclusions 
This thesis by analysing the Commission's definition in Alcoa/Reynolds has 
sought to discuss some issues related to the Commission's practice concerning market 
definition under the Merger Regulation. In Alcoa/Reynolds the central issue was the 
treatment of captive sales and long-term contracts. Captive sales have been examined 
in many cases under the ECMR and from the Commission's past practice one could 
infer that a "merchant market rule" was established by means that captive sales were 
normally excluded from the relevant market, which finally included only "merchant 
sales". 
The analysis of the Commission's definition in Alcoa/Reynolds shows that the 
merchant market rule is not always indicative of the competitive significance of 
captive sales and therefore it should not be applied blindly. The Commission's 
definition in Alcoa/Reynolds was not blind, since the Commission provided some 
evidence, such as the lack of availability of captive production to buyers, but 
nevertheless, its final decision potentially was not fully reflective of the competitive 
significance of captive sales for the SGA market. 
Another issue in this case concerns the different criteria applied for the exclusion 
of captive sales and the inclusion of long-term contracts. In the former case the lack of 
availability to buyers was the basic reason for the exclusion, while in the latter case 
availability was not taken into account, even if it was relevant, and the Commission 
relied instead on criteria, such as the fact that long-term contracts did not insulate 
buyers or sellers from industry price fluctuations. 
The whole practice of the Commission in this case appears to justify the criticism 
often levelled against the Commission that market definition has not always been used 
for the identification of competitive constraints but, instead, for facilitating the 
application of the market test of the ECMR. This, though, is not a proper treatment of 
market definition and it is not compatible with the scope of EC merger control, whose 
59 See Simon Baker op. cit. 11,163. 
83 
objective is to identify and prohibit on the basis of economic and not technical criteria 
mergers likely to harm competition and consumers. 
However, it is submitted that any inappropriate treatment of market definition 
should not be attributed so much to the Commission but to the inappropriately narrow 
scope of the dominance test of the ECMR before the recent reforms, which was 
forcing the Commission to house under the concept of dominance also cases, which 
should not be covered under that concept by defining narrow markets with high 
market shares 
For these reasons it is submitted that the recent reforms by expanding the scope 
of the substantive test of the Merger Regulation to cases beyond dominance will 
reduce the reliance on narrow market definitions and will help to produce relevant 
markets more reflective of competitive constraints. 
4.3 The relevant Geographic Market 
The Commission considered the SGA market as worldwide but for the purposes 
of its analysis in Alcoa/Reynolds excluded SGA produced in Eastern Europe, CIS60 
countries and China. The main reason was the lack of exports from these countries to 
Western smelters: while trade from the West to these countries existed (Western 
suppliers were exporting 4mt to these countries), there was no trade from the East to 
the West, mostly due to the deficit and lower quality of alumina in eastern countries. 
4.3.1 Analysis of competitive issues: globalisation of competition and relevant 
geographic market definition. 
The nature of SGA as a global market offers a good opportunity to discuss the 
relationship between global competition and geographic market definition. 
In economic literature global industries have been defined as "a series of linked 
domestic industries where structural forces combine to produce a single competitive 
arena which transcends national competitive environmentss61, while a more simplistic 
60The Commonwealth of Independent States that replaced the Soviet Union. 
61 See M. Porter "Changing Patterns of International Competition" 28 California Management Review 1986,9, at 
12. 
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definition refers to "an industry in which a firm's competitive position in one country 
is significantly affected by its position in other countries and vice versas62. 
The globalisation of an industry alters the latter's previous structural and 
competitive equilibrium. Global competition requires, amongst others, global-scale 
efficiencies, high technological intensity, access to raw materials, worldwide learning 
and local responsiveness, while firms must also be capable of timely reacting to the 
constantly changing global economic environment63. Moreover, compared with 
national markets, factors such as cost differences amongst countries, differing 
circumstances in foreign markets, different roles of foreign governments, and 
differences in goals, resources and ability to monitor need to be taken into account by 
firms when developing competitive strategies in global industries64. 
Competition authorities deal mostly with situations of increasing and not 
complete globalisation, which, amongst others, results in the gradual strengthening of 
cross-border competition and is accompanied by lowering of import tariffs and 
increasing trade flows between areas. Thus, national or regional entry barriers are 
being lowered or even completely removed thus widening the scope of geographic 
markets, while pressure from substitutes available by suppliers selling from 
previously distant world areas increases. Also technological advances have reduced 
the significance of physical distance, which constitutes one of the biggest barriers to 
the development of global trade. Regarding supply/demand balance, the effect of 
globalisation depends upon the degree of integration and concentration of buyers 
versus suppliers on a global scale65. 
In this context, merger analysis involving global markets becomes increasingly 
complex and proper market definition more difficult, because local barriers to trade 
are not always visible or at least so important. Although the definition of an "antitrust 
market" is an artificial construct seeking to help in the identification of market power 
held by a firm or group of firms and as such does not necessarily coincide with the 
62 See Mona V. Makhija, Kwangsoo Kim and Sandra D. Williamson "Measuring Globalisation of Industries Using 
a National Industry Approach: Empirical Evidence Across Five Countries and Over Time" Journal of 
International Business Studies, 1997,679, at p. 680. 
63 See Carlos Garcia-Pont "Global Strategic Linkages and Industry Structure" 12 Strategic Management Journal, 
1991,105,107; also Makija et al, ibid. 682-683. 
64 See Michael Porter, Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analysing Industries and Competitors, The Free 
Press, 1980, at 276. 
a5 On the issue see also Leo Sleuwaegen, Isabelle De Voldere and Enrico Pennings "The Implications of 
Globalisation for the Definition of the Relevant Geographic Market in Competition and Competitiveness Analysis" 
European Commission: Enterprise DG, January 2001,13. 
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economic concept of market66, it is nevertheless necessary the antitrust market not to 
depart from the economic conditions because the competitive assessment will be 
based exactly on these conditions67. Thus, the fact that a market concentrating all the 
economic features of a global market has been defined for merger-control purposes as 
regional does not mean that the competitive assessment should focus only on the 
regional competitive features but should also take into account the global 
developments because they affect competition at the regional level. 
The issue has practical importance because in cases involving global markets or 
markets increasingly globalised the calculation of market shares and concentration, 
which follows market definition, will not always be indicative of a firm's ability to 
exercise market power: in global markets competition develops dynamically and 
strategic behaviour is the main feature of the firms and this cannot be fully assessed 
only through structural analysis68. Thus, in certain global markets firms with high 
market share may nevertheless not be capable of exercising global market power (e. g. 
innovation markets), while in other global markets an otherwise low market share 
may enable the exercise of market power by a single firm (e. g. through strategic 
control of a commodity). 
In other words, what is argued here is that in global markets merger analysis 
should be less reliant on market shares and concentration and should focus instead on 
dynamic-competition analysis for proving anticompetitive effects. The markets of 
SGA and aluminium are examples of global markets and their analysis by this thesis 
will help to clarify these issues. 
Concerning EC merger control, the Commission's practice has traditionally been 
against defining worldwide markets69, even if geographic markets under the ECMR 
66 According to Scheffman and Spiller an antitrust market is defined as "... the smallest relevant group of producers 
possessing potential market power... ", whereas an economic market is defined as "... based on arbitrage". See 
David Scheffman and Pablo Spiller "Geographic Market Definition Under the US Department of Justice Merger 
Guidelines" 30 Journal of Law & Economics, 1987,123,124. 
The universe considered in antitrust situations should thus not be the economic market but rather the relevant 
product and geographic space in which sellers would jointly be able to exercise significant monopoly power (see 
Sleuwaegen et. al ibid., 24 citing also F. M. Fisher "Horizontal Mergers: Triage and Treatment" I Economic 
Perspectives. 1987,23; C. Davidson and R. Deneckere "Horizontal Mergers and Collusive Behaviour" 
International Journal of Industrial Organisation, 1984,117). 
67 According to Scheffman and Spiller ibid. arbitrage (the economic market) is also a relevant factor in the 
assessment of market power because arbitrage tempers market power. See also Sleuwaegen et al. op. cit. 65,24-25. 
68 Porter op. cit. 64,276, argues that the structural factors and market forces operating in global industries are the 
same as those in more domestic industries. However, he recognises that structural analysis in global industries 
must encompass foreign competitors, a wider pool of potential entrants, a broader scope of possible substitutes, 
and increased possibilities that firms' goals and personalities will differ as well as their perceptions of what is 
strategically important. 
69 The string of the few cases where geographic markets were defined as worldwide includes, amongst others, Case 
IV/M. 292 Ericsson/Hewlett-Packard [1993] 5 CMLR 403 (support systems for telecom networks); Case IV/M. 619 
86 
are generally broader than those under Articles 81 and 8270. This is not a surprise 
taking into account that the focus of the ECMR is on competition in the EU. 
However, as explained above, the globalisation of economies affects also the level 
and quality of competition within the EU and the Commission has to consider this 
when analysing mergers. 
Another issue about geographic market definitions under the ECMR concerns the 
Commission's methodology, which appears less systematic and consistent than the 
methodology applied when defining product markets because quantitative tests such 
as SSNIP, supply and demand substitution, and price tests, are rarely applied71. 
Instead, the Commission relies mostly on two "very simple and crudes72 empirical 
indicators for defining geographic markets: trade flows and comparison of price 
levels. 
4.3.2 The relevant geographic market of SGA 
The Commission's decision to consider the economic market of SGA as 
worldwide appears appropriate. SGA is connected to primary aluminium, a global 
commodity whose global prices are determined in the transactions of the LME. 
Moreover, SGA itself is produced worldwide and particularly in areas with low 
production costs from where SGA is shipped throughout the world. There are 
significant trade flows between geographic areas. Transportation or other local 
barriers to trade are rather insignificant. Firms producing alumina are multinational 
Gencor/Lonrho [1997] OJ L11/30; [1999] 4 CMLR 1076 (metals and minerals); Case IV/M. 532 Cable & 
Wireless/Schlumberger [1995] 4 CMLR 161 (advanced telecoms services for international groups); and Case 
IV/M. 1069 Worldcom/MCIOJ [1999] L116/1, [199915 CMLR 876 (top-level internet connectivity) 
In Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland (Case IV/M. 053 OJ [1991] L33/42; [1992] CMLR M2) the Commission 
considered the market of turbo-prop aircrafts as worldwide excluding China and Eastern Europe on the grounds 
that there was little interpenetration between those areas and the rest of the world. Western-built aircraft were too 
expensive for airline purchasers in China or Eastern Europe, and domestically manufactured aircraft in those two 
regions were not meeting international safety and technical requirements and therefore could not be sold in the rest 
of the world. However, in its Boeing/McDonnell Douglas (Case IV/M. 877 OJ [1997] C336/16) merger some years 
later the Commission defined the market for commercial aircraft as worldwide including China and Eastern 
Europe on the grounds that these countries had contributed significantly to recent market growth (See also C. J. 
Cook and C. S. Kerse, EC Merger Control, Sweet & Maxwell, 2000,147). 
These two mergers could be deemed an example of cases where globalisation led to broader geographic 
markets being defined. 
70 See Sleuwaegen et al. op. cit. 65,22. 
71 See European Commission, DG Enterprise "Me Internal Market and the Relevant Geographic Market" Final 
Report, February 3,2003,47-48. 
72 Ibid. 
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groups with global operations73. These according to economists are between the 
features indicating a global market74. 
However, for the purposes of its Alcoa/Reynolds analysis the Commission 
excluded from the relevant geographic market SGA produced in Eastern Europe, CIS 
countries and China. The reason as shown was that there were no imports to the West 
from these countries due to the lack of sufficient surplus SGA capacity and the lower 
quality of SGA produced there. However, this thesis argues that the East had to be 
included in the geographic market because it was affecting market balance in the 
West. 
In more detail, it is the Commission's established policy to consider a two-way 
pattern of trade between two regions as more important for including those regions in 
the same geographic market than one-way trade patterns75. In the latter case, 
particularly in the absence of significant imports, the Commission normally 
establishes separate geographic markets76. The Commission also seems to consider 
that an import level of less than 5-10% of the consumption in a given area indicates 
that that area constitutes a relevant geographic market or at least that the geographic 
market is not wider77. However, the 5-10% threshold is not strictly applied78. 
On the other hand, it has been reasonably argued that the absence of imports in 
itself should not be received as conclusive evidence for defining geographic 
boundaries. This is because, amongst others, the absence of imports in the past does 
not always prove also for the future (barriers to imports may be removed in the 
future)79. Moreover, it has been agued80 that in the presence of significant exports, the 
" All these features of the SGA market will become clear in the analysis of that market below. 
74 See Allen Morrison and Kendall Roth "A Taxonomy of Business-Level Strategies in Global Industries" 13 
Strategic Management Journal, 1992,399,400; also Porter, op. cit. 64,275-298. 
73 See Cook and Kerse op. cit. 69,141. 
76 See amongst others Case IV/M. 190 Nestle/Perrier, [1992] OJ L356/1; IV/M. 308 Kali & Salz/MDK/Treuhand 
[[1994] OJ L186/38; IV/M. 582 Orkla/Volvo [1996] OJ L66/17. 
7 See Navarro et al., op. cit. 46,5.168. 
78 This is because the 5-10% threshold does not take into account exports. Thus, when geographic market 
definition is crucial for the result of the case the Commission completes its analysis with other factors (see Navarro 
et al op. cit. 46, at 5.168; also Cook & Kerse op. cit. 69,140). 
79 See Navarro et al op. cit. 46, at 5.169; according to former European Director-General for competition Alexander 
Schaub "[l]ack of imports can be just an indicator of competitive prices in the domestic market" (See Alexander 
Schaub "European Competition Policy in a Changing Economic Environment" in International Antitrust Law and 
Policy, Fordham Corporate Law Institute, Juris Publishing, 1996,71,84). 
80 See William Landes and Richard Posner "Market Power in Antitrust Cases" 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1981,937,968; also 
Navarro et al op. cit. 46,5.173. Posner and Landes in their influential article also argue that if a distant seller has 
some sales in a local market, all its sales, wherever made should be considered a part of that local market for 
purposes of computing the market share of a local seller. This is because the distant seller has proved its ability to 
sell in the market and could increase its sales there, should the local price rise, simply by diverting sales from other 
markets. For a critic on those views see Timothy Brennan "Mistaken Elasticities and Misleading Rules" 95 
Harv. L. Rev. 1982,1849. 
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geographic market should be expanded to include those areas where these exports are 
directed, along with the production of those firms that are located in those areas. The 
idea is that an increase in the foreign production would reduce the exports of the 
domestic firms, which in turn would induce them to divert supply to their domestic 
market thereby reducing prices in that market. In other words, foreign production 
would constrain the domestic firms' ability to exercise market power. 
The above issues could be better seen in the SGA market where this thesis's 
market investigation revealed the following in addition to the Commission's evidence: 
First, tables 3 and 4 below record the SGA production in the East and the West, 
and the distribution of production in Eastern world respectively: 
Table 3 
The World Alumina hndustry Million Tomes 
World Annual rated ra aeih' of metallurgical alumina, end of 1999 48.904 
Rated Capacity in West 38.490 
Rated Capacity in East 10.414 
World annual estimated production of metallurgical alumina in 1999 45.338 
Production in West 36.927 
Production in Fast 8.410 
(addition appears imperfect due to rounding) 
Source: American Antitrust Institute. 
Table 4. Approximate Annual Rated Capacities o 
Metallurgical Alumina in the East as of December 1998 




Russia 3,000 29% 
Ukraine 1,300 I3°i% 
Kazakhstan 1,100 1 lo'. 
Rumania 600 G%. 
Azerbaijan 400 4'% 
Hungary 200 2% 
Other 100 1'7i, 
Source: American Antitrust Institute. 
According to table 3, Eastern SGA production constituted approximately 19% of 
the world production in 1999, while table 4 indicates that China and CIS countries, 
particularly Russia, were the biggest Eastern SGA producers with the role of Eastern 
European Countries, such as Romania and Hungary being limited. 
China was during the period under examination, a net SGA importer, by 
importing 1-2nit annually8'. In 1999, China imported 1.57mt of SGA out of 4mt 
" In 1998 China imported 1,090,000 tonnes of SGA or 7.5% of third-party sales, while in 1999 the volumes 
climbed to 1,570,000 or 10.5%. (Source: American Metal Market of May 31,2000). 
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Eastern-world imports82. Respecting aluminium production, China normally had a 
deficit though narrow83 meaning that imported SGA volumes were not re-imported to 
the West through aluminium exports from China. China during the period of the late 
90s, which is examined here, experienced steady economic growth, which fuelled the 
demand for aluminium and, as a result, for alumina, while this market trend was 
expected to continue in the future84. Regarding SGA deficit, it was also expected to 
continue to exist because projected capacity expansions in Chinese refineries were not 
sufficient to satisfy the needs of the increased demand85. 
In 1999 when the Gramercy explosion more than doubled spot alumina prices, 
China's imports rose by approximately 45% in comparison with 199886, thus 
contributing to the booming in SGA prices during that period87. 
In addition to the SGA deficit, which was making the sale to Western markets 
difficult, China had imposed a 20% duty88 on SGA imports to protect local producers 
who were not cost-efficient compared with Western ones. The existence of such a 
high import duty constitutes, taking into account the Commission's past practice 89 9 
sufficient reason for excluding China from the relevant geographic market. However, 
taking into account those mentioned above about the role of exports it might have 
been also reasonable to include China in the relevant market because changes in SGA 
demand in that country could affect prices in the West. China was annually importing 
more than lint of SGA from the West, a volume higher than that of Gramercy. This 
meant that the developments concerning demand in the Chinese market could affect 
prices in the West. Moreover, Chinese producers could contribute to the 
supply/demand balance of the Chinese market and through that in the western markets 
by increasing their own production. Thus, the ability of merging parties to exercise 
market power in the western markets could be constrained by the market 
developments in China. In any case, the role of China was proved after Gramercy 
82 Ibid. 
B3 See Bob Regan "China Down, Russia up in Aluminium Exporting", American Metal Market, Sept. 27,1999; 
also Bob Regan "Cheap Foreign alumina May Tempt China", American Metal Market, Feb. 26,2001. 
84 See Martyn Chase "China Viewed as Aluminium Wild Card" American Metal Market, April 15,2002. 
8S See ibid. 
eb See op. cit. 80; from 1,090,000 tonnes in 1998, imports climbed to 1,570,000 an increase by approximately 45%. 
17 See the Commission's decision in para. 15. 
88 Source AAI. 
89 Price differential due to import duties are often used by the Commission as sufficient evidence for establishing 
separate markets. E. g. in Mannesman/Vallurec/Ilva (case IV/M. 315 [1994] OJ L102/15) the Commission 
considered price differences of 35% between Japan and Western Europe as conclusive that the two regions were 
separate markets. It came to the same conclusions in relation to the US where prices were only 5% higher and 
there existed a 10% import duty, which would not be faced out completely until 2005 (see also Cook and Kerse 
op. cit. 69,142). 
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where China was the biggest contributor to the increase in spot prices and through 
them in medium and long-term SGA prices that followed the explosion at Gramercy. 
Regarding CIS countries, the situation was different: these countries, mostly 
Russia, were not exporting SGA to the West but they were exporting significant 
quantities of CIS-made aluminium, which however contained SGA`ý0 . 
Table 5 below depicts the situation in primary aluminium production and exports 
for CIS countries for the years 1996-98: 
Table 5: CIS aluminium statistics ('000 tonnes) 
I'rimarN production 1996 1997 1998 
Russia 2,873 2,905 3,005 
Azerbaijan 5 10 0 
Tajikistan 198 189 196 
Ukraine 97 101 107 
CIS total 3,173 3,205 3,307 
Exports 2,676 2,762 2,850 
Consumption 572 443 457 
Source: CRU International Financial Times Surve ys: Aluminium, 1999. 
Table 5 shows that more than 80% of CIS production was exported to the West, 
with Russia being the largest exporter. The country's exports continued to rise in the 
years to follow and reached 3.173mt9' in 2000. The basic reason for such huge 
Russian exports was relating to a tolling process developed from the early 90s, 
according to which western trading companies financed the purchase of alumina 
(from inside or outside Russia) and its delivery to Russian smelters where they paid a 
tolling fee and took back the resulting metal for sale in western markets. Tolling in 
Russia had enjoyed favourable tax treatment because it was essential for the survival 
Russian smelters, while the process was profitable also for western aluminium traders 
due to the low operating costs in Russia92. 
The existence of tolling also partly explains the import of millions of SGA tonnes 
annually in the Eastern world cited by the Commission. According to the latter, in 
1999 the West sold to the East 4mt of SGA. In the same year China's SGA imports 
were 1.57mt, meaning that the bulk of the remaining 2.43mt were exported to the CIS 
countries. Respecting Russia, in 1998 domestic alumina production was able to cover 
`w The CIS countries in the mid-90s had been responsible for the collapse of aluminium prices when following the 
collapse of Soviet Union they had flooded western markets with aluminium. In the late 90s when Alcoa/Revnolds 
merger was reviewed the role of CIS countries was significantly reduced but they were still possessing significant 
market positions. For more information about the events of the mid-90s see "New Aluminium Output Will 
Dampen Price Increases", Purchasing, July 15,1999; also Bob Regan "Wide Consensus Marks LME Aluminium 
Prices, Volume", American Metal Market, October 11,1999 
`° See Bob Regan "Russian Aluminium Figures Confusing" American Metal Market, April 17,2001. 
92 See also Christopher Stobart "Seeking a Long-term Strategy" in FT Survey: Aluminium 2001. 
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only 35%93 of smelters' requirements, approximately 2mt. Given that the total 
Russian SGA needs were approximately 6mt94 it is clear that the remaining 4mt were 
covered by imports from other CIS countries and the West. Such countries in CIS 
were Ukraine and Kazakhstan, which both had rated capacity of 2.4mt95 in 1998. 
Thus, the remaining 1.6mt should come from Western suppliers. 
Taking into account the insufficient quality of Eastern SGA and the financial and 
other maintenance problems the CIS producers were facing, it appears that the total 
western SGA imports to Russia did not fall below 2.5mt annually for the period under 
examination. In 1998 the country announced its intention to add 1.7mt96 of SGA 
capacity to its refineries, but gave no timetable and remains unclear whether the 
project was materialised. 
On the other hand, only Russia alone was exporting to western markets 
approximately 3mt of primary aluminium, which means that 6mt of SGA were also 
exported to the West through the metal. This further means that Russia was not only 
returning the SGA imports to the Western markets but was also exporting part of its 
own SGA production to those markets. Generally, it seems that exports of CIS-made 
SGA exceeded 2mt annually or more than 10% of the western merchant SGA market, 
which is a volume significant for the SGA market balance. 
The Commission's analysis did not mention the potential of SGA exports to the 
West from the East through aluminium. The situation resembles to the treatment of 
captive sales examined above: since eastern SGA would not reach the merchant 
market as such, it would not be included in the relevant geographic market. Another 
argument that the Commission could' use is that since in its competitive assessment 
for the merger took into account all western production including the 4mt exported to 
the East, there is no big difference. However, even in such a case it seems that a more 
appropriate approach would have been to include Eastern-made alumina in the 
geographic market, because the level of production and demand in the East finally 
affected market balance in the West. 
93 See Bob Regan "Russia to Boost Alumina Output" American Metal Market, Nov. 5,1998. 
94 For lt of the metal 2t of SGA are required. 
95 See table 4. Since rated capacity is not always in accordance with real production capacity, especially in the ill- 
equipped CIS countries, it is reasonable to believe that Ukraine and Kazakhstan actually produced less than 2.5mt. 
The same holds for Russia, which in 1998 had according to table 2a "rated" refining capacity of 3 million tonnes, 
while the market report above showed that during that year Russian refineries were able to provide smelters with 
only 2 million tonnes of SGA. 
' See op. cit. 93. 
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4.3.3 Conclusions 
The geographic market definition in Alcoa/Reynolds offered the opportunity to 
examine two important issues about geographic market definition, which also affect 
the competitive assessment of mergers: the first issue concerns the concept of global 
markets and its relationship with geographic market definition and thus with the 
competitive assessment; the second issue concerns the treatment of indirect imports of 
a product, which occur through the existence of that product as a raw material in the 
final product which is imported. 
The Commission in Alcoa/Reynolds recognised features of a global market for 
SGA but finally excluded Eastern countries from the relevant geographic market on 
the grounds of lack of imports from the East. However, this approach was rather 
insufficient provided that as shown above SGA production and demand in the East 
finally affected demand and prices in the West. 
In terms of methodology, the Commission's analysis lacked systematic means, 
such as SSNIP test and supply and demand elasticities, for defining the market. 
However, according to those mentioned above about global markets, the 
recognition of SGA as such a market would have an impact on the methodology 
followed in the competitive assessment. In particular, the assessment should include 
strategic competition considerations and rely less on structural features, such as 
market shares and concentration. As will be shown below, the Commission actually 
referred to strategic competition considerations. However, market shares remained a 
central factor for establishing Alcoa's dominant position. 
4.4 Competitive assessment 
The Commission examined the following factors: market situation, post-merger 
competition, entry and expansion, country risk of expansion projects, know-how and 
technology, bidding process, and possible long-term suppliers. The Commission 
concluded that the proposed merger would create a dominant position in the merchant 
market of Smelter-grade alumina. Analysis and comments on all these issues follow 
below. 
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4.4.1 The market situation97. 
The parties' market share post merger would be [45%-55%] followed by Kaiser 
[5%-15%] and Glencore, Alusuisse, the Guinean Government and the Jamaican 
Government with less than 10% each. The Commission considered these figures 
already indicative of the merged entity's market power post-merger. 
The Commission examined also buyer power and found that while supply-side 
was highly concentrated (C3 of 65%), demand-side was not (no buyer with a market 
share of more than 5%). Thus, buyers, according to the Commission had no 
countervailing buyer power. 
4.4.1.1 Competitive issues and comments 
Market shares and concentration are basic tools in the Commission's competitive 
assessments, even if there is no consensus between economists about which market 
shares or concentration level is critical for a firm's ability to exercise market power. 
Regarding market shares, the Commission's horizontal mergers guidelines 
reflecting the latter's practice under the ECMR establish that post-merger market 
shares of above 50% may in themselves indicate a dominant market position, while 
for market shares below 50%, particularly within the 40%-50% range, the same 
conclusion could be reached in view of other factors such as the strength and the 
number of competitors, the presence of capacity constraints or the extent to which the 
products of the merging parties are close substitutes98. Alcoa/Reynolds was no 
exception to this rule since the 45%-55% market share of the merged entity and the 
significantly lower market share of the next competitor was alone "indicative of the 
market power of the merged entity". 
Concerning concentration, the Commission Guidelines refer to the Herfindhahl- 
Hirschman Index (HHI), which is calculated by summing the squares of the individual 
market shares of all the firms in the market99. However, other concentration measures 
such as concentration ratios, which were used in Alcoa/Reynolds, are also used. 
97 Paras. 20-21 of the decision. 
98 See paras. 17,19-21 of the guidelines. 
"Ibid. para. 16. 
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In unilateral-effects cases, calculating the impact of the merger on concentration 
helps to assess the ability of the merged entity to raise prices above the pre-merger 
prevailing level1°°. 
The practical steps that the Commission follows is to examine first, the number of 
competitors, second the market share of each of the firms, and third the ratio and the 
difference between the quotas of each firm1°'. 
Regarding SGA, the Commission did not disclose precise data about the market 
shares of the parties and their main competitors. According to table 1 above, which 
contains more precise information than the Commission's decision, the situation 
concerning market shares between major SGA producers was as follows: Alcoa 43%, 
Kaiser 11.4%, Reynolds 7.6%, Glencore 7.6%, Nalco 6.3% and Algroup 4.9%. 
Following the acquisition of Reynolds, Alcoa's market share would be 50.6%, 
followed by only three firms with a market share above 5%, Kaiser, Glencore and 
Nalco. Also, Algroup's surplus SGA production after its merger with Alcan, which 
had been approved by the Commission a few months prior to the Alcoa/Reynolds 
decision, would shrink, since Alcan was having at that time SGA deficit. 1°2 
A first comment on the issue is that the merger of Alcoa/Reynolds concerned the 
acquisition of the third largest player by the market leader. Economic theory has 
proved that a merger increasing the size of the largest firm has negative impact on 
welfare, which means that consumers will be harmed by less output and higher 
prices 103. As a result, Reynolds's acquisition would harm consumer welfare. 
A second comment concerns the market share of the parties' closest competitors. 
Kaiser, the closest one, had a market share of 11.4%, less than a fourth of Alcoa's 
post-merger market share. The Commission often considers big differences in the 
market shares between the merging firms and their closest competitors, particularly if 
these differences result from the merger, as factors reinforcing the merging firms' 
ability to exercise market power 104. Economic theory also suggests that horizontal 
mergers are more likely to be welfare enhancing, the more concentrated is the 
10° See also Alistair Lindsay, The EC Merger Regulation: Substantive Issues, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003,2.01. 
101 See Navarro et al., op. cit. 46,6.45. 
102 According to estimates by AAl, which cited information taken from Alcan, that firm before the deal with 
Algroup had a deficit of about 200,000 tonnes. This means that the new firm resulted from the above transaction 
would have a surplus of 575,000 tonnes. 
103 See Preston McAfee and Michael Williams "Horizontal Mergers and Antitrust Policy", 40 Journal Industrial 
Economics. 1992,181. 
104 See e. g. Case IV/M. 983 Bacob Banque/Banque Paribas de Belgique [1997]; Case IV/M. 916 Lyonnaise de 
Eaux/Suez [1997]. 
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ownership of non-merging firms105. From that it could be also inferred that 
(consumer) welfare would be harmed the less concentrated the ownership of the non- 
merging firms. The market-share gap between Kaiser and Alcoa after the merger 
would be almost 31.6% of which 7.6% would be the contribution of Reynolds. Such a 
difference is normally sufficient to raise competitive concerns106, given also that the 
contribution of Reynolds to the creation of this difference was significant. Also, the 
market shares of the remaining competitors after the merger would be significantly 
lower, since there would be only 2 firms, Glencore and Nalco, with market share 
above 5% each, and a number of smaller firms with market shares significantly below 
5% each. This means that non-merging competitors were not concentrated. Thus, 
these two factors, namely the big market-share gap between the merging firms and 
their next closest rival and the non-concentrated rivals contributed further to the 
parties' ability to exercise market power post-merger. 
A third comment concerns the situation with suppliers and buyers. The three-firm 
concentration ratio for SGA indicated high supply concentration (C3 of 65%). On the 
other side, the buyers' side was not concentrated (no buyer according to the 
Commission with more than 5% market share) indicating lack of countervailing buyer 
power. The role of concentration ratio however, should not be overestimated, since 
the index is not always that illustrative of the competitive conditions 107, but in the 
case of SGA combined with the lack of concentration in buyers' side the index, 
nevertheless, indicative of the market situation. 
4.4.1.2 Conclusion 
The examination of market shares and concentration, as the Commission 
mentioned, proved that Alcoa, as a result of the merger, would have the ability to 
exercise market power, due to its high market share, the big gap in terms of market 
shares with its closest competitors, the low level of concentration in these competitors 
and, finally, the lack of countervailing buyer power. 
4.4.2 Post-merger competition108 
105 See Mcafee and Williams, op. cit. 103. 
106 See also Navarro et al op. cit. 46,6.50. 
107 See also Navarro et al op. cit. 46,6.46. 
108 Paras. 22-29 of the Commission's decision. 
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The Commission first examined the own-price elasticity of demand and found it 
extremely low (-0.146), because buyers had no alternatives to SGA and their only 
options were to accept an SGA price increase or shut down. It, however, said that 
aluminium smelters (the buyers) were not extremely sensitive to SGA prices because 
SGA represented only about 25% of their overall costs. A price increase of 10% 
would, therefore, result in a total-costs increase of only 2.5%, which would not 
threaten the viability of smelters' operation because the latter had higher profit 
margins. 
Then, the Commission examined the conditions in the spot market, which was the 
only short-term possibility for buyers. It said that even if spot sales accounted for only 
5% of the total SGA sales, they were very important because they served as a strong 
indicator for price negotiations for both new long-term contracts and annual 
negotiations for existing long-term contracts. The Commission considered that 
suppliers could use the spot market to raise prices of long-term contracts. It used the 
Gramercy as an example: the explosion in Kaiser's Gramercy refinery occurred on 
July 1999 and resulted in the withdrawal from the market of Imt or 7% of western 
third-party production. The immediate impact on the spot market was an increase in 
SGA prices by 34%. The prices continued to rise and reached 360-370$/t in 
December 1999 from 160$/t prior to the explosion. Regarding long-term contracts the 
impact was also significant. The Commission cited market reports, which recorded 
two contracts concluded at 15% and 14.2% of the LME aluminium price respectively 
compared to the previous levels of around 11%-12.5%. 
The Commission concluded that a cutback of 7% of SGA surplus production 
would raise spot prices by a multiple of that percentage figure with long-term prices 
also being affected. Thus, a large player, such as Alcoa, would be able to increase 
SGA prices significantly with relatively little cutback in its production. 
Further, the Commission provided a list of the largest refineries in the world 
along with their operating costs. Alcoa's average operating cost (AOC) in its 
refineries was lower than the market's, thus offering competitive advantage to the 
firm. Alcoa's advantage was due to its control of three bottom-cost refineries Darling 
Range in Western Australia. Reynolds's acquisition would bring under Alcoa's 
control the fourth Darling Range refinery thus broadening Alcoa's advantage. All 
Darling Range refineries represented 19% of the total world production. 
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Further, the Commission expressed doubts about Kaiser's ability to rebuild on 
time Gramercy, which was at the time under reconstruction, due to the financial and 
other problems that the firm was facing. 
Next, the Commission's investigation found that the merged entity would be 
capable post-merger of profitably raising prices by restricting SGA output. In 
particular, the merged entity would control the bottom-end refineries in terms of 
operating costs, while it would also control 2,200kt of high-cost production, which 
could be used as swing production for raising prices. Thus, the merged entity could 
shut down part of its high-cost production raising SGA prices. Such a move would be 
profitable because the losses from the shutdown would be fewer than the increases in 
profits caused higher margins in the other firm's refineries with lower operating costs 
than the swing plants. Alcoa was controlling the largest portfolio of low-cost 
refineries. 
Incumbent producers could also use the same strategy for deterring new entry or 
expansion. Any expansion would require at least 18 months lead-time, while Alcoa 
could immediately restart its mothballed capacity, drive prices down again and make 
the expansion unprofitable. 
Lastly, the same strategy could be used to undermine non-integrated downstream 
rivals in the market of primary aluminium by increasing their costs or to achieve 
higher profits downstream through higher aluminium prices. 
4.4.2.1 Competitive issues and comments 
Own-price elasticity of demand is a tool developed by economists, which is used 
to help in the assessment of a firm's ability to exercise market power through the 
imposition of higher prices on buyers'°9. It also provides information about the 
buyers' ability to switch to other suppliers or products in case of a significant price 
increase by their supplier. A low own-price elasticity of demand means that buyers 
are strongly dependent on suppliers and are therefore vulnerable to supra-competitive 
price increases. Further such a dependence combined with a high market share of the 
merged entity constitutes strong evidence for the latter's ability to exercise market 
109 Own-price elasticity of demand is the proportionate change in its quantity demanded divided by the 
proportionate change in price that induced the quantity change. For more details see Gregory G. Werden "Demand 
elasticities in antitrust analysis", 66 Antitrust L. J., 1998,363,365; also Philip Areeda et al. Antitrust Law, vol. 42, 
1995,138. 
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power' 10. Regarding SGA, the strong dependence of buyers upon suppliers as 
expressed by the low own-price elasticity of demand along with the approximately 
50% market share of the parties were very indicative for the parties' ability to exercise 
market power. 
However, the Commission's argument that buyers were not sensitive to increases 
in SGA prices, it did not seem to be absolutely accurate. The Commission said that 
SGA constituted only about 25% of smelters' overall cost and that, therefore, smelters 
were not extremely sensitive to a price increase of SGA by 10%, because the impact 
on their costs would be only 2.5% and their profit margins were higher. However, the 
market evidence collected by this thesis indicates that under certain circumstances 
smelters can be extremely sensitive to SGA prices. This is so, because profit margins 
of smelters are very unstable because of the existence of high volatility in production 
costs and the prices of aluminiuml11. Thus, there are periods where profit margins are 
very small or even negative for a large part of aluminium producers and in such 
periods any increase in SGA prices could harm these producers. Moreover, SGA 
prices are also very volatile and the price-increase rate often exceeds by far the 10% 
referred to by the Commission. Thus, the thesis's view is that the level of 5-10% used 
by the Commission in the SSNIP test was inappropriate to fully reflect the market 
reality and therefore insufficient to produce fully reliable results on buyers' sensitivity 
to price changes. 
In more detail, in respect of aluminium production costs, energy, which occupies 
significant part (more than 20%) of the smelters' total cost112 , is very volatile and 
there are periods where a significant increase in energy costs combined with low 
aluminium prices have inflicted significant harm on certain smelters, thus forcing 
them to exit the market 113. In such periods, any increase in SGA prices, however 
small, would deepen the losses of smelters thus forcing some of them to exit. 
110 According to Massimo Motta (see Massimo Motta "Economic Analysis and EC Merger Policy", EUI Working 
Papers, Florence 2000) "consideration of market shares alone can be misleading in industries where production 
depends on the availability of raw materials or other indispensable inputs... Availability must be kept in proper 
consideration in order to assess market power". On the issue see also Nestle/Perrier, Case IV/M. 190 [1992], OJ 
L356; Case IV/M. 619, Gencor/Lonrho (1996) [1997] OJ L11/42; [1996] 4 CMLR 742. 
." See below. 
112 See the table included by the Commission in para. 22 of the decision where information about the components 
of the production cost of aluminium are provided. From this information it can be seen that energy occupies more 
than 20% of that cost. 
3 In the summer of 2000 the outbreak of energy crisis in the Pacific area of the USA caused a lot of trouble to 
aluminium firms having operations in that area. The prices of electricity went up by 400% and this development 
forced these firms to curtail production in their smelters and refineries. In the area of Pacific Northwest all major 
American aluminium companies have operations (see also US Geological Surveys, Minerals Yearbook, 2000, 
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Respecting SGA prices' volatility, it is largely caused by their connection to 
aluminium prices, which are generally very volatile, and also by reasons related to the 
SGA supply/demand balance 114. 
Table 6 below will help to explain the volatility in aluminium and SGA prices: 
Table 6: The Aluminium market: Supply/demand balance and 3-month LME price 
Year Supply/demand balances LME 3-month prices (1) year average 
Surplus (+), deficit - , million tonnes) US$/tonne 
1994 -0.90 1,502 
1995 -0.80 1,831 
1996 +0.30 1,534 
1997 +0.26 1,618 
1998 +0.63 1,378 
1999 +0.08 1,388 
2000 -0.08 1,566 
*Source: Purchasing, teuruary iu, luuu. 
(1) Source: American Metal Market, December 7,2001. 
Table 6 shows that little changes in equilibrium from one year to another cause 
relatively big fluctuations in aluminium prices. The picture would be even clearer if 
year lows and highs had been included in table 6. For example in 1994, the year low 
and high were US$1,128/t and US$1,999/t respectively, while for 1998, the 
corresponding figures were US$1,055/t and US$1,538/t"5. 
Concerning SGA prices, they follow as mentioned above the metal's prices but 
this is not always the case as Gramercy showed. Using the examples given by the 
Commission the prices of long-term contracts after the explosion increased from 11- 
12.5% to approximately 15% of the metal's price, while AAI cited'16 increases for 
shorter-term contracts up to 17-18%, which means a price increase of between 20% 
and 60% for SGA contract prices and 5%-15% for aluminium smelters' total costs. 
This proves that real increases in SGA prices can often be higher than the level of 5- 
10% used by the Commission in the SSNIP test and that the impact on smelters' 
overall costs can be significant. Thus, the application of SSNIP test by the 
Commission could not produce useful results in this case. 
2001). The financial shock for some of these companies was so big that they were forced to file for bankruptcy. 
McCook and later Kaiser were amongst them. 
114 SGA prices are generally more volatile than aluminium. According to the analysis of AAl, the coefficient of 
correlation (that is the standard deviation divided by the average) is 27% for alumina (real monthly prices) and 
16% for aluminium (real monthly prices) during the period 9/1/94-10/1/99. Another measure of volatility 
presented by AAl is the variance of percent changes in prices month-to-month. That variance was at 18.5 for 
aluminium and 94.0 for alumina. Both the above indexes provide that alumina's prices are more volatile than the 
vices of the metal. 
Source: American Metal Market, December 7,2001. 
116 See op. cit. 37. 
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Further, according to the Commission's decision, the overall production cost for 
aluminium was US$1,410/t"7, while a more recent survey on the aluminium industry 
by the Financial Times puts that level to probably above US$1,100/t118. But even if 
the latter level was true, there were periods during the 1990s when aluminium prices 
fell below that low level. In particular, according to a prices report for aluminium 119 9 
the 3-month LME aluminium prices demonstrated level below US$1,100/t in 1992, 
1993,1998 and 1999. Although the average price for the above years had been 
slightly higher than US$ 1,100/t there had been long periods within these years where 
smelters were selling the metal at prices below their overall operating cost. Using the 
Commission's level of US$1,410/t for smelters production costs the examination 
shows that more periods and within more years existed during the 90s where the 
prices of aluminium were at a level below the total production costs of smelters. 
Aluminium prices make cyclical movements and according to James King -a market 
expert whose information was used in the Commission's market analysis- at the 
bottom of the market cycle prices fall temporarily (as one-year average) to 15% below 
the level at which the operating costs of 75% of the industry's capacity are covered120. 
Although SGA prices normally fall with the metal, it is not impossible suppliers to 
restrict supplies in order to block the fall of SGA prices or, if possible, to increase 
them. In these cases the loss for SGA buyers would broaden, thus forcing some of 
these buyers to exit. 
Thus, the argument of the Commission that SGA buyers were not sensitive to 
price fluctuations of SGA was not fully valid. 
Further, another disputable Commission argument was that aluminium producers 
facing higher SGA prices had only the options of accepting the higher prices or face 
exit. It seems that aluminium producers had also another option: to pass part of or all 
the SGA price increase onto their own customers. If that was true then Alcoa's ability 
to raise prices post-merger concerned not only the SGA market but also the 
downstream primary-aluminium market. The Gramercy event showed how this was 
possible: 
"Para. 23 of the decision. 
Iss See Gillian 0' Connor "Aluminium: Global crisis will delay expected recovery: Although the industry is 
confident about the long-term, it is the sort-term that is causing concern" in FT Survey: Aluminium 2001 October 
31,2001. 
119 See "LME High-Grade Aluminium Prices", American Metal Market, December 7,2001. 
120 See James F. King "Aluminium to 2015, the looming average" Research Report, The Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 1997, at 214. 
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Following the explosion of July 1999 the spot SGA prices from US$160/t121 
climbed to US$370/t by the beginning of 2000 and to US$425/tt22 in May 2000, while 
they fell to US$250/t123 in August 2000. The prices of long-term contracts during the 
above period, according to the Commission, were increased from the previous levels 
of 11%-12.5% of the LME 3-month price to 15%124. Regarding aluminium, the price 
trend was as follows: From a monthly average of US$1,400/t125 in July 1999, the 
prices advanced to a monthly average of US$1,680/t in January 2000. The prices 
remained at high levels throughout 2000 and in August of that year were being 
negotiated at approximately US$1,550/t126. 
Using the above prices, it is possible to estimate the real impact of the increase in 
SGA prices on the costs and prices of primary aluminium. The focus about SGA 
prices will be on long-term contracts. About those contracts, the pre-Gramercy level 
of 12.5% given by the Commission127 will be used as the pre-Gramercy SGA price for 
the purposes of the analysis here. The level of 15% also given by the Commission128 
will be used as the post-Gramercy SGA price level. For simplifying further the 
analysis it will be assumed that these levels refer to both long-term contracts under 
fixed prices and under annual renegotiations. The results are as follows: 
a) 6 months after the explosion the 3-month LME prices of aluminium rose from 
US$1,400/t to US$1,680/t or by US$280/t. The impact on SGA long-term contracts 
was as follows: at the aluminium price of US$1400/t smelters had a cost of US$350129 
from alumina purchases. At the level of US$1680/t the cost was US$504130. This was 
an increase in SGA cost by (504-350=) US$154/t. Given that aluminium prices rose 
by US$280/t, smelters managed not only to pass all SGA price increases onto their 
customers downstream, but they also realised extra profits. 
b) 12 months after the explosion, in August 2000, aluminium prices were at 
US$1,550/t, up by (1,550-1,400=) US$150/t from the price levels of July 1999. The 
121 Source: Department of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia: Report on alumina, 1999 
122 Source: Department of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia: 1999-2000 Statistics Digest. 
123 The reason for this fall was the announcement of Alcoa that would channel 400,000 tonnes of alumina to the 
market, after it completed a part of expansion in one of its refineries in Australia. Also Kaiser's Gramercy refinery 
restarted partly its production during that period. 
124 See para. 24 of the Commission's decision. 
us 3-months LME prices. Source: Department of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia, op. cit. 121. 
126 Source: American Metal Market. 
127 Para. 24 of the decision. 
128 Ibid. 
129 That is (1400*12.5%=) US$175/t of SGA. Since for the production of I tonne of aluminium, 2 tonnes of 
alumina are required, the total cost for the purchasing of these 2 tonnes was (175*2=) US$350. 
130 That is (1680* 15%=) 252*2= 504 US$ for 2 tonnes. 
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cost of SGA during the same period was up by US$115131, which was still lower than 
the price increase of the metal. 
There are many more real-market examples that could be used for proving that 
smelters finally passed all or at least the largest part of the increase in their production 
costs caused by higher SGA prices onto their customers. Thus, it seems that 
aluminium smelters had not only the option of accepting SGA price increases or 
shutting down, as the Commission argued, but also the possibility of passing the 
higher raw-material prices onto their customers and, why not, of realising extra 
profits. The issue had practical importance for Alcoa/Reynolds review, since Alcoa's 
domination of the SGA market post-merger would allow the firm to affect indirectly 
prices also in the downstream markets, particularly those where Alcoa had strong 
presence, such as primary aluminium. Moreover, Alcoa's control of the SGA market 
could also reinforce collusion risk in the primary aluminium market as a means to 
better coordinate price rises in that market. The Commission accepted that higher 
SGA prices would undermine by raising their costs the ability of buyers to compete 
against the vertically integrated firms in the downstream primary aluminium market 
but did not refer to the possibility of higher prices also downstream or the potential of 
collusion there. For this reason, the Commission's analysis could be deemed 
incomplete. However, the issues concerning the primary aluminium market will be 
clarified in subsequent chapter of the thesis where the impact of Alcoa/Reynolds 
merger on that market will be examined. 
Next, the Commission included in the text of its decision a table with information 
about refineries located in the Western world. Due to its importance, the table was 
included as table 7 into the thesis. 
Table 7. Alum ina refineries in the Western world 
Plant Country Owner Capacity Operating cost 
Kt US$/t 
Wagerap Australia/Darling Range Alcoa 60% 1,900 90.8 
Worsley Australia/Darling Range Reynolds 56% Billiton 30% 1,880 91.3 
Pinjara Australia/Darling Range Alcoa 60% 3,200 98.5 
Pocos de Caldos Brazil Alcoa 100% 216 104.5 
Damajodi India Nalco 100% 941 107.2 
Belgaum India Indalco 65%, Alcan 35% 153 109.8 
Gladstone Australia Comalco 30% Kaiser 28% 3,465 116.6 
Alcan 21% Pechiney 20% 
Alunorte Brazil Hydro 25% 1,476 118.6 
Gove Australia Alusuisse 70% 1,816 119.8 
Sao Louis Brazil Alcoa 54% Billiton 36% 1,140 120.8 
Alumar) Alcan 10°/. 
131 That is, 1550'15%=232.5 US$ for I tonne of alumina or 465 for two tonnes. The total increase in SGA cost 
was (465-350=) 115 US$. 
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Clarendon Jamaica Alcoa 50% JBI 50% 932 126.2 
(Jamalco) 
Kwinana Australia Alcoa 60% 1,935 126.6 
Paranam Surinam Alcoa 55% Billiton 45% 1,825 131.8 
Friguia-Kimbo Guinea Guinea 90% Reynolds 10% 600 135.9 
Ewarton Jamaica Alcoa 93% JBI 7% 550 152.4 
Kirkvine Jamaica Alcoa 93% JBI 7% 550 153 
San Ciprian Spain Alcoa 100% 1,150 155.8 
Auginish Iceland Glencore 100% 1,360 161 
Point Comfort USA Alcoa 100% 2,318 163.8 
Eurallumina Italy Comalco 56%, Glenc. 44% 975 166 
Stade Germany VAW 50%, Reynolds 50% 750 169.8 
Distomon Greece Pechiney 60% 720 170.3 
Burnside USA Ormet 100% 595 171.3 
St. Croix USA Alcoa 100% 600 179.5 
Corpus Christi USA Reynolds 100% 1,600 185.8 
Gardanne France Pechiney 100% 600 200.2 
Gramercy USA Kaiser 100% 926 214.6 
*Source: CRU 
According to table 7, Alcoa was controlling three bottom-cost Australian 
refineries (Wagerap, Pinjara and Kwinana) and through Reynolds it would acquire 
control over a fourth (Worsley). At the same time the firm post-merger would also 
control two high-cost refineries (St Croix, Corpus Christi) with overall capacity 
2,200kt (2.2mt), which according to the Commission could be used as swing facilities 
for controlling prices. Alcoa could undercut production in these high-cost refineries to 
raise SGA prices. Given that the most competitors in that market were capacity- 
constrained any significant response by competitors to Alcoa's move could come 
through capacity expansions which were costly and lengthy, while Alcoa could cancel 
any benefits from these expansions by returning to the market the undercut production 
thus driving prices lower just before these expansions entered the market. In such a 
case competitors would face not only low prices but also the high capital costs of their 
expansions 132. Thus, the possession by Alcoa of swing facilities, which would be 
strengthened through the acquisition of Corpus Christi of Reynolds, would reinforce 
the ability of the firm to exercise market power post-merger. 
Further, according to the Commission, the average operating cost ("AOC") of 
SGA in 1999 was at US$160-170/t and Alcoa's AOC was below the market average. 
From the information in table 7 it was possible to calculate the AOC for the major 
firms. Thus, the AOC of Alcoa's refineries in 1999 was close to US$125/t, for 
Reynolds US$151/t, for Kaiser US$151.5/t, for Glencore US$162.1/t and for Nalco 
132 For more details on issues of entry and expansion in the SGA market see below. 
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US$107.2/t. From the above firms, Indian Nalco had the lowest AOC but the firm133 
according to the Commission preferred agreements with Indian and Chinese smelters. 
From the other firms, Alcoa had by far the lowest AOC, which was well below 
the market average of US$160-170/t. Alcoa's advantage was very important given 
that its AOC was referring to a total production of 13.5mt (or 30% of the total 
Western world production of SGA) in 1999 of which 6.8mt were merchant SGA. The 
acquisition of Reynolds, which was having the second lowest AOC, would increase 
Alcoa's AOC to US$129.6/t or by 4%, which would still be far from the market 
average. The distance between the merging firms and Kaiser, the firm with the second 
lowest cost, would be approximately US$22/t or 17%, while between the merging 
firm and Glencore with the third lowest AOC the distance would be approximately 
US$32.5 or 25%. 
From the above situations about AOC two conclusions could be drawn: 
First, that Alcoa had a lower AOC than the overall market and its main 
competitors 134. Respecting Kaiser -the second largest firm in the market- apart from 
its cost disadvantage against Alcoa, it has also to be mentioned that the firm was 
facing financial difficulties due to increased expenses for the reconstruction of 
Gramercy135 and long-lasting disputes with workers' associations 136. These two events 
were undermining Kaiser's ability137 to vigorously compete against Alcoa and were 
further reinforcing the latter's market dominance. 
133 Nalco was also a state-owned company since Indian government was controlling a majority stake there. This 
meant that the state management was reducing the ability of the firm to compete. Moreover, the Indian government 
was seeking to privatise the firm and therefore until the privatisation was completed -the privatisation was 
projected for 2003- Nalco should not have been expected the play a major role in the market (source: 
www. investsmartindia. com). 
134 The Commission has in several merger cases examined the cost structures of firms to find out if competitors are 
able to constrain the merged entity, and in case of finding of absolute competitive advantages as a result of the 
merger, it has gone on to the establishment of dominant positions. [See e. g. Case IV/M. 794 Coca-Cola 
Enterprises/Amalgamated Beverages Great Britain [1997] OJ/L218/15 (Coca-Cola was able to achieve great 
economies of scale, which could not be matched by any of its competitors; Case IV/M. 877 Boeing/McDonnell- 
Douglas [1997] OJ 366/16 (The merged entity would have excessive bargaining power vis-ä-vis its suppliers that 
would directly prejudice its main competitor, Airbus]. 
The SGA market is a similar example since Alcoa's cost advantage, already in existence prior to the merger, 
would remain as such after that. 
135 Although Kaiser had insurance coverage in Gramercy, the money from the insurance was not enough to cover 
the overall capitals needed for the reconstruction of the refinery. The total cost of the reconstruction had been 
estimated at US$ 275 million of which the contribution of insurance had been expected to be around 50% (source: 
the firm's 2000 annual report to shareholders). 
136 Kaiser was sued by workers' association for unfair labour practices, while faced strikes by workers in its 
facilities during the years between 1998-2000. Only one of these strikes in 1999 caused, according to a report by 
American Metal Market, a loss of US$ 93 million to Kaiser. 
137 Finally, Kaiser did not escape bankruptcy in 2002. The reasons for this development were, according to market 
analysts, the energy crisis during the year 2001 in West US, where Kaiser has its most important operations, the 
expenses for the reconstruction of the refinery in Gramercy and the unfavourable conditions in the markets of 
aluminium due to the international economic recession (source: www. kaiseral. com) 
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Respecting Glencore, the other Alcoa's main competitor and the third largest 
SGA seller post-merger, the firm is part of a Swiss-based diversified group acting as a 
trader in most metals markets. At the time of Alcoa/Reynolds merger the firm apart 
from its cost disadvantage against Alcoa was also not completely independent as a 
competitor because it was partly sourcing SGA from Alcoa 138. In addition, Algroup, 
the 51h post-merger largest supplier, had been acquired a few months prior to the 
Alcoa/Reynolds deal by the Canadian Alcan, which according to the Commission was 
sharing with the merging parties the incentive for higher SGA prices as a means to 
harm non-integrated aluminium producers 139. Thus, Algroup was not a reliable 
competitor either. 
The second conclusion from the AOC examination concerns Alcoa/Reynolds 
merger itself. According to the economic theory 140, a merger between firms having 
different but constant AOCs leads to the shutdown of the high-cost firm. However, 
given that such shutdowns are almost never observed in real mergers, the theory 
suggests that the sole gain from the merger to the low-cost firm, which does not need 
the assets of high-cost firm, is the elimination of the latter as a Cournot rival. 
Alcoa and Reynolds had prior to the merger different but constant AOCs. The 
AOCs were constant because the largest part of these costs was fixed, due to the high 
capital costs and the relatively unchanged technology required for running the 
refineries'41. According to the above theory, Alcoa would not need Reynolds's assets 
because it had itself sufficient low-cost capacity and, therefore, the only reason for the 
acquisition was to eliminate Reynolds as a rival. A closer look to the deal might prove 
that this theory was applicable to this merger. Let us explain why: 
The most important of the Reynolds's assets was its stake at Worsley refinery in 
Western Australia, which had the second-lowest operating cost in the world. 
According to table 7, Alcoa was already controlling the first and third of Western 
Australian refineries and with the acquisition of Reynolds would acquire the missing 
second. Reynolds was also having a 50% stake in a German refinery and sole control 
in a US refinery, which were both high-cost facilities. Alcoa would not have cost 
benefits from the high-cost Reynolds's refineries but would benefit from Worsley, 
which would strengthen the firm's low-cost position. 
138 See para. 58 of the Commission's decision. 
139 See analysis of entry below. 
140 See Mcafee and Williams op. cit. 103,181. 
141 The refining of alumina use Bayer process, which was first introduced at the end of 19th century. 
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However, and given that competition authorities both in the EU and the US 
ordered the divestiture of Worsley, a move which Alcoa should have expected since 
Worlsey was competitively important, the only benefit for the firm from the merger, 
at least concerning the SGA market, was finally the elimination of Reynolds as a 
rival. The fact that Worsley would be sold to another competitor, which could 
potentially use it to compete aggressively against Alcoa, did not seem to be a big 
threat to the firm, since following the merger there were only a few independent and 
really capable competitors remaining in the SGA market. This was finally confirmed 
by the implementation of the decision on the remedies in this case, where as will be 
shown below the final acquirer of Worsley was Billiton, Alcoa's partner in several 
joint ventures in the SGA and the other aluminium markets. 
Thus, one could say, that the acquisition of Reynolds by not offering any 
significant cost benefit to Alcoa, was finally aimed at eliminating an existing 
aggressive rival, thus enhancing Alcoa's ability to exercise market power. 
4.4.2.2 Conclusions 
The Commission's analysis of post-merger competition in the SGA market was to 
some extent analytical and comprised strategic competition considerations, such as 
the ability of Alcoa post-merger to use its high-cost refineries as swing facilities to 
profitably raise SGA prices. However, the analysis of the market by the Commission 
appeared to have underestimated the impact of higher SGA on buyers and also on the 
downstream market of aluminium. The application of SSNIP test was arguably not the 
right method for studying the reaction of buyers in a market demonstrating big price 
volatility. 
It is submitted that the evidence presented above provides a more complete 
picture of the impact of Alcoa/Reynolds merger on competition and seek to contribute 
to a more qualitative approach to Alcoa's dominance. This will facilitate the 
discussion on the remedies for this case as well as on issues of effective merger 
control, one of the main objectives of this thesis. 
4.4.3 Entry and expansion142 
142 Paras. 30-46 of the decision. 
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The Commission's investigation found that due to the increasing demand there 
would be need for additional 5.5mt of SGA by 2003. Expansion of SGA capacity 
comes either in the form of capacity "creep" through de-bottlenecking, through 
"brownfield" expansions at existing sites, or through new, so-called "greenfield" 
projects. 
Regarding greenfield expansions, which concern the construction of new 
refineries with large capacity 143, the Commission concluded that such projects, which 
were high-cost and had long-lead time144 (5 years), were not viable taking into 
account the long-term term SGA prices. The realisation of the only two greenfield 
projects that were reported to the Commission was uncertain and the latter did not 
consider them as a serious threat to the market power of the merged entity. 
Regarding brownfield expansions, which are cheaper and have shorter lead-time, 
the Commission found that the most such projects due for completion in the period 
1999-2003 were intended to cover internal needs of major integrated producers. The 
parties' share in those projects would be 15%-25%, which was low but the 
Commission stressed that the completion date of many of the competitors' projects 
was speculative while the parties' projects were underway. Also that the integrated 
companies, which were running most of the competitors' projects, were sharing with 
the parties the incentive to increase SGA prices in the merchant market, since such a 
move would increase the cost of non-integrated rivals. 
Further, the parties were controlling Darling Range refineries in Australia, which 
were located in the most suitable place for expansion in the world, since they had the 
lowest operating costs, low capital costs and were located in a politically stable 
environment., The Commission stated that for these refineries the parties were 
capable, apart from completing existing expansion projects, to expand further their 
SGA capacity by million tonnes within two years after the merger. These expansion 
opportunities of the parties alone, according to the Commission, were capable of 
satisfying almost half of the extra demand for SGA generated by the growth in 
aluminium production. They could also be used as a warning to anyone considering a 
large capacity expansion. Any announcement of an expansion in the Darling Range 
143 At least lmt. 
144 According to the Commission capital costs for the construction of a new refinery of 1mt capacity totalled 
US$1 billion. 
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would have the effect of deterring expansions by competitors that had higher 
operating costs and less political stability. 
Further, the parties had the ability to block or delay expansion projects through 
the exercise of veto rights in a number of refining joint ventures, where they were 
partners with their competitors. 
The parties' control over the low and high-cost refineries, including expansion 
possibilities in combination with its veto rights, would make the following strategy 
successful: the parties could delay brownfield expansion and at the same time reduce 
high-cost capacity to keep market tight and thus raise SGA prices at supra- 
competitive level. In turn, the parties could maintain supra-competitive prices because 
they could act in such a way as to deter entry if such entry was motivated by the 
inflated price levels. The mere announcement of expansion by the parties would affect 
the market prices of SGA and, as a result, expansion business plans by other 
competitors would have to be reviewed in the light of future alumina prices. This 
would be particularly the case where the required return on investment of a third party 
expansion would not be achieved, because of depressed future alumina prices. 
Lastly, according to the Commission the market shares of the parties for the 
period 1999-2003 including all brownfield expansions and expansions through creep 
would be 50%, while if all the expansion opportunities in Darling Range were 
included, would be 65%-75% in 2003. This was considered in itself a strong indicator 
of the establishment of dominant position by the parties post-merger. 
4.4.3.1 Competitive issues and comments 
Entry is closely related to the merged entity's ability to exercise market power 
post-merger because if entry is sufficiently easy, a merger is unlikely to cause any 
significant anticompetitive effect. 
The Commission guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers establish 
three criteria for assessing whether entry can sufficiently constrain the merging 
parties 145. Entry should be likely, timely and sufficient to deter or defeat any potential 
anticompetitive effects of the merger. These criteria are not new but reflect the current 
Commission's practice under the Merger Regulation. 
I's Paras. 68-75 of the Guidelines. 
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Regarding the likelihood of entry, the Commission's practice is to examine 
whether entry is likely or whether potential entry is likely to constrain the behaviour 
of incumbents post-merger 146. The crucial issue concerning a likely entry is 
profitability, since potential entrants will enter into the market only if they can make 
profits out of the entry. The profitability of entry is a complex issue to determine since 
the analysis has to take into account several factors, such as the size of entry (small or 
large scale entry? ) the price effects of entry (the entry must be profitable at the 
prevailing price level following the realisation of entry), the reaction of incumbent 
firms, the structure and features of the market. 
Regarding timeliness, the Commission examines whether entry "would be 
sufficiently swift and sustained to deter or defeat the exercise of market poweri147. 
The appropriate time period taken into account in the examination will depend on the 
general features and dynamics of the market under investigation, but timely entry 
should normally occur within two years. 
Lastly, concerning sufficiency, the entry must have sufficient scope and 
magnitude to deter or defeat the anticompetitive effects of the merger148. 
Barriers to entry can take various forms and their effectiveness depends on the 
specific market conditions. In Alcoa/Reynolds the Commission's analysis was 
dominated by reference to the strategic use by Alcoa of its capacity-expansion 
capabilities to deter new entry or capacity expansions by existing rivals. The use of 
excess capacity for entry deterrence and control of existing rivals has been fully 
explained in economic literature. The basic entry-deterrence argument is that excess 
capacity adds credibility to the incumbent's threat to expand output in the face of 
entry, while it can also be used as a mobility barrier to counter aggressive 
undercutting by rivals 149. The outcome of that strategy is that entry by a new firm 
and/or expansions by competitors become unprofitable, since the use of excess 
capacity drives market prices to sufficiently low level. 
In Alcoa/Reynolds the Commission considered that Alcoa's strategic use of its 
excess capacity could be particularly effective in deterring entrants and existing rivals. 
Thus, Alcoa's dominance post-merger could not be threatened. 
'46 Ibid. paras. 69-73. 
147 Ibid. para. 74. 
148 Ibid. para. 75. 
149 See also Marvin B. Liberman "Excess Capacity as a Barrier to Entry: An Empirical Appraisal" XXXV(4) 
Journal of Industrial Economics, June 1987,607,608. 
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It is submitted that the Commission's findings were in essence correct. However, 
certain comments should be made, as a means to clarify also issues of the application 
of the criteria about entry as established in the Commission Guidelines. A distinction 
should be made between entry, expansion, and further expansion possibilities in the 
SGA market. 
Entry. Regarding the likelihood of entry post-merger, the situation in the SGA market 
was as follows: 
The SGA market demonstrated increasing demand, which should normally have 
induced entry'50, but nevertheless no new entry had occurred during the 5 years prior 
to the merger and no-one was expected for the foreseeable future. Any new entry in 
this market can come through the construction of new refineries. As the Commission 
said only one greenfield project had been completed in 1995 and there were two more 
by integrated firms at the stage of planning when Alcoa/Reynolds merger was 
examined. 
The absence of actual new entry, though, is not necessarily an indicator of high 
entry barriers and anticompetitive behaviour in the market because it may also mean 
that either the market is very competitive or the expansions by incumbent players and 
the threat of potential competition are sufficient to keep prices down151. Such 
situations make entry unattractive and Alcoa expressly stated to the Commission that 
the long-term prices of SGA would not justify the investment costs of a greenfield 
project'52, which could be interpreted as meaning that new entry according to Alcoa, 
would not be viable. 
However, entry analysis for merger control purposes does not focus on what will 
happen post-merger if the prices remain at competitive (and thus low) level but what 
will happen if the merged entity post-merger, imposes supra-competitive prices. 
150 Growth markets generally induce entry partly because they open up sales opportunities not exploited rapidly 
enough by established firms and partly because capacity constraints and satisfaction with the already possessed 
market positions may prevent market leaders from carrying a retaliatory price war very far (See F. M. Scherer and 
David Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, (Yd Ed. ), Houghton Mifflin Company, 
Boston, 1990,392). From past Commission's decisions recognising that market growth induces new entry, which 
reduces the risk of an individual or collective dominant position, see amongst others case IV/M. 872, TRW/Magna 
(1997), [1997] 4 CMLR 370; also Case IV/M. 322 Alcan/Inespal/Palco (1993), [1993] 5 CMLR 16). 
"' See Richard Schmalensee "Ease of Entry: Has the Concept Been Applied too Readily? " 56 Antitrust L. J. 1987, 
41,46. 
""Z Para. 33 of the decision. 
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Supra-competitive prices generally induce entry, but for SGA it seems that even if 
such prices occurred, a new entrant would still be difficult to appear. 
This was confirmed by the Gramercy event, which led SGA prices to supra- 
competitive levels for more than twelve months without however, attracting any new 
entry. This meant that in the SGA market there were in existence factors preventing 
new entry even if prices were to increase significantly. The Commission referred to 
high capital costs, long lead-period and the ability of existing players and mostly 
Alcoa to apply strategic deterrence using the brownfield projects, as factors making 
unlikely any new entry in the SGA market. 
Regarding high capital costs for initial entry, they have been recognised by 
several past ECJ'53 and Commission'54 decisions as constituting barriers to entry. 
However, it seems that a more accurate approach would be to consider them as 
temporary barriers to entry in the sense that they can delay entry and not permanently 
prevent it'55. Regarding SGA, the cost for the construction of a new refinery was 
according to the Commission approximately US$lbillion, which was definitely high 
but judging from the size of the firms involved in the industry it was not 
prohibitive'56. It, therefore, seems that other factors were raising more important entry 
barriers in the industry with a long lead-time, which relate to the timeliness of entry, 
being amongst them. 
The lead-time for the construction of a new refinery was according to the 
Commission at least 5 years. Economic theory suggests that this157 is in itself a 
discouraging factor for new entrants because total costs associated with entry are 
higher the longer the entry period. Finally, entry costs per unit of time in cases of long 
entry period may be unlikely to fall by enough to compensate. Moreover, the long 
entry period increases entry risks such as the reaction by incumbent players and the 
potential alteration in market conditions'58. Lastly, and maybe most importantly, the 
more time it takes an entrant to become fully committed to the market, the more time 
l53 See e. g. Case 27/76, United Brands Co and United Brands Continental BV v. Commission [1978] ECR 207, 
! 
34 
1978] 1 CMLR 429 para 122. 
E g. Re Continental Can Co [1972] OJ L7/25, [1972] CMLR D11 
ss See also Richard Schmalensee, op. cit. 151,48. 
isb Firms participating in the industry have multibillion US$ annual revenues. 
See John Hilke and Philip Nelson "The Economics of Entry Lags: A Theoretical and Empirical Overview", 61 
Antitrust L. J., 1993,365,371. 
isa Ibid. at 372. Also, Herbert Hovenkamp Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and its Practice, (2nd 
Ed. ), West Group, 1999, § 12.6b2. 
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established firms have to take action to discourage the entrant from entering or alter 
the way in which the entrant will enter159. 
The latter factor was particularly important in the SGA market where'incumbent 
players had significant first-mover advantages against new entrants because capacity 
expansions in existing refineries through brownfield projects had lead-time normally 
between 2 and 3 years well below the 5 years required for the construction of new 
refinery and also lower construction costs160. Thus potential new entrants were at a 
clear disadvantage against incumbent players 161. The disadvantage was even bigger 
since certain incumbent firms, such as Alcoa and Reynolds had, at the period of the 
merger, the ability to carry out serious capacity expansions in Australian refineries, 
which had the lowest operating cost in the world. 
Lastly, another factor discouraging new entry concerned the absence of buyers' 
concentration (no buyer with market share above 5%). According to a view supported 
by the Commission162 and accepted by economic theory 163, if there is a small number 
of buyers or just a single one, then entry may be more likely, since the potential 
entrant will face less difficulties in its attempt to win significant orders to recoup the 
sunk costs of entry. Thus, the absence of buyer concentration in the SGA market 
made new entry more difficult. 
Generally speaking the above analysis explained why new entry in the SGA 
market was not likely or timely within the meaning of the Commission guidelines. 
Expansion. The interest, then, shifts to incumbent competitors where the same 
methodology of assessment applies. The ability of these competitors to expand rapidly 
and sufficiently their production capacity to cancel supra-competitive price increases 
1 S9 Ibid.. 372. 
160 See para. 35 of the decision. 
161 First-mover advantages are incumbent advantages that derive from the asymmetry of timing between 
incumbents and entrants and constitute barriers to entry (see David Harbord and Tom Hoehn "Barriers to Entry 
and Exit in European Competition Policy" 14Int'l Rev. L. & Econ., 411, at 416; Cook and Kerse op. cit. 69, at 159). 
162 See e. g. case IV/M. 580 ABB/Daimler-Benz (1995); [1997] OJ LI 1/29; 5 CMLR 577. 
163 See Massimo Motta op. cit. 110, and for the formal presentation Chiara Fumagalli and Massimo Motta "Buyers' 
Coordination", mimeo, 1999. 
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by the merging parties164 and the ability of the latter to deter the competitors' 
expansions constitute crucial factors for the competitive assessment165. 
Regarding SGA expansions, the Commission considered that the parties had a 
competitive advantage over their competitors because they controlled 4 bottom-cost 
refineries, which had very good expansion prospects. This according to the 
Commission could be used to threaten expansions by incumbent competitors and 
along with the ability of Alcoa to undercut its high-cost capacity would constitute 
effective strategy leading to higher prices. But let us examine the issue in more 
details. 
First, it must be stressed that almost all SGA suppliers, including Alcoa, were 
capacity-constrained, since all firms were running their refineries in full capacity, to 
be cost-efficient. This was confirmed by available statistics collected by the thesis, 
according to which, prior to the Gramercy explosion western refineries were 
producing 96% of their rating capacity, while after that when a SGA deficit appeared, 
western production rose by only 1% to 97%166, which seemed to be the level of 
capacity maximisation. Thus, no SGA supplier was capable of immediately increasing 
its production by using idle existing capacity in case of higher SGA prices. Therefore 
the next issue to be examined is whether competitors were capable of expanding their 
production faster and with lower cost than Alcoa. 
Table 8 below, which lists expansion projects planned or underway for the 
period 2000-2004 in the SGA market helps to clarify this issue. The table was taken 
from the Commission's decision. 
Table 8: Alumina Brownfield Expansion Projects (2000-2003)' 
Location Owner Size tv Current status Estimated completion 
Wagerap 
Australia 





1,250,000 Nearly complete 2000 
Gramercy USA Kaiser 1,000,000 Underway 2000 
164 The significance of brownfield expansions for the industry has been confirmed by James King, the market 
expert whose views were also used in the Commission's analysis. According to him the number of alumina 
refineries in the world has fallen to 65 from 78 in the past 20 years, but alumina capacity has grown by 21.4 
million tonnes. The lesson, according to King is the importance of the expansion of existing capacity in the growth 
of the industry (See Alison Guerriere "Brownfields Said Main Source for Needed Capacity Increases" American 
Metal Market, March 6,2002). 
'6s See Faull and Nikpay op. cit. 26,3.69-3.72; also, Landes and Posner op. cit. 80,945. From the economic literature 
see Ciaran Driver "Capacity Utilisation and Excess capacity: Theory evidence and Policy" 16 Rev. Ind. Org., 
2000,69; also Olivier Compte, Frederic Jenny, Patrick Rey "Capacity constraints, mergers and collusion", 46 
E. E. R., 2002,1. 
'66 See op. cit. 37. 
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(rebuild) 
Burnside USA Ormet 400,000 Underway 2000 
Damanjodi 
(India) 
Nalco 700,000 Underway 2001 
Alunorte (Brazil) Hydro, Aluvale, CBA 825,000 Announced 2002 
Sao Luis (Brazil) Billiton (share) 635,000 Proposed 2003 
Muri Bihar (India) Indal 60,000 Announced 2002 
Gove (Australia) Alusuisse 400,000 Proposed 2003 
Renunkoot (India) Hindalco 210,000 Announced 2002 
*source: uepartment of minerals ana tnergy of western Australia. intormanon snout wagerap was ormttea from inc 
Commission's table for reasons of confidentiality but were disclosed by the thesis's investigation. 
' The Commission's table included two more projects of Indal and Alcan, but finally the Commission did not take them into 
account in its assessment because these projects were due for completion in 2004, which was outside the frame examined for this 
case. For these reasons these project were not included in table 8. 
Wagerup and Worsley are two bottom-cost Australian refineries. According to an 
alumina report of the Western Australian government 167, Wagerup expansion 
increased its annual production capacity by 450,000t from 1.75mt to 2.2mt. The report 
noted that the production at Wagerup depending on the market conditions could reach 
3.3mt in the future, through a further expansion by another 1. lmt. Regarding 
Worsley, Reynolds's share in the 2.25mt expansion would be 700,000t168. Thus, 
Alcoa post merger would control over (450,000+700,000=) 1.15mt of bottom-cost 
SGA or 19.5% market share of all the expansion projects of the period 2000-2003. 
As for the competitors' projects, the Commission said that several of them and 
probably part of the abovementioned Alcoa's and Reynolds's expansions were 
intended to cover internal needs of integrated firms. The Commission also stated that 
the expansion projects of the period 2000-2003 would only preserve supply/demand 
balance without creating any surplus in supply. Thus by 2003 all firms would still be 
capacity-constrained, which meant that Alcoa would still be able to restrict SGA 
supplies without the competitors being able to constrain it. 
Moreover, Alcoa's cost advantage in the market would still survive, since none of 
the competitors' expansions would take place at refineries with operating cost below 
that of Alcoa's Australian refineries. Instead, Alcoa's position post merger would be 
further strengthened because the acquisition of Reynolds's controlling stake at 
Worsley would enable the firm to control another bottom-cost refinery and also 
Billiton, the firm with the minority stake at Worsley. 
The fact that the market situation was not going to change following the 
realisation of the above expansion projects can be seen in table 9, which records the 
distribution of market shares for the period 1999-2003: 
167 See the report of Department of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia, "Alumina 1999". 
168 According to information in table 7, in Worsley joint venture Reynolds's stake was 56%. 
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Table 9: The SGA market 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Alcoa 48% 50% 44% 42% 44% 
Reynolds 4% 6% 6% 6% 6% 
Parties 52% 56% 50% 48% 50% 
Kaiser 10% 8% 11% 11% 11% 
Glencore 7% 8% 7% 7% 7% 
Alusuisse 5% 3% 5% 4% 4% 
Nalco 4% 4% 6% 6% 6% 
Guinee Gov 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 
Jamaic. Gov 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 
Total 86% 87% 87% 84% 86% 
Source: European Commission. 
The relative stability of market shares of the firms and particularly of the parties 
for the period 1999-2003 confirms that planned capacity expansions by competitors 
would not threaten Alcoa's dominance. 
Further expansions. They concern expansions beyond those that had already been 
announced for the period 1999-2003. The Commission's decision mentioned that the 
parties' Australian refineries had very good prospects of further expansion, 
particularly Wagerup and Worsley. The Commission's information was not complete, 
but the thesis's market research found that Wagerup's production, which after the 
2000 expansion had reached 2.2mt of production, could easily expand by another 
1. lmt to 3.3mt. The environmental approval169 for the further expansion had been 
given and, thus, there was nothing to stop Alcoa from realising the project when the 
market conditions would become favourable. Regarding Worsley, where Reynolds 
was controlling 56% stake, the refinery could be expanded further to 4mt from 3.1mt. 
Reynolds's share in this further expansion would be 500,000t. Moreover, in Kwinana, 
another Australian refinery, Alcoa had developed a new technology, which if applied 
to the other firm's refineries could increase total production of SGA by around 
500,000 tonnes annually 170. In any case Alcoa would have post-merger another 1.6mt 
(excluding the new technology's contribution) of SGA ready to enter into the market 
from Wagerup and Worsley. 
Such huge bottom-cost volumes could be used to raise further barriers to entry 
and expansion in the SGA market, while the Commission noted that the parties' 
market share would reach 65%-75% if all further expansion opportunities were taken 
i69 See report of Department of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia, "Alumina 1999". 
170 More information about the new technology was included in the report of Department of Minerals and Energy 
of Western Australia, see ibid. 
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into account. This market-share level constituted strong evidence of Alcoa's dominant 
position, which was further strengthened by the fact that Kaiser, the largest 
competitor, had planned no significant capacity expansion for the period 1999-2003 
apart from rebuilding the high-cost Gramercy refinery. Given also that Kaiser was 
facing financial problems, the firm's competitive gap from Alcoa would broaden 
during that period. 
Lastly, the parties' ability to block capacity expansions by incumbent competitors 
through their blocking interests in joint ventures that the parties were running with 
competitors was another crucial factor in Alcoa's attempt to dominate the market 
post-merger. As table 7 shows, Alcoa had a majority or equal interests in several joint 
ventures particularly with Billiton and Jamaican government, while Reynolds was 
having, apart from Worsley, also 50% interest in Stade refinery in Germany and 10% 
stake in Guinea, where the firm was offering technical assistance to the majority 
holder'71. The participation in these joint ventures would enable the parties not only to 
pursue a blockade or delay capacity expansions of the partners in the joint ventures 
but also to monitor the latters' behaviour. 
4.4.3.2 Conclusions 
The analysis of entry and expansion in the SGA market showed that the merging 
parties' dominance could not be threatened by the reaction of incumbent competitors 
or outsiders. To prove this, the Commission carried out a detailed analysis of the 
market situation. 
In respect of the methodology used, the Commission analysis involved apart from 
conventional entry analysis also reference to strategic behaviour concerning the 
parties' ability post-merger to raise prices profitably by deterring entry and expansion. 
It is submitted that this was a positive point in the Alcoa/Reynolds decision because 
the Commission went beyond a superficial static analysis by looking deep in the 
competitive behaviour of firms, which constitutes a step towards a more effective 
merger control. 
171 See para. 47 of the decision. 
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4.4.4 Country risk of expansion projects 
The Commission's investigation concluded that Australia was by far the country 
with the lowest country-specific risk using as a measure the level of interest rates. 
Australia was followed by Jamaica, India, and Brazil. The merging parties by having 
Darling Range refineries in Australia, as their main production sites had therefore 
competitive advantage against their competitors. 
On this issue there is no need for further comment. 
4.4.5 Know-how and technology 
According to the Commission, both Alcoa and Reynolds owned technology that 
could increase the yield of alumina in the refining process. Alcoa had a policy of not 
licensing know-how of this kind to competitors. 
Also, Worsley joint venture had developed a new technology, which would 
increase production at Worsley significantly. The Commission did not disclose more 
information about this new technology, but stressed that it could have given Reynolds 
the ability to attack Alcoa's dominance. By merging with Reynolds, Alcoa would not 
only eliminate the threat but would also gain access to this new technology thereby 
increasing its cost advantage over its competitors. Alcoa could also use the new 
technology to further deter entry. The Commission concluded that the new technology 
would strengthen Alcoa's dominance. 
The role of superior technology for establishing market control is somehow 
ambivalent. The ECJ and the Commission have in several instances172 considered 
superior technology as a factor indicating market dominance, and this was confirmed 
in the Commission Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers where 
technical advantages are cited between the types of entry barriers 173. However, this 
view is not widely accepted. 
Expenditure on new technologies normally requires high capital investment, 
which can be a sunk cost of entry thus contributing to the firm's dominance, but on 
the other hand, any potential entrant might not have to incur the same capital cost, 
172 See Case 27/76 United Brands v. Commission [1978] ECR 207, [1978] 1 CMLR 429, paras 82-84; Case 85/76 
Hoffman-La Roche v Commission [1979] ECR 461, [1979] 3 CMLR 211, para. 48; Case Eurofix-Bauco (Hilti) 
[1988] OJ L65/19, [1989] 4 CMLR 718. 
73 Para. 71. 
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since it will not be required to reinvent the new technology 174. Further, it has been 
argued175 that the fact that some firms possess greater skills or other sources of 
competitive advantage based upon superior management, expertise etc. may be the 
result of the competitive process, which competition policy aims to foster. According 
to this view superior technology in such cases is not anticompetitive. 
It seems that, as with captive sales, competition authorities in the context of 
merger analysis should not treat superior technology mechanistically. Such a 
technology gives competitive advantage to its owner but there are markets where for 
dominating the market other factors also play a crucial role. In the SGA market access 
to cheap raw material, namely bauxite ore, might be of equal or even bigger 
importance. Thus, in the SGA market, due to its nature, a high-cost US refinery would 
not be able to compete against Australian refineries whose production costs were half 
the US's even if it was using superior technology than the latter (see table 7). The 
latter technology would just weaken the competitive disadvantage of the US refinery. 
On the other hand, superior technology if applied to the bottom-cost Australian 
refineries, would further extend the cost advantage of these refineries and in this sense 
it would contribute to their ability to dominate the market. 
Regarding Alcoa/Reynolds merger, it seems that the Commission's decision to 
consider the parties' superior technology as a factor strengthening their ability to 
dominate the market was correct. Alcoa had already cost advantage against its 
competitors and the access to the new technology of Reynolds would further reduce 
the firm's costs thus strengthening Alcoa's market power. 
4.4.6 The bidding process176 
The Commission rejected the parties' allegations that there were at least 4-7 
bidders in tenders for third-party supply contracts in any given time. It cited historical 
evidence showing that Alcoa's share for contracts signed through the bidding process 
174 See Jones and Sufrin op. cit. 30,309,310. According to the definition of barriers to entry by the US economist 
George Stigler barriers to entry exist only where a new entrant will face higher costs than those already in the 
industry (see G. J. Stigler, The Organisation of Industry, Irwin, 1968, at 67). According to this theory superior 
technology is not a barrier to entry, since it does not represent a cost to the new entrant, which is not borne by the 
incumbents. 
'75 See Harbord and Hoehn op. cit. 161,423. 
176 Paras. 52-56 of the decision. 
119 
was in most years well above 40%, while if all bidders had equal opportunities 
Alcoa's share should have been 14%-25%. 
The Commission explained: 
"In a standard bidding situation where every bidder has the capacity to supply the whole market the 
winner is the company with the lower average cost. [That company] will set its bid just below the 
closest rivals average cost. In such a situation, the take-over of the closest rival [namely Reynolds] will 
lead to a considerable loss of competition since in any new bidding round the merged entity will set its 
price close to the third-best bidder". 
Alcoa submitted that SGA suppliers were capacity-constrained. The market was 
balanced and all suppliers could and did sell all their production. Consequently, the 
price in any given tender was close to the average cost of the bidder with the highest 
cost because no low-cost producer would ever forsake his higher profits by submitting 
a bid close to his nearest rival. 
The Commission accepted that the Darling Range refineries (two owned by Alcoa 
and one by Reynolds and Billiton) were playing an important role in tenders. 
Competition between Reynolds and Alcoa in tenders was tough because the two firms 
had similar costs and this was helping for lower prices. Reynolds could not be 
punished for deviation, because it had sufficient capacity to reply. Reynolds's 
elimination would therefore lead to higher equilibrium price in those bidding rounds 
where Darling Range plants were closely involved. 
Then, the Commission argued even if Reynolds's available SGA for future 
tenders was limited, since a large past had already been sold out, the firm would still 
be capable of keeping prices low in future tenders where it would participate to sell 
the remaining SGA. Moreover, according to the Commission, Worsley had still an 
expansion opportunity of at least 400,000t, which, because most expansions were 
committed before work started, would enable Reynolds to submit another bid for this 
quantity. 
The Commission concluded that the removal of Reynolds as a competitor would 
result in higher prices for long-term contracts because it would leave the control of all 
bottom-cost refineries to Alcoa. 
4.4.6.1 Competitive issues and comments 
For competition in bidding markets the all-or-nothing principle applies meaning 
that the winner supplies the whole tender, while the losers supply nothing. The 
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situation becomes serious for bidders when the size of the tenders on offer is large 
relative to the size of the total market because in that case bidders failing to win will 
be forced to cut production in their plants or even to exit from the market 177 . 
Also, in bidding markets, market shares may offer little evidence about market 
power, because even firms with immaterial or even no previous presence in the 
market could effectively constrain firms with high market shares if they were able to 
submit a credible bid and more importantly if this bid was successful. 
A merger involving firms competing in bidding markets may be harmful to 
competition if the merging firms for cost or other reasons were pre-merger 
constraining each other. Thus, the elimination of competition between the two firms 
post-merger will lead to higher equilibrium prices in the bidding process 178. 
Regarding the SGA market, the largest volumes of the product are sold under 
long-term contracts signed after the submission of bidding offers by suppliers. 
Another feature of the SGA market is that it is in equilibrium meaning that finally all 
firms even the high-cost ones sell their production. Thus, failure to win some tenders 
does not result in serious negative economic consequences for the firms. 
The Commission's analysis as shown concluded that Alcoa/Reynolds merger by 
involving two lowest-cost bidders would result in higher equilibrium prices in SGA 
tenders, because Alcoa after the elimination of it main rival would be free to offer 
higher prices in these tenders. This Commission's conclusion was reasonable but it 
seems that the elimination of Reynolds from the bidding process would reinforce 
apart from Alcoa's unilateral market power, also the risk of collusion there. The 
Commission did not establish also coordinated effects in this merger maybe because 
the dominance test, which was applied in this case, was oriented mostly towards tight 
symmetric oligopolies, mainly duopolies, and cases of broad and more asymmetric 
oligopolies such as that in the SGA market were not attracting equal attention'79 . 
However, as will be now shown, the SGA market concentrated several features 
relevant to tacit collusion. These features included amongst others, stable market 
shares, capacity-constrained competitors, homogeneous products, inelastic and 
177 Simon Bishop and Mike Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application and 
Measurement, Sweet & Maxwell, 2002,14.01,14.02. 
178 One such example could be a merger between the lowest and the second-lowest bidder. The removal of the 
second-lowest competitor will enable the lowest-cost firm to increase its bidding prices just below the price 
offered by the third-largest competitor from a level just below the second-lowest competitor prior to the merger. 
(See Bishop and Walker ibid., 14.08; also below). 
19 Under the dominance test almost all Commission decisions establishing collective dominance under the ECMR 
concerned duopolies. This issue is examined in more detail in chapter 7. 
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predictable demand, transparent market, barriers to entry and expansion, structural 
links between firms and credible mechanism of punishment. All these features would 
be strengthened after the merger due to the elimination of Reynolds, which was 
potentially a competitor disrupting successful coordination because of its low-cost 
capacity and existing overcapacity. Let us examine the issue of collusion in more 
detail. 
First, according to table 9 above, the market shares of the major SGA producers 
for the period 1999-2003 would remain almost unchanged. Market-shares stability 
generally is between the factors indicating coordinated behaviour180 but some 
economists have argued that such a situation is also compatible with a non-collusive 
oligopoly'81. For SGA, it seems that market-shares stability, taking also into account 
the other market features which are explained below, indicated more to risks of 
coordination than to the existence of a non-collusive situation. Further, table 9 shows 
asymmetries in market shares between SGA firms, which generally make 
coordination less likely182 but, on the other hand, they cannot exclude it183. Also, 
according to the CFI's decision in Airtours184, stable market shares resulting from 
cautious capacity planning do not indicate collective dominance if they exist prior to 
the merger, refer to all firms in the market and help firms to maintain their 
profitability against volatile and unpredictable demand. However, it is submitted that 
this ruling is not relevant for the SGA market. Although in the latter market capacity 
expansions could be deemed as "cautious", because amongst others they are difficult 
and costly, they nevertheless do not occur in the face of volatile and unpredictable 
demand, because as the Commission also said, capacity expansions follow the 
conclusion of the sale185. Moreover, demand in the SGA market is inelastic and this 
makes it predictable. In this respect and taking into account those mentioned above 
about the ability of Alcoa to make unprofitable or even block capacity expansions of 
competitors it seems that "cautiousness" in that market could be reasonably 
180 See Bishop and Walker op. cit. 177, at 7.38. 
181 See Roger D. Blair and Jill Boylston Herndon "Inferring Collusion From Economic Evidence", 15 Antitrust, 
2001,17,19. 
182 See Motta op. cit. 110,21. 
183 According to Navarro et al op. cit. 46,7.71, asymmetric market shares could indicate the existence of collective 
dominant situation "... as long as there is a main group of two or three undertakings with much greater market 
shares than the remaining competitors... " The Commission has established collective dominance in cases 
involving asymmetric market shares amongst others in IV/M. 1524 Aitours/First Choice (Case IV/M. 1524 OJ 
[2000] L93/1, [2000] 5 CMLR 494). The main reason for ignoring the lack of symmetry between the oligopolists 
was that this factor itself an obstacle to tacitly co-ordinated behaviour. 
1S4 Case T-342/99 Airtours v. Commission, (Judgment of 6 June 2002), paras 88-92. 
185 Para. 56 of the decision. 
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interpreted, as the result of coordination between suppliers or at least as a result of the 
intention of market participants to avoid engaging in tough competition, which could 
cause retaliation by big firms, particularly, Alcoa 186. Thus, the stability in market 
shares for the period 1999-2003 even if major expansion projects were at the stage of 
realisation during that period could imply the existence of some form of consensus 
between major SGA firms. The acquisition of Reynolds by Alcoa would strengthen 
that risk by eliminating a potential deviator. 
Further, product homogeneity and market transparency are two other factors 
generally facilitating coordination. Product homogeneity by reducing the dimensions 
of competition almost solely on prices reduces also the costs of coordination and thus 
makes it more likely' 87 Market transparency, amongst others, concerns transparency 
about prices, production and capacity levels, and investments in R&D and helps for 
monitoring the competitors' behaviour and detecting deviations188. SGA concentrates 
both elements, since it is a homogeneous product for unique use, namely the 
production of primary aluminium, while the nature of the latter as a global commodity 
whose prices are determined in the transactions of the London Metal Exchange 
safeguards wide transparency in both the aluminium and SGA markets. Thus, SGA 
demonstrates sufficient product homogeneity and market transparency to facilitate 
coordination between firms. 
Moreover, structural links between competitors generally reinforce the potential 
of coordination' 89. Although under the ECMR finding of such links is not required for 
the establishment of collective dominance between firms, their existence is positively 
related to it190. In the SGA market, Alcoa and Reynolds pre-merger by participating 
with veto rights in joint ventures with competitors were able to establish contacts with 
these competitors and monitor the latter's behaviour. Now, after the acquisition of 
Reynolds by Alcoa, the latter would expand its contacts and monitoring to Reynolds's 
partners thus reinforcing the potential of coordination in the industry. In such a case, 
"' The Commission guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers in para. 40 refer to coordination aiming at 
limiting production or the amount of new capacity brought to the market. 
187 See Jones and Sufrin op. cit. 30,775; also Europe Economics "Study on Assessment Criteria for Distinguishing 
between Competitive and Dominant Oligopolies in Merger Control", Final Report for the European Commission 
Enterprise Directorate General by Europe Economics, May 2001,31,32; also para. 45 of the Commission 
guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers. 
a8 See Europe Economics ibid. 32-33; also Bishop and Walker op. cit. 177,7.39,7.40. 
189 See para. 48 of the Commission guidelines; Navarro et al. op. cit. 46,7.74-7.94; Europe Economics ibid. at 87. 
190 See ibid. 
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veto rights could be used as a credible punishment of these partners in case of refusal 
to cooperate. 
Furthermore, all firms in the SGA market were capacity-constrained, which was 
facilitating coordination because there was no excess capacity to be used for deviation 
or retaliationt91. In connection to the above, the fact that all SGA suppliers would 
finally sell all their production could also help for establishing coordination between 
all firms because this would maximize the price that their products would be sold, 
thus increasing profit margins. 
As regards the form of coordination between bidders in the SGA market, it need 
not involve only collective action to raise price directly, which is the classical type of 
collusion, but merely action to change the rules of competition and to narrow its 
scope. Economists have described the relevant model as follows 192: 
"The collusive conduct in these cases [allows] the cartel members to insulate themselves from one 
another, at least partially, thereby establishing market segments within which each of the cartel 
members [have] increased pricing freedom. The newfound isolation [provides] benefits similar to those 
attainable from market power acquired in more traditional fashion. By increasing the space between 
cartel members, each [achieves] the power to raise prices. In these cases, collusion could generate 
profit increases even though the competing firms [do] not get together to set prices". 
In accordance with the above model, the scope of coordination between SGA 
bidders would be to change the rules and narrow the scope of competition between 
bidders to achieve supra-competitive prices. The collusive conduct needed not be a 
result of collective decision and action; the capacity constraints, the average costs, 
which differed between the bidders but were known to all of them, and the 
transparency holding in the market concerning the available capacity for tenders of all 
the suppliers, were sufficient to show to the firms the way they should follow to have 
the best results for themselves. So, in any given tender where Darling Range 
refineries took part all the other bidders knew, due to their cost disadvantage, that they 
would probably lose. Even if Alcoa's argument that the price in any given tender was 
close to the average cost of the bidder with the highest cost was true, this could not 
exclude the possibility that the price was intentionally set at that level, in order the 
low-cost refineries to realise higher profits, since they knew that none of the high-cost 
bidders would offer prices at level lower (or the same) of their average cost. 
191 See also Massimo Motta op. cit. 110; also Olivier Compte et al op. cit. 165,1; also Massimo Motta "The 
Economics of Joint Dominance", mimeo, University of Michigan, 1999. 
192 See Robert H. Lande and Howard P. Marvel "The Three Types of Collusion: Fixing Prices, Rivals and Rules", 
Wisconsin Law Review, 2000,941,943. The model described here refers to a situation of allocation of contracts 
between bidders. Such a form of coordination is referred to in para. 40 of the Commission Notice on horizontal 
mergers. 
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According to the model, the participation of Darling Range refineries in any given 
bidding process could be interpreted as a move to insulate these refineries from the 
other bidders thereby establishing a market segment where they would be virtually 
free to set the prices at the level they wished to, since the others would not bid hard. 
And according to Alcoa, that level was just below the average cost of the bidder with 
the highest cost. 
What about the other bidders, whose average costs were higher than those of 
Darling Range refineries but lower than the price finally offered by them? These 
bidder would prefer to set their prices higher than the price offered by Darling Range, 
even if such a move would make them lose the tender, because they knew that they 
would probably sell their SGA production at a higher price, in the tenders to follow 
(the market was in equilibrium and all refineries would finally sell their production). 
Then, Darling Range refineries after selling out all their production at their chosen 
price, would withdraw from future tenders where the remaining bidders would offer 
higher equilibrium prices. In these tenders, the bidder with the lowest operating cost 
would also set the price and thus it could establish its own market segment. The same 
process would continue until all bidders sold their production. Thus, in that way all 
firms would finally establish their own market segment within which they would be 
free to set the prices at the highest possible level. Even if that level differs 
substantially between the firms, it is nevertheless higher than that achieved in a 
competitive market. Thus, all the bidders would be able to exercise more market 
power than if the market was fully competitive and, as a result, the overall equilibrium 
price in the market would be higher. 
Alcoa/Reynolds merger would facilitate the establishment of the above scenario 
because it would result in the elimination of Reynolds a firm which due to its low-cost 
production and expansion capabilities was capable of acting independently thus 
making coordination more difficult. 
The above-described scenario does not directly concern collusion on prices, 
which is most often the case with collusive oligopolies, but collusion aiming to 
narrow the scope of competition. Such situations, however, also fall within the scope 
of the Commission's analysis for merger control purposes and therefore the 
Commission could have looked to the potential SGA bidders to seek, between other 
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things, also to narrow the scope of competition between them in the bidding 
process 193. 
The implementation of the above scenario would be further facilitated by the 
repeated interaction between bidders and by the absence of new entry in the market. 
Repeated interaction improves communication between coordinating firms and helps 
to solve problems, while the absence of entry reduces the threat of "hit-and-run" 
competition, which could threaten the results of coordination 194. In the SGA market, 
all bidders have long presence there and therefore are well known to each other. In 
addition, participation in SGA joint ventures and in other aluminium markets 
reinforces the potential of cooperation. 
However, the Commission's decision mentioned that Alcoa's share in contracts 
signed under the bidding process had been well above 40% for most years, while if all 
bidders had equal opportunities the firm's share would have been between 14-25%. 
This could mean that coordination in the bidding market was not working effectively 
because Alcoa was capable of deviating due to its cost advantage and its expansion 
opportunities. However, provided that all sellers in the SGA market were finally 
selling all their production and taking also into account the other market features 
mentioned about, such as stability in market shares, market transparency, product 
homogeneity and capacity-constrained firms, one could still not reject the presence in 
the SGA market of coordination aiming to narrow the scope of competition. 
For instance, firms being -most likely due to their higher costs- unable to 
establish their market segment in the bidding process and therefore with surplus 
production, could sell their production in the open market where Alcoa would not 
compete. In that market prices are generally higher and those firms would achieve 
higher profits. Thus, the market segmentation mentioned above could cover apart 
from the bidding process also the entire market. 
However, according to the theory on oligopoly and the Commission's practice, 
for the sustainability of coordination two additional requirements should be met: 
detection and punishment of deviations' 95. Detection of deviations seeks to identify 
193 The Commission has examined collective dominance where collusion takes place in bidding markets in MCI 
WorldCom/Sprint (Case COMP/M. 1741,2000), concerns geographic partitioning of the wholesale gas market in 
Exxon/Mobil (Case IV/M. 1383,1999), or downtime of productive assets in Norske Skog/Parenco/Walsum 
(COMP/M. 2499,2001). See also in para. 40 of the Commission guidelines on the appraisal of horizontal mergers. 
194 See Europe Economics op. cit. 187,22-23. 
195 See G. J. Stigler "A Theory of Oligopoly", 72 Journal of Political Economy, 1964,44. Also para. 41 of the 
Commission guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers. The guidelines refer also to a third factor, the 
reaction of outsiders, which was examined in the analysis of entry and expansion above. 
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those firms that do not adhere to the terms of coordination. In the SGA market such 
detection was not difficult, since any deviation required capacity expansion, which 
was easily detectable due to the high level of market transparency and the complexity 
and lengthiness of an expansion project. 
Regarding punishment of deviations in conditions of capacity restrictions, the 
Commission's view196 is that punishment based on capacity expansion can be 
successful if a) the punishment period is relatively short-lived, b) excess capacity can 
be absorbed by growing demand during the punishment period and c) the oligopolists 
are not committed to using the extra installed capacity base in the long-term. 
However it has been argued'97 that in a market with growing demand each 
oligopolist can achieve higher profits through competition for increased sales than 
through parallel behaviour. Also, that effective punishment should target only the 
deviator and that broad capacity expansion is not very effective in this sense because 
it has normally, by affecting the total market equilibrium, significant impact on prices 
and thus harms also the oligopoly members. According to this view, such a 
consequence may undermine common policy between the oligopolists. 
However, it should be mentioned that coordinated behaviour could be harmful to 
competition and consumers even if it did not perfectly achieve a monopoly outcome, 
but less than that 198. Regarding retaliation, it is definitely more effective if it applies 
only to the deviator but it can also be effective if it applies to all competitors. For 
instance, the return to the competitive price level constitutes in many markets 
sufficient retaliation even if it affects also the oligopolists'99. It may be even more 
effective at a preliminary stage as a threat against deviation because it is easy to 
apply. The retaliation threat, as the Commission showed in the analysis of entry, can 
often be as effective as the retaliation itself. Lastly, in cases where the oligopolists and 
the deviator compete against each other in several markets or where the deviator is 
dependent, even partly, upon the oligopolists for supplies of the product, the 
'Case IV/M. 2420 Mitsui/CVRD/Caemi, Decision of 30 Oct. 2001, paras. 239-24 1. 197 See Robert O'Donoghue and Christoph Feddersen "Case T-342/99 Airtours plc. v. Commission, Judgment of 
the Court of First Instance of 6 June, 2002", 39 C. M. L. Rev., 2002,1171,1178-1179. 
198 See Lande and Marvel op. cit. 193, at 942-3; also 1992 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 2.11. 199 See Frederic Jenny "Collective Dominance and the EC Merger Regulation" in International Antitrust Law & 
Policy, Fordham Corporate Law Institute, Juris Publishing, 2002,361, at 364; also Jonathan Baker "The Sherman 
Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the Oligopoly Problem and Contemporary Economic Theory" Antitrust 
Bull., 1993,143,161. 
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retaliation may involve all these markets, while it will likely include cease of supplies 
to the deviator thus increasing the losses for him200. 
Regarding the SGA market, punishment of deviation could come mostly from 
Alcoa through its expansion advantages. In the analysis of entry above it was shown 
that the firm post-merger would have at least 1.6mt of low-cost SGA available for 
entry in the market earlier than any other competitor. Such quantity of SGA was more 
than that of Gramercy and its impact on the market prices would therefore be 
significant. Also, the firm could block or delay any attempt by competitors to increase 
their production in joint ventures where the firm was participating. However, the most 
effective use of these advantages would be, as the Commission also pointed out, as a 
threat against competitors. In a market such as SGA where most competitors are 
capacity-constrained, which means that any significant deviation by these competitors 
would require capacity expansions, which are costly, difficult, take a long time and 
are easily detectable, it could hardly be seen why a firm would endanger its market 
position by seeking deviation, knowing that its attempt would most likely fail because 
the cartel members, mostly Alcoa, after detecting the expansion would be able to 
cancel any benefit from the deviation even before that deviation occurred. Alcoa's 
expansion opportunities would enable, as shown, the firm to channel SGA to the 
market, thus driving prices lower, before the deviator's new capacity entered the 
market. Thus, the deviator would have to sell its new capacity at lower prices than 
expected, while he would also suffer from the high costs of the expansion and also 
from lower prices for the sale of his old capacity, since the overall market equilibrium 
would be violated. Of course, Alcoa, as the market leader, would lose more from the 
lower SGA prices, but it has to be remembered that the firm had also significant cost 
advantages against its competitors and therefore the loss for the firm, finally might not 
be that significant. In addition, along with Alcoa other players could retaliate against 
the deviator potentially not only in the SGA market but also in other aluminium 
markets where the most firms acting in the SGA market had also presence. As a 
result, it seems that at the time of the merger there was in existence in the SGA 
market a credible punishment mechanism, which along with the practical difficulties 
200 For more on the role of multi-market contact in co-ordinated effects see Bishop and Walker, op. cit. 178, at 
para. 7.60. The commission has examined multi-market contacts in several merger cases including Air Liquide/BOC (Case IV/M. 1630, (2000); [2000] 4 CMLR 246) and Solvey/Montedison-Ausimont (Case 
COMP/M. 2690,2002). 
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that any potential deviator would face, were safeguarding the sustainability of the 
coordinated behaviour. 
However, a question arising is whether Alcoa, taking into account its significant 
expansion potential and the inability of its competitors to retaliate, could become a 
deviator itself. It seems that even for Alcoa deviation entailed significant risks. Apart 
from the potential of lower SGA prices due to the upset in supply/demand balance in 
the SGA market caused by Alcoa's increased sales, the firm could potentially face a 
price war by cartel members in other aluminium markets as well. As shown above the 
most SGA sellers are vertically integrated firms with presence also in downstream 
markets. Thus, these firms could retaliate downstream and this could harm Alcoa. It 
would therefore be more beneficial for the firm to act as a leader in a collusive 
oligopoly than to compete. 
4.4.6.2 Conclusion 
The above analysis demonstrated features of the SGA market indicating increased 
risk of coordinated effects from the Alcoa/Reynolds merger in the bidding market for 
long-term contracts. One could say that the elimination of Reynolds would not only 
increase Alcoa's unilateral market power in SGA tenders but would also facilitate 
coordination between Alcoa and its main competitors there. 
The Commission's decision by focusing only on unilateral effects in this case 
failed therefore to assess fully the impact of the merger on competition. Coordinated 
interaction is a serious market situation potentially more harmful to competition than 
unilateral market power, and therefore needs special treatment, particularly at the 
stage of remedies. 
However, a basic reason for the Commission's non-reference to coordinated 
effects might have been the dominance test, which was applied in this case. This test, 
which was until recently the market test of the ECMR, was oriented towards single- 
firm dominance or in cases of collusion towards dominant oligopolies, mainly 
duopolies. The SGA market, as will be explained in the next chapter, concerned a 
broad oligopoly involving at least five firms with no symmetry in market shares 
between them and there has been no case under the ECMR where coordinated effects 
were established in a similar case. However, such situations can definitely be harmful 
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to competition and therefore they should have been included within the scope also of 
the dominant test201. 
Now that a new substantive test in the ECMR has been adopted with broader 
scope and more flexibility, one should expect cases such as that of SGA to be 
captured and effectively dealt with by the Commission. 
4.4.7 Possible long-term suppliers 
The parties argued that there were at least seven SGAA producers with surplus 
production of more than 500,000t. They named apart from themselves Kaiser, 
Glencore, CVG, Nalco, the Guinean government and the Jamaican government. 
The Commission did not agree that all these firms were reliable long-term 
suppliers. 
Kaiser, the most reliable long-term supplier of the above firms according to most 
customers, was facing the uncertainty for the rebuilt of its refinery in Gramercy. 
Glencore was mostly a trader and was sourcing SGA partly from Alcoa. Nalco's 
preference was with medium-term contracts with Indian and Chinese smelters. The 
Jamaican government preferred also medium-term contracts and was facing capacity 
constraints due to Alcoa's first refusal rights in their joint refinery. CVG of Venezuela 
had only small quantities of alumina and was based in a politically risky area. 
Concerning Guinean government, it could not be considered as a reliable long-term 
supplier due to the country's political instability. Thus, the Commission concluded 
that after the merger only 3 long-term suppliers would remain in the market. 
Billiton and Pechiney, which were acting in alumina market as traders, should not 
be included in the list because they were significantly dependent upon Alcoa and 
Reynolds for SGA purchases. 
The Commission's analysis showed clearly that by acquiring Reynolds Alcoa 
would eliminate the most reliable and independent SGA competitor. 
4.4.8 Efficiency gains 
201 The issue will be examined in more detail in the chapters to follow. 
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Efficiency gains were not examined in Alcoa/Reynolds. According to Alcoa, the 
firm was expecting from the merger synergies of approximately US$300m by 2002, 
of which US$80m, on an annualised basis, was set to come from the Richmond, 
Virginia, site of the Reynolds's headquarters, where personnel would be reduced from 
2°2 808 to 108. 
Efficiencies in the framework of the ECMR could be examined, as explained in 
chapter three, under Article 2(l)(b), which authorises the Commission to take into 
account "... the development of technical and economic progress provided that it is to 
consumers' advantage and that does not form an obstacle to competition". However, 
the Commission's practice regarding efficiencies has been nebulous leaving 
sometimes the impression that the Commission is hostile against them, while 
according to some views efficiencies have played a role in several past cases under 
the ECMR203. However, thus far there has been no case where an otherwise 
anticompetitive merger was cleared on efficiencies grounds. 
The adoption in the ECMR of a new substantive test, which more clearly allows 
for efficiencies considerations 204, along with the adoption of an analytical framework 
on efficiencies in the Commission guidelines on the assessment of horizontal 
mergers205 set the stage for a formal examination of efficiencies in future cases. 
According to the guidelines, which follow a policy largely similar to the 1992 US 
merger guidelines206, efficiencies should cumulatively be beneficial to consumers, 
merger-specific and verifiable207. Regarding benefits to consumers, the relevant 
benchmark is that consumers should not be worse off after the merger and therefore 
efficiencies should be substantial and timely seeking to benefit consumers in the 
market where the competitive concerns arise208. Thus, the EU policy accepts the 
consumer and not the total welfare standard for the examination of efficiencies209. 
202 See Christopher Bowe and Nikki Tait "Aluminium: At a crossroads after acquisitions: Alcoa", in FT Survey: 
Aluminium 2000, October 25,2000. 
207 A good analysis of past and current trends in EC merger control with respect to efficiencies can be seen in a 
recent Article by Christopher Luescher "Efficiency Considerations in European Merger Control- Just Another 
Battle Ground for the European Commission, Economists and Competition Lawyers " 25 E. C. L. Rev. 2004,72. 
See also chapter 3. 
204 See also chapter 3. 
205 Paras. 76-88 of the guidelines. 
206 See also in the next chapter where the EU and US policies concerning efficiencies are considered. 
207 Ibid. para. 78. 
208 Para. 79 of the guidelines. 
209 On the issue Mario Monti "Merger Control in the European Union: a Radical Reform", Speech in the IBA 
Conference on European Merger Control, Brussels, November 7,2002. About consumer and total welfare models 
see in the analysis of efficiencies in the US in the next chapter. 
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Merger-specific efficiencies are those that are the direct consequence of the 
merger and cannot be achieved to a similar extent by less anticompetitive 
alternatives210. "Verifiable" are those efficiencies for which the Commission "... can 
be reasonably certain that [they] are likely to materialise and be substantial enough to 
counteract a merger's potential harm to consumers"21 
Also, the guidelines stress that the greater the possible negative effects to 
competition the more the Commission has to be sure that the claimed efficiencies are 
substantial, likely to be realised, and to be passed on, to a sufficient degree, to the 
consumer212. However, efficiencies are unlikely to counteract the anti-competitive 
effects of the merger if these effects concern the creation of monopoly or a situation 
similar to it213. 
Although the efficiencies' doctrine of the Commission has not been tested in 
practice yet, the decision to formally incorporate efficiencies in the analysis of 
mergers under the ECMR was correct and closed an existing gap in the legislation. 
In Alcoa/Reynolds issues of significant efficiencies were not raised. The amount 
of US$300m from cost savings proposed by Alcoa for the period of 2000-2002 would 
be rather immaterial given that the merged firm would have annual sales of 
approximately US$20billion214. In addition, the largest part of these savings would 
come, according to Alcoa, from reductions in administrative costs through reduction 
of personnel in Reynolds's headquarters, which constitute fixed costs. Economic 
theory has suggested that fixed costs likely result in price increases post-merger than 
in price reductions215. For this reason, the Commission guidelines provide that 
efficiencies leading to reductions in variable and marginal costs are more likely to 
preferable to reductions in fixed costs216. 
As a result, and given that neither the EU or the US decisions expressly referred to 
efficiency gains in Alcoa/Reynolds it could be assumed that the merger would not 
create any significant efficiencies, which constituted additional evidence against the 
210 Para. 85 of the guidelines. 
211 Ibid. para. 86. 
212 Ibid. para. 84. 
213 Ibid. 
214 Source: US decision. 
215 See European Commission The Efficiency Defence and the European System of Merger Control, Directorate- 
General for Economic and Financial Affairs, 2002,51. 
216 See para. 80 of the Guidelines. 
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merger. According to the economic theory, a merger that produces no or even limited 
merger-specific efficiencies is likely to result in higher prices. 217 
4.4.9 Conclusions on the competitive assessment 
The Commission's analysis in Alcoa/Reynolds is a classical example of a single 
dominance case under the ECMR, which is also captured by the new substantive test 
of the Regulation. However, apart from single dominance the interest in this case 
concerns also certain other issues, particularly to the risk of coordinated effects. 
A potential flaw in the Commission's analysis concerned the fact that coordinated 
effects were not examined. This thesis carried out a detailed analysis of how 
Alcoa/Reynolds merger could result also in such effects. For the Commission's failure 
to address the issue in this case the thesis concluded that the main cause was in the 
application of the dominance test which was focused more on dominant oligopolies 
comprising only a limited number of big firms, mostly only two. Thus, cases of broad 
oligopolies, such as that in the SGA market, seemed to have been given limited 
attention. Another reason, which will be examined in more details in subsequent 
chapters, concerns the fact that the dominance text provided for the establishment of 
either single or collective dominance in the same merger and not both. However, the 
analysis of the SGA market showed that in certain broad oligopolies the market 
conditions may facilitate collusion and failure by the Commission to deal with these 
cases could mean that the competitive assessment did not identify all the competitive 
effects of the merger. 
As for the methods of analysis followed by the Commission in Alcoa/Reynolds 
they included apart from reference to standard structural factors, such as market 
shares and concentration, also strategic behaviour, which refers also to dynamic 
analysis and which concerned Alcoa's ability to prevent entry and expansion of 
competitors by acting strategically. The advantage of dynamic analysis is that it goes 
deep into the market by focusing on firms' behaviour. Such an analysis generally 
produces more reliable competitive assessments but, on the other hand, it is more 
difficult to materialise. In the analysis of the US decision in the next chapter, the 
217 See Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis" Am. Econ. Rev. March 
1990,107,112. 
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thesis will present another method of dynamic analysis of competition focusing on 
maverick firms. 
4.5 The Commitments 
To address the Commission's competitive concerns the parties offered certain 
commitments consisting in the divestiture of Reynolds's 56% stake at Worsley and 
Reynolds's 50% stake in the refinery of Stade, Germany. The Commission considered 
these commitments sufficient to restore competition in the SGA merchant market 
because the capacity divested was considerably more than the tonnage of SGA sold 
by Reynolds on that market. The Commission further stressed that the sale of Worsley 
would also eliminate the overlap in the lowest-cost SGA refineries and that the 
refinery had very good expansion opportunity of at least a further 400,000t if not 
900,000t, whereas it was located in a geographic area with low country risk. Thus, the 
two undertakings proposed by the parties were capable of restoring the level of 
competition that existed prior to the merger. 
4.5.1 Competitive issues and comments 
The basic principles applied by the Commission when examining parties' 
commitments under the ECMR can be seen in the Commission Notice on 
Remedies 218. 
According to the Notice, the parties are required "... to show clearly.. . that the 
remedy restores conditions of effective competition in the common market on a 
permanent basiss219. Further, from several Notice's provisions220 and public 
comments of EU officials221 it follows that the preferred remedy is for the divestiture 
of a viable stand-alone business, which ensures that "competition is restored to the 
218 Notice on Remedies acceptable under Council regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 and under Commission Regulation 
(EC) No 447/98, [2001] OJ C68/3 ("Notice on Remedies"). The Notice is expected to change in the near future to 
be in line with the new substantive test of the ECMR. However, big changes in the Commission practice should 
not be expected. 
For more details on the Commission's policy regarding remedies see also in the chapter 3 of the thesis. 
219 Ibid. para. 6. 
220 Paras. 9,13,14,17 and 18 of the Notice. 
221 See speech by the Commissioner for Competition Mario Monti "The Commission Notice on Merger Remedies- 
one year after" CERNA, Paris, January 18,2002, available on the website of European Commission. 
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market either by the emergence of a new independent competitive entity or by the 
strengthening of an existing competitor"222. 
In practice concerning divestiture, which was the case in Alcoa/Reynolds, the 
Commission normally requires the divestiture package to be transferred to a 
"suitable" purchaser approved by it. Such a purchaser must be "... a viable existing or 
potential competitor, independent of and unconnected to the parties, possessing the 
financial resources, proven expertise and having the incentive to maintain and develop 
the divested business as an active competitive force in competition with the parties" 
[italics added]223. The Commission normally awards great importance to suitable 
buyers and therefore often connects the approval of the merger to the finding of such 
a buyer by the parties224. 
Regarding SGA, therefore, divestiture should be sufficient to address the 
Commission's concerns about the establishment of a dominant position as a result of 
Alcoa/Reynolds merger. 
The divestitures of Reynolds's stake at Worsley and Stade refineries seemed to 
have solved the structural problem, since with those divestitures all Reynolds's 
merchant SGA production would be sold to a third party. As a result, the market share 
of Alcoa in the merchant market would return to its pre-merger level, thus eliminating 
the risk of the establishment of a dominant position. Moreover, given that the two 
refineries were producing also SGA for Reynolds's captive use, Alcoa post-merger 
would be forced to capture extra SGA, otherwise sold to the merchant market, for 
internal use. Thus, Alcoa's market share in the merchant market would be further 
reduced. 
Further, as the Commission stressed, Worsley could be further expanded by at 
least 400,000t, which meant that the new owner would have even more bottom-cost 
SGA available for sale. The sale of Worsley to a third party would therefore prevent 
Alcoa from raising prices in bidding contracts. Thus, one could argue, that Worsley 
was the stand-alone business required by the Notice and which would enable a 
"suitable" buyer to compete effectively against Alcoa, as Reynolds did. 
222 See Mario Monti ibid.; also Simon Holmes and Sarah Turnbull "Remedies in Merger Cases: Recent 
Developments" 23 E. C. L. Rev. 2002,499,503. 
223 Para 49 of the Notice. 
224 See also Antoine Winckler "Some Comments on Procedure and Remedies under EC Merger Control Rules: 
Something Rotten in the Kingdom of the Merger Control? " 26 World Competition 2003,219, at 225-226 (citing 
recent cases where the Commission examined up-front buyers). 
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The next step was to find a "suitable" buyer for the divested assets, which would 
be "independent to and unconnected of the parties" and capable of competing 
effectively. Finding a suitable buyer was important for the restoration of competition 
not only quantitatively but also qualitatively, since Reynolds had been in the past 
independent from Alcoa. Establishing an independent competitor would also help to 
eliminate the risk of coordinated effects in the SGA market post-merger. Even if the 
Commission did not find such effects in Alcoa/Reynolds, the establishment of a new 
independent competitor would indirectly help also in this respect because that 
competitor would be capable of disrupting coordination in the SGA market, as 
Reynolds did. 
The wider possible list of buyers would include Kaiser, Glencore, Nalco, Alcan 
(Algroup), the Guinean government, the Jamaican government, Billiton, Pechiney and 
the categories of SGA traders and of independent smelters. The most of the above 
firms were the largest existing SGA players according to table 1, while the remaining 
were SGA traders and independent smelters, namely SGA buyers. From the above list 
should be excluded for obvious reasons the Guinean government and the Jamaican 
government, Indian Nalco, which was also a state-owned company, and Kaiser, which 
was facing financial and other difficulties. 
Regarding independent smelters, if one of them were to acquire Worsley, the 
SGA produced there would be used for internal purposes and such a potential would 
be of no benefit for the merchant SGA market. Instead, the new owner by becoming 
vertically integrated would seek higher SGA prices to harm non-integrated 
competitors. The same would hold for Alcan (Alusuisse) and Pechiney, which were 
also vertically integrated225. 
The two remaining firms were Billiton and Glencore. Regarding Billiton, it was 
Reynolds's partner in Worsley, and simultaneously partner with Alcoa in two refining 
joint ventures in Surinam and Brasil where Alcoa had controlling stake. Thus, even if 
Billiton after the acquisition of Worsley had the ability to compete effectively, it is 
doubtful if it would have the incentive to do it. The participation in joint ventures with 
Alcoa made the firm connected to the latter and therefore Billiton could not be 
deemed a "suitable" buyer. Regarding Glencore, the firm was according to the 
225 As mentioned in the analysis of the case above the Commission in its decision found that vertically-integrated 
firms had interest in higher SGA prices that would harm SGA buyer, with whom integrated firms were competing 
downstream. 
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Commission's analysis partly dependent upon Alcoa and other suppliers for its 
trading activities. The acquisition of Worsley would strengthen the firm's position in 
SGA merchant market and might make it more independent. 
The above references to possible buyers show that it would be difficult for 
competition authorities to find a suitable buyer for Reynolds assets. Although it is 
unknown how many and which firms finally showed interest for buying Worsley, the 
new owner of the refinery was finally, Billiton the minority shareholder there226. The 
firm was entitled according to an agreement with Reynolds to bid for the latter's stake 
and Billiton exercised this right. 
The approval of Billiton as a suitable buyer was controversial mostly due to the 
existence of the above-mentioned ties between that firm and Alcoa even if Billiton 
was in good position to effectively run Worsley. However, the cooperation with Alcoa 
was indisputable and this raised questions on whether Billiton would have sufficient 
incentive to effectively compete against Alcoa as Reynolds did. At least the 
Commission could have sought to sever ties between the two firms in the joint 
ventures. However, the good relationship between Alcoa and Billiton was confirmed 
one year after Alcoa/Reynolds deal when the two firms agreed to merge their metal 
distribution businesses in North America227. 
4.5.2 Conclusions 
The Alcoa/Reynolds decision concerning remedies in the SGA market revealed an 
aspect of the problem in the selection of the appropriate buyer in the divestiture 
process. Given that divestiture is the main remedy in merger control, competition 
authorities should give very close attention to the selection of the appropriate buyer. 
They should remember that effective merger control does not mean only proper 
identification of the competitive problem but also proper restoration of effective 
competition, otherwise merger control will fail to protect competition and consumers. 
And proper restoration in this respect means not only quantitative restoration of 
competition but also qualitative. 
226 See Bob Regan "Billiton to Buy Alcoa's Stake in Worsley for $1.49B" American Metal Market, August 30, 
2000. 
227 See "Alcoa's Distribution Unit Completes Merger with BHP Billiton" Pittsburgh Business Times, November 1, 
2001. 
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In the SGA market competition was restored quantitatively, since Alcoa's market 
share returned to its pre-merger level but it is questionable whether competition was 
restored also qualitatively, since the buyer of the crucial divestiture asset, was not as 
independent competitor as Reynolds was. 
Another more general conclusion arising from this case is that remedial decisions 
are dependent on the competitive assessment. If the competitive assessment fails to 
fully identify the competitive effects of the merger, the remedial decision will also 
fail228. If, for instance the Commission for SGA had established also coordinated 
effects as a result of Alcoa/Reynolds merger, it might have been more careful in its 
decision to approve Billiton as a buyer of the divested assets, because such a move 
would not have solved the coordination problem. 
228 A good example of a merger which clearly shows how closely related the competitive assessment and the 
decision of the remedies are, is SEB/Moulinex [Case IV/M. 2621, SEB/Moulinex (Decision of 8/1/2002)]. In that 
case the Commission cleared the merger in Phase I subject to commitments with respect to certain markets outside 
France. The CFI which reviewed the case following the filing of an appeal by the Babyliss SA, (Case T-114/02 
Babyliss SA v. Commission [2003] ECR 11-1279; [2004] 5 CMLR 1) annulled the Commission's decision for its 
part dealing with certain markets outside France for which the Commission had not imposed any commitments to 
the parties. (From all the European markets outside France the Commission had imposed commitments only in 
certain of them, while for the rest it imposed no commitments). The Commission for those markets had justified its 
decision not to impose any commitments on grounds that the merger would change competition only marginally. 
However, the CFI rejected this justification on grounds that it was based on an improper application of the theory 
of range effects and ruled that the Commission erred when refused to establish serious doubts as to the 
compatibility of the merger in these markets. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SGA market: the US decision 
5.1 Introduction 
The Alcoa/Reynolds merger was also reviewed by the US Department of Justice 
(DOJ) which, in respect of the SGA market, concluded that the merger would 
"substantially lessen competition" by resulting in both unilateral and coordinated 
effects. 
This chapter contains a detailed analysis of the US decision and also extensive 
comparisons between the framework and application of substantive merger control in 
the US and the EU. Such analysis and comparisons help to clarify the similarities and 
differences in the application of merger control in the two jurisdictions, which in turn 
help to assess the latest developments with the introduction of a new substantive test 
in the Merger Regulation of the EU. 
The adoption of the US substantial-lessening-of-competition (SLC) test had been 
proposed as a replacement of the dominance test in the EU but such a solution was 
finally not adopted. This thesis by analysing the practical application of the SLC test 
seeks to clarify basic issues about this test, to show the differences with the 
dominance test, as well as to assess the final EU decision not to adopt the SLC test for 
its merger control. 
In addition, the inclusion of a detailed analysis of the US test into this thesis, 
serves several other of the thesis's aims. First, the US agencies, as will be seen in the 
analysis, make a more extensive use of dynamic analysis in the assessment of the 
competitive effects of mergers, while, compared with the European Commission, they 
follow a more flexible approach to a number of issues, such as the market definition 
and the assessment of oligopolies. This offers support to the thesis's general argument 
that the application of merger control by the European Commission should become in 
the future more flexible and use more often dynamic analysis, which will not rely for 
establishing competitive harm only on market shares and concentration but will search 
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deeper into the competitive effects of the merger by analysing apart from general 
market conditions also the behaviour of firms. 
Second, as will be shown, the US agencies for assessing the competitive effects 
of mergers rely only on the results of the application of vigorous economic 
methodologies, which produce quantitative evidence, while the European 
Commission traditionally takes into account also qualitative factors. The thesis by 
analysing these apparently different US and EU approaches to merger analysis seeks 
to assess, which of these approaches best serves the scope of the protection of 
effective competition and consumers. 
Lastly, given that the thesis focuses on difficult issues of merger control, such as 
the product differentiation, the oligopoly problem and the remedies, it is useful to see 
how another jurisdiction deals with these issues. This would help drawing conclusions 
not only for the current effectiveness of EU merger control, but also for the adoption 
of appropriate measures to improve its effectiveness in the future. 
5.2 Merger control in the US: agencies, judicial review, framework and 
procedures. 
5.2.1 The agencies and the role of courts 
Merger control in the US is exercised primarily by two federal agencies: the 
Department of Justice ("DOJ") and the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), which 
share jurisdiction regarding the assessment of notified mergers. The two agencies are 
separate organisations but in 1992 they issued for the first time a joint statement, the 
1992 Revised Merger Guidelines, where they established common criteria for the 
review of horizontal mergers. 
The Antitrust Division of the DOJ is headed by an assistant Attorney General 
appointed by the US President for an indefinite period. It is responsible for enforcing 
the Sherman Act' and, jointly with the FTC, the Clayton Actg. The Antitrust Division 
has the authority to investigate and prosecute mergers that have been determined to be 
' 15 U. S. C.. §§ 1-7. 
2 15 U. S. C.. §12-27. 
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anticompetitive3. The DOJ does not have the authority to block a merger on its own. It 
must commence an action to temporarily or permanently enjoin the merger under the 
applicable statute in a federal district court4. 
The FTC is an independent regulatory agency headed by five Commissioners 
appointed by the President for seven years and has authority to enforce the Clayton 
Act, as it relates to mergers and other antitrust issues. Unlike the DOJ, the FTC has 
full authority to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate applications for merger 
approval6. The Office of Administrative Law Judges adjudicates the approval or 
denial of pre-notification merger applications. A decision of an administrative law 
judge in favour of the prosecuting arm of the FTC -thus rejecting the merger- can be 
appealed first to the full commission and then to a federal appeals court7. However, 
following the entry into force of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (HSR), which established 
a pre-merger notification system and provisions for preliminary or permanent 
injunctive relief before a federal courts, the FTC, in order to block the implementation 
of a merger notified to it in accordance with the HSR, has first to seek injunctive relief 
in a federal district court to prevent the consummation of the transaction pending 
administrative proceedings9. If the federal court issues an injunction and it is upheld 
by a federal court of appeals, the parties may choose to abandon the deal or, instead, 
may proceed to litigate the matter in administrative hearings before the FTC. If the 
court refuses to issue an injunction then the parties will consummate the deal and the 
FTC will decide whether to begin litigation before its own administrative law court to 
seek a divestiture order against the newly combined businesses10. 
From the above analysis it becomes clear that in the US the federal courts have 
the final say with respect to the prohibition of mergers. If the courts refuse to issue the 
injunction, the agencies can seek a full judgment of the case by the District Court and, 
3 See J. William Rowley & Donald I. Baker, International Mergers: The Antitrust Process, Sweet & Maxwell., 
1991,464. 
415 U. S. C. § 25. See also Diane P. Wood "A Comparison of Merger Review and Remedy Procedures in the United 
States and the European Union" in -Leveque Francois and Shelanski Howard (Ed. ), Merger Remedies in American 
and European Union Competition Law, Edward Elgar (Publ. ), 2003,67,69. 
s These Commissioners cannot be removed except "for cause" (They may only be removed for "inefficiency, 
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office". Humphrey's Ex'r v United States, 295 U. S. 602,623 (1935)) 6 Rowley & Baker op. cit. 3. 
7 15 U. S. C. § 45(c). 
8 15 U. S. C. §18a. 
9 The ability of FTC to seek preliminary or permanent injunctive relief is founded in section 13(b) (15 U. S. C. § 
53(b)) of Federal Trade Commission Act. See also Thalia Lingos "Transparency of Proceedings at the United 
States Federal Trade Commission" in Procedure and Enforcement in E. C. and U. S. Competition Law (Piet Jan Slot 
and Alison McDonnell Ed. ), Sweet & Maxwell, 1993,203, at 211-212. 
10 See also Lingos ibid. 
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following an appeal, by the Court of Appeals". The US Supreme Court has not 
decided a merger case on its merits since 1974. However, a full judgment of the 
District Court or of the Court of Appeals is very rare since the injunction decision is 
usually accepted by both sides as the final say of the case12. In most cases 
anticompetitive mergers are settled at the administrative level with the settlement 
agreement between the parties and the agencies taking the form of a consent degree, 
which is then taken to the Court for approval. However, in the most of these cases, as 
will be shown below, the Court gives its approval without examining in depth the 
details of the settlement. 
As a whole, in practice the US merger control system is not very different than 
that of Europe, since the US merger policy, like in Europe, is almost exclusively in 
the hands of competition agencies and not of the courts. 
5.2.2 The legal framework 
Section 7 of Clayton Act (15 U. S. C. § 18) constitutes the primary statutory basis 
for the review of mergers and acquisitions. Section 7 prohibits a corporation "engaged 
in commerce" from acquiring the stock or share capital or assets of another 
corporation where the effect of the acquisition "may be substantially to lessen 
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly". Section 7 establishes an express right 
of the federal government to challenge a merger or acquisition that is likely to lessen 
competition substantially or to create a monopoly13. 
Merger transactions may also fall within Section 1 of Sherman Act (15 U. S. C. 1) 
which prohibits "contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of trade"14, 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits monopolisation, attempted 
monopolisation and conspiracies to monopolisers and Section 516 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act (15 U. S. C. 45), which prohibits "unfair methods of competition" and 
"unfair acts or practices"17. 
11 Emil Paulis "Checks and Balances in the EU Antitrust Enforcement System" in International Antitrust Law and 
Policy, Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 2002,381,393. 
12 Ibid. 
13 See also William Dolan "Acquisitions & Mergers" 1371 PLI/Corp 2003,901, at 905. 
14 See e. g. United States v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 376 U. S. 665,671-672 (1964). 
15 See e. g. United States v. Grinnel Corp., 384 U. S. 563,575-576 (1966) 
16 See e. g. Am. Medical In'l, 104 F. T. C. 1,110 (1984). 
17 See Yvonne Quinn, Merger Analysis" 1252 PLI/Core 2001,1009,1014. 
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In addition to the above statutes, several sets of guidelines have been introduced 
and are used in merger analysis. Most important are the 1992 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines ("the Guidelines" or "US Guidelines"), dealing with horizontal mergers 
and the 1984 Merger Guidelines ("1984 Guidelines"), which were issued by the DOJ 
and which continue to regulate non-horizontal mergers. In 1993 the National 
Association of Attorneys General issued a set of uniform Merger Guidelines 18 . 
Although all those guidelines are not binding on the courts19, they are widely used by 
the enforcement agencies, which deal with a vast amount of cases as opposed to the 
courts, which review only a small number. Hence, the guidelines have become the 
basic tools of merger enforcement in the US. 
5.2.3 The procedures followed by the DOJfor anticompetitive mergers. 
If the DOJ finds that a merger, such as Alcoa/Reynolds, gives rise to 
anticompetitive effects, it will bring the case before a District Court2° by filing a 
Complaint21, signed by the Assistant Attorney General of the DOJ acting on behalf of 
the United States and which requests the court to block the merger because it violates 
(usually) Section 7 of Clayton Act. The DOJ also, after negotiating with the notifying 
parties, files in court for the settlement of the case a consent decree, which consists of 
a proposed Final Judgement22 and a "Hold Separate Stipulation and Order"23 
documents, and publishes them in the Federal Register. The proposed Final 
Judgement sets the conditions for the approval of the transaction referred to in the 
Complaint, which have also the consent of the parties against whom the case was 
filed. The conditions largely refer to divestiture of assets. The "Hold Separate 
Stipulation and Order" document, signed by both the plaintiff and the defendant 
applies to ensure that the Divestiture Assets "shall be maintained and operated as 
independent, economically viable and active competitors24s in the markets until the 
divestiture process is completed. 
18 256 Trade Reg. Rep Supp. (CCH) March 30,1993. 
19 See e. g. FTC v. PPG Indus., 798 F. 2d 1500,1503 n. 4 (D. C. Cir. 1986). 
20 See Section 15 of the Clayton Act 15 U. S. C. § 25. 
21 15 U. S. C. § 16. Even if there is an extra judicial settlement between the agencies and the notifying parties the 
case cannot be formally closed before it is brought to the court through the filing of a Complaint document by the 
DOJ and the court approves the settlement as being "in the public interest". (See below) 
22 See ibid. 
23 See ibid 
24 See "United States' Response to Public Comments" in Alcoa/Reynolds Case, p. 2. 
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After the filing of the Complaint and the consent decrees and in accordance with 
, the Tunney Act the DOJ must also prepare a Competitive Impact Statement (CIS)21 
which will contain analysis of the competitive concerns caused by the merger, 
explanation of the proposed settlement and a reference to and assessment of 
alternative solutions. The CIS must also be published in the Federal Register thus 
initiating a period of at least 60 days for public comments26 on the proposed Final 
Judgement. A Response to these comments by the "United States" is also to be filed 
with the Court and to be published in the Federal Register. 
Next, the plaintiff after issuing a Certificate of Compliance27, which will state that 
all the requirements of the Tunney Act have been satisfied, will pass the case to the 
Court, which will decide, after taking into account all the above, whether the proposed 
Final Judgement is "in the public interest"28 and if so will enter into the Final 
Judgement or else it may put the case to trial29. 
Regarding public interest, the court's function "... is not to determine whether the 
resulting array of rights and liabilities is one that will best serve society, but only to 
confirm that the resulting settlement is within the reaches of the public interest"30. The 
Court will examine the Final Judgement "in light of the violations charged in the 
complaint and.. . withhold approval only (a) 
if any of the terms appear ambiguous, (b) 
if the enforcement mechanism is inadequate, (c) if third parties will be positively 
injured or (d) if the decree makes a "mockery of judicial power"31. 
As for the remedies proposed in the Final Judgement the Court is not authorised 
by the Tunney Act to reject them or to impose different ones on the parties32. 
25 15 U. S. C. § 16. The Tunney Act was amended in 2004. 
26 See ibid. 
27 See ibid. 
28 See ibid. 
29 See Thomas Kauper "The Use of Consent Decrees in American Antitrust Cases" in Procedure and Enforcement 
in E. C. and U. S. Competition Law, (Piet Jan Slot and Alison McDonnell Ed. ), Sweet & Maxwell, 1993,104, at 
106. 
30 United States V. Western Elec. Co., 993 F. 2d 1572,1576 (D. C. Cir. ), cert. Denied, 510 U. S. 984 (1993); See also 
"United States Response to Public Comments" in Alcoa/Reynolds Case: The Court "should evaluate the relief set 
forth in the proposed final Judgement if it falls within the government's rather broad discretion to settle with the 
defendant within the reaches of the public interest" [quoting United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F. 3d 1448,1461 
(D. C. Cir. 1995); accord United States v. Associated Milk Producers, 534 F. 2d 113,117-18 (8`h Cir. ), cert. denied, 
429 U. S. 940 (1976)]. On the issue see also Kauper ibid. at 111. 
3' Massachusetts Sch. Of Law at Andover, Inc. v. United States, 118 F. 3d 776,783 (D. C. Cir. 1997). However, it 
seems that the legal standard of "public interest" under the Tunney Act remains vague and controversial. For more 
details on the issue see Lloyd C. Anderson "United States v. Microsoft, Antitrust Consent Decrees, and the Need 
for a Proper Scope of Judicial Review" 65 Antitrust L. J., 1996,1. The Tunney Act was amended in 2004, imposing 
certain changes on the courts' approach to the "public interest" when examining consent degrees. 
32 Microsoft. 56 F. 3d at 1460; United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131,153 n. 95 (D. D. C. 
1982) ("AT&T"), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U. S. 1001 (1983) (mem). 
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5.3 Substantive merger control in the US and the EU: some preliminary 
observations 
A central issue of debate between European competition scholars and legislators, 
particularly after the publication of the CFI's decision in Airtours, had been around 
the potential of replacing the dominance test of the ECMR with the US-oriented 
substantial-lessening-of-competition test ("SLC")33. 
Before examining in detail the SLC test and comparing it with the EU dominance 
test and the newer SIEC test some preliminary comments should be made. 
First, the SLC test, as mentioned above, is founded on the Clayton Act, which 
was adopted in 1914 and amended in 1950, and particularly on section 7, which 
prohibits mergers and acquisitions whose effects "may be substantially to lessen 
competition or to tend to create a monopolys34. The language is broad and, therefore, 
the role of its interpretation rests with competition agencies and the courts. During the 
1960s and early 1970s, the test was interpreted as meaning to "nip in the bud" 
mergers that threatened anticompetitive effects, including those that significantly 
increased concentration 35. The interpretation made the merger law so prohibitive that 
the US antitrust agencies and the courts soon considered it more appropriate to shrink 
the scope of the law. They did so gradually through guidelines and case law, which 
now prohibit only those mergers that significantly increase market power to the 
detriment of consumers36. 
Thus, according to the latest 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, mergers 
"should not be permitted to create or enhance market power or to facilitate its 
exercise"37. Market power, which according to the guidelines could be exercised 
either by a single firm acting unilaterally or by a few firms acting in coordination, is 
33 See e. g. Ulf Boge and Edith Muller "From the Market Dominance Test to the SLC Test: Are There any Reasons 
for a Change" 23 E. C. L. Rev. 2002,495; Eleanor Fox "Collective Dominance and the Message from Luxembourg" 
17-Fall Antitrust, 2002,57; also the European Commission in its Green Paper on the Review of Council 
Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 COM (2001) 745/6 raised the question of whether it would be appropriate to 
change the basis against which mergers are assessed from a dominance test to a test of "substantial lessening of 
competition". 
34 15 U. S. C. §18. 
35 See Eleanor Fox "Competition Law" in Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Economic Law, oxford, 2002, at 
362-3; Robert Pitofsky "Proposals for Revised United States Merger Enforcement in a Global Economy" 81 
Geo. LJ. 1992,195,196-198. 
76 See also Fox ibid. 
37 § 0.1; see also William M. Landes, Richard A. Posner "Market Power in Antitrust Cases" 94 Harvard Law 
Review 1981,937; Richard A. Posner Economic Analysis of Law (4'h ed. ) Little Brown and Co., 1992,299. 
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defined as "the ability profitably to maintain prices above competitive levels for a 
significant period of time"38. Similarly, the US courts have defined market 
(monopoly) power as the power to control prices or to exclude competition39. The 
guidelines refer also to lessening of competition on "dimensions other than price, such 
as product quality, service and innovation"40. 
Compared with the SLC the European dominance test appears different. 
According to the legal definition given by the ECJ°1, a dominant position contains two 
elements: the ability to prevent effective competition and the ability to behave to an 
appreciable extent independently from competitors, customers and consumers42. 
However, these two elements translated into economic terms constitute nothing more 
than illustrations of market power. The ability to act independently on the market 
appears reflective of the economists' concept of power over price, which means the 
ability of a firm or firms to increase price above the competitive level by restricting 
output43. Effective competition from an economics perspective means that no firm 
either acting individually or in coordination is able to exercise market power44 and 
from this it could be extracted that the ability to prevent effective competition means 
exactly the ability to exercise market power. 
From all the above it could be inferred that SLC and dominance tests converge 
significantly on the issue that market power is the main source of concern and that a 
firm or group of firms should not be allowed to exercise it. The only difference 
between the two tests in this respect is that such a conclusion could be more clearly 
derived from the SLC than from the dominance test, at least judging from the 
definition of dominance given by the ECJ45. 
However, a more significant difference between the two tests is on the applicable 
methods for measuring market power: the dominance test relies on a structural 
approach to merger analysis by placing more weight on market definition and market 
8§ 0.1 
39 See Standard Oil Co of New Jersey v. United States, 221 US 1 (1911); United States v. EI Du Pont de Nemours 
& Co, 351 U. S. 377 (1956); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U. S. 563 (1966). 
ao §0.1 n. 6. 
41 Case 27/76 United Brands v. Commission (1978] ECR 207, [1978] 1 CMLR 429. 
42 For more details on the issue see in the previous chapter. 
43 See Richard Whish, Competition Law, (4`h Ed. ), Butterworths, 2001,163; Valentine Korah, An Introductory 
Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice, (7t' Ed. ), Hart Publishing, 2000, at 3.2. 
44 See Simon Bishop and Mike Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law, (2"d Ed. ) Sweet & Maxwell, 2002, 
at 6.08. 
°S However, as Jones and Sufrin point out about the dominance test the term 'dominant position' should relate to 
the adverse consequences, which result when an undertaking has market power (see Alison Jones and Brenda 
Sufrin, EC Competition Law, (2nd Ed. ) Oxford University Press, 2004,261). 
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shares, which make it more rigid and less flexible, while the SLC test is less 
dependent on structural analysis, which makes it more flexible46. Also, under the 
dominance test, the role of efficiencies appears to be negligible or at least limited, 
while, in US, efficiencies constitute standard tools of merger analysis. 
However, even these differences do not arise so much from the different 
economic methodologies applied by the two jurisdictions but mostly from different 
policy considerations. This is so, partly because economics has not thus far provided 
any effective and widely accepted test for determining that crucial level where the 
market power possessed by a firm or firms turns anticompetitive. All the existing tests 
only provide measurements of market power and as a result, it is up to competition 
authorities to determine the critical level obviously taking into account the policies 
and objectives pursued by competition law in the specific jurisdiction. 
This was well summarised by B. E. Hawk47: "Economics provides a variety of 
tools to measure degrees of market power.... [b]ut it does not define -except at the 
extreme- at what point that market power becomes `monopoly power'... Thus, 
economics does not provide the means to resolve the essentially legal question 
whether the market power of a firm is essentially great to constitute a `dominant 
position' or `monopoly power'... `Dominant position' and `monopoly power' are 
legal constructs based on political considerations which suggest where the line should 
be drawn between acceptable monopoly power and suspect monopoly power". 
A mere reference to the history of the EU and US tests shows how policy 
considerations have played a role in the application of these tests. Thus, in the US the 
SLC test had been used to support "by far the most stringent anti-merger policy in the 
world"48 in the 1960s when violations of competition had been found in mergers with 
combined market shares as low as 4.51/649. By the 1980s the same test "properly" 
applied supported an "extremely lenient merger policy", regularly allowing billion 
dollar mergers to go through without government challenge, even when they involved 
direct competitors50, while in the 1990s following the publication of the 1992 merger 
46 See also Bishop and Walker op. cit. 44,7.100-7.104. 
47 See B. E. Hawk United States, Common Market and International Antitrust: A Comparative Guide, (2"d Ed. ), 
Aspen Law & Business, 1990,788-789. 
48 See Pitofsky, op. cit. 35,195. 
49 See e. g. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 US 546,550 (1966) (combined market shares of 4.5% in one 
market where violation was found); United States v. Von' s Grocery Co.. 384 US 270,281 (1966) (horizontal 
merger where combining firms had market shares of 4.7% and 4.2% respectively). 
50 See Robert Pitofsky op. cit. 35,195; also Thomas G. Krattenmaker and Robert Pitofsky "Antitrust Merger Policy 
in the Reagan Administration" 33 Antitrust Bull. 1988,211,213. 
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guidelines the rule is that the law prohibits only those mergers that significantly 
increase market power to the detriment of consumers51. Thus, in US during all these 
decades, while the legal test remained apparently the same -mergers are still 
prohibited if they substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly- its 
content and scope significantly changed. 
The same could be said about the dominance test. In particular, while the wording 
of Article 2 of the Merger Regulation remained until recently unchanged -"a 
concentration which creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which 
effective competition would be significantly impeded in the common market or in a 
substantial part of it shall be declared incompatible with the common market"- its 
meaning and scope have significantly changed. Thus, while the test was initially 
thought of as applying only to single-firm dominant positions S2, this changed later 
when it was ruled that collective dominant positions were also within its scope53. 
Further, whilst the collective-dominance concept was for a long period synonymous 
to duopolY14, this again changed following the Commission's decision in 
Airtours/First Choice", which established collective dominance by three firms. Even 
if the CFI's decision in Airtours annulled the Commission's analysis and was the 
main reason for the alteration of the substantive test of Merger Regulation, this 
alteration was not so much the result of the inability of the dominance test to deal with 
all the anticompetitive effects as it was to remove the legal uncertainty concerning 
non-collusive oligopolies following the Court's decision56. 
However, even prior to the latest developments in the EU, the abovementioned 
changes in the meaning and scope of SLC and dominance tests -made by competition 
agencies and supported by domestic courts- along with the daily practice in merger 
control had already led to significant convergence in the scopes of the two tests57, 
11 See Fox op. cit. 35. 
52 See also Jones and Sufrin op. cit. 45,932-3. 
33 Although European Commission had from its earlier decisions under C. R. 4064/89 established that the 
Regulation was applicable also to collective dominance situations (see e. g. case IV/M. 190 Nestle/Perrier [1992] 
OJ L356/1, [1993] 4 CMLR M17) the issue was not completely resolved until the ECJ' s decision in Kali & Salz 
case, where the court accepted the extended application of the dominance test because otherwise the regulation 
would be "deprived of a not insignificant aspect of its effectiveness" (Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95 France v. 
Commission, Societe Commerciale des Potasses et de I'Azote v. Commission [1998] ECR 1-1375, [1998] 4 CMLR 
829). 
1 See e. g. the Note by Europe Economics "One' sa Monopoly, Two' s Collectively Dominant, Three' s Alright? ", 
2002. 
ss Case IV/M. 1524 OJ [2000] L93/1, [2000] 5 CMLR 494. 
56 The recent developments regarding the substantive test of Merger Regulation are discussed in more details in 
other chapters of the thesis. 
" This was recognised by the former US Deputy Assistant Attorney General William Kolasky: "... to date ... we have generally reached consistent results on the mergers we have reviewed in common, despite having different 
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which, according to those mentioned above, reflected also convergence of policies. 
The recent developments with the new European test, and particularly with the 
recently published Commission Guidelines on horizontal mergers, whose provisions, 
as will be seen in more detail in the analysis below, are largely similar to those of the 
1992 US merger guidelines, only confirmed this pre-existing political trend. 
Moreover, the adoption of the new European SIEC test, which reduces the market- 
share threshold for anticompetitive mergers, addresses also the previous concerns 
about the structural, and therefore rigid and insufficient, nature of the European test 
compared with SLC test. Thus, the lower market-share thresholds enable the new test 
to rely less on market shares and concentration for establishing anticompetitive 
effects, while from the Commission Guidelines on horizontal mergers becomes 
apparent that efficiencies will be formally incorporated in the analysis. As a result, 
both tests now, even if their wording still remains different, now cover the whole 
spectrum of anticompetitive effects that can possibly arise as a result of a merger, 
while they also rely largely on the same economic methods and criteria for proving 
such effects. This, in turn, enables the two jurisdictions, unlike existing differences in 
other areas of merger control, to converge significantly on their decisions concerning 
the competitive effects of mergers falling within the scopes of both tests. However, 
perfect convergence will not be achieved because, as the European Commissioner of 
competition rightly argued, "a degree of divergence is unavoidable in a multi-polar 
world composed of sovereign jurisdictions, each with its own laws, enforcement 
authorities and courts"58. 
As a conclusion, and provided that maximum convergence on public policy issues 
is not possible for the foreseeable future, the preservation of the current status quo of 
two different tests seems to be the most appropriate solution because it safeguards the 
autonomy of the two jurisdictions without preventing convergence whenever this is 
required by the circumstances, political, economical or others. However, concerning 
substantive standards (or at least different verbal formulations of our standards) and different merger review 
processes" (William J. Kolasky "United States and European Competition Policy: Are There More Differences 
than we Care to Admit? ". Speech before the European Policy Centre, Brussels, Belgium, April 10,2002. 
According to Commissioner Monti "Today the EU and US... have substantive tests with different wording. But 
we share the same fundamental concern: the use of market power and its ultimate effect of consumer welfare. It 
should therefore be clear... that the common ground on the interpretation of the two substantive tests is substantial; 
the focus is very much on the comparison of tests at the margin" (see Mario Monti "Analytical Framework of 
Merger Review", Speech in International Competition network Conference, Naples, September, 2002). 
38 See Mario Monti "Antitrust in the US and Europe: A History of Convergence", Speech in the General Counsel 
Roundtable, American Bar Association, November 14,2001. 
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the application of the two tests, the adoption of certain common standards is useful, 
and therefore already exists. 
5.4 The US decision for the SGA market 
The published US documents for Alcoa/Reynolds merger are less detailed than 
the European Commission's published decision. This is due to the more restrictive 
policy in the disclosure of information about mergers reviewed by US agencies59. 
There are certain exceptions only for cases where there is judicial involvement which 
allows the publication of more detailed information. This was the case with 
Alcoa/Reynolds, which was challenged by the DOJ before a US District Court and this 
allowed the publication of some non-confidential information about the deal. To fill in 
the still missing information this thesis used the results of its own market research and 
information from the decision of the European Commission, which cooperated closely 
with the US authorities for this case60. 
5.4.1 The relevant product market 
The US authorities adopted a broader product market definition than the 
European Commission by including captive SGA in the relevant market. 
The US view as included in the Complaint61 and the Competitive Impact 
Statement (CIS)62 could be summarised as follows: 
a. "The refining and sale of SGA is a relevant product market (i. e., a `line of 
63 
commerce') within the meaning of Section 7 of the Clayton Act". 
59 Although the Freedom of Information Act, which was enacted in 1966, permits general access to the FTC and 
DOJ files to anybody at any time and for any reason, the US Congress for reasons related amongst others to 
national security or the protection of trade secrets exempted certain categories of documents from public release. 
Regarding mergers section 7A of Clayton Act which rules on the merger review process expressly states: 
"Any information or documentary material filed with the Assistant Attorney General of the Federal Trade 
Commission pursuant to this section shall be exempt from.. . 
disclosure. 
. . and no such information or 
documentary 
material shall be made public, except as may be relevant to any administrative or judicial action or 
proceeding.... "(U. S. C. §I 8a (h)). 
As a result, the publications for Alcoa/Reynolds merger occurred in the context of the judicial action and 
proceeding initiated by the antitrust authorities before the District Court for this case. 
See the Commission's Press Release of May 4,2000 for this case. 
61 See the civil antitrust Complaint (No: 00-CV-954 (RMU)) of May 3,2000 filed with the District Court of 
Columbia for this case. 
62 See the Competitive Impact Statement of June 6,2000. 
63 Ibid.. 
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b. SGA is used by aluminium smelters to make aluminium metal. There is no product 
that can be substituted for SGA to make aluminium metal. 
c. If aluminium smelters were confronted with a small but significant SGA price 
increase, they would have to pay the higher price or shut down. 
d. It is extremely costly and inefficient to shut down a smelting operation; smelters 
therefore require a stable and steady supply of SGA to maintain production. 
e. Demand is highly inelastic. A small decrease in the supply of SGA will cause a 
significant increase in the price of SGA. When the July 1999 explosion at Kaiser 
Aluminium Corporation's refinery at Gramercy, Louisiana removed 2% of world 
alumina capacity, SGA "spot" prices nearly tripled, and long-term SGA prices 
increased 20% to 30%. 
5.4.1.1 Product market definition under the 1992 merger guidelines: analysis. 
comments and comparisons with the EU 
The 1992 Guidelines and the methodology applied by the US competition agencies 
The 1992 Guidelines define the relevant product market as "... a product or a 
group of products such that a hypothetical profit-maximising firm that was the only 
present and future seller of those products ("monopolist") likely would impose at least 
. a `small but significant and nontransitory' 
increase in price"64 
For the definition the US agencies apply a rigorous methodology based on the 
SSNIP test: "... [T]he Agency will begin with each product (narrowly defined) 
produced or sold by each merging firm and ask what would happen if a hypothetical 
monopolist of that product imposed at least a small but significant and nontransitory' 
increase in price, but the terms of sale of other products remained constant"65 . The 
"small but significant and nontransitory" price increase is more often at the level of 
5% but bigger or smaller increase is also possible66. 
If the price increase is unprofitable, "... the Agency will add to the product-group 
the product that is the next-best substitute for the merging firm's product67". In such a 





case the test will be applied to the product group and in the same way the test will 
expand until the increase becomes profitable. 
For avoiding cellophane fallacy implications68 the test uses "... prevailing prices 
of the products of the merging firms and possible substitutes for such products, unless 
pre-merger circumstances are strongly suggestive of coordinated interaction, in which 
case the agency will use a price more reflective of the competitive price69". 
The guidelines provide also an explicit list of evidentiary criteria to be examined 
for finding out whether buyers will switch to substitutes in response to the 5% 
increase. The list includes, amongst others, past evidence of buyers' switch; evidence 
that sellers base business decisions on the prospect of buyers' substitution between 
products in response to price changes or other competitive variables; the influence of 
downstream competition faced by buyers in their output markets and the timing and 
costs of switching products70. However, the list is not exhaustive and the agencies will 
examine "all relevant evidence". 
In addition, although the agencies focus "solely on demand substitution factors" 
when defining the market, they nevertheless take into account supply substitution 
when they seek to identify firms participating in the relevant market71. The guidelines 
distinguish between "committed" and "uncommitted" entrants and take into account 
the latter when defining the market. "Uncommitted" entrants are firms not currently in 
the market, but which can, within one year, enter or divert output into the subject 
firm's market without making significant irreversible investments. 
Generally speaking the SSNIP test adopted by the guidelines for defining markets 
produces some certainty and predictability in the inherently difficult task of market 
definition. However, uncertainty still exists. For instance, the "cellophane fallacy" 
68 The Cellophane case refers to a decision of the US Supreme Court in United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours 
& CO 351 US377 (1956). This case became the leading example of false market definition. In particular, the US 
Supreme Court defined a broad relevant product market including all flexible packaging materials and not only the 
cellophane, which was sold by du Pont and in which the latter had a 75% market share. The Court used the concept 
of "cross-elasticity of demand", which showed that an increase in the price of the cellophane would cause shifts by 
buyers to other flexible materials. However, many commentators relying amongst other factors on the unusually 
high profits of du Pont from the cellophane pointed out that the prices of cellophane on which the cross-price 
elasticity was applied were already at supra-competitive level. Thus, the Court's definition was not reflective of the 
du Pont's market power in the cellophane. 
Since that decision, the selection of the appropriate price levels for applying elasticities and the SSNIP test has 
always been a contentious issue. The problem is further fuelled by the practical difficulties in determining which 
level of prices is the competitive one to use it as the basis for applying the SSNIP test. 
On the issue see also Gregory Werden "Market Delineation under the Merger Guidelines: Monopoly Cases and 
alternative approaches" 16 Review of Industrial Organisation, 2000,211. 
69 § 1.11. 
70 Ibid. 
71 § 1.3. 
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problem is not completely solved, since the guidelines do not explain how the 
agencies will decide whether the prevailing market prices are competitive enough to 
be used in the test or whether a more competitive price should be used and how the 
latter price could be found72. In addition, "hypothesising" a "small but significant" 
price increase in a volatile market and then considering how neighbouring markets 
will respond, requires predictive abilities based on market analysis, which is often 
very complex and this could limit the accuracy of the test73. 
Also, the guidelines' test, which has history of more than 20 years in US merger 
analysis74, was introduced in merger control to deal with mergers giving rise to 
increased likelihood of collusion rather than with mergers facilitating the exercise of 
market power by a single firm75. In this respect, the guidelines' test has been 
considered by some US economists and competition scholars as insufficient to deal 
with unilateral effects particularly in case of differentiated products where the issue is 
how closely firms compete76. 
A leading example in this respect is the decision by a US district court in FTC v. 
Staples77 where the FTC sought a preliminary injunction against the acquisition of 
Office Depot by Staples. The relevant market was defined as including "office supply 
superstores" and the court found that the merger would substantially lessen 
competition in that market (the merger would reduce the number of "office supply 
superstores" from three to two). For defining the market FTC used econometric and 
documentary evidence from a natural experiment based on the so-called "merger 
simulation techniques", which showed that office supply superstores were distinct 
product market from which non-superstore sellers should be excluded. 
It was argued78 that a proper guidelines' analysis in this case would have posed 
significant problems. First, because the alleged market was a "cluster market" -a 
collection of products not viewed by consumers as substitutes but lumped together for 
reasons related to the way the products are distributed- and the guidelines do not use 
cluster markets. According to this view, the guidelines allow the aggregation of 
n See also Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice, (2nd Ed. ), 
West Group, 1999, §3.8e. 
" See also ibid. 
74 The test was first imported in the 1982 merger guidelines. 
73 See also Hovenkamp op. cit. 75, §3.8. 
76 See Jonathan Baker "Stepping out in an Old Brown Shoe: in Qualified Praise of Submarkets" 68 Antitrust LJ., 
2000,203, at 210-217. The role of SSNIP test in market definition in differentiated products where unilateral 
effects arise is discussed also in the analysis of beverage can market below. 
77 FTC v. Staples Inc-, 970 Supp. 1066 (D. D. C. 1997). 
78 See Gregory Werden op. cit. 65,218. 
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products that are not good demand substitutes if and only if, the competitive 
conditions are essentially the same for all of them, and this was most unlikely in this 
case. Second, the guidelines do not define markets as collections of firms but rather as 
collections of products and in this case there was need for a definition on a firm basis. 
However, other, opposite, views79 suggest that this case constitutes the best empirical 
example of the implementation of the guidelines' methodology. 
In any case, criticisms, as the above, are parts of the general debate lasting for 
several years in the US whether the guidelines are sufficient to properly analyse 
unilateral effects and whether other methods, such as merger simulation, should be 
used. Some economists even question the need for market definition in cases 
involving unilateral effects analysis80. The issue is examined in more details in other 
chapter of the thesis81. 
The views of the US courts 
Concerning market definition in the US it is necessary to refer also to the courts' 
view, which does not fully coincide with the guidelines' doctrine and methodology. 
The US courts do not consider themselves bound82 by the guidelines and, without 
rejecting the latter, prefer to use the methodology developed by the case-law of the 
US Supreme Court, which has built on "reasonable substitutability"83, a concept based 
both on demand and supply substitutability, for defining product markets. 
Under the concept of demand substitutability goods or services are likely in the 
same market if they are "reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same 
purposes"84. The interchangeability inquiry focuses on the products' users or 
consumers. The degree of "functional" interchangeability is one indicator of 
substitutability but is not conclusive, since the test requires proof of both "... the 
availability of products that are similar in character or use to the product in question 
79 See e. g. Lawrence White "Present at the Beginning of a New Era for Antitrust: Reflection on 1982-1983" 16 
Rev. of Ind. Org. 2000,131,133,134. 
80 See Werden op. cit. 68. 
81 See the analysis about the beverage cans market in chapter 7. 
82E. g. FTC v. Owens-11l. Inc. 681 F. Supp. 27,34 n. 17,38-46 (D. D. C. 1988) ("the Guidelines are not binding on the 
courts"). 
83 United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. 351 US 377 (1956), 394-5 ("In considering what is the relevant 
market for determining the control of price and competition, no more definite rule can be declared than that 
commodities reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes make up that 'part of trade or 
commerce', monopolisation of which may be illegal"). 
84 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 US 377,394-5 (1956). 
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and the degree to which buyers are willing to substitute those similar products for the 
product"85. Users' willingness to shift purchases from one product to another is then 
calculated through use of cross-demand elasticities 86. 
Supply substitutability may also be an important factor in defining a product 
market87. This seems to be in relative contrast with the guidelines, which provide for 
supply-substitutability consideration not in the market definition but when examining 
supply responses by "uncommitted" and "committed" entrants. 
The US courts' approach to product market definition was well summarised in 
FTC v. Cardinal Health Inc. 88: 
"[W]hen one product is a reasonable substitute for the other, it is to be included in the same 
relevant market even though the products themselves are not the same. A product is construed to be a 
'reasonable substitute' for another when demand for it increases in response to an increase in the price 
for the other. Because the ability of consumers to turn to other suppliers restrains a firm from raising 
prices above the competitive levels, the definition of the 'relevant market' rests on a determination of 
available substitutes. The degree to which a similar product may be substituted for the product in 
question is said to measure the cross-elasticity of demand, while the capability of other production 
facilities to be converted to produce a substitute product is referred to as a the cross-elasticity of supply. 
The higher these cross-elasticities, the more likely it is that the alternative products are to be counted in 
the relevant market. In other words, the relevant market consists of all of the products that the 
defendants' customers view as substitutes to those supplied by the defendants". 
The US courts in certain cases have defined very narrow product markets, which 
comprise for instance only a single manufacturer's product89. However, a much more 
important but also controversial concept developed by the US courts is that of 
"submarkets", which was first established by the Supreme Court in Brown Shoe Co. v. 
United States90. The concept of submarket refers to a well-defined part of a broader 
market, which could constitute distinct product market for antitrust purposes. The 
relevant Court's statement in Brown Shoe reads: 
"The outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the reasonable interchangeability of 
the use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and substitutes for it. However, 
within this broad market, well-defined submarkets may exist, which, in themselves, constitute product 
markets for antitrust purposes. The boundaries of such a submarket may be determined by examining 
such practical indicia as industry or public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity, 
the products peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facilities, distinct prices, sensitivity to 
price changes, and specialised vendors". 
However, the court did not specify how these indicia should be weighed and this 
caused fierce criticism, focusing on the risk of defining inappropriately narrow 
markets and, thus, of the identification of market power in markets where firms 
85 FTC v. Swedish Match 131 F. Supp. 2d 151,157 (D. D. C. 2000). 
16 See also Dean Ringel "Monopolies and Joint Ventures" 1311 PLI/Corp 2002,11,23. 
$ý Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370, US 294,325,82 S. Ct. 1502,8 L. Ed. 2d 510 (1962). 
88 FTC v Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d. 34 (D. D. C. 1998). 
89 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services Co. 504 US 451 (1992). 
90 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370, US 294,325,82 S. Ct. 1502,8 L. Ed. 2d 510 (1962). 
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compete vigorously91. Concerning the practical indicia themselves, it appears that 
they are related to the identification of demand and supply substitution patterns, while 
they also help to the definition in differentiated-product and price-discrimination 
markets92. Despite views against the existence of different criteria for defining 
submarkets and markets93, which were also adopted in certain court decisions94, the 
practical indicia of Brown Shoe are still used by the US courts for defining 
submarkets, particularly in cases where factors, such as product differentiation, 
differences in physical characteristics and price discrimination, are examined95. 
In relation to the guidelines the submarket methodology is often used by courts in 
assessing unilateral effects cases, an issue which has also attracted criticism96. 
The issue of submarkets has not only legal implications, but also practical ones 
concerning the fact that there is not always available market evidence that would help 
to draw the boundaries of a distinct submarket within a given market. Conversely 
when there is available such evidence it is quite sensible to believe that the result will 
7 be the proper definition of a "market" and not of a "submarket"9. 
Product market definition in the US and the EU-comparisons 
Compared with the US methodology the EU approach has several similarities but 
also certain differences. 
The Commission's Notice on the relevant market states that the relevant product 
market "comprises all those product and/or services, which are regarded as 
interchangeable or substitutable by the consumers by reason of the product 
characteristics, their prices and their intended use"98. The definition refers to the 
91 See Baker op. cit. 76,206; also Hovenkamp op. cit. 72, §3.2c. 
92 See Baker ibid. 
9' See Baker ibid.; also Phillip Arreda et al Antitrust Law (1995), Para. 533c. 
" See e. g. Forsyth v Humana, Inc. 99 F3d. 1504,1513-1514 (9' Cir. 1996); HJ. Inc. v international Tel. & Tel. 
Corp., 867 F. 2d. 1531,1540 (8'h Cir. 1989) ("the same proof establishes the existence of a product market or a 
product submarket"); White & White, Inc. v American Hosp. Supply Corp., 723 F. 2d, 495,500 (6'h Cir. 1983) ("a 
submarket is a market"). 
9s See also Hovenkamp op. cit. 72, §3.2c. 
See e. g. FTC v. Staples, 970 F. Supp. 1066, (D. D. C. 1997). In that leading unilateral effects US case the District 
Court used certain Brown Shoe factors, such as "sensitivity to price changes" and industry recognition in order to 
define a narrow market consisting of the sale of consumable office supplies by office superstores. The criticism of 
the use of the Brown Shoe criteria in unilateral effects cases is that as with conventional market definition these 
criteria do not provide direct evidence with respect to the effects of the merger on prices (see Baker op. cit. 74,218). 
The issue of market definition in unilateral effects cases is discussed in detail in chapter 7 of the thesis. 
97 See also Baker op. cit. 76; also Hovenkamp op. cit. 72, §3.2c. 
98 Para. 7 of the Notice. 
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concept of functional interchangeability which focuses on product characteristics99. 
Compared with the US guidelines' definition the EU definition is less precise and 
leaves many issues open to interpretation10°. However, the reference to 
interchangeability of product characteristics constitutes an old-style approach to 
market definition101 and is more close to the concept of "reasonable 
interchangeability" of the US courts rather than to the guidelines. 
Further, the Notice provides that market definition focuses mostly on demand 
substitution, which is largely determined through the application of the SSNIP test in 
a manner similar to the guidelines' 02. However the Notice, unlike the guidelines, 
requires also examination of supply-substitutability, which will be taken into account 
when its effects "are equivalent to those of demand substitution in terms of 
effectiveness and immediacys103. To be effective, supply-side substitution must be 
timely and must occur without significant additional costs or risks in response to 
small and permanent changes in relative prices, but identifying these costs or risks and 
quantifying how much is "significant", is a contentious issue104. 
Nevertheless, the difference between the guidelines' and the Notice's approach 
on the treatment of supply substitution is not of big practical importance, since the 
guidelines take into account supply factors in the calculation of market shares'°5. 
Also, the Commission's practice regarding supply substitution is to take it into 
account only rarely, which means that demand substitution is, as in the US, the main 
basis for defining the market106. Thus, finally in practice both tests result in the 
identification of almost ideal sets of competitive constraints107. 
Another source of differences concerns the process that the two tests follow in the 
definition. The guidelines start with each product (narrowly defined) produced or sold 
by each merging firm and expands outwards through the application of the SSNIP 
99 The concept was developed by the ECJ in Hoffman-La Roche (Case 85/76 Hoffman-La Roche & Co AG v. 
Commission [1979] ECR 461; [1979] 3 CMLR 211). 
100 See also in chapter 3. 
101 See Peter Camesasca and Roger J. Van Den Bergh "Achilles Uncovered: Revisiting the European 
Commission's 1997 Market Definition Notice" Antitrust Bull, 2002,143 at 158. 
102 Paras 13,15-19 of the Notice. 
103 Para. 20. 
10° See also Simon Baker and Lawrence Wu "Applying the Market Definition Guidelines of the European 
Commission" E. C. L. Rev. 1998,273,275. 
105§§1.3,1.4. 
106 See also Bishop and Walker op. cit. 44,4.58. Also Lorenzo Coppi and Mike Walker "Substantial Convergence 
or Parallel Paths? Similarities and Differences in the Economic Analysis of Horizontal Mergers in US and EU 
Competition Law, SPG-SUM Antitrust Bull. 2004,101,107. 
10' See also Bishop and Wu op. cit. 104,275. 
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test108. The Commission's policy is to start, on the basis of preliminary information 
available or information submitted by the merging parties, with broadly establishing 
the possible markets within which a concentration has to be assessed and continue 
inwards thus finally defining a narrower relevant market109. Also, according to the 
Notice, applying the SSNIP test is "one way" of determining demand substitution 1° 
but not the only way in contrast with the guidelines' approach, which promotes the 
SSNIP test as the only way to define the product market. 
As regards market evidence, the two systems use almost the same types of 
quantitative evidence"' but the Commission takes also into account qualitative 
evidence. The technical nature of the SSNIP test makes the guidelines heavily reliant 
upon economic evidence for determining whether the hypothetical price increase 
would be profitable, but in Europe, where the SSNIP test is only one way for defining 
product market, the Commission follows "an open approach to empirical evidence 
aimed at making an effective use of all available information, which may be relevant 
in individual cases"112. Also, the examination of past empirical evidence for defining 
the markets is provided both in the guidelines and the Commission's Notice113. 
In sum, the US approach is more precise and clear-cut, due to its heavier reliance 
on the results of economic analysis in the context of SSNIP test, while the 
Commission's policy, even if it makes extensive use of economic analysis and of the 
SSNIP test, is still also oriented towards a qualitative approach to market definition. 
This is clear from the coexistence in the Notice of "functional interchangeability", 
which refers to the traditional market definition based on the qualitative assessment of 
product characteristics and intended use, and of the more modern hypothetical 
monopolisation, which refers to quantitative assessment 114 - 
However, it is necessary to mention that the Notice applies both to mergers and 
cases under Article 81 and 82, whereas the guidelines apply only to mergers and not 
to cases of antitrust violations. This is an important difference because SSNIP 
application is more appropriate in merger cases where competition authorities seek to 
1° § 1.11 of the guidelines. 
109 Para 26 of the Notice. 
110 Para 15 of the Notice. 
"' See also James S. Venit and William J. Kolasky "Substantive Convergence and Procedural Dissonance in 
Merger Review" in Simon J. Evenett, Alexander Lehmann, and Benn Steil, Antitrust Goes Global: What Future 
for Transatlantic Cooperation?, London Royal Institute for International Affairs, 2000,79. 
112 Para 25 of the Notice. 
13 § 1.11 of the guidelines and para. 45. 
"4 See also Camesasca and Van Den Bergh op. cit. 101,185. 
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assess what will happen in the future if the hypothetical monopolist were to raise its 
prices after the merger, but not in dominance and antitrust violation cases where the 
defendant may already charge monopoly prices'". This may explain why the 
Commission's Notice does not establish SSNIP as the only way for defining the 
relevant market. 
5.4.1.2 The relevant product market of SGA. 
The refining and sale of SGA was, as shown above, the relevant product market 
or "line of commerce" within the meaning of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The 
decision was based on findings that if aluminium smelters were confronted with a 
small but significant SGA price increase, they would have to pay the higher prices or 
close down. This was so, because there were no substitutes for SGA. 
At this point there are no differences from the Commission's definition, as 
presented in the previous chapter. The US decision was also consistent with the 
guidelines' methodology according to which demand substitution is the sole 
determinant of the relevant product market. Thus, since there were no demand 
substitutes for SGA, it was apparent that the product alone would be considered as the 
relevant product market. 
The next step according to the guidelines is to identify the firms that participate in 
the relevant market. The task of identification is quite important because it concerns 
the calculation of market shares and concentration, two important factors for the 
assessment of market power. In Alcoa/Reynolds the task produced a decision to 
exclude CGA from the relevant product market and a decision to include captive SGA 
production. 
In more detail, according to Section 1.3 of the guidelines, the relevant product 
market comprises current producers or sellers and firms that participate through 
supply response. The category of current sellers includes also vertically integrated 
firms "... to the extent that such inclusion accurately reflects their competitive 
significance prior to the merger". As regards firms participating through supply 
response, the guidelines develop the concept of "uncommitted entrants", that is, firms 
"not currently producing or selling the relevant product in the relevant area 116" but 
1" See also Whish op. 0.43,28. 116 See § 1.32. 
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which could enter the market "within one year and without the expenditure of 
significant sunk costs of entry and exit, in response to a `small but significant and 
nontransitory price increase' 1179s. Uncommitted entry is hit-and-run and concerns 
firms that, in the imposition of supra-competitive prices by the incumbents, can enter 
quickly and with low sunk costs into the market, take advantage of the higher prices 
there, and get out of the market in the same way when higher prices disappear. If the 
entrants expect to stay in the market permanently, then they will be classified as 
"committed" entrants and will be included in the entry analysis, which is carried out at 
a later stage' 18. The guidelines recognise several types of uncommitted entry, such as 
production substitution and extension 119 or the acquisition of new assets for 
production or sale of the relevant product120. However, the guidelines stress that if a 
firm has the technological capability to achieve an uncommitted supply response but 
likely would not, that firm will not be considered as a market participant. 
The concept of "uncommitted entry" generalises the idea of supply substitution, 
which has been recognised by the US courts as a factor constraining the exercise of 
market power and which should therefore be included in market definition121. The 
courts have also held that supply substitution expands the market122. However, the 
authors of the guidelines considered as more appropriate to take it into account only in 
the calculation of market shares. 
Compared with the EU approach the guidelines' approach to supply substitution 
appears more precise than the Commission's Notice and seems to avoid the all-or- 
none problem, which is present in the Notice. This problem can be seen in the 
Notice's example of paper of different qualities 123. The different qualities of papers 
are not demand substitutable with each other, but according to the Commission should 
be all included in the relevant product market because paper manufacturers are able to 
compete for orders of the various qualities, given the absence of particular distribution 
hurdles and sufficient lead-time to allow for modification of production plants. The 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid. 
119 § 1.321. 
120 § 1.322. 
121 Although the role of new supply as a factor constraining the exercise of market power was recognised by US 
courts long ego it was only in the 1970s and under the Chicago School pressure when US courts recognised the 
role of supply substitution in market definition. The leading cases were those of Telex (Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp. 
510 F. 2d 894,914-919 (10th Cir. ), cert. dismissed, 423 U. S. 802 (1975) and Twin City Sportservice (Twin City 
Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 512 F. 2d 1264,1271-74 (9` Cir. 1975), afrd after remand, 676 F. 2d 
1291 (9`" Cir. ), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 1009 (1982)). 
122 Ibid. 
123 Para. 22 of the Notice. 
160 
decision to define a broad market including all qualities is based on the view that an 
analysis based exclusively on demand substitution would lead to the definition of a 
large number of too narrow and artificial mini-markets, in which the market volume 
and market shares could not be correctly measured and would lose their meaning 124. 
However, this approach is not necessarily reflective of market power since producers 
of the various product qualities may have no reasons, even if they are capable, for 
switching production. Conversely, defining separate relevant markets for each product 
quality may also not be the best solution, since this will not take into account the 
potential of capacity shifts from one product to the other, which would constrain the 
exercise of market power 125. 
The US guidelines avoid this problem by assigning market shares to uncommitted 
entrants based on divertible capacity, namely capacity that the producer will find 
profitable to shift from one product to another in case of a hypothetical price increase 
and excluding capacity which would not be diverted to the relevant market either 
because it is committed or it is so profitably employed outside the relevant market that 
would not be available to respond to a price increase in that market 126. 
However, the concept of "uncommitted" entrants does not seem to have broad 
acceptance in the US and a FTC official has characterised uncommitted entrants "as 
elusive as the Abominable Snowman" and that category of entry an empty box127. 
For the SGA market the potential of uncommitted entry would be examined for 
firms not currently producing or selling SGA. Most likely such entrants would be 
firms producing chemical-grade alumina (CGA), a product deriving from the same 
production process as SGA but at an earlier stage of that four-stage process 128. The 
US published texts did not provide any information on whether CGA capacity or part 
of it was included in the calculation of market shares for the SGA market. The market 
shares for the merging parties given by the US authorities differed from those given 
by the European Commission but this was most likely due to the different treatment of 
captive sales129. 
124 See also E. Navarro, A. Font, J. Folguera and J. Briones, Merger Control in the EU, Oxford University Press, 
2002,5.107. 
125 See also Camesasca and Van Den Bergh op. cit. 101,160-1. 
126 §1.41; see also Jonathan Baker "The Problem with Baker Hughes and Syufy: On the Role of Entry in Merger 
Analysis" 65 Antitrust L. J. 1997,353,356-9. 
127 See Thomas B. Leary "The Essential Stability of Merger Policy in the United States" 70 Antitrust L. J. 2002, 
105,121. 
128 See also in the previous chapter where the market definition of the European Commission was examined. 129 See below. 
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As regards CGA capacity, judging from the Commission's analysis and from 
information collected by this thesis, it seems unlikely that such capacity was taken 
into account by US authorities for the calculation of market shares in the SGA market. 
This is so because CGA capacity did not satisfy the criteria of the guidelines for entry 
within one year, recovery of sunk costs within one year after the entry and the 
. condition that if stayed outside CGA capacity would not be more profitable130 
CGA producers, to switch towards SGA in response to a hypothetical price 
increase in the latter, would have to install additional equipment, which judging from 
the general situation in aluminium industry, would mean significant sunk costs and 
long-term investment 131. Moreover, as the Commission mentioned in its analysis 132 , 
CGA costs twice as much as SGA and therefore a switch from CGA to SGA would 
result in economic penalty for the refineries. Lastly, switch to SGA would potentially 
require more than the one year required by the guidelines for such a switch to 
occur133. 
As a result, CGA production does not meet the criteria of guidelines for 
"uncommitted entry". 
As regards other firms that were not producing either SGA or CGA, they would 
face additional problems due to the fact that they would have to build new refineries 
through greenfield projects, which as shown in the previous chapter require five years 
lead-time and of course do not constitute hit-and-run entry. 
Regarding captive SGA production, the US authorities, as shown, included it in 
the relevant product market along with merchant sales. This was, as explained in the 
previous chapter, the correct approach, since captive SGA was capable of influencing 
SGA supplies and therefore prices on the open market and as such was competitively 
significant. For this reason the US definition was more appropriate than the 
Commission's, which excluded captive production from the relevant product market. 
This conclusion will be best seen in the analysis of competition in the downstream 
primary aluminium market in the next chapter, where it will be shown that the 
remedies promoted by the US authorities for SGA were more sufficient to address the 
problem from the potential application of raising-rivals'-cost strategies by Alcoa 
130 §§ 1.32 and 1.41. 
131 See the analysis regarding capacity expansions in refineries in the previous chapter. Also in para. 10 of the 
Commission's decision. 
132 Para. 10 of the Commission's decision. 
133 See the analysis of refinery's capacity expansions in the previous chapter. 
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against non-independent downstream competitors. The examination of the aluminium 
market will also strengthen the arguments for the importance of a proper market 
definition for an effective merger control system. 
As for long-term SGA contracts, there is nowhere in the US published texts for the 
SGA market any reference to these contracts but they were obviously included in the 
relevant market. This inclusion could be deemed as justified taking into account also 
the treatment by the DOJ of captive sales and also as explained in the previous chapter 
the market realities concerning SGA. 
5.4.1.3 Conclusions on the product market definition regarding SGA 
The examination of product market definition made by US agencies compared 
with the European Commission's definition reveals a different approach in the 
treatment of captive SGA production by the two agencies. Although it is not clear 
from the published documents on what grounds the US agencies decided to include 
captive SGA, which had been excluded by the Commission, in the product market, it 
nevertheless seems, judging from the market realities, that the US decision was more 
appropriate. 
5.4.2 The relevant geographic market 
The US decision defined the SGA market as a world market and did not exclude 
from it the countries of Eastern Europe, CIS and China as the European Commission 
did in its decision. The relevant, laconic, statements in the Complaint134 read: 
"Aluminum smelters purchase alumina from refineries located throughout the world. 
Alcoa, Reynolds and other alumina refiners refine and sell SGA throughout the 
United States and the world. The world constitutes a relevant geographic for SGA 
within the meaning of Section 7 of the Clayton Act". 
5.4.2.1 Geographic market definition under the guidelines: framework, comments and 
comparison with the European Commission's practice. 
134 Paras 14,15. 
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As with the product market, the guidelines apply the SSNIP test for defining 
geographic markets. The geographic market is defined as "a region such that a 
hypothetical monopolist that was the only present or future producer of the relevant 
product at locations in that region would profitably impose at least a `small but 
significant and nontransitory' increase in price, holding constant the terms of sale for 
all products produced elsewhere"135. The test first applies to "the location of each 
merging firm (or each plant of a multiplant firm)" and examines whether the 
imposition of a `small but significant and nontransitory price increase' in this location 
would be profitable. The process continues as in the case of product market and 
culminates with the definition of the `smallest market', where the price increase will 
be profitable, as the relevant geographic one. The guidelines also provide a non- 
exhaustive list of evidence that will be taken into account in considering buyers' 
reaction to a price increase 136. 
The US courts have not developed any precise criteria or formula about 
geographic market definition, but they normally take into account factors, such as 
sales patterns in specific areas, price movements and transportation costs. Also, 
national factors, such as import tariffs, are also taken into account. However, a basic 
principle is that geographic market must be determined pragmatically in accordance 
with the real market conditions and should be economically meaningful137. 
Compared with the European Commission's approach, the guidelines are more 
precise, since they rely on the rigorous methodology of the SSNIP test. The European 
Commission makes rare use of the SSNIP test when defining geographic markets and 
prefers to rely more on empirical evidence, such as trade flows and comparisons of 
price levels, which have been characterised "very simple and crude"138. 
Another potential source of differences concerns the fact that the European 
Commission seems to apply different techniques in geographic market definition from 
those in the product market, unlike the guidelines where the SSNIP applies to both 
markets. This could be inferred from both the different definition given to the concept 
of geographic market by EC competition law, as well as from the Commission's 
practice. In particular, the conventional definition for geographic market refers to the 
I35 § 1.21 
13bibid. 
131 See also Quinn op. cit. 17, at 1034. 
138 See European Commission, DG Enterprise "The Internal Market and the Relevant Geographic Market" Final 
Report, February 3,2003, at 47-48. 
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homogeneity of competitive conditions, as the basic test applied139, which is different 
from the definition given to the product market 140, while there is nowhere reference to 
the consumer behaviour of switching locations in response to a price increase. As 
regards practical application, the Commission seems to treat product and geographic 
markets as two distinct, sequential steps in its analysis 141, as opposed to the 
simultaneous application of the SSNIP test on both product and geographic dimension 
proposed by the US guidelines142. Sequential analysis has been considered to result in 
some cases in narrower relevant markets than when the analysis is simultaneous 143 . 
In general comparing the past decisions of the US agencies and of the European 
Commission it seems that the latter's geographic markets are narrower'44. A US DOJ 
official related this difference, not to the applicable tests, but to the different levels of 
geographic integration in the two economies145. It has also been arguedla6 that 
defining the geographic market narrowly need not necessarily bias the findings of the 
investigation provided the competitive forces outside the area are considered when the 
meaning of market shares is assessed. This seems to have been confirmed by the 
practical application of merger control in US and EU, where the different geographic 
definitions have not prevented the two jurisdictions from reaching consistent results 
on the most mergers they reviewed in common147. 
5.4.2.2 Geographic market definition regarding SGA. 
The SGA market confirms the abovementioned view about geographic market 
definitions in US and EU merger control systems. The US agency defined SGA as a 
world market thus including the Eastern world, which had been excluded in the 
definition of the European Commission. The published US documents for 
Alcoa/Reynolds offer little guidance on how such a definition was made and the only 
reasons provided, as shown above, were that aluminium smelters purchase alumina 
from refineries located throughout the world and that Alcoa, Reynolds and other 
139 See para. 8 of the Commission's Notice on the relevant market. 
140 Ibid. para. 7. 
141 See also Camesasca and Van den Bergh op. cit. 101,162; also Navarro et al. op. cit. 124,5.130-5.136. 
142 §1.0 of the guidelines. 
143 Camesasca and Van den Bergh op. cit. 101. 
144 See Kolasky, op. cit. 57. 
165 Ibid. Also according to Coppi and Walker op. cit. 106, at 110, due to the diversity of Europe linguistic, cultural 
and regulatory barriers often play role in geographic market definition. 
146 See Bishop and Walker op. cit. 44, at 4.71. 
147 See also Kolasky op. cit. 57. 
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alumina refiners refine and sell SGA throughout the United States and the world. 
Conversely, the European Commission had excluded Eastern world (countries of the 
Eastern Europe, CIS and China) from the geographic market on grounds that there 
were no imports from these countries to the West. 
The lack of imports from East to the West implies non-availability of Eastern SGA 
to Western buyers, a situation which could potentially justify the latter's exclusion 
particularly, since under the guidelines the ability of buyers to switch to other areas in 
response to a small but significant and non-transitory price increase imposed by 
sellers on their domestic markets is a crucial issue in market definition148. 
However, the US agency by defining SGA as a world market may have taken into 
account the fact that SGA imports to the West occurred through aluminium metal, 
which includes, as a raw material, SGA and, as shown in the previous chapter, was 
imported in big volumes to the West from the East. Such metal imports had been 
responsible for the collapse of metal prices on the Western markets in the mid 1990s, 
which also affected SGA prices and the US authorities may have considered this fact 
an indication for the ability of Western buyers to shift for purchases to the East'49. 
The fact that imports of SGA to the West came through the metal might not have 
made much difference, since in the US, frequently, captive output -output of 
production used internally in the production of downstream goods or services- is 
included in the market for the base product'50. Thus, since there were SGA imports, 
even indirectly, from the East to the West, which were able to render SGA price 
increases in the West unprofitable, the US agency might have considered it as 
sufficient reason to include eastern world in the relevant market. 
The guidelines do not specify whether they will use total foreign output or only 
that part of foreign output shipped into the US in calculating market shares. The 
guidelines state that "[m]arket shares will be assigned to foreign competitors in the 
same way in which they are assigned to domestic competitors"151. The general rule 
about the latter competitors, in accordance with section 1.41 is that market shares will 
be calculated on the basis of total sales of all firms participating in the market or on 
the basis of capacity "currently devoted to the relevant market together with that 
148 §1.21. 
149 See the analysis of the geographic market definition of the European Commission in the previous chapter. 
130 See the analysis regarding captive sales in the previous chapter; also Thomas Kauper "The Problem of Market 
Definition under EC Competition Law" 20 Fordham Int 7 L. J., 1997,1682, at 1749-1750. 
151 § 1.43; see also Hovenkamp op. cit. 72, at §3.8b. 
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which likely would be devoted to the relevant market in response to a small but 
significant and non-transitory price increase". In the case of SGA, the total world 
capacity was used in the calculation of market shares. 
The DOJ's decision to consider the SGA market as worldwide is potentially more 
reflective of market realities, which indicate that Eastern world is integral part of the 
market, than the respective European Commission's decision. This is so because, as 
shown in the previous chapter, the Eastern world affects SGA supplies and prices in 
the West both on the supply and demand sides. On the supply side because the 
Eastern world indirectly exports SGA to the West and on the demand side because the 
Eastern world imports significant SGA volumes and therefore any considerable 
increase or decrease in demand for the product in the East would affect prices in the 
West. As a result, the US decision to define a single, worldwide, geographic market 
for SGA is closer to the market realities. 
5.4.2.3 Conclusions 
The geographic market definition by US and EU competition authorities in the 
case of SGA constitutes a good example of the different approaches followed by the 
two jurisdictions regarding geographic market definition. In the case of SGA the US 
definition seems to be more appropriate but this conclusion cannot produce conclusive 
results also about the positive effectiveness of the US methodology against that of the 
European Commission. This is so, because SGA constitutes only a single case and 
also because as will be shown below the different geographic market definitions did 
not prevent the two agencies from coming to the same conclusions about the 
anticompetitive effects of the merger in question. 
5.4.3 Market shares and concentration 
According to the DOJ152, in 2000, the world SGA capacity was expected to total 
49 million metric tons (MT), whereas Alcoa would own or control approximately 14.5 
million MT or 29% of that capacity and Reynolds's respective numbers would be 4.4 
152 Complaint, May 3,2000. 
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million MT or 9%. The HHI increase due to the merger would be 530 points and the 
index would reach a level of approximately 1800153. 
The DOJ considered that the increase in Alcoa's market share from the merger 
would significantly enhance the firm's incentive and ability to exercise market power 
unilaterally by reducing its output in the SGA market because demand for SGA was 
very inelastic'54. The DOJ stated that Alcoa would have sufficient market share to 
profit from the increase in price caused by a unilateral reduction in output'55. The 
merger would also increase the likelihood of anticompetitive coordination between 
Alcoa and the remaining firms in the SGA market, which had certain characteristics 
conducive to anticompetitive coordination156 . 
5.4.3.1 Market shares and concentration in merger ysis in the U. S. - comparison 
with the EU. 
The relationship between market shares, concentration, and market power is very 
close. A wide range of economic theories on oligopolistic conduct suggest that fewer 
fines and more concentrated markets are associated with higher prices'57, thus 
indicating the existence of market power. Empirical studies on industrial organisation 
also confirm the positive relationship between market concentration and prices'58. It 
has been estimated that the coefficient of profits on market share is about 0.20159 
meaning that a market share of for instance 60% is associated with a sustained profit 
rate on equity of about 25%, far from the competitive rate of about 10%160. 
An issue of debate concerning market shares and concentration concerns the 
number of competitors that are necessary for effective competition to exist. Although 
before the 1970s economic research had suggested that upward of 10 comparable 
153 Ibid. 
1S4 Complaint para. 18,19. 
iss Ibid. para. 19. 
156 Ibid. para 20. 
151 See Jonathan B. Baker and Steven C. Salop "Should Concentration be Dropped from the Merger Guidelines? " 
33 UWLA L. Rev.. 2001,3; also Richard Posner "Oligopoly and Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach", 21 Stan. 
L. Rev., 1969,1582. 
158 See Richard Schmalensee "Inter-industry Studies of Structure and Performance", in Handbook of Industrial 
Organisation, Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989,988. Other studies found that there is positive 
correlation between market concentration and profitability, but New Chicago-school-economists argued that this 
correlation was never proved to be causation (see George B. Shepherd, Joanna M. Shepherd and William G. 
Shepherd "Antitrust and Market dominance", The Antitrust Bull., 2001,835, at 841-842. For a detailed discussion 
on the issue see also Barry C. Harris & David D. Smith "The Merger Guidelines v. Economics: a Survey of 
Economic Studies" Antitrust Report 23,1999. 
159 See Shepherd et al. ibid., 841. 
160 See ibid. 
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competitors161 were needed to constitute significant barriers to collusion, in the 1970s 
new-Chicago-School writers suggested that one or two small rivals were enough'62. 
However, a more balanced view argues in favour of at least 5 comparable 
competitors, of which none to be dominant, associated with easy entry for new 
competitors' 63 . 
The aluminium industry could be used as an example, since the control of 
alumina supply by few players (less than 10, of which one is the dominant player) is 
positively related to the level of prices in that market and also in the downstream 
aluminium market164 
However, the treatment of market shares and concentration in merger analysis is a 
different issue. The U. S. approach has changed several times over the past years due 
to influences by various schools of thought and the advances in economic and 
econometric sciences. 
In the early 1960s, the US Supreme Court in Brown Shoe'6s held that market 
shares are "the primary index of market power", while in Philadelphia National 
Bank166 decision of the same period, the Court held that sufficiently high market 
shares establish prima facie illegality. In the latter case it was also ruled that high and 
increasing market concentration resulting from a merger creates a presumption of 
anticompetitive transaction. One decade later, in General Dynamics Corp. 
167 the same 
Court clarified that the Philadelphia National Bank presumption was refutable. 
Finally, in the leading modem decision in United States v. Baker Hughes Inc. 168 the 
issue of market concentration was related to economic analysis in the sense that even 
if a merger between significant competitors raised prices, the courts should undertake 
an extensive and thorough economic analysis of the likely anticompetitive effects of 
the transaction, in which market concentration is just one of many relevant factors 169. 
161 See ibid. at 840; also Joe S. Bain Industrial Organisation (rev. ed), New York: Wiley, 1968. 
162 See Shepherd et al ibid.; also Robert H. Bork The Antitrust Dilemma: A Policy at War with Itself, New York: 
Basic Books, 1978. 
163 See Shepherd et al ibid citing also F. M. Scherer & David Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic 
Performance (P Ed. ) Boston: Hughton Mifflin, 1990. 
164 Timothy F. Bresnaham & Valerie Y. Suslow suggest that a merger in the North American aluminium industry 
during the 1960s and 1970s would have led to a price increase of 2.7% during cyclical downturns were operating 
at excess capacity, for every one-hundred point increase in the HHI of market concentration (see Timothy F. 
Bresnaham & Valerie Y. Suslow "Oligopoly Pricing with Capacity Constraints" 15/16 Annales D'Economie et de 
Statistique, 1989,267). 
165 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370, US 294,322,82 S. Ct. 1502,8 L. Ed. 2d 510 (1962). 
166 United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321 (1963). 
167 United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U. S. 486 (1974), 39 L. Ed. 2d. 
168 United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F. 2d 981 (D. C. Cir. 1990). 
169 See Baker and Salop, op. cit. 155,5. 
169 
The 1992 merger guidelines consider that market shares and concentration 
"provide only the starting point for analysing the competitive impact of a merger"170. 
Further, the guidelines in unilateral effects analysis seem to establish a safe harbour 
for firms whose combined market shares are less than 35%171, but this may not be the 
case when there is evidence that the merging firms are each other's closest 
competitor 172. As regards concentration, the guidelines use the HHI index for its 
measure. In general, the role of market shares is more important in unilateral effects 
analysis 173, while concentration is more relevant in the examination of coordinated 
effects174. 
Under EC competition law where the focus is traditionally on market dominance, 
which refers mainly to the examination of market structures, market shares have a 
central role in the Commission's analysis. This has been also confirmed by the ECJ 
which in Hoffman-La Roche stated: 
"The existence of a dominant position may derive from several factors, which, taken separately, are not 
necessarily determinative but among these factors a highly important one is the existence of very large 17s 
market shares". 
Since then the Commission's reliance on market shares for establishing 
dominance both under Article 82 and the ECMR is well known 176, even if, at least for 
merger control, C. R. 4064/89 did not establish a specific methodology for assessing 
whether the merger actually created or strengthened a dominant position 
177 
. 
Regarding concentration, which is also a structural factor, the Commission has 
followed an open approach concerning the methodology applied for its calculation. 
Hence, it has used concentration ratios such as C2, C3, C4 etc., which refer to the 
aggregate market shares of the top 2,3 and 4 players respectively, as well as on HHI 
178 index, but in fewer cases. 
170 § 2.0. 
ºn §§ 2.211,2.22. 
172 See also Jonathan Baker "Unilateral Competitive Effects Theories in Merger Analysis" 11 Antitrust 1997,21. 
The author presents an example of a merger where the firms' combined market share of 20% led to a 12.5% price 
increase; also Robert H. Lande and James Langenfeld "From the Surrogates to Stories: The Evolution of Federal 
Merger Policy" 11 Antitrust 1997,5. 
º73 See Roscoe B. Starek III and Stephen Stockum "What Makes Mergers Anticompetitive?: "Unilateral Effects" 
Analysis under the 1992 Merger Guidelines" 63 Antitrust L. J. 1995,801,804. 
174 See Jonathan Baker and Steven Salop op. cit. 155,3. 
º7s Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche, (1979] ECR 461, [1979] 3 CMLR 211, para. 41. 
176 See Jones and Sufrin op. cit. 45,925-926. 
171 See Roger Van den Bergh and Peter Camesasca European Competition Law and Economics: A Comparative 
Perspective, Insertia, 2001,334. 
178 The Commission's policy to use concentration ratios more than HHI reflects the application of dominance test, 
which is more structural. On the other hand HHI, which measures the increase in market concentration as a result 
of the merger is more appropriate in the SLC test used in US (see also Navarro et al op. cit. 124,7.57-7.63) 
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The situation in European merger control, however, changed after the adoption of 
a new substantive test in the ECMR and the issue of the Guidelines on the assessment 
of horizontal mergers (or "Commission guidelines")179. The new market test has 
broader scope concerning oligopolies by dealing also with non-collusive oligopolies, 
which apparently were not covered by the dominance test' 80. In the new test the role 
of concentration becomes more important and therefore the Commission's guidelines 
formally adopt the HHI test as in the US181. 
However, under the new regime market shares and concentration constitute only 
"useful first indications" of market power 182. This means that the role of market 
shares, which was central under the dominance test, will now be less important. 
However, and provided that the concept of dominance is prevalent also in the new test 
one should expect particularly in situations of single-firm market power, the level of 
market shares to remain crucial for the approval of the merger. 
5.4.3.2 Market shares and concentration in the SGA market. 
For the calculation of market shares in the US, the guidelines state: "The Agency 
normally will calculate market shares of all firms (or plants) identified as market 
participants in Section 1.3 based on the total sales or capacity currently devoted to the 
relevant market together with that which likely would be devoted to the relevant 
market `in response to a `small but significant and nontransitory' price increase"183. 
Section 1.3 refers to the identification of firms that participate in the relevant market 
namely current producers and sellers, and uncommitted entrants. Further, the 
guidelines state that market shares will be calculated using "the best indicator of 
firms' future competitive significances184. 
Due to the different market definitions, the calculation of market shares by the US 
agency for SGA produced different results from that of the European Commission. 
Thus, according to the DOJ, Alcoa's market share post-merger would increase from 
29 to 38%, which was significantly lower than the level of 45-55% given by the 
179 OJ [2004] C 31/03. 
180 This issue is examined in detail in other chapters of the thesis and particularly in the chapter 7 where an 
example of a non-collusive oligopoly is examined. 
181 Para. 16 of the Commission guidelines. 
182 ibid. para. 14. 
183 § 1.41. 
114 See ibid. 
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European Commission. Moreover, the US calculation was based on SGA production 
capacity, while the European Commission's on real production. The latter difference, 
however, is not important since, as shown in the previous chapter, SGA refineries 
normally run in full capacity to be cost-efficient and therefore there was no significant 
overcapacity in the market. 
Concerning concentration the US guidelines use three thresholds: a) mergers 
resulting in a HHI below 1,000 are unlikely to produce adverse competitive effects 
and ordinarily require no further analysis; b) mergers resulting in a HHI between 
1,000 and 1,800 are unlikely to have adverse competitive effects and require no 
further analysis if the HHI increase from the merger is less than 100 points, but may 
be challenged if the increase is more than 100 points; c) mergers resulting in a HHI 
above 1,800 will not be challenged if the increase is less than 50 points; if it is above 
50 points the merger may raise significant competitive concerns; if it is above 100 
points the merger is likely to create or enhance market power or facilitate its exercise. 
As regards the SGA market, the merger of Alcoa/Reynolds would increase HHI 
by 530 points to a level of approximately 1,800185. The change in market 
concentration was sufficient to cause competitive concerns, because the increase 
exceeded 100 points. 
However, as mentioned above, market shares and concentration constitute only 
two of the factors taken into account in the competitive assessment and therefore they 
are not in themselves conclusive of market power. Between the factors that affect the 
significance of market shares and concentration, the guidelines list two: changing 
market conditions and the degree of difference between products inside and outside 
the market186. 
In the US practice, however, market shares and concentration become important 
only when they reach very high levels 187. In Alcoa/Reynolds, the US authorities 
seemed to have placed more weight on these factors than usual because they 
considered the moderate market share of 38% and the equally moderate concentration 
level of 1,800 as sufficient to produce unilateral and coordinated effects. According to 
185 See Complaint para. 17. 
186 §§ 1.521 and 1.522. 
181 A recent review of US enforcement trends reveals that the median HHI level for cases that were closed (that is, 
not challenged) by the US agencies has stayed at around 2,500 since the mid-1980s, while for cases subject to 
challenge the median HHI had been 5,000 or more since 1991. See Philip Nelson, Simon Baker, Simon Bishop and 
Derek Ridyard "The European Union's new Horizontal Merger Guidelines" 17-SUM Antritrust, 2003,57,61. 
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a DOJ official'88, the merger of Alcoa/Reynolds would reduce the number of firms 
from 6 to 5 and this was considered a cause of concern. However, as will be shown 
below, other market features also played a role in the competitive assessment and 
therefore it cannot be safely concluded that market shares and concentration were the 
crucial factors in this case. 
5.4.4 Unilateral effects in the SGA market 
On the issue of unilateral effects the Complaint reads: 
`By merging with Reynolds, Alcoa's market share will increase to nearly 40 percent 
of world SGA capacity. Because demand for SGA is so inelastic, this increase in 
market share will significantly enhance Alcoa's incentive and ability to exercise 
market power unilaterally by reducing its output in the SGA market. Alcoa would 
have sufficient market share to profit from the increase in price caused by a unilateral 
reduction in outputs189. 
5.4.4.1 Unilateral effects analysis under the 1992 guidelines-Comparisons with the 
EU. 
The guidelines basically accept two settings under which unilateral 
anticompetitive behaviour can arise. The first is when firms are "distinguished 
primarily by differentiated products"190 and the second when "firms are distinguished 
primarily by their capacities", which refers to homogeneous products191. The two 
settings correspond to the simplistic Betrand and Cournot models of competitive 
behaviour as suggested by industrial organisation theory. The common element of the 
two models is that mergers, in the absence of entry and efficiencies, will lead to 
increases in market power 192. 
In the Bertrand model demand substitutability between the differentiated 
products is the source of market power, while in the homogeneous products Cournot 
model the focus is on capacity. According to this model, firms producing a 
188 See William Kolasky "Coordinated Effects in Merger Review: From Dead Frenchmen to Beautiful Minds and 
Mavericks", Speech before the ABA Section of Antitrust Law Spring Meeting Washington DC April 24,2002. 
119 See Complaint of May 3,2000, at para. 19. 
190 § 2.21. 
19' § 2.22. 
192 See Starek III and Stockum op. cit. 173,814. 
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homogeneous product under the same cost conditions first must commit to their 
output or productive capacity, and the price becomes that which clears the market of 
this output 193. 
The guidelines do not require high market shares for establishing unilateral 
effects as is traditionally the case with the Commission's dominance doctrine. 
However, it is obvious that situations similar to those covered by single dominance in 
Europe are also covered. The guidelines also state that the section on competitive 
effects considers only "some" of the means by which mergers can result in 
anticompetitive effects and that "mergers will be analysed in terms of as many 
potential adverse competitive effects as are appropriate" t94. Economic literature has 
developed various unilateral effects theories and models, which could all be 
applicable in appropriate mergers'95. In practice merger analysis in US is a much 
more complex task than the Betrand and Cournot models suggest. 
Unilateral effects, which were incorporated into the guidelines in 1992, were 
viewed by some commentators in the US as a means for revitalising "submarket" 
analysis, which was prevalent prior to the 1982 guidelines and which was an attempt 
to assert that firms with small market shares in the relevant market wielded market 
power because they had a large market share in a narrower product category, which 
came to be known as a submarket196. Such criticism may not be completely 
unfounded at least concerning US courts, which, as shown, have often resorted to 
submarket analysis for assessing unilateral effects197. Also, market shares and 
concentration, the main tools of structural analysis, which had been considered 
outdated, seem to return into play, since the existence of "unilateral" market power is 
associated with the existence of some "significant market share"198. This means that 
even if market shares and concentration constitute only the starting point for assessing 
the competitive effects of a merger, under unilateral effects analysis they have a more 
193 See ibid. 
194 §2.0 
195 Unilateral effects theories have been classified in two basic categories: "dominant firm" type models and 
"oligopoly" models (see David T. Scheffman and Mary Coleman "Quantitative Analysis of Potential Competitive 
Effects from a Merger", June 9,2003. 
'96 See also Starek III and Stockum op. cit. 173,814; also, William J. Blumentahl "Thirty-One Merger Policy 
Questions Still Lingering After the 1992 Guidelines", 38 Antitrust Bull., 1993,593, at 626. For the concept of 
submarket see in the product market definition, above. 
197 See the analysis on product market definition above. 
198 See also Starek III and Stockum op. cit. 173,804; also § 1.0 of the 1992 guidelines. 
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important role: merger guidelines make clear that a 35% market share199 of the 
merging firm could be a minimum threshold for the examination of unilateral effects. 
The practical application of unilateral-effects methodology comprises use of 
econometric tools and empirical models for evaluating merging firm's incentives and 
opportunities to raise prices. In this context, the development of merger simulation 
has been the most important recent development. Simulation, generally, uses 
economic models grounded on the theory of industrial organisation to predict the 
effect of mergers on prices in the relevant markets200. The technique, which produces 
best results in markets involving differentiated products, seeks to offer assessments of 
competitive effects and remedies that are beyond the reach of other methods of 
inquiry201. For example, simulation has been used to evaluate whether the potential 
merger-specific efficiencies resulting from the merger are sufficient to offset 
predicted increases or to evaluate the adequacy of proposed divestitures 
202. Some 
technique's proponents have gone so far as to argue that its ability to predict the 
anticompetitive effects of a merger, renders unnecessary or even useless the market 
definition, particularly with respect to differentiated products, and that therefore 
structural analysis based on market shares and concentration is not needed203. 
However, even if merger simulation, which is based on anecdotal evidence, offers 
useful assistance to antitrust agencies, it should be made clear that real market 
conditions are not fully reflected in these techniques. This is so because most 
simulation models do not take into account market imperfections 
204, while their 
credibility relies upon the assumptions and data lying behind it and whose harmony 
with the real market conditions should be checked205. Also, the complexity of the 
models makes more difficult an assessment of their validity206. 
1"§§2.211,2.22 
200 See also Roy J. Epstein and Daniel Rubinfeld "Merger Simulation: A Simplified Approach with New 
Applications" 69 Antitrust L. J., 2002,883; also Gregory J. Werden "Simulating the Effects of Differentiated 
Products Mergers: A Practical Alternative to Structural Merger Policy", 5 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1997,363. 
201 Epstein and Rubinfeld ibid. 
202 Ibid. 
203 See in the analysis of beverage cans market in other chapter of the thesis where the issue is discussed in more 
details. 
204 Such imperfections could include, amongst others, the potential exhibition of irrational behaviour by consumers 
and/or producers in the future, potential existence of consumers loyalties and uncertainties about consumers future 
behaviour due to the existence of national of other factors (see also, Shepherd et al op. cit. 156, at 843). 
205 See Note "Analysing Differentiated-Product Mergers: The Relevance of Structural Analysis" 111 Harv. L. Rev., 
1998,2420,2430-2432. 
206 See also Gregory J. Werden "A Perspective on the Use of Econometrics in Merger Investigations and 
Litigation" 16 Antitrust, 2002,55,56. 
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The difficulties arising in the application of simulation can partly explain the 
cautious stance of US courts against them. According to a former DOJ member, 
"... [j]udges are more accustomed to making decisions based on facts about what 
happened; in mergers, they are called on to predict what might happen in the 
future ... More and more when we go to court, the judges seem to be asking for 
concreteness; the anecdotal evidence seems less important to them... s207 
Compared with the unilateral-effects doctrine of the guidelines the old dominance 
test of the Merger Regulation was narrower in scope since the "single dominance" 
concept did not seem to cover also certain situations of unilateral markets power, such 
as those where the merger would result in the establishment of a second largest player 
capable of raising prices unilaterally, despite the existence of a market leade? °8. Such 
situations however, are covered by the US SLC test and guidelines and thus the 
dominance test appeared not to cover all the types of anticompetitive effects resulting 
from mergers209. 
This deficiency in the European test was solved through the adoption of a new 
substantive test in the ECMR, which through its new doctrine on non-collusive 
oligopolies, now covers those types of unilateral effects that were not covered by the 
dominance test. Moreover, the new Commission Guidelines on the assessment of 
horizontal mergers in the section dealing with non-coordinated effects set the criteria 
and methodology for the assessment of unilateral effects other than dominance210. 
The list of market factors, which are relevant with unilateral effects and are 
mentioned in the Commission guidelines, includes amongst others the closeness of 
competition between firms and the possibility the competitors to be unlikely to 
increase supply if prices increase 21 1. Both these factors are mentioned also in the 
unilateral effects section of the US Guidelines and this constitutes a strong indication 
of the convergence of EU and US policies on the issue. 
However, and given that so far the unilateral effects doctrine of the Commission 
has not yet been tested in practice, we will have to wait to see if the Commission will 
follow the US practices or will follow its own path. 
207 See Constance Robinson "Quantifying Unilateral Effects in Investigations and Cases" 5 Geo. Mason L. Rev., 
1997,387,387. 
208 The EU dominance test is connected to the traditional dominance model, which involves a "large" firm (post- 
merger), and a competitive fringe (see Scherer and Ross, op. cit. 163,224-26; also Jonathan Faull and Ali Nikpay 
The EC Law of Competition, Oxford University Press, 1999, paras. 1.154-1.156) 
209 This issue is addressed in more details in the chapter dealing with beverage can market. 
210 Para. 25 of the Commission guidelines. 
211 Ibid. paras. 28-30 and 32-35 respectively. 
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In any case we could say that both the EU and US tests now cover the entirety of 
anticompetitive effects arising from mergers with no exceptions. 
5.4.4.2 Unilateral effects in the SGA market. 
The US DOJ, as shown, considered that the merger of Alcoa/Reynolds would 
enhance Alcoa's ability to exercise unilateral market power by giving the firm 
sufficiently high market share to profitably increase SGA prices by reducing output. 
Alcoa's ability would be also facilitated by the highly inelastic demand for SGA. 
SGA is a homogeneous product whose examination falls within section 2.22 of 
the 1992 guidelines, which deals with "firms distinguished primarily by their 
capacities". The principles concerning the analysis of "differentiated capacities" were 
set forth as follows: 
"Where products are relatively undifferentiated and capacity primarily distinguishes firms and 
shapes the nature of competition, the merged firm may find it profitable to raise prices and suppress 
output. The merger provides the merged firms a large base of sales on which to enjoy the resulting 
price rise and also eliminates a competitor to which customers otherwise would have diverted their 
sales. " 
Concerning "relatively undifferentiated products" consumers consider the 
products of the merging firms and those of their competitors as relatively close 
substitutes 212. In such cases the potential unilateral effects could arise where "capacity 
primarily distinguishes firms and shapes the nature of their competition", which 
means that the level of capacity determines the competitive role of the firms in the 
market. In the SGA market where refineries operate at nearly full capacity to be cost- 
efficient, and the expansion of this capacity is a difficult investment it is certain that 
all SGA producers' market role is strongly dependent on the level of their production 
capacity. 
Further, section 2.22 recognises the important role of market shares for 
establishing unilateral effects: 
"Where the merging firms have a combined market share of at least thirty-five percent, merged firms 
may find it profitable to raise prices and reduce output below the sum of their premerger outputs 
because the lost markups on the foregone sales may be outweighed by the resulting price increase on 
the merged base of sales". 
212 See also Starek III and Stockum op. cit. 173,820. 
177 
In Alcoa/Reynolds the post-merger market share of the merging firms was 38% 
thus falling within the threshold of the guidelines. The next step for the DOJ was 
therefore to assess the possibility of unilateral effects as a result of the merger. 
In this respect section 2.22 reads: 
"unilateral effect is unlikely unless a sufficiently large number of the merged firm's customers would 
not be able to find economical alternative sources of supply i. e. competitors of the merged firm likely 
would not respond to the price increase and output reduction by the merged firm with increases in their 
own outputs sufficient in the aggregate to make the unilateral action of the merged firm unprofitable. 
Such non-party expansion is unlikely if those firms face binding capacity constraints that could not be 
economically relaxed within two years or if existing excess capacity is significantly more costly to 
operate than capacity currently in use". 
The focus therefore of the analysis shifts from the merged firm to the reaction of 
buyers and competitors to the attempt of that firm to increase prices by reducing 
output. 
For the SGA market the DOD's analysis similarly to the Commission concluded 
that buyers were not able to find alternative supply sources because the demand for 
SGA was highly inelastic, since there were not substitutes for SGA, while it was 
extremely costly for smelters (the buyers) to shut down their aluminium smelters in 
response to higher prices213 As regards Alcoa's competitors they were capacity- 
constrained and would remain so for the two years following Alcoa/Reynolds merger. 
As a result, competitors were unable to respond to an output reduction by Alcoa214. 
The DOD's views about competitors can be seen in the agency's analysis about entry 
and expansion in the SGA market where it was stated that entry through "greenfield" 
and "brownfield" projects was slow, costly and difficult: a minimum-efficiency-scale 
greenfield refinery would cost Million and would take four years or longer from 
planning to operation, while for brownfield expansions, the DOJ referred to Worsley's 
expansion whose cost was $700 million and was expected to last 32 months215. 
Consequently, buyers and competitors were unable to prevent Alcoa from profitably 
raising SGA prices post-merger. 
To support its argument the DOJ, like the European Commission, referred to the 
result of the explosion in Kaiser's Gramercy refinery in 1999, which removed 2% of 
world alumina capacity from the market forcing spot SGA prices to nearly triple and 
long-term prices to go up by 20-30%. The DOJ stressed the fact that no company 
213 See para. 18 of the Complaint and section C of the Competitive Impact Statement. 
Zia See para. 21 of the Complaint. 
eis See ibid. 
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attempted entry or expansion in response to the Gramercy closure despite the 
significant price increase in SGA. 
The reference to 2%, instead of the 7% of the European Commission, reflects the 
different relevant markets in the two decisions, but did not change the conclusions 
that Alcoa was controlling sufficient capacity to impose higher SGA prices. The firm 
would be, according to the DOJ, controlling approximately 19 million tonnes (mt) of 
SGA post-merger, which meant that a reduction of SGA output by Imt, the equivalent 
of Gramercy's loss, would represent a reduction in Alcoa's total output by less than 
6%. However, since after Gramercy SGA spot prices rose threefold and the prices of 
long-term contracts by 20-30%, it is obvious that the increase in prices through output 
reduction would be profitable for Alcoa. But even using as a measure only Alcoa's 
production for the merchant market, as proposed by the European Commission, there 
would still be profits for Alcoa. Alcoa's post-merger output for the merchant market 
would be approximately 8mt216, of which a reduction by lmt to 7mt, represented a 
decrease by approximately 12%. However, the remaining 7mt could be sold at 20%, 
30% or even higher prices, which means that the output reduction would finally be 
profitable for Alcoa217. 
Apart from the different relevant markets, which affected the calculation of 
market shares and concentration in the market in the two decisions, the DOJ adopted 
also different timeframe for the examination of competitor's reaction. The DOJ 
applying the guidelines referred to two years, while the Commission, whose practice 
is generally more flexible, took into account capacity expansions planned for the 
period 1999-2003, that is for five years218. 
On the issue, the guidelines also state that "the timeliness and likelihood of non- 
party expansion will be analysed using the same methodology as used in analysing 
uncommitted or committed entry (sections 1.3 and 3) depending on the significance of 
the sunk costs entailed in expansion"219 . 
216 See table I in the previous chapter. According to the information in that table Alcoa was prior to the merger 
selling 6.8mt of SGA on the merchant market and Reynolds 1.2mt. 
217 By way of example, if the pre-reduction prices of SGA were $150/t, Alcoa for its 8 million tons would receive 
$1.2 billion. If, following the reduction, SGA prices were to increase by 20% or more to $180/t, Alcoa for the 7mt 
would receive at least $1.26 billion or 5% more. Thus the reduction would be profitable. 
218 The Commission's Guidelines on horizontal mergers in para. 74 using Alcoa/Reynolds, as an example, clarify 
that the appropriate time period for the examination of entry (and expansion) "depends on the characteristics and 
dynamics of the market, as well as on the specific capabilities of potential entrants". 
2 9§ 2.22, footnote 24. 
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Applying the guidelines' methodology on entry, US agencies examine both hit- 
and-run expansion220, as well as expansion "that can be achieved within two years 
from initial planning to significant market impact"221. An issue arising concerns the 
exact beginning of the expansion period. In the entry theory, it is often assumed that 
the entry period begins when the price increase begins and that this also coincides 
with the initial plan of entry222. For the purposes of the analysis in Alcoa/Reynolds the 
timeframe included two years after the merger. 
Another significant point in the US methodology concerns the distinction 
between expansions announced prior to the merger and those caused in response to 
the merger. The expansions of the former category according to section 3.2 are to be 
included in the measurement of the market, while only the expansions of the latter 
category are to be considered as possible deterrence against merged firm's attempt to 
increase prices. 
Further the expansion is likely if "it would be profitable at premerger prices and if 
such prices could be secured [by the firm considering expansion]"223. 
The application of the above principles in Alcoa/Reynolds would mean that the 
US analysis would be somewhat different than that of the European Commission. 
More specifically the latter's analysis of entry and expansion included a list of SGA 
capacity expansions planned or underway by the merging parties and their 
competitors for the period 2000-2003 and concluded that these expansions would not 
threaten Alcoa's dominance224. 
Under the US methodology, such capacity expansions would be considered as 
parts of the market and would not be taken into account in the examination of the 
ability of competitors to react to the merger. Instead, the US agency would focus only 
on the potential of further expansions in reaction to the merging firms' attempt to 
increase prices by reducing output. It is the further expansion potential that matters for 
the US agencies and the ability of competitors to carry out such expansions within 
two years. 
220 § 1.32 
n1§3.2 
222 See also John C. Hilke and Philip B. Nelson "The Economics of Entry Lags: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Overview", 61 Antitrust LJ., 1993,365,367.369. 
223 § 3.3. 
224 See the Commission's analysis of entry and expansion in the SGA market, as presented and commented in the 
previous chapter. 
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However, the European Commission also made extensive reference to further 
SGA expansions stressing the ability of the merging parties to carry out bottom-cost 
further expansions and their ability to block, through participation with blocking 
interest in joint ventures with competitors, the latter' s ability to expand. 
A last issue about the US methodology relates to the fact that, as with entry, 
expansion by competitors to be likely should be profitable at pre-merger prices. The 
meaning of the likelihood condition is examined in more details in the analysis of 
entry below. Regarding SGA it seems that DOJ focused more on the fact that capacity 
expansions by competitors were unlikely to occur within two years due to economic 
and other technical reasons than on whether the expansions would be profitable. 
An important notice about the DOJ's analysis is that there is nowhere in the 
published documents any reference to Alcoa's ability to prevent capacity expansions 
by competitors by using its own expansion opportunities as a threat. This was a factor 
clearly contributing to Alcoa's ability to exercise unilateral market power and was 
pointed out in the European Commission's analysis. Instead, the DOJ, maybe relying 
on the "two-years" rule, mentioned only that competitors were unable to react timely 
due to their capacity-constraints and also because of the slow, costly and difficult 
nature of capacity expansions. 
5.4.4.3 Conclusions 
The DOJ's decision to establish unilateral effects in the SGA market from 
Alcoa/Reynolds merger was generally justified from the market evidence. Although 
Alcoa's post-merger market share generally could not be considered as high it was 
however sufficient from the market conditions to enhance the firm's ability to 
exercise market power by increasing SGA prices. The DOD's findings were no 
different from those of the European Commission even if the two agencies applied 
different market tests. 
The analysis above also clarified issues of practical application of the US 
unilateral effects doctrine thus helping to the comparison of the US policies on the 
issue with the equivalent of the European Commission. 
5.4.5 Coordinated interaction in the SGA market 
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According to the Complaint, the merger of Alcoa/Reynolds would "increase the 
likelihood of anticompetitive coordination among the remaining firms in the world 
SGA market". The DOJ explained: "... The SGA market has certain characteristics 
conducive to anticompetitive coordination, including product homogeneity; stable, 
predictable and inelastic demand and supply; and transparency of actions by suppliers 
and customers"225. 
5.4.5.1 Coordinated interaction in the US merger guidelines: principles application 
and comparison with the "collective dominance" doctrine of the European 
Commission 
The theory on coordinated interaction suggests that a unilateral price increase by 
the merged entity is not profitable unless there are accommodating responses (i. e. 
output restrictions) by other significant competitors, and the evidence indicates that 
there will be sufficient accommodating responses226. 
Similarly, the 1992 guidelines state: 
"Coordinated interaction is comprised of actions by a group of firms that are profitable for each of 
them only as a result of the accommodating reactions of the others. This behaviour includes tacit and 
227 
express collusion, and may or may not be lawful in and of itself'. 
The guidelines' approach relies on the Stiglerian228 basic analytical framework: 
"Successful coordinated interaction entails reaching terms of coordination that are 
profitable to the firms involved and an ability to detect and punish deviations that 
would undermine the coordinated interaction"229. The definition of Stigler recognises 
three requirements for successful coordinated interaction: the ability of the firms 
involved to reach profitable terms of coordination, to detect deviations from the 
agreed policy, and to punish such deviations. The US courts also accept Stigler's 
theory230. However, since 1964 when it was first put forward, newer theories sought 
to improve it. One such theory, which was incorporated into the guidelines is the 
theory on "mavericks", namely firms refusing to follow the industry consensus 
225 Para. 20 of the Complaint. 
226 See Scheffman and Coleman op. cit. 195. 
2n§2.1 
228 George J. Stigler "A Theory of Oligopoly", 72 Journal of Political Economy, 1964,44. 
229 § 2.1; see also Kolasky op. cit. 188. 
230 See e. g. Brooke Group Ltd v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U. S. 209,240 (1993) (suggesting that 
coordinated interaction is not possible where firms cannot effectively punish deviation from the coordinated 
outcome). 
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thereby constraining effective coordination. According to the theory231, a merger 
resulting in the loss of a maverick is likely to facilitate coordination, unless another 
firm is well positioned to assume the role of maverick post-merger. Conversely, a 
merger eliminating a non-maverick firm is unlikely to increase coordination. 
However, in practice the task of identifying the market's maverick, which requires 
analysis of firm's behaviour, is complex232. 
In addition, the guidelines incorporate a "checklist" of industry characteristics 
that are likely to be conducive to coordinated outcomes. The guidelines recognise 
factors, such as key information concerning market conditions, transactions and 
individual competitors; the extent of firm and product homogeneity; pricing or 
marketing practices typically employed by firms in the market; the characteristics of 
buyers and sellers; and the characteristics of typical transactions 233. The checklist 
along with market shares and concentration constitute basic tools of structural 
analysis. However, the "checklist" approach has been characterised 234 as too crude to 
provide much assistance in determining whether coordinating interaction really 
occurs, since many industries that fit the checklist do not exhibit outcomes consistent 
with coordinated interaction. For this reason a more in-depth analysis of the market 
focusing on firms' behaviour would be required. 
Further, within the scope of the guidelines fall both tacit and express collusion 
even if such behaviour "may or may not be lawful in and of itself'. The guidelines 
also cover cases of imperfect or incomplete collusion, which even if they do not 
achieve the monopoly outcome, are nevertheless harmful to consumers. In general, 
the guidelines under the term "coordinated interaction" refer to the whole spectrum of 
oligopolistic situations resulting from mergers, and which could cause competitive 
concerns235. 
However, the guidelines leave open the issue about the number of competitors 
required for successful coordination. Some guidance could come from the guidelines' 
approach to market shares and concentration 236. Thus, the HHI critical level of 1800, 
which indicates high concentration, is equivalent to a market with 5.56 equal-sized 
231 See also Jonathan Baker "Mavericks, Mergers and Exclusion: Proving Coordinated Competitive Effects under 
Antitrust Laws" 77 N. Y. U. L. Rev., 2002,135; also Kolasky op. cit. 188. 
232More analytical presentation of the theory on mavericks takes place in the analysis of beverage can market in 
chapter 7. See also below. 
233 § 2.1. 
234 See Scheffman and Coleman op. cit. 195,7. 
235 See also Hovenkamp, op. cit. 72, §12.1b. 
236 §1.5. 
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firms each with a market share of 18%, while five equally-sized firms with market 
share of 20% each equal HHI 2000237. One could therefore infer that a merger 
reducing the competitors' number from six to five is on the edge between competition 
and coordination. As will be shown below this was the case with Alcoa/Reynolds 
merger regarding the SGA market. 
However, as explained above, the HHI level of 1800 has generally little practical 
importance, since the US agencies more often challenge mergers leading to post- 
merger median HHI of more than 2500. 
The US courts, in establishing coordinated effects, have traditionally relied upon 
structural factors, such as market shares and concentration. However, as shown in the 
analysis of market shares and concentration above, the courts following the Supreme 
Court's decision in United States v. General Dynamics238 and the subsequent Appeals 
Court decision in United States v. Baker Hughes Inc239, which built on General 
Dynamics, now incorporate market shares and concentration along with all other 
relevant factors into a broad economic analysis of the competitive effects of the 
transaction240. 
In any case the issue of coordinated interaction, unlike unilateral effects, is well 
settled between US courts and competition agencies, since coordination has 
traditionally been the main source of concern about mergers in the US, and therefore 
there are no differences in the approaches of the agencies and the courts. 
Compared with the doctrine of collective dominance of the European 
Commission, the US approach to "coordinated interaction" is more clear-cut and more 
complete. The guidelines establish an explicit methodology for analysing coordinated 
effects while their scope covers the whole spectrum of such effects. 
Conversely, in the EU the Commission's collective-dominance doctrine under 
which coordinated effects are covered is more inflexible. The application of the 
doctrine, which focuses on situations of express and tacit collusion, has thus far 
focused almost only on duopolies241, even if the Commission's analysis in many cases 
237 See Ky P. Ewing "The Soft Underbelly of Antitrust: Some Challenging Thoughts For the New Millennium" 
Antitrust Report, 9-1999. 
238 415 U. S. 486 (1974). 
239 908 F. 2d 981 (D. C. Cir. 1990). 
240 See also Baker op. cit. 229, at 149. A more recent case that confirmed the above policy is the Federal Trade 
Commission v. H. J. Heinz Co. (246 F. 3d 708 (D. C. Cir. 2001)). However, in H. J. Heinz the Court recognised the 
significance of concentration particularly in a merger to duopoly. 
24 See also Peder Christensen and Valerie Rabassa "The Airtours Decision: Is There a New Commission 
Approach to Collective Dominance? " 22 E. C. L. Rev. 2001,227,235. 
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concerned oligopolies with more than two firms242. In general the doctrine is more 
oriented towards situations of symmetrical duopolies, while the Commission appears 
to believe that collusion in broad or asymmetric oligopolies is not sustainable 243. Also, 
the strict language used in the old dominance test of the Merger Regulation which 
referred to mergers leading to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position had 
initially led to debates on whether oligopolies were covered at all by that test. Even if 
the Commission established a collective dominant position in a merger case, as early 
as in 1991244, it took at least until 1998, with the ECJ's decision in Kali & Salz245 to 
become absolutely clear that the dominance test was applicable to oligopolies. 
Moreover, it was as late as 2002 with the CFI decision in Airtours246 when it became 
clear that the concept of collective dominance could not cover non-collusive 
oligopolies. 
However, the adoption recently of a new substantive test in the Merger 
Regulation and the issue of the Commission guidelines could help to eliminate these 
inflexibilities of EC merger control. The new test by referring to significant 
impediment to effective competition can also include broad oligopolies, while the 
Commission guidelines contain an explicit methodology for assessing coordinated 
effects247. This methodology is generally similar to the US one, since it refers to the 
same criteria, namely reaching terms of coordination, monitoring deviations and 
deterring mechanisms. In addition, the Commission guidelines, which do not establish 
a new policy but merely clarify issues of the Commission's daily practice, also 
provide for the examination of the reaction of outsiders, such as non-coordinating 
firms, potential competitors and customers that may be in position to break the 
oligopoly. This additional criterion is not provided by the US guidelines, but is 
nevertheless taken into account as one of the factors relevant with the analysis of 
coordinated effects. Moreover, the Commission guidelines, like the US ones, include 
242 See e. g. Case IV/M. 484 Krupp/Thyssen/Riva/Falck/Tadfin/AST [1995] OJ L251/18 (duopoly or five-firm 
oligopoly in cold-rolled stainless steel flat products); case IV/M. 942 Veba/Degussa [1998] OJ L201/102 (three 
firm oligopoly in diamines/polyamines). In these cases the Commission did not find collective dominance. 
243 The Commission's hesitance in establishing collective dominance in situations involving broad oligopolies can 
be seen in its decision in Price Waterhouse/Coopers & Lybrand (Case IV/M. 1524 [1999] 4 CMLR 665) where the 
Commission stated: "From a general viewpoint, collective dominance involving more than three of four suppliers 
is unlikely simply because of the complexity of the interrelationships involved and the consequent temptation to 
deviate; such a situation is unstable and untenable in the long term". 
However, the analysis of Alcoa/Reynolds shows that collusion is feasible and possible also in broad 
oligopolies. 
244 The first collective dominance case was M. 190 Nestle/Perrier (1992); [1992] OJ 356/1; [1993] 4 CMLR M17. 
245 Cases C-68/94 and 30/95 France v. Commission [1998] ECR 1-1375, [1998] 4 CMLR 829. 
246 Case T-342/99 Airtours v. Commission [2002] ECR 11-2585 
247 See paras. 39-60 of the Commission Guidelines 
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also a checklist of structural factors related to coordinated interaction, such as stable 
and symmetrical market shares, product homogeneity and stable demand. 
Generally speaking, the methodology and criteria that US agencies and the 
Commission apply in the assessment of coordinated effects has always been almost 
similar248, while differences could be found in the interpretation and assessment of 
market evidence and potentially in the scope of the two market tests with the 
European test appearing to be more hesitant to prohibit broad oligopolies. 
5.4.5.2 Coordinated interaction in the SGA market 
The public documents in Alcoa/Reynolds provide limited information about the 
coordinated effects of the merger. The Complaint and the Competitive Impact 
Statement refer to certain features of the SGA market, which make it conducive to 
anticompetitive coordination, such as product homogeneity, stable, predictable and 
inelastic supply and demand, and transparency of actions by suppliers and customer. 
These structural market features are generally included in the checklist about tacit 
collusion but do not in themselves explain how the merger would alter the competitive 
conditions in the SGA market towards coordination. 
More illustrative in this respect is the reference to the Alcoa/Reynolds merger by 
a senior DOJ official who stated: "... We found.. . that the merger would reduce the 
number of firms from 6 to 5, while increasing Alcoa's market share from 29 to 38 
percent.. . We [also] found.. . 
high entry barriers... [and] a history of coordination and 
price signalling. Finally, we found that Reynolds was a potential maverick because it 
had more excess capacity than other small competitors, while Alcoa would be well 
positioned post-merger to discipline a cartel because it would not only be the largest 
producer but would also have substantial excess capacity, which would enable it 
credibly to threaten to punish cheating"249. 
From the references of the DOJ official becomes clear that apart from the 
checklist factors, the agency looked also on newer theories on oligopolies, such as the 
theory of mavericks for assessing Reynolds's behaviour pre-merger. Moreover, the 
248 According to Juan Briones who examined the analytical framework regarding oligopolies in different 
jurisdiction including the EU and US ones: "... there are more similarities than differences in the analytical 
framework used by different jurisdictions to analyse oligopolies" (see Juan Briones "Oligopolistic Dominance: Is 
There a Common Approach in Different Jurisdictions? A Review of Decisions Adopted by the Commission under 
the Merger Regulation" 16 E. C. L. Rev. 1995,334, at 334). 
249 See Kolasky op. cit. 188. 
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DOJ looked also to dynamic factors, such as the use of Alcoa's substantial excess 
SGA capacity as a threat for punishing cheating by competitors. These two factors 
along with evidence of past coordination and price signalling in the industry seem to 
have played an important role in the decision of the DOJ to challenge on grounds of 
coordinated effects a six-to-five merger, which could not in terms of concentration 
indicate a highly concentrated market post-merger. 
It is therefore useful for assessing the DOD's decision regarding SGA to examine 
in more detail the treatment by guidelines of the two factors: maverick firms and 
excess capacity. 
According to the guidelines "... [i]n some circumstances, coordinated interaction 
can be effectively prevented or limited by maverick firms-firms that have a greater 
economic incentive to deviate from the terms of coordination than do most of their 
rivals (e. g. firms that are unusually disruptive and competitive influences in the 
market). Consequently acquisition of a maverick firm is one way in which a merger 
may make coordinated interaction more likely, more successful, or more complete"250. 
In addition to the guidelines' definition the concept of maverick also encompasses 
firms that constrain coordination from becoming more likely or more effective 
without necessarily starting price wars or otherwise appearing observably 
disruptive251. In simple terms, the competitive significance of a maverick is 
significantly greater than would be indicated by its market share252. 
The guidelines provide an example of a maverick firm: 
"... [i]n a market where capacity constraints are significant for many competitors, a firm is more likely 
to be a maverick the greater is its excess or divertable capacity in relation to its sales or its total 
capacity, and the lower are its direct and opportunity costs of expanding sales in the relevant market. 
This is so because a firm's incentive to deviate from price-elevating and output-limiting terms of 
coordination is greater the more the firm is able profitably to expand its output as a proportion of the 
sales it would obtain if it adhered to the terms of coordination and the smaller is the base of sales on 
which it enjoys elevated profits due to the price cutting deviation"253 
About Reynolds the DOJ official referred to the firm's excess capacity, which 
was more than that of other smaller producers as a reason for considering it as 
maverick but it seems that the firm concentrated also other features indicating a 
maverick firm, such as low costs. 
250 §2.12 
251 See also Baker op. cit. 231, at 140. 
252 See also Scheffman and Coleman Op-cil. 195, at 3. 
253§2.12 
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In more detail, as shown in the previous chapter, the firm was controlling 56% 
stake in Worsley refinery, Australia, which had one of the lowest operating costs in 
the world.. Moreover, Reynolds was completing in 2000, the year of the merger with 
Alcoa, a capacity expansion of 1.2mt in Worsley, which would thus reach a capacity 
of 3. lmt. Worsley could be further expanded to 4mt, which was the refinery's 
operational limit254. According to the European Commission's analysis Worsley 
provided Reynolds with sufficient low-cost excess capacity to deviate against 
. coordination and also to escape punishment 
by Alcoa255 
Using the terminology of the US guidelines the above findings therefore 
confirmed that Reynolds, in a market where most firms were capacity constrained, 
had relatively big excess and low-cost capacity compared to its total capacity, which 
enabled the firm to expand profitably its sales in the relevant market, to a level that 
would safeguard higher profits than if it followed coordinated policies with other 
firms. Moreover, the firm had sufficient capacity to respond to an attempt by its 
competitors, mostly Alcoa, to punish it. 
However, even if the above findings about Reynolds were true, this would not 
necessarily mean that the firm was really a maverick. This was because the firm, even 
if capable, might not have an incentive to constrain coordination. For instance, 
competitors might be able to retaliate also in other markets where the firm had 
presence thus, increasing the cost of deviation256. Reynolds apart from SGA was also 
operating in the market of primary aluminium and other downstream markets where it 
was competing against almost the same competitors as in SGA, particularly Alcoa257. 
Another reason might have been that deviation would not serve the long-term strategy 
of the firm. 
For such reasons competition authorities before deciding whether a firm (or 
firms) is the market's maverick (or mavericks) should look also to the firm's 
incentives and to its existing and past policies. The economic theory has suggested 
certain methods for identifying mavericks258. One such method is by observing 
whether the firm at issue really constrains industry pricing. A second method is by 
using natural experiments such as examining whether the factors affecting the firm's 
234 See the analysis of entry and expansion in the SGA market in the previous chapter. 
255 See paras. 52-56 of the European Commission's decision. 
256 For such a retaliation see also Bishop and Walker, op. cit. 44, para. 7.60 
257 See also the analysis regarding bidding process in the SGA market in the previous chapter. 
258 See also Baker op. cit. 231,173-175. 
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pricing policy are firm specific or not: if they are, then it is likely that firm to be a 
maverick. A third method, refers to a priori factors and relies on understanding the 
reasons for which a firm would prefer a high or low price in the specific market. 
In respect of Reynolds, there is no information about whether the firm acted in 
the past as a maverick but only that according to DOJ the firm had sufficient excess 
SGA capacity. Also, the European Commission's analysis, even if it stressed the 
competitive significance of Worsley refinery, did not say whether Reynolds really 
used the latter to keep prices down. The Commission only referred to a SGA supply 
contract won by Billiton -Reynolds's partner with minority stake at Worsley- only 
because of Worsley, which enabled the firm to offer lower price than Alcoa259. 
Moreover, the DOJ official above referred to the history of coordination and 
price signalling in the industry, which indicated that firms preferred to coordinate than 
compete and it cannot be seen why Reynolds would be any different. According to the 
theory of mavericks, a merger resulting in the loss of a non-maverick firm is unlikely 
to lead to increased coordination 260 and, therefore, if Reynolds was not a maverick its 
elimination would not greatly change post-merger competition in the SGA market. 
However, it seems that the DOJ, after taking into account all the available evidence, 
considered that Reynolds played a significant role in the maintenance of effective 
competition in that market and therefore its removal would enhance the risk of 
coordination between the remaining players. 
The acquisition of Reynolds by Alcoa would reinforce further the existing 
Alcoa's excess capacity, which could be used to punish deviations. According to the 
guidelines "... excess capacity in the hands of non-maverick firms may be a potent 
method with which to punish deviations from the terms of coordinationi261. In the 
SGA market all firms, including Alcoa, run their refineries in full capacity to be cost- 
efficient. However, as shown in detail in the analysis of unilateral effects above and 
also in chapter 4, Alcoa's biggest advantage concerned its ability to expand its SGA 
capacity faster than its competitors and in refineries with the lowest operating costs in 
the world. Alcoa could also, if it decided to undercut production to raise SGA prices, 
use the mothballed capacity as an additional threat against any attempt by its 
competitors to respond by increasing their own production. This was because the firm 
259 See para. 56 of the Commission's decision. 
260 See Kolasky, op. cit. 188. 
261 See footnote 19 of the guidelines. 
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could make unprofitable the attempt by competitors to expand their production 
capacity by returning the undercut SGA to the market, thus causing prices to fall, 
before the competitors' new production entered into the market (capacity expansions 
in the SGA market take almost two years to complete)262. As a result, Alcoa was 
capable of using the above advantages for threatening its competitors, as the European 
Commission's analysis also made clear. Following the acquisition of Reynolds, the 
firm would acquire more bottom-cost SGA capacity and capacity-expansion potential 
and therefore the firm would have more weapons to use for disciplining competitors. 
However, given that Alcoa had sufficiently excess capacity, why would not it 
have been the market's maverick? According to the guidelines, a firm is more likely 
to be a maverick the greater is its excess or divertable capacity in relation to its total 
capacity and the lower are its direct and opportunity costs of expanding sales in the 
relevant market. Alcoa presumably had significant excess capacity and would acquire 
more following the merger. The firm was also able to carry out significant capacity 
expansions in bottom-cost refineries, which could be used for higher sales. Moreover, 
Alcoa could not be punished by its competitors because the most of these competitors 
were capacity-constrained and the firm had sufficient excess capacity to retaliate. 
However, it seems that the firm preferred supra-competitive SGA prices to 
competitive ones for reasons related to both the SGA and aluminium markets. In the 
latter market Alcoa was also the largest player and as shown in the previous chapter 
higher SGA prices generally mean higher aluminium prices. This in turn means that 
Alcoa might prefer to see as high SGA prices as is possible and this is probably easier 
to achieve through coordination with competitors. 
Further, could Alcoa be a non-collusive ("barometric") price leader, which does 
not harm competition? According to the relevant theory263, one firm is acknowledged 
by its competitors as the price leader -due amongst others to its size or to its more 
efficient management- which is capable of reacting timely and effectively to the 
changing market conditions. The leader adjusts market prices and, in due course, the 
other firms follow suit. Such a situation might not be the result of coordinated 
interaction, since it could occur also under competitive conditions. For instance, an 
increase in raw-material prices increases costs across industry and, as a result, all 
262 See in the analysis of unilateral effects above. 
263 For a formal analysis of price leadership (collusive and non-collusive) see Scherer and Ross op. cit. 163, at 221- 
226 and 357-365 
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competitors may raise prices simultaneously, beginning with the market leader. Such 
a price leadership, which is more effective with homogeneous products, is not harmful 
to competition unless it is the result of an agreement264. 
However, a barometric price leader has no power to substantially influence 
prices or to discipline deviating firms otherwise the situation is one of collusive price 
leadership265. Regarding the SGA market Alcoa's ability to discipline its competitors 
was clear due to its excess SGA capacity, while regarding its ability to influence 
prices was due to its ability to effectively restrict SGA output. As a result, Alcoa 
could not be a barometric price leader. 
Concerning structural features of the SGA market, such as product homogeneity, 
stability and predictability of supply and demand, and transparency of actions by 
suppliers and buyers, which were mentioned in the DOJ's analysis, these issues were 
examined in detail in the previous chapter. In that chapter it was also shown how 
suppliers could coordinate their behaviour to achieve higher prices in SGA tenders, in 
which the bulk of SGA is sold. 
5.4.5.3 Conclusions 
The DOJ's decision on coordinated effects in the SGA market was generally 
justified from the market conditions. Although the merger by reducing the number of 
big competitors from 6 to 5 would not lead to very high concentration levels in the 
market, it was the other market features and the behaviour of the merging firms and 
their competitors in the past which indicated that the market was in enhanced risk of 
coordination post-merger. 
In terms of merger control the Alcoa/Reynolds case demonstrated the increased 
flexibility of the US SLC test compared with the Commission's collective dominance 
doctrine, since the US competition authorities did not hesitate to challenge a merger 
reducing the number of competitors from 6 to 5, something which does not happen 
264 E. g. in National Macaroni Mfrs. Assn v. FTC, 345 F. 2d 421 (1965), in the wake of a durum wheat crop failure, 
pasta manufacturers reduced quality by changing the pasta recipe. This could have been a unilateral decision by an 
industry leader that was followed by the rest of the industry. If that were the case, then the leader-follower 
behaviour would not have been collusive. However, in reality the US court found explicit agreement, which 
indicated collusion (see also Roger D. Blair and Jill Boylston Herndon "Inferring Collusion from Economic 
Evidence" 15-SUM Antitrust, 2001,17,18). Similarly in EU law the existence of barometric price leadership does 
not make parallel action unlawful (see Jones and Sufrin, op. cit. 45,665-666). 
265 See also Scheffman and Coleman, op. cit. 193 at 19; also Faull and Nikpay op. cit. 206, at 1.159; Julio J. 
Rotenberg and Garth Saloner "Collusive Price Leadership" 39 J. Ind. Econ. 1990,93. 
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under the Commission's practice. However, another source of difference may have 
been the fact that under the SLC test, which focuses on the reduction of competition, 
it is possible to establish both unilateral and coordinated effects in the same case, 
unlike Europe where under the dominance test the Commission could establish either 
single or collective dominance but not both effects. However, under the new 
European test this problem was eliminated and it is now possible for the Commission 
to establish, as in the US, both effects for the same case. This issue will be discussed 
in detail in chapter 7 of the thesis. 
5.4.6 Entry in the SGA market 
About entry in the SGA market the Competitive Impact Statement states: 
"An increase in output of SGA in response to anticompetitive price increases is 
unlikely to be timely or sufficient to undermine the price increases. Firms are 
currently operating at or near capacity and are expected to continue to do so during at 
least the next two years. Successful entry through the construction of a new 
"greenfield" alumina refinery or through the expansion of an existing "brownfield" 
refinery is slow, costly and difficult. A minimum efficiency scale greenfield refinery 
could cost $1 billion and take four years or longer from planning to operation. 
Reynolds' expansion of its Worsley refinery is costing $700 million and was 
scheduled to take thirty-two months. No company attempted entry or expansion in 
response to the Gramercy closure despite the significant increase in SGA prices after 
the closure". 
5.4.6.1 Entry analysis under the 1992 Guidelines: analysis, comments and 
comparisons with the EU. 
Section 3 of the 1992 guidelines establishes three criteria for assessing "whether 
266 committed entry would deter or counteract the competitive effect of concern". The 
three criteria concern timeliness, likelihood and sufficiency of entry. If entry meets 
266 §3. 
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these criteria then the merger "is not likely to create or enhance market power or 
facilitate its exercise" either collectively or unilaterally. 
Section 3 deals only with "committed" entry or "new competition" associated 
with sunk costs and which "can be achieved within two years from initial planning to 
significant market impacts267 and excludes assessment of "uncommitted" entry, which 
is examined in the relevant market definition. Also, expansions of capacity by 
incumbent competitors in a market where unilateral effects arise are examined in 
section 2.22, which deals with such effects. Thus, section 3 deals with "new 
competition", namely firms that do not currently sell in the market but would 
probably enter into it in case of an anticompetitive price increase by the incumbent 
firms acting "either collectively or unilaterally". 
Regarding timeliness, the guidelines state: 
"[t]he Agency generally will consider timely only those committed entry alternatives that can be 
achieved within two years from initial planning to significant market impact , 
268. 
The meaning of "significant market impact" is not clear. According to one view, 
the term means generally that "... the firm must build its plant, arrange its distribution 
system and markets, get the kinks worked out of its system, and begin adding its 
output to that of the market"269. Regarding durable goods for which the two-year 
period may not be appropriate the guidelines provide that it is possible to examine 
entry occurring outside that period if that entry will deter or counteract the 
competitive effects within the two-year period and subsequently 270. 
Also, the guidelines state that agencies should not take into account firms, which 
have committed to entering into the market prior to the merger because such firms are 
generally included in the measurement of the market271. 
Further, entry is likely if "it would be profitable at pre-merger prices and if such 
prices could be secured by the entrant" [italics added]272. This implies that the agency 
will rely entirely on objective criteria for determining whether entry will effectively 
discipline monopoly pricing. Such a conclusion could be more clearly inferred from 
section 3.1 where it is stated that the agency will evaluate entry "without attempting to 
267 § 3.2. 
268§3.2. 
269 See Herbert Hovenkamp, op. cit. 72, § 12.6d. 




identify who might be potential entrants"273. However, the guidelines use the term 
"would" instead of "could" for profitable entry, which means that the agencies should 
prove that the firm would enter and not that it could enter, which is more speculative. 
Thus, even if the identification of the potential entrant is not required, the "would be" 
clause provides for designing its profile274. 
Respecting entries with significant sunk costs, as in the case of SGA, the 
guidelines provide that firms examining such an entry should evaluate its profitability 
` on the basis of long-term participation in the market, because the underlying assets 
will be committed to the market until they are economically depreciated"275. 
For evaluating the entry profitability the guidelines have developed the concept of 
"minimum viable scale", which is "... the smallest average annual level of sales that 
the committed entrant must persistently achieve for profitability at pre-merger 
pricess276. The guidelines state that entry is unlikely if "the minimum viable scale is 
larger than the likely sales opportunity available to entrants". As a rule of thumb, the 
guidelines suggest that an entry plan may not be plausible if the minimum viable scale 
exceeds 5% of total market sales. 
Lastly, profitable entry should be sufficient to deter or counteract the 
anticompetitive effects of the merger otherwise it is not taken into account277. 
Respecting US courts, they generally accept the idea that easy entry makes a 
merger harmless to competition regardless of market concentration 278. However, it 
seems that the courts are more willing to find easy entry than competition agencies. 
More specifically the courts' stance has been characterised as being closer to the 
concept of "uncommitted" entry, namely unlimited, low sunk-cost and rapid entry, 
which does not require identification of potential entrants, and as ignoring 
"committed" entry, which involves sunk costs and whose analysis takes into account 
also newer theories of strategic behaviour by incumbent firms279. 
273 See also Hovenkamp op. cit. 72, §12.6d. 
274 See also Baker op. cit. 126,363. 
275 § 3.0. 
276 § 3.3. 
277 § 3.4. 
278 See e. g. United States v. Waste Management Inc., 743 F. 2d 976,978,983-84 (2d Cir. 1984); Accord, United 
States v. Calmar Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1298,1306 (D. N. J. 1985). 
279 The criticism refers to two appeals courts decisions in United States v. Baker Hughes Inc. (980 F. 2d 981 (D. C. 
Cir. 1990)) and United States v. Syufy Enters (903 F. 2d 659 (9°i Cir. 1990)) in which the courts rejected on the 
grounds of ease of entry the DOJ's pleas to block the mergers. The two decisions followed the ruling in Waste 
Management above but were criticised for overestimating the ability of committed entrants to cure the competitive 
problem. The two decisions paved the way for establishing in the 1992 guidelines the three criteria for evaluating 
committed entry, thus distinguishing that entry from the "uncommitted" one (see also Jonathan Baker "Responding 
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Regarding committed entry the relevant methodology seeks to determine if not 
who the new entrants might be, at least whether these entrants would be profitably 
capable of deterring the exercise of market power by the merging firms acting 
unilaterally or in coordination. Committed entry is also affected by the potential of 
strategic reaction by incumbents against new entrants280. 
The authors of the 1992 guidelines, by making for the first time the distinction 
between "uncommitted" and "committed" entry and by setting out the "timeliness", 
"likelihood" and "sufficiency" criteria for assessing the latter, sought to clarify the 
distinction between the two types of entry and to incorporate into entry analysis newer 
theories of strategic behaviour, but it is not very clear if they achieved their scope. 
Even if proponents of the 1992 guidelines argue that US courts see positively the 
new approach, this cannot yet be said with maximum certainty281, while recently an 
FTC senior official raised concerns that agencies never find uncommitted entry and 
that the methodology for evaluating committed entry is impractical given the limits of 
available information282. 
Compared with the European Commission's policy about entry, the guidelines' 
methodology is not very different. 
One could say that the latter methodology is generally more rigorous, compared 
with the relatively more flexible policy of the European Commission. Thus, the two- 
year rule for examining committed entry does not exist in the Commission's policy, 
which considers that the appropriate time period should depend on the characteristics 
and dynamics of the market as well as on the specific capabilities of the potential 
entrants283. However, the period normally taken into account by the Commission in 
the examination of entry is as in the US two years284. 
Also, the Commission guidelines establish criteria similar to the US guidelines, 
namely likelihood, timeliness and sufficiency, for assessing entry effect285. However, 
in respect of likelihood, the Commission guidelines do not require entry to be 
profitable at pre-merger prices as in the US but only to be sufficiently profitable 
to Developments in Economics and the Courts: Entry in the Merger Guidelines" in 20'h Anniversary of the 1982 
Merger Guidelines: The Contribution of Merger Guidelines to the Evolution ofAntitrust Doctrine, June 10,2002. 
280 See also Baker ibid. 
281 See Baker ibid. 
282 See Leary, op. cit. 127. On the issue see also, Malcolm B. Coate and A. E. Rodriguez "Pitfalls in Merger 
Analysis: The Dirty Dozed' 30 N. M. L. Rev., 2000,227, at 244-245. 
283 See para 74 of the Commission guidelines. 
284 Ibid. 
28$ See paras 78-86. 
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"... taking into account the price effects of injecting additional output into the market 
and the potential responses of the incumbents"286. Also the Commission guidelines 
avoid reference to "minimum viable scale" but talk about entry "... economically 
viable on a large scale... resulting in significantly depressed price levels"287. 
However, the Commission guidelines, as the US ones, state that the existence of 
sufficient entry deters or defeats the anticompetitive effects of the merger. 
5.4.6.2 Entry in the SGA market 
Expansion by incumbent firms in the SGA market was examined in the analysis 
of unilateral effects above where it was shown that sufficient reactions by competitors 
were unlikely to be timely and sufficient to deter Alcoa from exercising unilateral 
market power. It was also shown, in accordance with the DOJ's analysis, that capacity 
expansions in existing refineries or construction of new refineries required significant 
capital costs and lead time of more than the two years laid down in the guidelines. As 
a result, the high sunk costs along with the long lead-time constituted sufficient 
barriers to expansion in the SGA market. 
Similar problems with incumbents would face a new competitor, since that 
competitor would have either to build new refineries or to acquire existing ones and 
expand their production thus facing the difficulties that incumbent players had. As a 
result new entry was unlikely to deter Alcoa from exercising market power 
unilaterally or in coordination for the two years following the merger with Reynolds. 
However, as mentioned also in the analysis of unilateral effects, the DOJ's 
analysis focused only on the inability of competitors to respond timely and 
sufficiently and did not refer to Alcoa's ability to further prevent such responses by 
acting strategically. The issue was important and concerned the risk of coordinated 
interaction. If Alcoa was capable of preventing new entry by making it unprofitable 
then the risk of coordinated interaction in the SGA market would further increase 
because an external threat to coordination would be eliminated. 
Regarding sunk costs, which were implicitly mentioned by the DOJ as 
constituting barriers to entry in the SGA market, it must be said that the US courts 
286 Pß. 69. 
287 Ibid. 
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have not always considered such costs as constituting per se entry barriers288. The 
issue also raises the conflicting theories between economists about the definition and 
role of entry barriers in merger analysis289. The situation is clearer when high sunk 
costs are associated with long lead-time, namely the time between the entry decision 
and the earliest market impact290. In such cases the risk of entry increases and this 
constitutes entry barrier. This as shown occurred in the SGA market and, as a result, 
the DOJ's decision to consider on such grounds that entry in the SGA market was 
difficult, was justified. 
Compared with the European Commission's, decision the DOJ's analysis came 
to the same conclusions and the only difference is that at least in the US published 
texts for Alcoa/Reynolds there is no reference to the ability of Alcoa to act 
strategically in order to deter new entry in the SGA market. 
5.4.7 Efficiency gains 
The published US texts like the European Commission's decision do not include 
any references to possible efficiency gains to from Alcoa/Reynolds merger. 
However, according to public statements by Alcoa's executives the firm was 
expecting to realise from the merger synergies of approximately US$300 million by 
2002, of which US$80 million, on an annualised basis, was set to come from 
personnel reduction in Reynolds's headquarters in Richmond, Virginia291. 
5.4.7.1 Efficiency defence under the 1992 guidelines: analysis, comments and 
comparison with the EU. 
288 E. g. in Los Angeles Land Co. v. Brunswick Corp. (6 F. 3d 1422,1428 (9t' Cir. 1993)) the court held: "... The 
mere fact that entry requires a large absolute expenditure of funds does not constitute a 'barrier to entry'; a new 
entrant is disadvantaged only to the extent that he must pay more to attract those funds than would an established 
firm". Similarly in Advo, Inc. v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. (51 F. 3d 1191,1200 (3`d Cir. 1995)) the court 
ruled: "High capital requirements... pose no barrier to entry". In contrast, in FTC v. Illinois Cereal Mills, (691 F. 
Supp. 1131,1138,1144 (N. D. III. 1988)) the court recognised the value of asset specificity, or suck costs, as entry 
barriers. 
289 Aspects of this conflict along with the result of their economic analysis on the entry-inducing effects of 
Horizontal mergers are presented by Gregory Werden and Luke M. Froeb in "The Entry-Inducing Effects of 
Horizontal Mergers: An Exploratory Analysis" Vol. XLVI The Journal of Industrial Economics, 1998,525. 
290 See e. g. FTC v. Illinois Cereal op. cit. 285, at 1145 (it took nine years for another firm to build a new plant, 
suggesting high entry barriers); FTC v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (681 F. Supp. 27,51 (D. D. C. ), vacated as moot, 850 
F. 2d 694 (D. C. Cir. 1988)) (two year lead time with significant sunk expenditures entailed high entry barriers). See 
also Hilke and Nelson op. cit. 222,371-372. 
291 See Christopher Bowe and Nikki Tait "At a crossroads after acquisitions: Alcoa", in FT Survey: Aluminium 
2000, Oct. 25,2000; see also "Alcoa's Earnings Up 57% From Year-Ago Quarter On a 38% Increase in 
Revenues", Business Wire, July 10,2000. 
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The US competition authorities in 1997 incorporated into the 1992 guidelines a 
revised Section 4, which developed a new doctrine on the examination of efficiencies, 
an issue controversial and difficult. 
Section 4 repeats the presumption found also in 1984 and 1992 guidelines, that 
"the primary benefit of mergers to the economy is their potential to 
generate ... efficiencies"292 and states that efficiencies 
"can enhance the merged firm's 
ability and incentive to compete, which may result in lower prices, improved quality, 
enhanced service, or new products". 
Next, Section 4 establishes the concept of "cognisable" efficiencies, which refer 
to "merger-specific efficiencies that have been verified and do not arise from 
anticompetitive reductions in output or services". Competition authorities will not 
challenge a merger if cognisable efficiencies are sufficient to counteract the 
anticompetitive effects of the merger293. 
Concerning "merger-specific", the guidelines state that competition authorities 
will consider "only those efficiencies likely to be accomplished with the proposed 
merger and unlikely to be accomplished in the absence of either the proposed merger 
or another means having comparable anticompetitive effects"294. The term "likely" 
indicates that efficiencies considerations should be made on the basis of likelihood 
and not of mere feasibility295. Regarding "means having comparable anticompetitive 
effects", which refer to formations less than mergers, such as joint ventures or 
competitor collaborations 
296, the guidelines provide that "only alternatives that are 
practical in the business situation faced by the merging firms will be considered in 
making this determinationi297. 
In sum, the guidelines seek efficiencies that are likely to be achieved by the 
merger and which cannot be practically achieved by any other means less than 
merger298. However, the guidelines recognise the practical difficulties associated with 
292 A senior DOJ economist has summarised the preference to efficiencies over competition as follows: "efficiency 
is the goal, competition is the process" (see Kenneth Heyer, Address before the Merger Task Force of the 
European Commission's Directorate General for Competition, April 9,2002). 
293 §4. 
294 Ibid. 
293 See also William Kolasky and Andrew Dick "The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of Efficiencies into 
Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers" in 20`h Anniversary of the 1982 Merger Guidelines: The Contribution of 
Merger Guidelines to the Evolution of Antitrust Doctrine, June 10,2002, at 29. 
2% Ibid. at 28. 
297 §4. 
298 See also Robert Pitofsky "Efficiencies in Defence of Mergers: Two Years After" 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1999, 
485, at 486. 
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the verification and quantification of efficiencies and therefore require the merging 
parties to substantiate efficiency claims "so that the Agency can verify by reasonable 
means the likelihood and magnitude of each asserted efficiency, how and when each 
should be achieved (and any costs of doing so), how each would enhance the merged 
firm's ability and incentive to compete, and why each would be merger-specific"299 . 
However, even if the guidelines refer to verification by "reasonable means", meaning 
that efficiencies may not necessarily need quantification to be accepted300, there is still 
the practical problem of their assessment301. In this respect the development of merger 
simulation, which seeks to offer quantitative predictions on the possible effects of 
mergers on prices could offer some support for the quantification of efficiencies302. 
However, merger simulation even if it seems to gain ground between economists has 
not generally won wide approval yet303. 
Another open issue in the guidelines is whether efficiencies should be passed to 
consumers to be "cognisable". On one hand, the guidelines state: "the Agency 
considers whether cognisable efficiencies likely would be sufficient to reverse the 
merger's potential to harm consumers in the relevant market, e. g. by preventing price 
increases in that market"304. On the other hand, it is also stated: "The Agency also will 
consider the effects of cognisable efficiencies with no short-term, direct effect on 
price in the relevant market "305 Thus, while on the whole the guidelines seem to lean 
towards a price or consumer-welfare effect of efficiencies, it is nevertheless possible 
to apply also the "total welfare" approach, which views all efficiencies positively, 
whether or not they were passed onto consumers in the form of lower prices306. 
Further, the guidelines provide that the agency within its prosecutorial discretion 
... will consider efficiencies not strictly 
in the relevant market but so inextricably 
linked with it that a partial divestiture or other remedy could not feasibly eliminate the 
anticompetitive effect in the relevant market without sacrificing the efficiencies in the 
299 §4. 
300 Kolasky and Dick, op. cit. 295,29. 
301 About the difficulties that agencies face when assessing efficiencies claims see Graig W. Conrath and Nicholas 
A. Windell "Efficiency Claims in Merger Analysis: Hostility or Humility? " 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1999,685. 
302 See also Epstein and Rubinfeld, op. cit. 200,883; also Conrath and Windell ibid., 693-694. 
303 Issues concerning merger simulation were examined in the analysis of unilateral effects above and will also be 
examined in other chapters of the thesis below. 
304 §4. 
305 See footnote 37. 
306 See also Gregory Werden "An Economic Perspective on the Analysis of Merger Efficiencies" 11-SUM 
Antitrust 1997,12, at 14. Similarly, Kolasky and Dick op. cit. 294,32, consider that the guidelines adopt a hybrid 
consumer welfare/total welfare model regarding efficiencies. 
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other(s) market"307. The above provision could be deemed as paving the way for the 
approval of mergers that harm some consumers308. However, the guidelines say that 
inextricably-linked efficiencies "are most likely to make a difference when they are 
great and the likely anticompetitive effect in the relevant market(s) is small'309. 
Lastly, concerning the difficult task of balancing efficiencies against 
anticompetitive effects, the guidelines adopt a sliding scale for this purpose by 
providing that the greater the anticompetitive effects, the greater must be the 
cognisable efficiencies for the agency to conclude that the merger will not have an 
anticompetitive effect in the relevant market. When the potential adverse effects of a 
merger are likely to be large, extraordinarily great cognisable efficiencies would be 
necessary to prevent a merger from being anticompetitive. Regarding mergers to 
monopoly or near-monopoly, the guidelines state that efficiencies will never justify 
310 such mergers" 
However, it must be mentioned that the ultimate purpose of merger analysis 
under the guidelines is to conclude whether the merger will "substantially lessen 
competition" in line with the language of Section 7 of Clayton Act and in this respect 
the examination of efficiencies precedes the final decision regarding the competitive 
effects of the mergers311. 
Regarding the stance of US courts, the trend over the past years seems to favour 
the consideration of efficiencies claims of merging parties, even if there is almost no 
decision which cleared, an otherwise anticompetitive merger, on efficiencies 
grounds312. However, all recent decisions refer to lower courts, since the US Supreme 
Court has not decided on efficiency claims since 1967, when in FTC v. Procter & 
Gamble Co. 313 it dismissed such claims because "possible economies cannot be used 
as a defence to illegality". The lower courts' decisions seem to permit an efficiency 
defence to rebut showing of anticompetitive effects based on market shares and 
concentration but they have not thus far articulated specific rules for evaluating the 
314 defence 
307 Footnote 36. 
308 See Kolasky and Dick op. cit. 295,32. 
309 Footnote 36. 
310 See §4. 
311 See also Werden op. cit. 306,13. 
312 See also Conrath and Windell op. cit. 301,689-690. 
313 386 U. S. 568 (1967). 
314 A relatively clear case is FTC v. University Health, Inc. (938 F. 2d 1206 (11s' Cir. 1991)) in which the court 
said: "... in certain circumstances a defendant may rebut the government's prima facie case with evidence showing 
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Also, after the entry into force of the revised section 4 of the guidelines in 1997, 
there have been at least three court cases with extensive efficiencies analysis: FTC v. 
Staples Inc. 315, FTC v. Cardinal Health Inc. 316 and FTC v. Heinz317. In all three cases, 
the appeals courts recognised the right of merging parties to raise efficiency defence 
and generally endorsed the guidelines framework of efficiencies' analysis318, but they 
finally rejected the relevant claims. 
Generally speaking, the trend in US Courts is to incorporate efficiency claims in 
the competitive effects analysis of mergers, but the courts appear reluctant to clear an 
otherwise anticompetitive merger on efficiencies grounds. However, this courts' 
stance is no different from the stance of competition agencies, which have not thus far 
cleared any anticompetitive merger on efficiencies grounds319. 
As a whole it seems that the efficiencies section of the guidelines needs further 
elaboration in order to become completely workable and that in its current form its 
biggest utility is that it incorporates efficiency claims into the competitive effects 
analysis320. 
Unlike in the US where the treatment of efficiencies in the context of merger 
control has been discussed in some detail, in the EU the situation is more nebulous. 
As shown in the previous chapters the treatment of efficiencies by the Commission 
appeared in merger decisions to be only implicit, while there have been cases where 
the Commission appeared to have been hostile to mergers creating efficiencies321. 
The issue in the EU concerns not only the Commission's practice but also the 
legislation, since the ECMR does not contain an explicit provision for the trade-off 
between the anticompetitive effects of the merger and efficiencies. The only 
provision, which has been used as the basis for examining efficiencies, is Article 
2(1)(b) which refers to "technical and economic progress". However, and given that 
there has been thus far no Commission decision clearing an otherwise anticompetitive 
that the intended merger would create significant efficiencies in the relevant market". On the issue see also David 
Balto "The Efficiency Defence in Merger Review: Progress of Stagnation? " 16-Fall Antitrust, 2001,74. 
315 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D. D. C. 1997). 
71612 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D. D. C. 1998). 
317 116 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D. D. C. 2000), rev'd, 246 F. 3d 708 (D. C. Cir. 2001). 
318 See also Balto op. cit. 314,78. 
39 See also ibid. 
320 This was well summarised by Robert Pitofsky, FTC chairman at the time of the drafting of section 4: "Given 
the many limitations and qualifications on the successful assertion of an efficiency defence, it will be difficult to 
reverse what otherwise would be a finding of illegality. That is as it should be. The goal of the merger revisions 
was to open the door to efficiency claims as part of the competitive effects analysis in close cases -not to give 
away the whole enforcement enterprise" (see Pitofsky op. cit. 298,493; Balto op. cit. 314,79-80). 
321 The GE/Honeywell (Case COMP/M. 2220 (Decision of 3 July 2001)) merger is a case where according to some 
commentators the Commission demonstrated hostile attitude towards efficiencies. 
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merger on the basis of efficiencies it is still questionable whether Article 2(l)(b) 
constitutes adequate legal basis for the examination of efficiencies322. 
The Commission's practice until recently to adopt a cautious stance towards 
efficiencies could be deemed justified. The dominance test, which was until recently 
the substantive test of the ECMR, required a high standard of anticompetitive effects 
for the merger to be blocked and when such standard was established any efficiencies 
argument would have little chances of success323. Besides, as also the US guidelines 
recognise efficiencies are more likely to make a difference when the anticompetitive 
effects of the merger are not great. Thus, when a merger produces a dominant firm it 
is difficult an efficiency defence to change this situation. 
However, the adoption as of May 1,2004, of a new substantive test in the ECMR, 
which expands the scope of merger control beyond market dominance, brings the role 
of efficiencies into fore. Even if Article 2(1)(b) of the ECMR was not amended in the 
latest reforms, the Commission guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers 
provide an analytical methodology for the assessment of efficiencies. 
According to the guidelines, Article 2(l)(b) of the ECMR remains the legal basis 
for the examination of efficiencies meaning that the consumer-welfare standard 
proposed by that Article is the sole standard for efficiencies. This is in relative 
contrast with the US guidelines, which as shown above, leave open the application 
also of the total-welfare standard. 
Further, as with the US guidelines, the Commission guidelines provide that 
efficiencies, if sufficient in magnitude, could counteract the adverse effects to 
competition from the merger and thus lead to clearance of the merger324. 
Moreover, the Commission guidelines talk about "substantiated" efficiencies325, 
which as in the US indicates that the burden of proving efficiencies claims are on the 
parties. 
Also, similar to the US guidelines, the Commission guidelines establish three 
criteria for the examination of efficiencies claims. Thus claimed efficiencies must a) 
benefit consumers326; b) be merger-specific meaning that the parties must prove that 
there are no less anticompetitive means than the merger for realising these 
322 See also Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin op. cit. 45,953. 
323 See also chapter 3. 
324 Para. 77 of the Guidelines. 
32$ Ibid. 
326 Ibid. paras. 79-84. 
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efficiencies 327; and c) be verifiable meaning quantification of efficiencies where 
possible or at least ability to foresee a ".. clearly identifiable possible impact on 
consumers" 328 
Generally speaking, the efficiencies doctrine of the Commission's guidelines is 
close to the US one. Possible sources of difference in the two jurisdictions concern the 
applicable welfare standard and of course issues of practical application because we 
have not seen yet how the Commission intends to apply its efficiencies doctrine. 
However, judging from the Commission's conservative approach to efficiencies 
so far and the objective difficulties concerning the practical application of the 
doctrine, one should not expect in the near future radical changes from the current 
Commission's practice. 
5.4.7.2 Efficiency gains in the SGA market. 
In Alcoa/Reynolds case, potential merger-specific efficiencies had to be sufficient 
to address both the unilateral and the coordinated effects of the merger. 
According to section 4 of the guidelines, regarding unilateral effects "marginal 
cost reductions may reduce the merged firm's incentive to elevate prices", while 
regarding coordinated interaction "marginal cost reductions may make coordination 
less likely or effective by enhancing the incentive of a maverick to lower price or by 
creating a new maverick firm". 
Regarding SGA the biggest cost savings would come through reductions in 
administrative staff at Reynolds's headquarters, which, however, affect fixed rather 
than marginal costs. Fixed-cost savings are generally irrelevant, since they lead to 
higher and not to lower prices and therefore could not be seen favourably by section 4 
of the guidelines329. 
From Alcoa's announcement it does not follow that the firm was expecting any 
other large-scale cost savings from the merger apart from the abovementioned fixed- 
cost reductions. Thus, for a firm with combined annual sales of US$20 billion, cost 
savings of US$300 million within three years were rather immaterial and therefore 
insufficient to address concerns of unilateral market power and coordinated 
327 Ibid. para. 85. 
3281bid. paras. 86-88. 
329 See also the analysis of efficiencies for the SGA market in the previous chapter. 
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interaction in the SGA market. Moreover, raising efficiencies issues in that merger 
would work against the merging firms, since according to economic theory, a merger 
which produces no or limited merger-specific efficiencies is likely to lead to higher 
prices33o. 
As a conclusion, the efficiencies produced by Alcoa/Reynolds were not sufficient 
to counteract the anticompetitive effects of the merger. 
5.4.8 Remedies 
According to the Final Judgment331, in order to gain the approval of the merger the 
merging parties were ordered to divest the Worsley interest within 270 days after the 
filing of the Complaint in this matter or 5 days after notice of entry of the Final 
Judgment by the Court whichever was later. Moreover, the merging parties had to sell 
the Corpus Christi Assets "within 180 days after the filing of the Complaint in this 
matter, or 5 days after notice of entry of the Final Judgment by the Court, whichever 
was later332. 
The divestiture assets had to be sold as viable and ongoing businesses to a 
purchaser or purchasers in such a way as to satisfy "the United States, in its sole 
discretion"333. The purchaser/s should have the "intent to compete effectively in the 
refining and sale of SGA" and have "the managerial, operational and financial 
capability to compete effectively in the refining and sale of SGA"334. Moreover the 
Final Judgment provided measures seeking to ensure that the merging parties would 
not be capable of preventing the purchaser/s after the acquisition from competing 
effectively against them335. 
The decision on the remedies was explained as follows: "Divestiture of the 
Divestiture Assets preserves competition because it will restore the world SGA 
"' See Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis" Am. Econ. Rev. March 
1990,107,112. 
J31 The proposed Final Judgment was filed on May 3,2000 along with the Complaint and the other documents, in 
the context of the settlement of Alcoa/Reynolds merger and became final after it gained the approval of the Court 
(see also section 5.2.3 above). 
332 Section IV, A of the Final Judgment. 
333 Ibid. at I. 
334 Ibid. 
335 In particular Section IV(I) of the Final Judgment states: "none of the terms of any agreement between the 
purchaser or purchasers and [the merging parties], including any joint venture, governance, operation, or 
shareholders agreements, shall give [the merging parties] the ability to limit the purchaser's capacity or output, to 
raise a purchaser's costs, to lower a purchaser's efficiency, or otherwise to interfere in the ability of the purchaser 
or purchasers to compete effectively. 
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... market to the structure that existed prior to the acquisition and will preserve the 
existence of independent competitors... "336. More specifically "[d]ivestiture of the 
Worsley Interest and the Corpus Christi Assets preserves competition... by requiring 
Alcoa to sell virtually all of the world-wide SGA refining capacity owned by 
Reynolds"337. In addition to these assets and in accordance with the European 
Commission's decision Alcoa had been forced to sell Reynolds's Stade refinery in 
Germany. 
The District Court examined the merger and concluded that the proposed by the 
DOJ Final Judgment was "in the public interest" after taking in to account the 
following factors as set forth in 15 U. S. C. § 16(e)338: 
1. the competitive impact of such judgment, including termination of alleged 
violations, provisions for enforcement and modification, duration of relief sought, 
anticipated effects of alternative remedies actually considered, whether its terms are 
ambiguous, and any other competitive considerations bearing upon the adequacy of 
such judgment that the court deems necessary to a determination of whether the 
consent judgment is in the public interest; and 
2. the impact of entry of such judgment upon competition in the relevant market or 
markets, upon the public generally and individuals alleging specific injury from the 
violations set forth in the complaint including consideration of the public benefit, if 
any, to be derived from a determination of the issues at trial. 
5.4.8.1 Remedies in the US merger policy -Comparison with the EU. 
The US Supreme Court in United States v. Du Pont De Nemours & Co339 made 
clear that the agencies' first responsibility concerning remedies should be to preserve 
free and open competition and therefore "the key of the whole question of an antitrust 
remedy is... the discovery of measures effective to preserve competition". As a result, 
336 See section III of the Competitive Impact Statement. 
337 Ibid. 
338 These provisions of the Tunney Act include the Amendments made in 2004, which however do not 
differ significantly from the provisions existed when the Alcoa/Reynolds decision was made. 
339 366 U. S. 316,326 (1961). 
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consumers should benefit from the same degree of competition after a merger as 
before a merger340. Protection of consumer welfare prevails in any decision on 
341 remedies. 
Moreover, the decision on the remedies takes into account potential efficiency 
gains to the extent that is possible without compromising the obligation to preserve 
competition 342. The main goal of the US competition authorities is therefore to find 
remedies sufficient to eliminate the competitive problem without cancelling the 
efficiency gains of the merger343. Regarding efficiencies in particular, a basic concern 
of competition agencies is whether efficiencies are "sufficiently likely to be passed on 
to consumers to outweigh the risks that the restructuring will not fully restore pre- 
existing competition"344 . 
Regarding the timeframe for the examination of remedies, the US agencies, 
particularly the DOJ, demonstrate some flexibility. 
A basic illustration of this flexibility could be found in "fix-it-first" policy, which 
was first developed by the DOJ and allows the merging parties to restructure, mostly 
though divestments, and by themselves, an otherwise problematic merger at an early 
stage and then seek approval of the deal from the agency345. The agency then, if 
satisfied from the restructuring, could approve the merger without filing a judicial 
complaint and consent decree, which would be normally required for such a case to 
close the dea1346. Given that in the US there is no notification deadline for mergers - 
another factor of flexibility- the merging parties could potentially divest overlapping 
businesses in certain problematic markets even before notifying the merger to 
competition agencies347. The fix-it-first policy, therefore, is considered as providing 
for a fast approval of a merger, which benefits both merging firms and consumers. 
340 See also Richard G. Parker and David A. Balto "The Evolving Approach to Merger Remedies", Antitrust 
Report, 2000; also Robert Pitofsky "The Nature and Limits of Restructuring in Merger Review", Remarks in the 
Cutting Edge Antitrust Conference, Law Seminars International, New York, Feb. 17,2000. See also section II of 
the DOJ Guidelines on merger remedies, which were published on October 2004. 
341 See Pitofsky ibid.; also according to a DOJ official: "... the goal is to effectively remedy the violation for the 
benefit of consumers, maintaining competition at pre-merger level" (see Deborah Platt Majoras "Antitrust 
Remedies in United States: Adhering to Sound Principles in a Multi-faceted Scheme" Speech before Canadian Bar 
Association, National Law Section, October 4,2002. 
342 See Parker and Balto, op. cit. 339. 
343 See David Balto and James Mongoven "Antitrust Remedies in High Technology Industries" 708 PLI/Pat 2002, 
113,117-118. See also section 2 of the DOJ Guidelines on merger remedies. 
344 See Pitofsky op. cit. 339. 
343 More details about the "fix-it-first policy" of the DOJ are provided in section IV of the DOJ guidelines on 
merger remedies. 
346 See Hewitt Pate "Antitrust Enforcement at the United States Department of Justice: Issues in Merger 
Investigation and Litigation" Colum. Bus. L. Rev., 2003,411,422-423; also Majoras op. cit. 340. 
347 In the US notification is a prerequisite only to closing the transaction but not a legal requirement in itself (see 
Venit and Kolasky, op. cit. I 11,89). 
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However, the policy has attracted some criticism focusing, amongst others, on 
arguments that the agency accepts remedies only to avoid investigative work or that 
the agency accepts remedies at an early stage when market investigation has not been 
completed yet and therefore the agency has not enough information to effectively 
consider whether there is, in fact, a violation to redress348. Conversely, a quick 
solution is a basic argument in favour of the policy along with saving taxpayers', the 
parties', and third parties' time and expense349. However, the FTC's approach on the 
issue is relatively different, since the agency will normally require a consent decree 
(official settlement) before closing the merger35o. 
The agencies are not biased in favour of any type of remedies, but seek the most 
appropriate to fully restore competition. However, the US Supreme court has 
considered divestiture as the "most drastic" and "most effective" remedy for 
anticompetitive mergers and has stressed that this remedy should always be "in the 
forefront of a court's mind when a violation... has been found"351. The Court has also 
held that a divestiture order should not be limited to restoring the status quo ante, but 
that it should provide, where necessary, additional "relief' to allow the divested 
business "an opportunity to establish its competitive position"352. However, apart 
from divestiture, there have been a number of cases where agencies were willing to 
accept licensing arrangements (especially in high-technology markets), supply 
agreements and certain behavioural remedies, such as non-discrimination 
provisions353. 
Respecting divestiture, the US agencies examine a list of options, such as up-front 
buyers for the divested assets, "as is" divestiture of ongoing businesses, divestitures of 
"crown jewel" assets354 when parties fail to meet the agency's divestiture timetable, 
348 See Majoras op. cit. 340. 
749 See ibid. Also section 4 of the DOJ guidelines on merger remedies. 
350 See William Baer and Ronald Redcay "Solving Competition Problems in Merger Control: The Requirements 
for an Effective Divestiture Remedy" 69 G. W. L. R.. 2001,915,927. 
351 United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U. S. 316,326 (1960). The DOJ guidelines on merger 
remedies also consider that divestiture is the preferred remedy. 
352 Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U. S. 562 (1972) 
353 See also Parker and Balto, op. cit. 339. 
334 In the case where parties fail to meet the timetable for finding satisfactory buyer/s for the divested assets, the 
agencies can exercise rights under the consent decree to empower the trustee to auction the assets up for divestiture 
and, if that fails, the agencies can authorise the trustee to divest an even more attractive package of assets (the 
"crown jewel") (See also Federal Trade Commission, A Study of the Commission's Divestiture Process, 1999,30- 
31). However, the DOJ guidelines on merger remedies stress in section IV that the DOJ "disfavours the use of 
crown jewel provisions because generally they represent acceptance of either less than effective relief at the outset 
or more than is necessary to remedy the competitive problem". 
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"clean sweep" divestitures 355 mostly in horizontal mergers, the so-called "zero-delta" 
policy356, and mix-and-match357 divestitures. From the above list the US agencies 
seem to prefer divestiture of ongoing businesses to up-front buyers because they 
believe that such a remedy is most likely to create a viable competitor358. 
On the issue, the FTC published in 1999 an influential study "of the 
Commission's divestiture process"359, which examined divestiture orders, issued 
between 1990-1994, on mergers and acquisitions reviewed by the agency. The study 
analysed the competitive position of the divested assets after their acquisition by the 
new owner and drew conclusions about the validity of the FTC's divestiture decisions. 
The publication of the study provided new insight into the divestiture process and 
affected the future developments in that area not only in the US360 but also in other 
jurisdictions 361. Also in October 2004 the DOJ issued Guidelines on merger 
remedies362. The document is addressed to the DOD's attorneys and economists and 
seeks to provide them ".. with a framework for fashioning and implementing 
appropriate relief short of a full-stop injunction in merger cases363". 
The European Commission's approach is not very different from that of the US. 
The Commission's policy can be seen in the Commission's Notice on remedies, 
which was adopted in December 2000. According to the Notice, which reflects the 
Commission's practice under the Merger Regulation, the parties should submit 
remedies sufficient to "eliminate the creation or strengthening of... a dominant 
position"364 Similarly to the US, the Commission's practice is to accept only 
remedies that are capable of fully addressing competitive concerns and restoring 
competition 365. 
355 "Clean sweep" divestiture requires either party to divest all of its assets used to conduct business in the relevant 
market (see also Joe Sims and Michael McFalls "Negotiated Merger Remedies: How Well do They Solve 
Competition Problems? " 69 G. W. L. R., 2001,932,948-949). 
356 "Zero-delta" policy refers to sales to non-incumbent players (see also Sims and McFalls ibid., 949). 
357 "Mix-and-match" divestitures refer to assets of both parties. For the approval of such divestments US 
competition authorities are more careful since there are rather significant uncertainties about the joint function of 
these assets since there is no past experience and the addition of a new owner further complicates the situation (See 
also Parker and Balto op. cit. 339). 
358 See also Parker and Balto op. cit. 339; also the FTC's Divestiture Study op cit. 349,10-12. 
359 See op. cit. 352. 
36° See Parker and Balto op. cit. 339. 
361 About the EU see below. 
362 The text of the guidelines is available on the website of the DOJ. 
363 Ibid 
364 Para. 6 of the Notice. The adoption of the new substantive test in the ECMR in the latest reforms will lead to 
the revision of the Commission's Notice in order to fully comply with the new regime. 
365 See also, Mario Monti "The Commission's Notice on Merger Remedies: One Year After" Speech before 
CERNA, Paris, January 18,2002. 
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Also, as in the US, the Commission strongly prefers structural remedies through 
divestitures than behavioural ones and the Notice provides guidance for assessing 
such remedies. The Commission's preference is for the sale of a "viable" business to a 
"suitable" buyer366, which constitute the European equivalents of "ongoing" 
businesses and "up-front" buyers used in the US. In general, the Notice on remedies 
was largely inspired by the FTC's divestiture study and has adopted many of the 
proposals therein367. 
However, meeting the relatively strict and detailed requirements for "viable" 
businesses and "upfront" buyers, as well as other remedies, such as "crown jewel" 
divestitures, increases the burden on the merging parties, which have also to comply 
with the Commission's demands within the strict timeframe of the ECMR368. In this 
respect, the European approach to remedies is generally more stringent and inflexible 
than the US one, even if the deadlines of the ECMR have been extended in the latest 
reforms to the ECMR369. 
In any case the provisions of the Notice on remedies and their significant 
connection with the FTC's divestiture study constitute evidence that the EU and the 
US jurisdictions converge in their remedial policies370, as they do in other areas of 
merger control. 
5.4.8.2 Remedies in the SGA market 
The competitive assessment of Alcoa/Reynolds concluded that the merger would 
result in both unilateral and coordinated effects in the SGA market. More specifically, 
the DOD's analysis, as presented above, concluded that the merger would enhance 
Alcoa's ability to exercise unilateral market power because it would give the firm 
sufficiently high market share to raise prices unilaterally by reducing the SGA output. 
Moreover, the merger would increase the likelihood of coordination in a market that 
was already concentrating features facilitating such coordination, such as product 
homogeneity, stable demand and market transparency. Although the published 
366 See para. 19 of the Notice. 
367 This was explicitly recognised by the European Commissioner for Competition Mario Monti op. cit. 363. 
36$ Issues regarding the timeframes for the submission of commitments by the merging parties are examined in the 
context of the analysis of European merger review process in other part of the thesis. 
369 See also in chapter 2 of the thesis. 
370 On the issue, see also Simon Holmes and Sarah Turnbull "Remedies in Merger Cases: Recent Developments" 
23 E. C. L. Rev., 2002,499. 
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documents did not explain how the merger would affect the risks of coordination, a 
DOJ official revealed that the merger would reduce the number of SGA suppliers 
from six to five, while Reynolds was pre-merger competitively important, as a 
potential maverick. Lastly, the DOJ in its decision on the competitive effects of the 
merger took also into account the high entry barriers and the inability of incumbent 
competitors to constrain Alcoa's unilateral market power or to break coordination. 
For these reasons any decision on remedies should be sufficient to address both 
unilateral and coordinated effects of the merger. 
The DOD's decision ordered the divestiture of Reynolds's Worsley and Corpus 
Christi assets, which, along with the divestiture earlier of Stade refinery in Germany, 
would deprive the merged firm of all Reynolds's SGA refining capacity worldwide. 
Such a solution was considered as sufficient to preserve competition because it would 
restore "world SGA market.. . to the structures that existed prior to the acquisition" 
and would "preserve the existence of independent competitors" in that market. 
Before commenting on the US decision, it is necessary to recall the different 
market definition, which the US competition authorities followed, compared with the 
European Commission. In particular, the relevant market of SGA, according to the 
DOJ, included both SGA sold in the merchant market and that used internally by 
integrated firms, and was worldwide. Conversely, the European Commission had 
defined product market as including only merchant SGA and, in geographic terms, 
only the Western world. For this reason the Commission was satisfied with the 
divestiture of only Stade and Worsley refineries, which were considered as sufficient 
to solve the competitive concerns for the western-world-merchant-SGA market, while 
the DOJ ordered also the divestiture of Corpus Christi refinery, which would 
eliminate overlaps in the broader worldwide all-SGA market. However, these 
differences in market definition and in remedies could potentially be associated with 
certain consequences for a proper competitive assessment of the merger, as will be 
shown in the next chapter. 
The US remedial decision was typically sufficient to address the unilateral effects 
of the merger because Alcoa's market share would return to the pre-merger level but 
this could not be confirmed before the owner of Reynolds's assets was identified. This 
was so because competition should be restored not only quantitatively but also 
qualitatively. Qualitative restoration would be particularly important for a market such 
as SGA, which was already concentrating features conducive to coordination and in 
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which Reynolds had significant competitive presence pre-merger. According to the 
DOJ official, the firm was potentially a market maverick, namely an aggressive 
competitor, which, amongst other competitors, was constraining also Alcoa's ability 
to exercise market power unilaterally. The restoration therefore of competition in the 
SGA market should not only seek to deprive Alcoa of Reynolds's SGA assets, but 
also to ensure that these assets would be acquired by a firm willing to replace 
Reynolds as a maverick. 
In addition, the issue of Alcoa was particularly important, since as shown in more 
details in the previous chapter371, the firm had already prior to the merger been 
capable, by using its capacity-expansion opportunities as a threat, to constrain the 
ability of its competitors to compete. In simple words, Alcoa was already prior to the 
merger capable of exercising "some" unilateral market power. Reynolds was one of 
the firms, which potentially resisted Alcoa's market power and its elimination without 
replacement by an equally effective competitor would further enhance Alcoa's ability 
to exercise such power unilaterally even if the latter's market share post-merger 
would remain unchanged. Thus, Alcoa's market power was not based only on its 
market share but also on other factors. 
Respecting coordinated effects, the DOJ's argument that the divestitures would 
"preserve independent competitors in the market" is not very clear. The DOJ 
potentially implied that if Reynolds's assets were sold to independent competitors, 
these competitors would be capable of competing against coordinating oligopolists as 
Reynolds did. However, there are two questions arising: first, who were these 
competitors? And second, would these competitors be able to compete independently 
only because the acquired assets would enable them to do so or would it be a matter of 
management decision? An answer to the first question is given below. Regarding the 
second question, it has to be said that apart from the bottom-cost Worsley refinery, the 
acquisition by a new buyer of the high-cost Corpus Christi and Stade refineries would 
not provide sufficient motives to the management of that buyer (or buyers) to compete 
against the oligopoly, since these assets would not transfer any competitive advantage 
to their new owner372. On the other hand Worsley refinery would provide some cost- 
advantage and it was therefore absolutely necessary the refinery to pass to a buyer 
pursuing independent competition. 
371 See the analysis of entry and expansion in the SGA market in chapter 4. 
372 The production costs in these assets can be seen in table 7 in the previous chapter. 
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On the issue of the selection of an appropriate buyer for the divestiture assets, the 
DOJ guidelines on merger remedies provide for three "fundamental" tests, which a 
successful buyer should pass373: 
a. The assets divestiture to the proposed purchaser "... must not itself cause 
competitive harm" meaning that for instance in unilateral effects cases the 
divestiture to another large competitor in the market may not be acceptable, 
although divestiture to a fringe incumbent might. 
b. the DOJ must be certain that the purchaser "... has the incentive to use the 
divestiture assets to compete in the relevant market". 
c. the DOJ will perform a "fitness" test "... to ensure that the purchaser has 
sufficient acumen, experience, and financial capability to compete effectively in 
the market over the long term". 
Competition authorities in the US and Europe finally approved three different 
buyers for the three refineries. Worsley Interest was finally sold to Billiton plc, which 
was the partner of Reynolds in the relevant joint venture, Corpus Christi Assets were 
sold to the US company BPU Reynolds, Inc. and the Stade's stake was sold to a 
European firm. 
A first conclusion is that the previously maverick firm was split into three pieces 
and sold to three different buyers, which leads to the further conclusion that there was 
no direct replacement of Reynolds by a firm concentrating all Reynolds's assets. 
Whether the decision was correct or not it is difficult to say. However, if all Reynolds 
assets had been sold to a single buyer, the latter would have concentrated all resources 
that Reynolds had used pre-merger for becoming effective competitor. 
Further, regarding the new owners in the two high-cost assets, it is difficult to see 
how these firms would be capable of competing aggressively, since these assets did 
not provide any competitive advantage to their owners. The only possible benefit from 
those acquisitions would be that the SGA produced in these assets would remain in 
the market thus preserving market balance. 
Regarding Worsley, Reynolds's strategic asset, the approval of Billiton as a buyer 
is not certain that met the criteria set in the proposed Final Judgment for a suitable 
buyer. According to these criteria, the new owner should have been capable and have 
373 Section IV(D). 
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the intention to compete effectively in the SGA market and in addition "none of the 
terms of any agreement between the purchaser or purchasers and [the merging 
parties], including any joint venture, governance, operation, or shareholders 
agreements, shall give [the merging parties] the ability to limit the purchaser's 
capacity or output, to raise a purchaser's costs, to lower a purchaser's efficiency, or 
otherwise to interfere in the ability of the purchaser or purchasers to compete 
effectively"374. It is also doubtful whether Billiton satisfied the three criteria for a 
suitable buyer referred to in the DOJ guidelines on merger remedies, particularly the 
second test. 
Billiton was partner with Reynolds at Worsley and this might have constituted a 
sufficient reason for selling Reynolds's stake to that firm, since Billiton had 
experience in running this particular refinery. However, as shown in the previous 
chapter, Billiton was a partner of Alcoa in at least two refining joint ventures, in 
which Alcoa was holding controlling stakes375. The Final Judgment provided that in 
case of participation of the purchaser/s of divestiture assets in joint ventures with the 
merging firms, this participation should not restrict the purchaser's ability to compete. 
In the case of Billiton, it seems that Alcoa was capable of restricting the firm's ability 
to compete through the controlling stakes in the two joint ventures. It remains unclear 
thus far whether the US competition authorities by approving Billiton sought also to 
deprive Alcoa of its ability to restrict Billiton by imposing relevant terms to Alcoa. If 
they did not, then Billiton did not meet the requirements of the Final Judgment. If they 
did, then Billiton could potentially be deemed as a suitable buyer. However, it seems 
that Alcoa and Billiton continued, following the sale of Worsley, to have close 
relationship, since one year after the sale they agreed to merge their North American 
metal distribution businesses. This could potentially indicate that Billiton even if 
capable might not have the intention to compete effectively against Alcoa and the 
other oligopolists at least as Reynolds did. 
5.4.8.3 Conclusion 
From all the above it could be concluded that the effectiveness of the remedial 
decision of the DOJ was largely dependent on the identity of the purchaser of the 
374 Section IV(I) of the Final Judgment. 
375 These joint ventures included Sao Luis in Brazil and Paranam in Surinam (see table 7 in the previous chapter). 
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divestiture assets, particularly of Worsley. If the buyer of Worsley had sufficient 
intention to compete as effectively as Reynolds did, then the decision on the remedies 
would be rather successful, if not, then competition would be restored in terms of 
market shares, but not in qualitative terms. In the latter case the (already existent) risk 
of exercise of unilateral and multilateral market power would significantly increase 
post-merger. By choosing Billiton, Alcoa's partner, as a buyer for Worsley the DOJ 
took the risk that the concerns of coordination might not have been fully addressed, 
since the motive of Billiton to compete independently seemed questionable. 
In terms of merger control, the analysis of the US decision further reinforces the 
argument developed by the thesis in the previous chapter that effective competition in 
anticompetitive mergers is not restored with the approval by competition authorities 
of the remedies proposed by the parties but with the implementation of the decision. 
Another conclusion is that remedies should seek to restore competition not only 
quantitatively through the divestiture of the overlapping capacity, but also 
qualitatively through the selection of an appropriate buyer for the divestiture assets 




Alcoa/Reynolds merger: The market for primary aluminium 
6.1 Introduction 
Primary aluminium is the immediate downstream market of SGA. For that market 
neither the European Commission nor the DOJ found any anticompetitive effects in 
the merger of Alcoa/Reynolds. However, as will be shown below, the merger had 
significant impact on the market for primary aluminium by strengthening Alcoa's 
already leading position in that market. Alcoa's post-merger market share was low 
enough to fall below the minimum thresholds for merger review established under 
both the Merger Regulation and the 1992 US merger guidelines and this must have 
been a major reason for competition authorities in the two jurisdictions not to consider 
the primary aluminium market. 
The analysis below examines the impact of Alcoa/Reynolds merger on the 
primary aluminium market and refers to both horizontal and vertical effects. 
Concerning the latter effects, the focus is on the possibility of Alcoa acting 
strategically to raise the costs of certain of its aluminium rivals, thus undermining 
their ability to compete. The analysis also examines the impact of these raising- 
rivals'-costs strategies on the prices of aluminium. Lastly, in the context of the 
analysis of these strategies the role of vertical analysis for assessing anticompetitive 
effects of mergers is also discussed. 
The analysis of primary-aluminium is included in the thesis for several reasons. 
One basic reason is to explore the vertical effects of mergers and their treatment in 
merger control. Competition authorities generally do not pay so much attention to 
vertical aspects of mergers but focus instead on horizontal effects, which are more 
directly related to the exercise of market power. Moreover, vertical effects are 
generally considered as less harmful to competition because they enhance vertical 
integration, which is a basic source of efficiencies. However, as will be seen in the 
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analysis newer economic theories of vertical foreclosure indicate that vertical mergers 
may result also in higher prices. 
Therefore, a second reason for the inclusion of primary-aluminium into the thesis 
was to present these newer theories of incomplete foreclosure, mostly the raising- 
rivals'-costs theory, and discuss the utility of these theories for merger control. Given 
that these theories were formulated and tested by competition authorities first and 
foremost in the US, this thesis makes extensive references to the approach of the US 
competition authorities as well as to the Commission's approach. 
Lastly, vertical mergers fall within the scope of EC merger control and as such 
fall also within the scope of this thesis, whose main objective is to assess the EC 
merger-control framework. Therefore, the inclusion of vertical mergers in the analysis 
helps to make this assessment more complete. 
6.2 The relevant product and geographic markets 
Primary aluminium is the pure metal produced through the electrolysis (smelting) 
of alumina'. Then, primary aluminium is subject to further processing for the 
production of aluminium products, which are used in numerous applications, such as 
in the automotive industry, in the aerospace industry, in packaging, and transportation. 
Given that it is the central and basic product of aluminium industry, its role is unique 
and there are no other materials that could be used as substitutes. 
The Commission in several cases2 has ruled that primary aluminium constitutes a 
relevant product market for purposes of merger analysis. It has based its decisions on 
arguments by customers that the metal has distinct characteristics, price and end use3. 
Also, the US courts4 in the past have come to the same conclusion. 
Regarding the relevant geographic market, the European Commission has defined 
it as worldwide5 based on its uniform pricing, which is determined in the transactions 
of the London Metal Exchange (LME); of the fact that EEA is a net importer of the 
metal; and of the fact that Eastern European countries, particularly CIS, are major 
' The process is known as the Hall-Heroult process and is energy-intensive. See also in chapter 4. 
2 Case IV/M. 675 Alumix/Alcoa [1995] (Decision of 21/12/95); Case IV/M. 723 Norsk Alcoa/Elkem [1997] 
(Decision of 6/8/97); Case IV/M. 1003 Alcoallnespal [1997] 5 CMLR 763; Case IV/M. 1161 AlcoalAlumax [1998] 
(Decision of 28/5/98) 
See e. g. decision on Alcoallnespal ibid.. 
4 U. S. v Aluminium Co. of America 247 F. Supp. 308,1962; U. S. v Aluminum Co. of America 214 F. Supp. 501, 
1963. 
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exporters of the metal6. In the US there is no recent decision on the issue but judging 
from the DOD's ruling in SGA, it is most likely that the US authorities would equally 
consider the geographic market of primary aluminium as worldwide. 
6.3 Competitive assessment 
6.3.1 The market situation 
Firms competing in the primary aluminium market? belong mainly to two 
categories: a) vertically-integrated producers such as Alcoa, Alcan and Pechiney; b) 
non-integrated (or independent) smelters, such as Hoogovens, Southwire and Dubal, 
who are dependent upon the merchant market for purchases of the raw materials, 
mostly smelter-grade alumina (SGA)8. Unlike vertically integrated ones, non- 
integrated firms smelters are subject to market risks associated with their dependence 
on third parties for alumina supplies. For this indispensable raw material, the analysis 
in previous chapters showed that supply is generally tight while SGA prices are very 
volatile, partly due to their dependence upon the volatile prices of primary aluminium 
and partly due to the tight SGA supply9. Independent smelters face also the problem 
that SGA deteriorates in storage, since it soaks up water, and therefore are unable to 
build up SGA inventories in periods of low SGA prices1°. As a result, non-integrated 
smelters are dependent upon SGA suppliers, the most of which however are vertically 
integrated and compete against those smelters for market shares in the market for 
primary aluminium. Alcoa and Reynolds were amongst the vertically-integrated firms 
that were major primary aluminium producers and at the same time major sellers of 
SGA to non-integrated firms. 
The prices il of primary aluminium are determined in the daily trading of LME. 
The key short-term price is the LME 3-month price for metal of 99.7% purity (the 
price today for metal to be delivered into LME warehouses in three months' time). 
5Case IV/M723 Norsk Alcoa/Elkem [1997] OJ; Case IV/M1003 Alcoa/Inespal [1997]; Case IV/MI161 
AlcoalAlumax [1998] (Decision of 28/5/98) 
6 See decision on Alcoa/Inespal at 6. 




Information obtained from James F. King, Aluminium to 2015, the Looming Shortage, Research Report, The 
Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd (Ed. ), 1997, at 201-209. 
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The LME also quotes prices for metal for immediate delivery, the cash or settlement 
price. 
The market situation in 1999 when the Alcoa/Reynolds deal was announced can be 
seen in table 1. 
Table 1: Aluminium Production 1999 ('000 tonnes) 
Alcoa 3,138 2,735 
Alcan 1,661 1,490 
Reynolds 1,118 1,065 
Billiton 886 890 
Pechiney 828 827 
Hydro 745 749 
Comalco 659 654 
Aluminium Bahrain 537 515 
CVG 520 482 
Kaiser 510 413 
VAW 421 421 
Dubai 424 433 
CIS countries*' 3,337 
World total*' 21,822 20,655 
Source: CRU International *Tonnes per year 
"' 1998 
*= Source: International Aluminium Institute 
Alcoa was the market leader. Its total annual aluminium capacity after the 
acquisition of Reynolds would be approximately 4.256mt or 19.5% of the market. The 
market shares of the other firms were significantly lower. Alcan's share was 7.6%, 
Billiton's 4.1%, Pechiney's 3.9%, Hydro's 3.5% and Comalco's 3%. 
Alcoa's post-merger market share would not be high enough to justify the 
establishment of unilateral market power under the Merger Regulation (ECMR) or to 
give rise to unilateral effects under the US 1992 horizontal merger guidelines. The 
ECMR12 establishes a presumption of legality for mergers with market share less than 
25% in the common market or in a substantial part of it13. However, in practice the 
12 Recital 32. 
13 Also para. 18 of the Commission Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers. 
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Commission establishes single dominance where the market share of the undertakings 
14 concerned is at least 40%. 
In the US, the 1992 horizontal merger guidelines also establish a presumption of 
legality for mergers whose combined market shares are less than 35%15, but this may 
not be the case when there is evidence that the merging firms are each other's closest 
competitor 16. 
However, even if the rules establishing the above minimum thresholds are not 
mandatory in either the EU or the US, competition authorities in the two jurisdictions 
normally refrain from challenging mergers falling below these thresholds. 
Regarding primary aluminium, the 19.5% market share of Alcoa post-merger was 
well below the above thresholds and this might have been one of the strongest 
arguments of competition authorities for not considering that market. 
Another factor also indicating no threat to competition from Alcoa/Reynolds 
merger was the low post-merger level of concentration. A calculation of concentration 
using the information of table 1 resulted in a post-merger HHI below 1000, which 
according to the agencies' practice in both jurisdictions, is another minimum 
threshold of merger review below which mergers are unlikely to be challenged' 7. The 
low HHI level shows that risks of coordinated or unilateral effects were immaterial in 
the market of primary aluminium post-merger. 
However, certain other features of the primary aluminium market and its 
relationship with the SGA market where the merged entity was the dominant firm, 
attracted the interest of this thesis, which carried out its own market investigation in 
order to find out whether Alcoa/Reynolds merger could nevertheless result in higher 
prices in the primary aluminium market. The results of this investigation are presented 
here. 
First, primary aluminium, like SGA, is a homogeneous product market and for 
such markets, the level of production capacity of firms determines their competitive 
position18. In addition, and similarly to SGA, most aluminium firms, as will be 
14 lbid para. 17. 
15 §§ 2.211,2.22 of the guidelines. 
16 See also Robert H. Lande and James Langenfeld "From the Surrogates to Stories: The Evolution of Federal 
Merger Policy" 11-SPG Antitrust, 1997,5,7. 
" See in §1.5 of the 1992 merger guidelines and para. l9 of the Commission Guidelines on the assessment of 
horizontal mergers. 
18 For such markets the so-called Cournot model on oligopoly applies (see also Carl Shapiro "Theories of 
Oligopoly Behaviour" in Schmalensee and Willig (Eds. ) Handbook of Industrial Organisation, Elsevier publ., 
1989,329, at 333-343). 
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explained below, were at the time of the Alcoa/Reynolds merger capacity-constrained 
with Alcoa possessing the largest part of the limited excess capacity. Alcoa could use 
this capacity to influence the market equilibrium for raising prices or to discipline 
capacity-constrained competitors or as a threat against entry'9. Asymmetrical capacity 
constraints are generally considered by economic theory as harming tacit collusion but 
there are also cases where they increase collusion risk20. One such market was 
primary aluminium. However, as will be shown below, the aluminium market is less 
concentrated than that of SGA, and therefore collusion is more difficult. Therefore, 
firms seeking the establishment of collusion should also use the crucial upstream SGA 
market, where they have stronger presence, for achieving their purpose. 
In other words, it is argued below that a combination of strategies in the SGA and 
aluminium markets could potentially enable Alcoa post-merger to raise aluminium 
prices either unilaterally or in coordination with other large players. 
In more detail, Alcoa post-merger would have a 18.3% market share in terms of 
annual production and 19.5% in terms of annual capacity21. The firm's excess (or idle 
or overcapacity) capacity would be 456,000t or approximately 39% of the overall 
market22. Also according to table 1 above the overall excess capacity in the market 
was 1,167,000t, which was limited compared with the overall production capacity of 
21,822,000t. According to available statistics, in the period of Alcoa/Reynolds merger 
the average rate of capacity utilisation in the industry was above 90% and was maybe 
reaching 95%23. This was so, because aluminium smelters, as with SGA, had to run in 
full capacity to be cost-efficient. 
Alcoa's significant idle capacity, which was higher than the market average, had 
largely been created in the mid-1990s, following an agreement by major western 
aluminium producers to reduce their output in order to prevent prices from collapsing. 
19 The analysis of the SGA market in previous chapters examined in detail the use of excess capacity by firms 
possessing such capacity for raising prices or disciplining competitors. 
° For economic studies suggesting that asymmetry in firms' capacities harms tacit collusion see Olivier Compte, 
Frederic Jenny and Patrick Rey "Capacity Constraints, Merger and Collusion", 46 European Economic Review, 
2002,1,2-3). On the other hand, the European Commission in AlcanlAlusuisse (Case IV/M. 1663, Decision of 
14/3/2000, para. 76) proved that asymmetries in capacity could reinforce the potential of collusion. 
21 See table I above. 
22 From table 1, in 1999 the world annual production capacity was 21,822,000t, while the annual production 
20,655,000t. From this, it follows that world excess capacity was (21,822,000-20,655,000=)1,167,000t of which 
(4,256,000-3,800,000--)456,000t or 39% were the combined Alcoa' s and Reynolds's share. 
23According to a market expert, world-operating rates of aluminium capacity in 1999 and 2000 were 91.5% and 
92.6% respectively (see Tsukasa Furukawa "Aluminium Supply, Demand Seen Rising" American Metal Market, 
Oct 15,1999). In addition, a chart included in a market report of European Aluminium Association (update of 
October 2000) shows that the rate approached or exceeded 95% during 1999 and 2000, mostly due to the strong 
demand at the time. 
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The threat of price collapse came from countries of the former Eastern block, which 
had flooded western markets with East-made aluminium. The reductions finally 
reached 600,000t and Alcoa, as the market leader, took the largest share of them24. 
Following the merger with Reynolds Alcoa would have approximately 456,000t of 
excess aluminium capacity which constituted only 2% of the world overall capacity of 
21,822,000t, but which was nevertheless competitively important. This was because 
aluminium prices are generally very sensitive to changes in the market equilibrium 
and therefore little changes in the equilibrium could affect prices. Thus, Alcoa could 
use these 456,000t to alter the equilibrium and thus prices. 
Table 2 below, demonstrates the relationship between the market supply/demand 
balance and the average annual aluminium prices: 
Table 2: The aluminium market: Supply/demand balance and 3-month LME 
prices. 
Year Supply/demand balance* 
Surplus (+), deficit 
(million tonnes) 
LME 3-month prices (1) year average 
(US$/t) 
1994 -0.90 1,502 
1995 -0.80 1,831 
1996 +0.30 1,534 
1997 +0.26 1,618 
1998 +0.63 1,378 
1999 +0.08 1,388 
2000 -0.08 1,566 
"Source: Purchasing, February 10,2000. 
(1) Source: American Metal Market, December 7,2001. 
Table 2 shows that changes in the market equilibrium by less than a million 
tonnes could cause relatively big changes in metal prices. For instance, in 2000 the 
market had a deficit of only 80,000t down 160,000t from a surplus of 80,000t a year 
earlier, but the average prices were significantly higher than in 1999. The situation 
would have been even clearer if year lows and highs had also been included in table 2. 
In such a case it would have been seen that aluminium prices are extremely volatile. 
For example in 1994, when the market had a deficit of 900,000t, the year low was 
24 About the events of the mid-1990s and their market impact in the subsequent years see also "New aluminium 
output will dampen price increases", Purchasing. July 15,1999; also Bob Regan "Wide consensus marks LME 
aluminium prices, volume", American Metal Market, October 11,1999. 
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US$1,128/t and the high US$1,999/t25. In 1998 a year of 630,000t oversupply, the 
price low and high were US$1,055/t and US$1,538/t respectively. 
The analysis therefore shows that even a small shift in supply/demand balance 
would directly affect aluminium prices, while Alcoa, by controlling approximately 
3,800,000t of primary production and another 456,000t of idle capacity, was 
potentially capable of affecting the market equilibrium and thus of raising prices. 
However, a policy to raise prices, following the merger with Reynolds, would be 
more effective if Alcoa's aluminium position was combined with the firm's dominant 
position in the SGA market, the crucial raw material. In that case Alcoa could 
potentially exercise what is called raising-rivals'-costs strategies against certain weak 
aluminium rivals, which could also result directly or indirectly in higher aluminium 
prices. The analysis below explains the theoretical foundations of raising-rivals' costs, 
and their role in merger analysis, and explores how such strategies could be used by 
Alcoa to raise aluminium prices. 
6.3.2 Raising rivals' costs 
6.3.2.1 Raising-rivals'-costs theories in antitrust and merger analysis 
Raising-rivals'-costs ("RRC") are economic theories dealing with the foreclosure 
of rivals and stand for some non-price predatory conduct aimed at raising 
competitors' costs26. The traditional predatory behaviour provides that a predator 
reduces the victim's revenues to unprofitable levels by price cuts thus forcing the 
victim to exit. In contrast, a RRC strategy seeks to increase the victim's costs by, for 
instance, raising the price of some scarce critical input needed by the victim, causing 
the victim to reduce its output in the benefit of the predator27. Two basic advantages 
of RRC over traditional predation are that RRC does not require rivals' exit to be 
profitable and that there is no need for sacrificing profits in the short-run, since the 
strategy allows profits to be increased immediately28. In addition, unlike predatory 
25 Source: Purchasing. 
26 See Steven C. Salop and David T. Scheffman "Raising Rivals' Costs" 73 Am. Ec. Rev. 1983,267,267. 
27 See David T. Scheffman "The Application of Raising Rivals' Costs Theory to Antitrust" Antitrust Bull., 1992, 
187,188-189. 
28 See Salop and Scheffman op. cit. 26; also Timothy J. Brennan "Understanding 'Raising Rivals' Costs"' Antitrust 
Bull. 1988,95. 
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pricing, cost-increasing strategies can often be made irreversible, and thus more 
credible29. 
RRC theory, one of the achievements of the post-Chicago School of antitrust 
analysis30, contains various market models and strategies31. In competition terms, the 
RRC effects appear ambiguous, because they are not always anticompetitive: the fact 
that higher costs harm the predator's rivals is not anticompetitive in itself, unless the 
harm is associated with price rises at supra-competitive levels32. It has also been 
shown that in reality in concentrated industries much of "competition on the merits" 
involves strategies and tactics disadvantaging rivals without this being 
anticompetitive33. This gives rise to another practical problem, which remains largely 
unsolved: how to distinguish between pro-competitive and anti-competitive 
strategies34. 
Although RRC economists in the US have used in the past mainly 
monopolisation cases as an empirical suppor t35, these cases were rejected by other 
economists on the basis of additional facts or different interpretation of the facts36. As 
a result, although everyone seems in principle to accept that RRC strategies are 
feasible, it has nevertheless been argued that for any viable antitrust case based on 
RRC, proof of credible and not merely feasible anticompetitive effects must be 
required37. 
Regarding mergers, the original RRC theory suggests that a merger leading to 
vertical integration may result in anticompetitive effects when one of the merging 
29 See Salop and Scheffman op. cit. 26,267. 
30 See Herbert Hovenkamp "Post-Chicago Antitrust: A review and Critique", Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 2001,257,318- 
323. 
31 See e. g. Steven C. Salop and David Scheffman "Cost-Raising Strategies" 36 Journal of Industrial Economics, 
1987,19; Janusz Ordover and Garth Saloner "Predation, Monopolisation and Antitrust" in Handbook of Industrial 
Organisation, Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989,537-596; Thomas G. Krattenmaker and Steven C. 
Salop "Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price" 96 Yale L. J., 1986,209. 
32 See Karattenmaker and Salop ibid., at 242. 
as See David T. Scheffman and Richard Higgins "20 Years of Raising Rivals' Costs: History, Assessment and 
Future", FTC, 2003, at p. 6, citing also Charles Holt and David Scheffman "Strategic Business Behaviour and 
Antitrust" in Economics and Antitrust Policy, P. Lamer and J. Meehan (Eds), Quorum Books, 1989,39-82. 
34 See Scheffman and Higgins ibid; also Holt and Scheffman ibid. 
35 See Krattenmaker and Salop op. cit. 31. 
36 See Timothy Muris "The FTC and the Law of Monopolisation" 67 Antitrust L. J., 2000,693,712-715; also 
Scheffman and Higgins op. cit. 33; also Malcolm B. Coate and Andrew M. Kleit "Exclusion, Collusion or 
Confusion? The Underpinnings of Raising Rivals' Costs" 16 Res. L. &Econ., 1994,73; Hovenkamp op. cit. 30. 
According to the influential US judge Easterbrook who does not favour RRC, arguments promoted during the 
1990s for anticompetitive behaviour based on RRC in the US telecommunication sector, were not justified by the 
subsequent developments in the sector where, instead of higher costs and prices and exit of rivals, the sector 
demonstrated falling prices, and considerable entry and expansion of both infrastructure and sales (see Frank H 
Easterbrook "When is Worthwhile to Use the Courts to Search for Exclusionary Conduct? " Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 
2003,345, at 356-358). 
37 See Scheffman and Higgins op. cit. 33,12; also, Muris ibid. 715. 
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firms possesses market power in at least one of the vertically-related markets (either 
upstream or downstream). In such a case, the merger may lead to anticompetitive 
price increases or rivals' foreclosure in the other market38. Newer RRC literature has 
gone beyond that point by suggesting that anticompetitive effects may arise even if 
the merging firms do not have market power at any level39. 
However, in respect of vertical mergers, the RRC needs to be balanced against 
efficiencies. Vertical mergers are generally considered as more likely to produce 
efficiencies than horizontal mergers and an example of such efficiencies is the 
elimination of "double-marginalisation". Double-marginalisation occurs when one 
firm with market power sells to a second firm with market power and each sets its 
optimal monopoly price independently. This results in higher prices and lower output 
than when a single monopolist controls both distribution levels40. In general, the 
greater the monopoly position of the vertically related firm, the greater the efficiency 
gains from the elimination of double marginalisation41. However, vertical integration 
may result also in anticompetitive RRC effects, in which case there is need to balance 
these effects against efficiencies42. Such balancing, though, may finally favour 
efficiencies, which are easier to provea3. 
Additional problems may arise also in the process of proving the existence of 
RRC, which may finally render unnecessary the balancing of RRC against 
efficiencies44. For instance, there may be in existence in the market disruptive factors 
capable of cancelling an otherwise feasible RRC policy. Such factors could include, 
amongst others, the ability of targeted rivals to respond, the ability of un-excluded 
rivals to act effectively against the merging firms, easy market entry, and lack of 
sufficient incentive by the merging parties themselves to apply an RRC policy post- 
merger. In particular, targeted rivals may be able to respond, for instance, by locating 
38 See Scheffman and Higgins ibid., 20. 
39 See ibid., 21. 
40 For a formal presentation of the competitive effects of double marginalisation see Simon Bishop and Mike 
Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application and Measurement, Sweet & Maxwell, 
2002, at 5.37-5.40. 
41 See also Hovenkamp op. cit. 30,325-326; also Michael Riordan and Steven Salop "Evaluating Vertical Mergers: 
A Post Chicago Approach" 63 Antitrust LJ., 1995,513,526-527. 
42 See also Hovenkamp ibid.; also Riordan and Salop ibid. However, opponents of RRC have suggested that purely 
balancing anticompetitive effects against efficiencies in vertical mergers is an error because in such mergers 
efficiency benefits are largest precisely when the risk of competitive harm is the greatest and that the most likely 
outcome in these cases is lower rather than higher prices (see David Reiffen and Michael Vita "Comment: Is There 
New Thinking on Vertical Mergers? " 63 Antitrust L. J. 1995,917,920-921; for a response to these views see 
Michael H. Riordan and Steven C. Salop "Evaluating Vertical Mergers: Reply to Reifen and Vita Comment" 63 
Antitrust L. J., 1995,943). 
43 See Hovenkamp ibid. 
44 See Riordan and Salop, op. cit. 42,945. 
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alternative suppliers or products45, while regarding un-excluded rivals they may be 
able, particularly when they are vertically integrated, to cancel the effects of RRC by 
supplying disadvantaged rivals in competitive prices, thus preventing cost increases in 
the latter46. In the same way easy entry could cancel the anticompetitive effects of 
RRC, while about the merging parties, it has been argued that the merger must be 
sufficient to alter their motives in favour of anticompetitive RRC strategies and that it 
is not enough that the merger merely creates favourable market conditions for the 
exercise of these strategies47. 
The biggest contribution of RRC theories to antitrust and particularly to merger 
analysis is that they improved foreclosure analysis, by shifting the interest from the 
extreme situation of rivals' destruction, which was the source of concern in the 
traditional foreclosure literature, to competitive harm caused by disadvantaging rivals 
without forcing them to exit, which is a more realistic scenario48. However, RRC 
analysis is more complex than that of the traditional foreclosure and there is particular 
difficulty in proving how by disadvantaging certain rivals consumers will be harmed 
through higher market prices. This practical difficulty in distinguishing between pro- 
competitive and anti-competitive strategies makes competition authorities and courts 
in the US hesitant in accepting theories of competitive harm based on RRC49. 
Particularly regarding vertical mergers, for which some RRC economists suggested 
the establishment of an analytical methodology based on such theories analogue to the 
horizontal guidelines50, additional problems arise concerning the issue of balancing 
RRC against efficiencies and the establishment of credible anticompetitive effects, as 
a result of the merger. Thus, taking into account those mentioned above, for a vertical 
merger (or a merger giving rise to vertical effects) to result in anticompetitive effects 
based on RRC, one must prove that the merger will create sufficient capabilities and 
incentives to the merging parties to exercise credible RRC; that the policy will result 
See Krattenmaker and Salop, op. cit. 31,268-272. 
46 See ibid. at 243. 
41 See Scheffman and Higgins op. cit. 33,22. 
48 See also Hovenkamp op. cit. 30,318-326. 
49 In US where the issue of RRC was debated more than in Europe, the influential US judge Easterbrook op. cit. 36 
at 357, held: "My recommendation is that for the foreseeable future we leave raising rivals' costs to the academy". 
Similarly, Hovenkamp op. cit. 30 at 326 stressed: "... post-Chicago theories of vertical mergers are not 
fundamentally irrational or absolutely incapable for administration ... But they may not 
be quite ready for prime 
time either". Even Scheffman, a proponent of RRC, has recognised that "[w]hat is needed... for non-price 
predation and vertical mergers specifically, is much more empirical research that can help us distinguish 
anticompetitive conduct from conduct that is benign or pro-competitive" (see Scheffman and Higgins op. cit. 33, at 
30). 
50 See Riordan and Salop op. cit. 41; for a critic of their views Reifen and Vita op. cit. 42. 
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apart from disadvantaging rivals also in higher market prices; and that neither 
disruptive market factors nor efficiencies are sufficient to reverse the anticompetitive 
effects. The burden of proof, as can be seen, is high and rests with competition 
authorities, which in such a case, lack also sufficient support by economic theory 
which still evolves and as shown has not come out with concrete results yet. 
However, to apply RRC theories in the context of merger control one should 
necessarily take into account the legal framework in the EU and the US. In the EU, 
vertical mergers and vertical aspects of mergers are examined in terms of the 
substantive test of the ECMR. Under the old dominance test, a vertical merger to be 
anticompetitive was required to give rise to a dominant position, while under the new 
test, where the focus is on substantial impediment to effective competition, which has 
broader scope the situation will change because for competitive harm situations of 
non-collusive oligopolies will also be covered. However, the Commission has not 
issued yet guidelines on the assessment of vertical mergers and therefore it has still to 
be seen how vertical mergers will be dealt with under the new test. However, the 
Commission's traditional approach, which should not be expected to change 
significantly in the future, is that vertical effects of mergers are examined when the 
merging parties possess market power in one of the vertically related markets51, while 
the key concerns in such cases include foreclosure effects and facilitation of 
collusion52. 
Moreover, the Commission is concerned with the position of rivals post-merger 
and therefore has often demonstrated a hostile attitude against efficiencies caused by 
vertical integration, which were considered as factors facilitating market dominance53. 
The Commission's theory of competitive harm in such cases is based on the 
assumption that rival firms will be unable to compete and, as a result, will be forced to 
exit the market and thereafter the vertically integrated firm will be able to increase 
prices54. Thus, one could assume that the Commission could be receptive to RRC 
51 See e. g. the Commission's decision in Skanska/Scancem (Case IV/M. 1157 (1998); [1999] OJ L 183/1; [2000] 5 
CMLR 686) which referred to the acquisition by Skanska, the largest construction company in Sweden, of 
Scancem, which was controlling 90% share of the market for the supply of cement in the same country. The 
Commission declared the acquisition incompatible with the common market and forced Skanska to divest its 
already acquired shareholding in Scancem. See also Giuseppe B. Abbamonte and Valerie Rabassa "Foreclosure 
and Vertical Mergers-The Commission's Review of Vertical Mergers in the Last Wave of Media and Internet 
Mergers: AOL/Time Warner, Vivendi/Seagram, MCI Worldcom/Sprint" 22 E. C. L. Rev. 2001,214,226. 
32 See also Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EC Competition Law, (2nd Ed. ) Oxford University Press, 2004,961. 
53 See Bishop and Walker op. cit. 40,7.62. 
S4 See ibid. 
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theories of vertical foreclosure, particularly when disadvantaged rivals were likely to 
exit the market. 
One merger case, in which the Commission's views on foreclosure and RRC 
were presented, was Telia/Sonerass. In the assessment of foreclosure, the Commission 
said56: "In assessing whether the foreclosure problem is significant, it is necessary to 
establish not only that the merged entity will have the incentive to foreclose, but also 
whether it has the ability to do so, and whether it will have any significant effect on 
competition on the market in question... " Regarding RRC, the view was that "[i]f the 
foreclosure can raise competitors' costs, it can either provide a disciplining force that 
would make the competitor less inclined to compete aggressively, or in the worst case, 
it could increase the likelihood of exit". However, in Newscorp/Telepiu57 the 
Commission made clear that foreclosure and RRC "are not considered in 
isolation... but they must be seen in the perspective of the overall anti-competitive 
effects brought about by the transaction". 
On the other hand, in the US, vertical mergers and vertical aspects of mergers are 
subject to the analytical framework of the 1984 Merger Guidelines, which were 
published by the Department of Justice and apply to all "non-horizontal" mergers. 
These guidelines establish three risks to competition from vertical mergers: increased 
barriers to entry, facilitation of collusion, and avoidance of rate regulation. 
Regarding barriers to entry, the guidelines set forth three necessary but not 
sufficient conditions for vertical mergers to raise competitive problems. First, the 
vertical integration resulted from the merger must be so extensive as to require 
simultaneous entry in both markets58. Second, following the merger the requirement 
of entry in the "secondary" market must make entry in the "primary" market 
significantly more difficult and less likely to occur. Third, the structure and other 
characteristics of the primary market must be otherwise so conducive to non- 
competitive performance that the increased difficulty of entry is likely to affect its 
performance. 
Regarding collusion, according to the guidelines vertical mergers may facilitate 
horizontal collusion by removing obstacles to effective coordination59. This could 
ss Case IV/M. 2803, Decision of 10/7/2002 
56 Ibid., at para. 91. 
51 Case COMP/M. 2876, Decision of 2/4/2003, at para. 131. 
sa See § 4.21 of the guidelines. 
59 § 4.22. 
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happen in two instances: when the integration of upstream firms to the retail level 
facilitates monitoring of prices, and when the merger eliminates a disruptive buyer6o. 
Lastly, the third competitive risk with however little practical importance is that 
referring to the case where vertical mergers allow price-regulated utilities to 
circumvent rate regulation by inflating the costs of internal transactions with the 
unregulated subsidiary61. 
The 1984 merger guidelines, initially found little application, since the prevalent 
view between competition agencies at that time was to favour vertical mergers as 
efficiency-enhancing and therefore very few such mergers were challenged62. 
Moreover, the "theories" proposed in these guidelines were not used by courts and 
were not well developed in academic literature63. At the time, the fundamental 
Chicago-school insight that vertical mergers are problematic only to the extent that 
they have an effect on competition at a horizontal level, which could be assessed 
through horizontal analysisTM, was widely accepted. However, the rise of the post- 
Chicago school of thought caused certain changes in the approach of the US 
competition agencies, which led in the 1990s to increased interest on vertical issues 
relating to mergers. Thus, the US agencies, without changing their preference for 
horizontal analysis, focused more on vertical relationships and their ability in certain 
circumstances to harm horizontal competition by foreclosing rivals without forcing 
them to exit65. This shift in policy, with the adoption of newer theories not available 
under the framework of 1984 guidelines, did not lead to changes in these guidelines, 
but had nevertheless significant practical impact on the negotiations between the 
agencies and the merging parties on the competitive effects of the merger and the 
subsequent settlement66. However, although the new policy shows that competition 
authorities are willing to accept RRC theories, if they can be proved67, the latter have 
60 ibid. 
61 § 4.23. 
bZ See also Herbert Hovenkamp Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice, West Group, 
1999,348-349. 
63 Ibid. 
60 See also Thomas Leary "The Essential Stability of Merger Policy in the United States" 70 Antitrust L. J. 2002, 
105,129. 
65 Some of the highest profile cases which were examined by US competition authorities in this context during the 
1990s, included mergers of the telecommunication, computer, healthcare and defence industries (see also M. 
Howard Morse "Vertical Mergers: Recent Learning" 53 Bus. Law. 1998,1217). 
66 See also Leary op. cit. 64,129-130; Morse ibid. at 1217. 
67 See also Frederick R. Warren-Boulton "The Contribution of the Merger Guidelines to the Analysis of Non- 
Horizontal Mergers" available at www. tisdoi. gov/atr/hmereer/i 1709. pdf 
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not yet been tested at the judicial level and the various problems in their application 
have deterred thus far their incorporation into the guidelines68. 
6.3.2.2 Raising-rivals'-costs strategies and primary aluminium 
Alcoa/Reynolds was not a vertical merger since both firms were fully integrated. 
As a result, the merger produced largely horizontal effects in the markets of SGA and 
primary aluminium. However, the strengthening of Alcoa's position in both those 
vertically-related markets as a result of the merger unavoidably produced also certain 
vertical effects, one of which concerned the potential ability of Alcoa to raise the costs 
of its non-integrated aluminium competitors by combining its dominant position in 
the upstream market of SGA and its large idle aluminium capacity downstream. Let 
us examine the issue in more detail. 
First, according to those mentioned above, for a viable theory of anticompetitive 
effects based on RRC at least the following should be proved: a) the merger creates 
sufficient incentives and capabilities to the parties to put forward credible RRC 
strategies to undermine the competitive positions of certain rivals or force them to 
exit; b) the RRC cannot be cancelled by the targeted rivals or other disruptive market 
forces or new entry; c) the RRC strategies will also unavoidably lead to higher prices 
thus harming competition; and d) the merger will not produce efficiencies sufficient 
to counterbalance the competitive harm. 
From the above conditions the issue of efficiencies in Alcoa/Reynolds did not 
arise, because the merger would not create significant efficiencies 69. This might have 
been expected because the two firms were already vertically integrated and therefore a 
large part of economies would come from the reduction in administrative costs. Thus, 
there is no need in this case to balance efficiencies against the anticompetitive effects 
from possible RRCs. 
Regarding the other conditions, their existence in aluminium should be examined 
within the context of possible RRC strategies, which could apply in the aluminium 
market as a result of Alcoa/Reynolds merger. It seems that at least two such strategies 
were possible: one pursuing higher aluminium prices through raising the costs of 
independent aluminium producers, for which strategy Alcoa's dominant position in 
68 See also Leary op. cit. 64, and the analysis of RRC theories above. 69 See the analysis about the SGA market in the previous chapters. 
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the SGA market would be the main tool; and one pursuing the exit of independent 
rivals or alternatively the reinforcement of coordination between all firms in the 
aluminium market, for which a combined use of the upstream dominant position of 
Alcoa with the firm's downstream idle capacity would be required. In the second case, 
the outcome would also be higher aluminium prices. 
6.3.2.2.1 The first RRC strategy 
First, Alcoa by dominating the upstream SGA market, the critical raw material for 
aluminium, would be capable of restricting SGA output thus increasing SGA prices. 
As shown in the previous chapters, competition authorities in the EU and the US, 
which reviewed the merger considered that such a policy would be successful because 
most of Alcoa's SGA competitors were capacity-constrained and therefore would be 
unable to eliminate the created supply deficit, whilst Alcoa was capable, by using its 
expansion opportunities, to prevent any competitors' attempt to expand their 
production. It was also shown that new entry was unlikely to prevent price rises due to 
the high sunk costs and lead-time required for the construction of new refineries, 
whereas Alcoa was able to raise additional entry barriers. Lastly, as both the EU and 
US competition authorities stressed in their analyses SGA buyers, namely 
independent aluminium smelters, would suffer from higher prices because they would 
be unable to find SGA substitutes. Thus, buyers would have to either accept price 
increases or close down. 
The competition authorities also referred to a real market event, the explosion in 
Kaiser's Gramercy refinery, which reduced SGA supply by approximately lmt or 7% 
of the merchant market (or 2% of the world capacity) in 1999. The relatively small 
supply deficit created due to the explosion affected significantly SGA prices, which 
went up by multiple of that percentage point. 
However, the European Commission in its decision7° considered that buyers were 
not extremely sensitive to SGA, since the latter represented only 25% of a smelter's 
overall costs, and therefore a permanent price increase of 10% in SGA would result in 
a total cost increase of only 2.5%, which was deemed unlikely to drive smelters out of 
business. 
70 See paras. 22-23 of the decision. 
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Thus, from the above references, it could be inferred that both competition 
authorities and particularly the European Commission accepted that Alcoa post- 
merger would have the ability to raise SGA prices, which in turn would increase the 
costs of independent smelters, but considered the cost increase insufficient to drive the 
latter out of the market and thus to pave the way for higher prices also downstream. 
Using RRC terms, it could be said that, according to the agencies, Alcoa post-merger 
by using its upstream dominant position could apply feasible RRC policy against 
downstream rivals, but such a policy would not harm competition because aluminium 
prices would not rise as a result, since disadvantaged rivals would not leave the 
market. 
However, as shown in chapter 4 by this thesis, which used available market 
evidence, the Commission's argument that buyers were not sensitive to alumina prices 
might not have been completely correct because the prices of SGA and aluminium are 
generally very volatile and the volatility range often exceeds by far the 10% level 
used by the Commission for studying the reaction of buyers71. Moreover, this thesis in 
chapter 4 showed also that other components of smelters' costs, mostly energy, were 
also volatile and the same happened with the smelters' profit margins72. Thus, for all 
the above reasons the thesis concluded that the Commission's use of a 10% level of 
price increase for studying the reaction of rivals was not very appropriate and that in 
reality smelters were sensitive to changes in SGA prices. Thus, under certain realistic 
market conditions higher SGA prices could seriously harm certain smelters thus 
driving them out of the market. 
Using these findings to adjust the above conclusion of competition authorities we 
could restate that conclusion as follows: Alcoa by dominating the SGA market post- 
merger would be capable of significantly increasing prices, thus causing significant 
cost rises to SGA buyers, which were at the same time Alcoa's rivals in the aluminium 
market. The fact that disadvantaged downstream rivals would not be forced to exit, 
which was mentioned by the Commission, is not essential requirement for RRC. 
Further, another argument of the agencies was that aluminium producers facing 
higher SGA prices would either accept these prices or close down because they would 
71 The thesis analysing the market impact from Gramercy showed that SGA prices in certain, not rare, cases could 
increase by 50%, 100% or even more. 
72 Aluminium prices, generally, make cyclical movements and according to a market expert whose views were 
cited by the thesis in chapter 4, there are periods where these prices fall temporarily (as a year average) to 15% 
below the level at which the operating costs of 75% of the industry's capacity are covered. 
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be unable to find SGA substitutes. However, this argument seemed to ignore the 
potential of the producers to pass the price increases further downstream, thus 
avoiding to incur themselves the extra SGA costs. 
The thesis in chapter 4, analysing the market impact of Gramercy explosion, 
showed that after the explosion aluminium prices rose together with the SGA prices73. 
It was also shown that the increase in metal prices very likely covered all or at least 
the largest part of the extra cost caused to smelters by the higher SGA prices. As a 
result, independent aluminium smelters did not suffer from the higher SGA costs. 
Concerning RRC, the situation after Gramercy proved that an increase in 
aluminium costs results in higher prices of the metal. Thus, Alcoa by being able post- 
merger to raise aluminium costs would be capable also of raising aluminium prices, 
hence producing the anticompetitive effects proposed by RRC theory74. 
The European Commission in its decision also recognised such a potential, 
namely higher aluminium prices, but the latter interpreted the market consequences 
from higher aluminium prices differently. The Commission said: 
"Any increase in the price of smelter grade alumina will raise the costs of [the parties'] rivals, which 
are not vertically integrated, [in the aluminium smelting business]. Even if prices of aluminium were to 
go up as well, as a consequence of a tight alumina market, total profits of integrated companies, such as 
the merging entity, would be higher relative to non-integrated aluminium companies conveying a 
competitive advantage to integrated companies. In other words, if higher alumina prices result in higher 
aluminium prices, this would be relatively more advantageous for integrated companies such as the 
parties"75. 
Thus, the Commission accepted that higher SGA prices could also raise 
aluminium prices, but it preferred to focus on the impact of such a move on the 
aluminium firms' profits where it found that vertically integrated firms, such as 
Alcoa, would realise more profits than independent smelters thus acquiring a 
competitive advantage. However, from a consumer viewpoint the finding of higher 
aluminium prices was more important, since it proved the passing of upstream price- 
rises downstream, thus increasing the risk of harm to final consumers. 
73 Although SGA prices are generally tied to the prices of the metal and are therefore affected by the demand for 
the latter, in the case of Gramercy it was SGA, which affected aluminium prices. See also "Rise in Raw Material 
Costs is Inflating Aluminium Ingot" Purchasing, 10 February 2000 
74 As shown above RRC is only anticompetitive if it can result in higher price. Merely raising some rivals' costs 
does not suffice. 
75 Para. 28 of the decision. 
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Aluminium price-rises, as those after Gramercy, could occur also in other cases, 
this time after the execution of a relevant plan by aluminium companies. This was 
implicitly recognised also by both the EU and US competition authorities in their 
decisions concerning SGA. The US DOJ, in its analysis stressed that apart from 
Alcoa's ability to raise SGA prices unilaterally post-merger, the market would also 
face increased risk of anticompetitive coordination, while according to a DOJ official, 
the market was experiencing a history of coordination and price signalling76. 
Similarly, the Commission in its decision, when examining capacity expansions in the 
SGA market, stressed that the expansions projected for the future were carried out by 
integrated firms to satisfy increased internal needs and that integrated firms were 
sharing with the parties the incentive to increase SGA prices in order to "... increase 
the cost of their rivals, which [were] not vertically integrated"77. Also, as shown 
above, the Commission accepted that higher SGA prices could result in higher metal 
prices, which would mean extra profits for vertically integrated firms. As a result, 
both DOJ and the Commission in their decisions either expressly or implicitly referred 
to the potential SGA price increases to be transferred also to the aluminium market. 
Further, the conditions in the aluminium market were largely similar to those in 
the SGA market. First, features, such as predictable demand and supply, market 
transparency, capacity-constrained competitors and product homogeneity, which 
existed in the SGA market, existed also in primary aluminium. Second, the same 
players that controlled the largest part of the SGA production had a major presence 
also in the aluminium market78. According to the Commission's information, two- 
thirds of the world SGA production was in 2000 used internally by integrated firms, 
such as Alcoa and Alcan, which in reality meant that two-thirds of aluminium 
production was also produced by these firms. Given that integrated firms were 
interested in higher SGA prices, it is reasonable to assume that they were interested 
also in higher aluminium prices, which would mean extra profits for them. Thus, they 
would be willing to help Alcoa to raise apart from SGA prices also aluminium prices 
either through coordination with the firm or implicitly through not taking action to 
stop aluminium prices from rising by Alcoa's action. Third, independent smelters 
76 For more details on the issue of coordination in the SGA market see the analysis of coordinated effects in 
chapter 5. 
77 See para. 37 of the decision. 
78 At the time of the merger, Alcoa, Reynolds, Alcan and Pechiney were major SGA and aluminium producers, 
even if the two latter were not selling in the SGA market but were using all their SGA production internally. 
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would be most interested to cooperate in passing the higher SGA prices further 
downstream, because otherwise they would suffer from higher costs79. If one adds the 
situation of capacity constraints that the most aluminium producers were facing at the 
time of the merger, it seems reasonable to conclude that Alcoa's ability to raise SGA 
prices, could result in addition to higher aluminium prices also in increased risk of 
coordination in that market. 
Alcoa would not be required to have significant market power also in the market 
of aluminium for its RRC policy to be effective. It would be sufficient for the firm to 
put pressure on or provide sufficient incentive to the disadvantaged downstream rivals 
to carry out the increases themselves either unilaterally or in coordination with 
vertically integrated firms. The result would be harmful for consumers, because prices 
would be higher80. 
As a conclusion, under the above-described RRC strategy Alcoa would be 
capable post-merger to use its dominant market position in the SGA market to raise 
prices there, and then using its strong aluminium position and also the potential 
willingness of it aluminium rivals for help, to raise unilaterally or in coordination 
aluminium prices. 
6.3.2. Z2 The second RRC strategy 
The second RRC strategy would target independent smelters and certain capacity- 
constrained vertically integrated firms. Under the relevant market scenario, Alcoa, 
acting either unilaterally or in coordination with other vertically-integrated firms, 
would prevent higher SGA prices to be passed onto aluminium prices. Independent 
smelters would suffer from the higher costs because they would not be able to pass 
these costs onto their own customers. The strategy could also affect certain vertically- 
integrated firms, particularly those capacity-constrained and with relatively high 
production costs, by squeezing their profit margins even if the squeeze would be less 
painful than that for independent smelters. The final outcome of this strategy would 
be to undermine the ability of independent smelters and certain vertically-integrated 
firms to compete and maybe to force some of them to exit. However, the most likely 
79 The participation of independent smelters in the coordinated policies could be even involuntary, namely forced 
by their higher costs (see also Riordan and Salop op. cit. 41,528). 
8 See also Riordan and Salop ibid. 
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result would be the reinforcement of coordination between independent smelters and 
vertically integrated firms, which could translate into higher prices. 
For such a strategy to be effective, the use of Alcoa's idle aluminium capacity 
would be required. As shown above, Alcoa had 456,000t of idle aluminium capacity, 
which could be restarted combined with the imposition by the firm of restrictions in 
SGA supplies. The reduced SGA supplies would increase SGA prices, but the 
increase at the same time of aluminium production would help preventing the higher 
SGA prices to be passed to aluminium. Thus, independent smelters would be trapped 
between higher costs and stable or maybe lower aluminium prices, while in case of 
lower aluminium prices, vertically integrated firms, particularly the high-cost ones 
could be harmed as well. The profit squeeze would undermine the ability of 
disadvantaged aluminium producers to compete and if this could force some of these 
producers to exit. 
In more detail, the market scenario could unfold as follows: by restarting 
456,000t of aluminium Alcoa would withdraw 900,000t of SGA from the merchant 
SGA market to use them as raw materials for the restarted production. These 900,000t 
constitute SGA production almost equivalent to the Imt lost in Gramercy, which 
caused huge increases in SGA prices. Then, while higher SGA prices would press 
aluminium prices upwards, the new aluminium production would prevent aluminium 
prices from rising. 
The above-described scenario was partly confirmed by real market conditions. On 
January 2000, six months after the Gramercy explosion, Alcoa announced its decision 
to restart 200,000t of its idle smelting capacity81. At that time the spot SGA prices 
were at US$370/t up from less than US$160/t prior to the explosion, while the 3- 
month LME aluminium prices had risen from US$1400/t to US$1740/t. Four months 
after Alcoa's announcement SGA prices rose further by around 15% to US$425/t, 
while the aluminium prices immediately after the announcement fell by 
approximately 10% to US$1530/t and stayed there for a few months. The situation 
was reversed later in the year when SGA prices fell to US$250/t in August 2000, 
while the prices of the metal rose82. 
81 See also, Bob Regan "Alcoa's Plan to Bring Idle Capacity Back Comes as Surprise", American Metal Market, 
Jan 21,2000. 
82 Information about the prices of SGA and aluminium for the above period was collected from various market 
sources including price reports of London Metal Exchange, the 1999-2000 Statistics Digest of the Department of 
Minerals and Energy of Western Australia, the American Metal Market and the Purchasing (the last two journals 
specialise on issues related to the markets of metals). 
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Thus, the initial market reaction to Alcoa's announcement confirmed the viability 
of the above-described strategy that a restart of aluminium idle capacity could drop 
aluminium prices but at the same time raise SGA prices, thus squeezing the profit 
margins of independent smelters. The fact that in the above case this situation lasted 
only for a few months and was reversed later does not prove against the sustainability 
of the strategy, because the reversal occurred for reasons related to the specific market 
momentum, which therefore could not be generalised. More specifically, SGA prices 
fell from US$425/t, four months after Alcoa's announcement, to US$250/t, seven 
months after that, due to the completion in May 2000 of two long-announced capacity 
expansions at Reynolds's Worsley83 and Alcoa's Wagerup84 refineries, and also 
because SGA prices at US$425/t were already at extraordinary levels. Also, the fact 
that aluminium price rose again later in 2000 was due to the increased demand for the 
metal worldwide, which was fuelled by the favourable developments in the global 
economy at that time85. 
It should be also noted that Alcoa announced the restart of only half of its idle 
capacity, while SGA and aluminium prices reacted to the announcement even if they 
were already at high levels. Thus, one could imagine what would have happened 
under more favourable market conditions for Alcoa. For instance, if Alcoa had 
announced the restart of all (and not half) of its idle capacity in periods of relatively 
low demand for aluminium, the prices of the latter would have fallen by much more, 
while SGA prices would have risen potentially by more than the 15% mentioned 
above and apparently for a longer period. The profit squeeze for disadvantaged 
smelters would have been more painful then. 
However, concerning Alcoa's announcement, it should be mentioned that the EU 
competition authorities were at the time of the announcement reviewing 
Alcoa/Reynolds merger and the Commission came to a final decision, following a 
phase-Il investigation, on the 3`d of May 2000. Similarly, on the same day, the US 
competition authorities finished their own market investigation by filing the 
Complaint and the proposed settlement of the case. Thus, both competition authorities 
83 On May 2000 Worsley completed the final stage of an expansion project that increased production by 1.3mt 
annually (See 1999-2000 Statistics Digest, Department of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia) 
84 Alcoa's 440,000t capacity expansion at Wagerup, Australia, came on stream in July 2000 
(www. investsmartindia. com report of August 28,2000). 
8 As can be seen in table 2, the aluminium market closed 2000 with small deficit of 80,000t from a small surplus 
one year before, while its average price was significantly higher than in 1999. This 2000 deficit was created even if 
the 200,000t of Alcoa's restarted production entered into the market. 
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could not have been aware of the full market consequences resulted from Alcoa's 
announcement. However, a first market reaction from Alcoa's January 2000 
announcement was already visible by the May of that year and therefore both 
competition authorities could have taken it into account, but it seems that other 
factors, such as the low Alcoa's post-merger share in the aluminium market and the 
low level of concentration in that market, weighed more on those authorities' decision 
not to challenge the merger on that grounds. 
The next step in the analysis of the second RRC strategy would be to consider 
how that strategy would result in higher aluminium prices. This would be possible in 
two cases: first, if a sufficient number of disadvantaged rivals exited the market, and, 
second, if the RRC policy reinforced coordination between the disadvantaged rivals, 
Alcoa, and the other integrated firms. 
In the first case, the exit of independent smelters would result in lower output in 
the aluminium market, thus leading to higher prices. However, such a potential would 
not be very likely, since disadvantaged rivals could prove tough86, while aluminium's 
nature as a volatile and complex market could make unsustainable the RRC strategy 
for a very long period. Moreover, certain vertically integrated firms would also lose 
money from such a strategy, since the lower aluminium prices would squeeze their 
aluminium profits and they would not be able to recoup part or all of these loses 
through higher profits in the SGA market, since, as shown, not all integrated firms 
were selling SGA on the merchant market. Thus, these firms could act against Alcoa's 
policy and therefore the latter could be cancelled. 
In the second case, the coordination between disadvantaged rivals and integrated 
firms would also result in less output and higher prices. Coordination could possibly 
take one of the two forms: either between Alcoa and the other vertically integrated 
firms against independent smelters in order to force the latter to exit, or between all 
aluminium firms, including independent smelters, in order to raise prices. The second 
scenario would be more likely, since it did not require such costly policies as price 
wars. 
86 One of the arguments against traditional foreclosure, under which the exit of rivals is the main source of 
concern, is that rivals are much more tenacious and markets far more robust than antitrust had assumed. As a 
result, many of the foreclosure strategies will never work or will work only under very strictly defined conditions 
(See also Hovenkamp op. cit. 30,318, citing also Frank Easterbrook "Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies" 
48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1983,263). The RRC theories were developed exactly for dealing with situations where, 
competition is harmed without the exit of disadvantaged rivals. 
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Concerning the punishment mechanism, which is necessary for a sustainable 
collusion, the situation respecting independent smelters is clear. They could be 
punished through higher SGA prices, which would mean higher costs for them. If 
deviation came from integrated firms, punishment would come from the restart of 
Alcoa's idle capacity, which would drop aluminium prices thus harming the profit 
margins of these firms. 
Regarding integrated firms however, it should be recalled that the most such 
firms were at the time of Alcoa/Reynolds merger capacity-constrained, which meant 
that they were unable to deviate and to retaliate against Alcoa87. Moreover, the 
Commission in its SGA decision mentioned that vertically integrated firms were 
sharing with Alcoa the incentive for higher prices as a means to harm downstream 
rivals. However, one could say the same for aluminium, because, as shown above, 
higher SGA prices normally result also in higher aluminium prices, while the metal is 
the main source of profits for vertically integrated firms. Thus, these firms could 
generally share the incentive for higher prices. Additional support for this conclusion 
could be derived from the past experience from aluminium industry, which as shown, 
indicated high coordination risk, and also the market events in mid-1990s when the 
increased aluminium supply by producers of the Eastern block violated the market 
equilibrium and collapsed aluminium prices in the international markets. These events 
were responsible for the accumulation of idle capacity in Alcoa and other major 
western producers, and showed that situations of oversupply, which is also the usual 
result of price wars, could cause significant harm to all competitors. As a result, one 
could say that a credible and sufficient punishment mechanism existed in the 
aluminium market. 
Regarding monitoring, which is also essential for a sustainable policy of co- 
ordination, there is generally sufficient transparency in the aluminium industry to 
safeguard effective monitoring through the existence of the London Metal Exchange 
(LME), the global centre where aluminium contracts are concluded and prices are 
determined. The LME is a reliable source of information for the developments in 
aluminium supply and demand, capacity utilisation, and current and future projects for 
87 As mentioned above the level of capacity utilisation in the industry was in the period under examination above 
90%, while from the limited idle capacity that existed in the market Alcoa had a lion's share. Capacity-constraints 
as well known in economic theory, limit both incentives to deviate and retaliation possibilities (see Olivier 
Compte, Frederic Jenny and Patrick Rey "Capacity Constraints, Mergers and Collusion" 46 European Economic 
Review, 2002,1). 
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capacity expansions. Thus, the level of transparency in existence in the aluminium 
market would safeguard sufficient monitoring of possible deviations. 
6.3.2.2.3 The role of entry and expansion 
Effective entry, as explained above, if sufficient could cancel the anticompetitive 
results of a RRC strategy. 
The situation regarding entry in the primary aluminium market is similar to that of 
SGA88. The construction of a new smelter, as with SGA refineries, is a capital- 
intensive investment and the lead-time approaches 5 years. Moreover, for a new 
smelter to operate, SGA supplies need to be located, which, due to the relatively tight 
and controlled supply of SGA, might not be always easy. Major SGA suppliers, such 
as Alcoa, which have also interests in the aluminium market, could act to deny SGA 
access to the entrant. Although complete exclusion did not seem likely, possible 
delayed or high-cost access could not be completely excluded, particularly taking into 
account the history of coordination between SGA producers. Additional problems for 
a new entrant could arise out from energy costs. Aluminium production is an energy- 
intensive process and therefore smelters should be built in areas where energy is 
cheap. However, there are a few places in the world where energy is cheap and this 
could potentially constitute additional obstacle to a viable new entry89. For these 
reasons, it is not surprising that between 1997-2002 -three years prior to 
Alcoa/Reynolds merger and two years after that- the two most significant new 
smelters were built by two major incumbent aluminium players, Alcan and Billiton, 
and no significant new entry occurred in the aluminium market. The costs of these 
projects, were for Alcan's 373,000t Alma smelter in Canada US$1.3billion and for 
Billiton's 250,000t Mozal smelter in Mozambique US$1.9billion. The construction of 
both smelters took several years and the huge amount of capital used showed the 
difficulty of such projects90. It is also necessary to mention that many independent 
firms acting in the aluminium market, particularly in the US, have acquired their 
88 See also the analysis about entry and expansion in the SGA market in chapter 4. 89 On the issue see also Gillian O'Connor "Time to Plan a New Generation of Plants: `Smelting: Since Smelters 
Need Vast Amounts of Energy to Run it is not Surprising that they are Built Where Cheap Long-Term Supplies are 
Available"' in FT Surveys: Aluminium 2001, Oct. 31,2001. 
90 The information included in this paragraph was taken from the annual Financial Times' surveys titled 
"Aluminium" of 1999,2000 and 2001. 
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smelters from integrated firms and have not built them themselves. However, these 
smelters have generally high operating costs"I. 
Consequently, new entry in the aluminium market was difficult and therefore 
there could be no threat to RRC from that cause. 
Further, in addition to entry, one should examine capacity expansions by 
incumbent players, particularly integrated firms. Such expansions ("hrownfield" 
projects) occur through the construction of new production lines in existing smelters 
and as with SGA, they are costly, difficult and take long time (2-3 years) to complete. 
Thus, timely reaction by incumbent competitors through production expansion, in 
response to Alcoa's attempt to raise aluminium prices by foreclosing independent 
smelters should not be expected. 
Lastly, it should be recalled that most aluminium suppliers were capacity- 
constrained at the time Alcoa/Reynolds merger and thus they were not capable of 
using any excess capacity to cancel aluminium price-rises. 
However, with respect to entry, specific reference should be made to the role of 
CIS countries92. These countries, as mentioned above, were responsible through 
oversupply, for the collapsing of aluminium prices in the international markets in the 
mid-90s, while in the late 90s, their impact on prices was less significant but not 
immaterial. 
Table 3 below demonstrates the situation in CIS countries and Russia: 
Table 3: CIS aluminium statistics ('000 tonnes) 
Primary production 1996 1997 1998 1 
Azerbaijan 5 10 0 
Tajikistan 198 189 196 
Ukraine 97 101 107 
CIS total 3,173 3,205 3,307 
Exports 2,676 2,762 2,850 
Consumption 572 443 457 
Source: (RU International, Financial 'limes Surveys: Aluminium, 1999 
Between 1996-1998 CIS production and exports to the West increased and this 
trend continued until recently`". The biggest production growth was registered in 
Russia due to the development in that country of a tolling process, according to 
91 See also James F. King op. cit. 11,42. 
`''` Commonwealth of Independent States, which includes the most countries of the former Soviet Union. 
91 Aluminium production in Russia, the biggest CIS producer, reached 3.35 million tonnes in 2002 (source: Metal 
Bulletin Monthly: Aluminium Supplement, September 2002,9). 
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which, western trading companies financed the purchase of alumina and its delivery to 
the smelters; they paid smelters a tolling fee and took back the resulting metal for sale 
in export markets94. Tolling in Russia enjoyed favourable tax treatment, while Russian 
smelters had the additional advantage of low energy costs. 
However, in the late 1990s the impact of CIS countries on the aluminium market 
did not seem to be so significant, because the increased exports from these countries 
did not prevent aluminium price-rises after Gramercy. Also, as shown in the 
Commission's analysis for the SGA market, Russian smelters were largely dependent 
for their SGA supplies on imports and they would therefore suffer if a RRC strategy 
aiming at increasing SGA prices was applied95. However, Russian smelters had the 
competitive advantage of cheap energy and therefore were unlikely to leave the 
market in response to RRC. 
Regarding entry and expansion in the aluminium market, one should also note 
that even if the long-term demand for the metal is steadily upwards (the long-term 
demand growth has been estimated to 2.5% annually96), which could generally 
provide for more aggressive capacity expansions to capture extra market shares, such 
aggressive expansions do not occur in aluminium. Instead, the fact that there is 
generally little excess capacity in the industry even if there is some capacity growth, 
indicates the existence of cautious capacity planning by the major aluminium players 
aiming at preserving supply/demand balance and, therefore, price stability. Thus, 
unlike the cyclical and sometimes extreme volatility of aluminium prices, the market 
balance, with the exception of the situation in mid-1990s, seems to have been under 
stable control. The existing policy of some large aluminium firms to act as "swing" 
producers by cutting output when prices are falling and increasing it when they are 
rising97, imply the existence of some sort of concerted action. Thus, even if the CFI in 
Airtours considered that cautious capacity planning might not be an indicator of 
anticompetitive action by oligopolists98, it seems that for aluminium the situation is 
9" See Christopher Stobart "Seeking a Long-term Strategy" in Financial Times Surveys: "Aluminium" 1999. 
9s Russian and Chinese buyers had been responsible for the huge increase in spot SGA prices following Gramercy, 
since these buyers were particularly active in the spot market. (see in chapter 4). 
9' See Gillian O'Connor "Hyperactivity in a Strong Market" in FT Survey: Aluminium 1999, October 1999. 
97 About that policy of large aluminium firms see also Gillian 0' Connor ibid. For instance, in 2001 a year of low 
demand for aluminium due to the international economic downturn Alcoa's idle capacity according to the 
Financial Times climbed to 700,000t. 
98 Case T-342/99, Airtours plc v. Commission, [2002] ECR II-2585, at paras. 88-92. 
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different from Airtours and therefore cautious capacity planning does indicate the 
existence of coordination or at least of high risk of coordination99. 
6.3.2.2.4 Summary and conclusions about possible RRC strategies in the aluminium 
market 
As explained above, for establishing anticompetitive effects on the basis of RRC 
at least the following conditions should be met: a) the merger creates for the parties 
sufficient capabilities and incentives to put forward credible RRC strategies in order 
to undermine the competitive positions of certain rivals or force them to exit; b) the 
RRC strategy cannot be cancelled by the targeted rivals or other disruptive market 
forces or new entry; c) the RRC strategies will also unavoidably lead to higher prices 
thus harming competition; and d) the merger will not produce efficiencies sufficient 
to counterbalance the competitive harm. 
It is submitted that the analysis of the market of primary aluminium proves the 
following: 
Regarding the first condition, the analysis showed that the merger would make 
possible the exercise of at least two RRC strategies: one seeking to raise independent 
smelters' costs through raising SGA prices in order finally to raise also aluminium 
prices; and one seeking to squeeze the profit margins of independent smelters by 
increasing SGA prices and at the same time keeping aluminium prices low through 
the use of idle aluminium capacity. The second strategy would also target capacity- 
constrained aluminium producers and its outcome most likely would not be the exit of 
the targeted rivals but rather the reinforcement of collusion using Alcoa's idle 
capacity as a punishment. On the issue of how the merger would create sufficient 
capabilities and incentive to Alcoa to exercise the above-mentioned strategies, the 
99 In Airtours ibid., the CFI considered that if cautious capacity planning was a feature of the relevant market prior 
to the merger where effective competition existed, was affecting all firms in the market and not only the members 
of the oligopoly, and was a measure taken by suppliers for protection against downwards volatility in demand, it is 
not an indicator of the exercise of collective dominance, because it does not prove that there is no competition 
between the alleged oligopolists. 
However, it has been argued that it is precisely that play-it-safe policy that fosters tacit collusion and that even 
if there is no questionable practice behind this policy the final outcome can still be highly damaging for consumer 
welfare. It is the aggregation of the wholly rational, independent decisions of the oligopolistic firms that produces 
the adverse result, not active collusion on their part. According to this view, such situations fall also within the 
scope of the ECMR (see Andrew Scott "'Winter Talk By the Fireside? ': Tacit Collusion and the Airtours Case" 
J. B. L. 2003,298,312-313, citing also Richard Whish, Competition Law (4's Ed. ), Butterworths, 2001,728: 
"... merger control is not, or not only, about pre-emptively preventing a merger entity from abusing its dominant 
position in the future ... it 
is an instrument for the maintenance of competitive market structure... "). 
242 
analysis showed that the firm would acquire through Reynolds a dominant market 
share in the SGA market and also increased market share in the aluminium market. 
Regarding the second condition, the analysis showed that Alcoa's existing rivals 
would be either unable to react or willing to cooperate with the firm in order to raise 
aluminium prices. It was also shown that new entry in the aluminium market was 
difficult. 
On the crucial issue whether the above-mentioned RRC strategies would result in 
higher aluminium prices in order to be considered as anticompetitive (third condition), 
the analysis used certain real-market evidence, namely the market situation following 
the Gramercy explosion, which showed that both these strategies could result in 
higher prices. Under the first strategy, the increase in the SGA prices could be passed 
directly to aluminium prices either through action by disadvantaged rivals or through 
coordination by all aluminium producers, which would realise extra profits from the 
higher prices. Under the second strategy, higher prices could come either if 
disadvantaged rivals exited the market, thus resulting in lower aluminium output, or 
through the enhanced possibility of coordination, which could again result in higher 
prices. The latter case, as shown, was more likely. 
Lastly, significant efficiencies were not expected for Alcoa/Reynolds merger and 
therefore the anticompetitive effects of the merger could not be cancelled. 
Thus, the above analysis using market evidence shows that the application of 
RRC strategies following Alcoa/Reynolds merger was both feasible and possible. This 
was confirmed also by the Commission's SGA decision, which considered that higher 
SGA prices would increase the costs of independent smelters and that aluminium 
prices could be affectedloo. However, the Commission considered that the source of 
Alcoa's market power was the firm's post-merger dominant position in the SGA 
market, which could imply the Commission's confidence that the issue could be 
addressed through remedies in the SGA market. Moreover, as mentioned above, the 
Commission's main concern in foreclosure cases is whether the disadvantaged rivals 
will finally exit the market, which in this case would not happen. Regarding RRC, the 
Commission's view, as explained, is that RRC should be taken into account along 
with all the other competitive effects of the merger and in this context Alcoa's post- 
100 See para. 28 of the decision ofAlcoa/Reynolds 
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merger market share and the post-merger level of concentration in the aluminium 
market did not provide for competitive risks. 
On the other hand, the US decision for the SGA market went beyond the 
Commission by stressing that the merger would give rise to both unilateral and 
coordinated effects. Connecting this analysis about the SGA market to that of 
aluminium one would then ask why firms capable of conspiring for higher SGA prices 
would not conspire to raise also aluminium prices given that the same firms 
controlling the SGA market were major aluminium sellers. The DOJ could argue, 
similarly to the Commission, that the source of concern from Alcoa/Reynolds merger 
was the control of the SGA market, which was effectively addressed through the 
decision on the remedies, and that due to the weak post-merger position of Alcoa in 
the aluminium market there would be no competitive risk in that market. 
A basic issue therefore to be clarified is whether by remedying the competitive 
problem in the SGA market, competition authorities in EU and the US addressed also 
potential competitive risks from Alcoa/Reynolds merger on the primary aluminium 
market. The answer to this question would also provide some guidance on the debated 
issue of whether there is need to establish an independent legal framework for the 
examination of vertical mergers, as proposed by some proponents of the post-Chicago 
school or whether the current framework of horizontal analysis is capable of 
addressing also vertical issues. 
These issues are addressed below. 
6.4 Remedies 
The Alcoa/Reynolds merger would enable Alcoa to exercise at least two RRC 
strategies: one aiming at raising the costs of aluminium through raising the prices of 
SGA, the crucial raw material, for which the use of Alcoa's dominant position in the 
SGA market would be required; and one aiming at squeezing the profit margins of 
certain independent aluminium producers and capacity-constrained vertically 
integrated firms in order to raise aluminium prices through foreclosure or 
coordination. For the second strategy a combination of policies in the SGA and 
aluminium markets would be required. It is therefore clear that, any potential remedy 
seeking to cure the RRC problem should necessarily involve the SGA market. 
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Regarding the SGA market, it was explained in detail in the previous chapters 
that the EU and US competition authorities adopted relatively different approaches 
due to their different market definitions101. The Commission, having defined a 
merchant western-world SGA market as the relevant market was satisfied with the 
divestiture of all Reynolds's merchant SGA production and maybe more than that. 
More specifically, the Commission ordered the divestiture of Worsley and Stade 
refineries whose overall production capacity exceeded Reynolds's sales in the 
merchant market. On the other hand, the DOJ, having defined an all-SGA worldwide 
relevant market ordered the divestiture of virtually all Reynolds's SGA capacity 
worldwide, by asking Alcoa to sell, in addition to the above two refineries, also 
Reynolds's Corpus Christi refinery in the US. 
The two decisions however had different effects on RRC strategies. 
Under the Commission's decision, Alcoa was allowed to increase its total SGA 
capacity by keeping the Corpus Christi refinery, even if the firm's position in the 
merchant SGA market was not strengthened. At the same time in the market of 
primary aluminium, Alcoa would acquire, as can be seen from table 1, more than lmt 
of aluminium smelting capacity. Thus, in total, under the Commission's decision the 
vertical effects of Alcoa/Reynolds merger, and through them the ability of Alcoa to 
exercise RRC strategies, would be strengthened post-merger since Alcoa would 
increase its position in both SGA and the primary aluminium markets. 
Another important detail, which further strengthens this argument, is that in the 
SGA market prior to the merger Alcoa was controlling approximately 29%102 of the 
world SGA capacity, while the Gramercy explosion, which caused huge price 
increases concerned a reduction in world capacity by 1 mt or only 2%. The equivalent 
of lmt in Alcoa's total pre-merger capacity was approximately 7%, which could be 
deemed rather immaterial taking into account the big increases in both SGA and 
aluminium prices that Gramercy caused. The latter event showed also that incumbent 
players were unable to react timely and sufficiently to close the created supply gap, 
and the same could have happened also in the hypothetical case where Alcoa 
restricted SGA by lmt as Gramercy did. What is implied here is that Alcoa most 
likely had already prior to the acquisition of Reynolds been capable of affecting the 
market equilibrium and raising SGA prices and the remedial decision of the European 
101 See the analysis of the Commission's and DOD's remedial action in the SGA market in chapters 4 and 5. 102 The calculation was made by the DOJ. 
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Commission in Alcoa/Reynolds by allowing Alcoa to keep part of Reynolds's 
production thus increasing its total SGA capabilities further strengthened the already 
existing ability of the firm. 
On the other hand, the DOJ's decision by not allowing the firm to keep any of 
Reynolds's production was more sufficient to prevent Alcoa from strengthening its 
SGA position post-merger. However, as just explained, Alcoa was already pre-merger 
in a position to raise SGA prices and this in combination with the reinforcement due 
to the merger of the firm's position in the aluminium market strengthened, even under 
the DOD's decision, Alcoa's ability to exercise RRC. The only difference between the 
Commission's and the DOD's decision is that under the latter decision Alcoa's RRC 
abilities were strengthened less. 
It seems that for cancelling Alcoa's ability to exercise RRC strategies post- 
merger a combination of the DOD's SGA divestitures along with the divestiture of 
Alcoa's idle aluminium capacity would be the most appropriate remedy. The DOD's 
divestiture would return Alcoa's share in the SGA market to its pre-merger levels 
whereas the divestiture of Alcoa's idle aluminium capacity would reduce its ability to 
use this capacity to discipline aluminium competitors by squeezing their profits. 
Another conclusion from the discussion on the remedies here is that the DOD's 
market definition concerning SGA was more appropriate than that of the European 
Commission. In particular, the Commission's decision to exclude captive SGA sales 
from the product market and to exclude Eastern world from the geographic market 
failed to capture all competitive constraints, since it did not capture fully the RRC 
possibilities of the merger. 
This reinforces this thesis's argument that market definition in the context of 
merger control, should not be technical seeking to facilitate the application of the 
market test but should instead be fully reflective of the competitive market conditions 
in order to reveal all the competitive effects of the merger. 
6.5 Concluding remarks-the issue of vertical merger analysis 
This chapter sought to clarify certain issues about vertical aspects of mergers. 
The examined issues concerned raising-rivals'-costs strategies aiming at raising 
prices. The main advantage of these strategies, as was explained in detail in the 
analysis, is that they do not require the exit of rivals to be effective. 
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Primary aluminium was a good case for studying the practical application of 
RRC strategies. The analysis used market evidence collected by this thesis from the 
Commission's and DOD's decisions about Alcoa/Reynolds merger as well as from the 
thesis's own investigation. However, a more comprehensive analysis would require 
also the use of econometrics for calculating the potential quantitative impact of the 
discussed RRC on aluminium prices. Such quantitative evidence would offer further 
indication on whether anticompetitive price rises would be possible in aluminium 
after Alcoa/Reynolds merger. In any case, the above analysis demonstrated how in 
certain markets a firm apparently concentrating insufficient horizontal means of 
exercising market power is nevertheless capable by using its strong market position in 
vertically-related markets to raise prices. 
The analysis of primary aluminium provided also some answers concerning 
vertical analysis of mergers, in particular, whether such analysis is necessary for 
identifying anticompetitive effects or whether horizontal analysis alone is sufficient. 
The aluminium market showed certain limits of horizontal analysis, which potentially 
prevent it from effectively dealing with all vertical issues. Thus, the low market share 
of Alcoa, which fell below established minimum thresholds of the EC and US merger 
law' 03, and the low level of concentration in the aluminium market, which also fell 
below minimum concentration thresholds established in the two jurisdictions 104, 
deprived competition authorities of sufficient support by hard horizontal evidence 
against the merger. Thus, it would be very difficult for these authorities under the 
current framework to challenge the merger on horizontal grounds. 
Some antitrust economists however, particularly in the US, doubt the utility of 
safe harbours in merger control. They have particularly targeted the market share 35% 
threshold, which has been considered as hiding anticompetitive effects105. Such a 
finding could also affect the credibility of the minimum HHI thresholds. 
103 As shown minimum market shares thresholds for examining mergers in EU and the US are 25% and 35% 
respectively. Alcoa's post-merger market share would be less than 20%. 
104 Both jurisdictions establish a minimum HHI level of 1000 points post-merger in order to examine in details a 
merger. Alcoa/Reynolds impact on concentration would be immaterial because the post-merger Hill would be less 
than 1000. 
'0' See e. g. Roy J. Epstein and Daniel Rubinfeld "Merger Simulation: A Simplified Approach with new 
Applications" 69 Antitrust LJ. 2002,883,910-911. See also Jerry A Hausman and Gregory K. Leonard 
"Economic Analysis of Differentiated Products Mergers Using Real World Data" 5 Geo. Mason L. Rev., 1997,321, 
at 338-339. Further, Jonathan Baker, another prominent US antitrust economists, cites an example based on an 
auction model according to which a merger creating a firm owning 20% of the market and increasing the Hill 
from 1000 to 1200 led to a price increase of 12.5% (Jonathan Baker "Unilateral Competitive Effects Theories in 
Merger Analysis" Antitrust. 1997,21,21-22) 
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However, abolishing or further lowering minimum market shares and 
concentration thresholds, which would possibly pave the way for the examination of 
markets such as aluminium, increases significantly the number of cases to be 
scrutinised by competition authorities and at the same time puts additional economic 
burden on the merging parties. The outcome from such a move would be poor, since 
the vast majority of cases falling within the current safe harbours do not give rise to 
anticompetitive effects. Moreover, no economist has come up so far with a more 
reliable alternative system, which could replace the minimum thresholds106. Thus, at 
least for now it seems that the current minimum thresholds could not change and for 
this reason competitive effects such as those in aluminium will not be examined. 
However, the current minimum thresholds are not mandatory and it is submitted 
that competition authorities should not hesitate to examine mergers falling below 
these thresholds when there is indication that these mergers may nevertheless result in 
higher prices. 
The above analysis of RRC strategies in the aluminium market showed that for 
these strategies, to be fully analysed and assessed, there is needs for a combined 
horizontal and vertical analysis, because they require action on two levels. Thus, in 
the second RRC strategy the use of Alcoa's idle aluminium capacity alone would be 
less effective as a threat of punishment against the targeted aluminium rivals without 
the parallel use of the SGA market. The idle aluminium capacity alone would help to 
keep aluminium prices low but the profit squeeze for the targeted firms would be 
much bigger if there was pressure also from higher SGA costs. In addition, under the 
first RRC strategy where higher SGA prices also seek to raise those of aluminium, 
Alcoa's strong presence in the aluminium market would make the achievement of this 
target easier. Conversely, for assessing Alcoa's ability to raise SGA prices one should 
look also the reaction of SGA competitors, which is a task of horizontal analysis. 
Similarly, horizontal analysis has to deal with issues of collusion in the aluminium 
market. As a conclusion, a complete assessment of RRC strategies as the above 
requires a combination of both horizontal and vertical analysis. 
Regarding vertical analysis, EC merger control establishes a 25% safe harbour 
for vertical mergers 107. However, this 25% concerns either level, upstream or 
106 In this respect see also Jonathan Baker and Steven Salop "Should Concentration be Dropped from the Merger 
Guidelines? " 33 UWLA L. Rev. 2001,3. 
107 Vertical relationships in Form CO are described in subsection III, which deals with "affected markets". Form 
CO is Annexed to the Implementing Regulation (Commission Regulation 802/2004). In particular Form CO states 
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downstream, and therefore situations such as those in SGA and aluminium do not fall 
within this minimum threshold, since Alcoa had a market share around 50% in the 
SGA market. The Commission's decision as demonstrated above, referred to some 
vertical effects of Alcoa/Reynolds merger, such as that higher SGA prices would harm 
non-integrated competitors in the downstream market of aluminium but did not assess 
the full impact on that market, possibly because of the limited horizontal effects of the 
merger there. Also, from the Commission's analysis it could be inferred that the latter 
was not concerned so much about the anticompetitive effects in the aluminium market 
because disadvantaged competitors would not leave that market in case of higher 
costs. Moreover significant risk of complete foreclosure of these firms from access to 
SGA, the critical raw material did not seem to exist 108. 
However, it is submitted that if there were a risk of higher aluminium prices as a 
result of the merger, the Commission had to act regardless of the low market share of 
the parties or the fact that disadvantaged rivals would not exit. Higher prices mean 
harm to consumers and this cannot be ignored. 
On the other hand, under the 1984 US non-horizontal merger Guidelines RRC 
strategies as the above would probably fall within the cases facilitating collusion as a 
result of a vertical merger109. On the issue the guidelines, as explained, distinguish 
between two cases: first, if the merger leads to vertical integration to the retail level, 
and second if the merger eliminates a disruptive buyer"(). However, the 1984 
guidelines consider that vertical mergers are unlikely to be challenged on the above 
grounds if the overall concentration in the upstream market is less than 1800 HHI. But 
even if the merger meets or exceeds these limits "the Department's decision whether 
to challenge [it] on this ground will depend upon an individual evaluation of its likely 
competitive effect" I 11. 
In Alcoa/Reynolds the merger according to the DOD's analysis would result in a 
post merger HHI of 1800 in the SGA market 112. This meant that the merger met the 
that vertical relationships exist when "... one or more of the parties to the concentration are engaged in business 
activities in the same product market, which is upstream or downstream of a product market in which any other 
party to the concentration is engaged and any of their individual or combined market shares at either level are 25% 
or more, regardless of whether there is or not any existing supplier/customer relationship between the parties to the 
concentration". 
108 As explained above the Commission's main concern in vertical mergers is the foreclosure of rivals. 
'09The other two grounds of consideration such as two-level entry and evasion of rate regulation would not arise 
from Alcoa/Reynolds merger. 
10 § 4.22 of the guidelines. 
"'§§ 4.221,4.222 of the guidelines. 
112 See the analysis of the DOJ's decision in the previous chapter. 
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1800 threshold. However, Alcoa/Reynolds was not a vertical (or "non-horizontal") 
merger as defined in section 4.0 of the 1984 guidelines according to which "... non- 
horizontal mergers involve firms that do not operate in the same market". Alcoa and 
Reynolds were both vertically integrated and were both operating in both the SGA 
and aluminium markets. 
However, as explained above, the US competition authorities generally take into 
account RRC theories in the analysis of vertical aspect of mergers even if they have 
not yet awarded these theories an official status through incorporation into the 
guidelines. In Alcoa/Reynolds it is not clear what happened regarding RRC. The DOJ 
may have considered it as more appropriate to solve the competition problems 
through horizontal analysis. The agency may also have looked to the issue and have 
considered that such a risk would not arise or that the only source of concern was 
Alcoa's post-merger dominant position in the SGA market, which was addressed 
through the SGA remedies and thus any risk of vertical effects was also eliminated. 
In any case, and beyond aluminium, the analysis in this chapter showed that RRC 
theories of competitive harm should be taken seriously into account. With respect to 
aluminium, in particular, the analysis of RRC showed how a firm controlling low 
market share can nevertheless be capable of acquiring disproportional control over 




The Remain (PLM)/American National Can and Schmalbach- 
Lubeca/Rexam mergers in the market for beverage cans 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with the analysis of the beverage can market, which was 
examined by the Commission in Rexam/ANCI and Schmalbach-Lubeca/Rexam2 
decisions. 
The acquisition of American National Can ("ANC") by Rexam, a UK-based firm, 
was notified to the Commission on June 5,2000. Following a Phase-I investigation 
the Commission concluded that the acquisition would result in the establishment of a 
duopolistic dominant position by Rexam and its competitor, Continental Can Europe 
("CCE"), in the beverage-can market of Northern Europe (Germany, Austria, 
Northern France, Benelux and UK) and in the creation of single dominance in the 
beverage-can market of southern Europe (Spain, Portugal, Italy and Southern France). 
Finally, the Commission approved the deal on July 19,2000 after the parties 
submitted certain commitments sufficient to address the identified competitive 
concerns. 
The second case, Schmalbach-Lubeca/Rexam, which was cleared on September 
2001, concerns the acquisition by Schmalbach-Lubeca of two of Rexam's beverage 
can plants in UK and France, which along with another one in Germany, were the 
divestitures that Rexam had agreed to realise for settling the ANC deal. Schmalbach- 
Lubeca was no other than the Continental Can Europe (CCE) referred to in the 
Rexam/ANC decision. 
The two cases raise a number of issues, which are in the context of the thesis: 
1 Case IV/M. 1939, Decision of 19/7/2000. 
2 Case IV/M. 2542, Decision of 17/9/2001. 
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a. the product market definition, which comprised aluminium and steel cans and 
excluded plastic (PET) and glass bottles, offers a good opportunity to study the 
treatment in market definition of differentiated products, a controversial and difficult 
issue. 
b. Rexam/ANC also raises issues concerning the treatment of oligopolies in EC 
merger control. In particular, in Northern Europe where the Commission found that 
the merger would create a duopoly there were in existence only three firms including 
the duopolists. This thesis explores the potential for inclusion of the third firm in the 
collusive oligopoly and the Commission's doctrine on collusive oligopolies is 
analysed in this context. 
c. This thesis uses also the situation in the beverage can market, which comprised 
only three firms and was therefore highly concentrated to discuss issues of practical 
application of the new EU doctrine on unilateral (or non-coordinated) effects. 
d. This chapter continues the analysis initiated in chapters 4 and 5 of the theory of 
mavericks, which refers to firms having sufficient capabilities to break collusion in 
oligopolistc markets. The theory focuses on individual firms' behaviour and as such 
constitutes a tool of dynamic merger analysis which seeks to offer additional evidence 
on whether a merger in an oligopoly increases the risk of tacit collusion there or not. 
Thus, the theory helps to improve the effectiveness of merger control and as such falls 
within the scope of this thesis. 
e. The decision on the remedies in Rexam/ANC whose practical application could be 
seen in Schmalbach-Lubeca/Rexam raises the issue whether the sale of assets from 
one duopolist to the other was sufficient to sever ties between them or whether the 
decision finally strengthened the collusion risk. The thesis uses this opportunity to 
continue the discussion on the effectiveness of the Commission's policy concerning 
remedies initiated in the previous chapters. 
f. Other interesting competitive issues include price discrimination and buyer power. 
Generally speaking the Rexam/ANC and Schmalbach-Lubeca/Rexam decisions 
raise certain of the most difficult issues of merger control, for which the risk of failure 
in competitive assessment is higher than in other areas. In particular, the interest is in 
the treatment of oligopolies where economic theory has not thus far offered 
satisfactory answers as to when an oligopolistic situation gives rise to risks of 
coordinated interaction, unilateral effects or no anticompetitive effects at all. 
Although there are in existence several theories which establish various market 
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criteria and methods for the assessment of oligopolies, there is no consensus about 
which of these criteria and methods are most effective. Thus, when it comes to the 
application of economic theories in the specific facts of each market, competition 
authorities have often difficulties in distinguishing between pro-competitive and anti- 
competitive oligopolies and this increases the risk of failure in the application of 
effective merger control in these cases. 
7.2 The relevant product market3 
The merging parties were both involved in the manufacturing of beverage cans. 
The Commission's market definition comprised three stages: 
First, the Commission examined beverage cans, plastic (PET) and glass bottles 
and included in the relevant product market only beverage cans on the grounds that 
buyers (bottlers/fillers) would not shift to PET or glass in case of a small but 
significant non-transitory price increase in cans. According to buyers, non-price 
factors, such as marketing and product image, and varying consumer preferences, 
were playing a crucial role in any decision to shift to other products and not the 
change in price. Thus, beverage cans constituted a distinct product market in the 
broader market of single-serve beverage packaging. This decision was in line with the 
Commission's previous case-law4. 
Second, the Commission examined slim and standard cans, the two main types of 
beverage cans, and concluded that the relevant product market should include only 
standard cans and exclude slim cans because buyers (bottlers/fillers) could not easily 
change their filling lines to accommodate apart from standard cans also slim cans. 
However, buyers could easily change their filling lines to accommodate the various 
sizes of standard cans (e. g 15,25 or 27.5 cl. ), which had all the same diameter. 
Moreover, the Commission's investigation did not reveal any strong preference of 
final consumer for any particular can size that could affect the switching possibilities 
of the bottlers. On the supply-side (can manufacturers) the Commission considered 
that switching between the various can sizes could occur at a reasonable time and at a 
reasonable cost and that therefore any supra-competitive price increase in cans of a 
3 Paras. 7-13 of the Decision in Rexam/ANC 
4 The Commission referred to its decision in VIAL/Continental Can (Case IV/M. 81). 
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particular size would be defeated by either customers shifting to other sizes or can 
manufacturers producing more cans of that size. Thus, the product market should 
include standard cans of all sizes and exclude slim cans. 
Third, the Commission considered aluminium and steel cans, and concluded that 
the two products formed a single market The Commission's market investigation 
found a high price correlation between the two can products, almost identical end- 
users' and consumers' perceptions5, and a cost difference of producing aluminium and 
steel cans below 2%. 
As a result, the relevant product market in Rexam/ANC included single-serve 
aluminium and steel beverage cans of all sizes. 
7.2.1 Product market definition involving differentiated products: some observations. 
The product market definition in Rexam/ANC involves differentiated products6 
considerations, a task practically difficult and sometimes controversial. The biggest 
problem faced by competition authorities in such cases concerns the issue of which 
products must be included in the relevant market and which must be excluded. The 
existence of the differentiation often leads to the creation of a long list of products, 
which in one way or another could be considered as potential substitutes. The problem 
becomes even bigger with consumer products for which consumer perceptions and 
preferences determine the level of demand substitution. Consumer choice is 
influenced by numerous factors, such as advertising, local perceptions, social factors, 
and age, which are often subject to unpredictable changes, and therefore are difficult 
to reach and quantify. 
The Commission's Notice on the relevant markee acknowledges that it is 
difficult to gather the direct views of end consumers about substitute products8. 
Moreover, functional inter-changeability or similarity in characteristics, which are 
s The Commission found only a limited number of situations where steel and aluminium were not good substitutes 
for one another. 
6 Differentiation can be horizontal and/or vertical. Horizontal differentiation concerns variations in the locations of 
suppliers, which may constitute a significant variable of competition when transport costs are high or where local 
aspects are relevant. Vertical differentiation concerns the quality aspects of the product or its physical 
characteristics (See also E. Navarro, A. Font, J. Folguera and J. Briones, Merger Control in the EU, Oxford 
University Press, 2002, at 7.99-7.100). 
In Rexam/ANC the product market definition dealt with issues of vertical differentiation, while certain aspects 
of horizontal differentiation were examined by the Commission in the geographic market definition, which is 
examined below. 
7 Para. 41. 
8 Para. 36 of the Notice. 
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between the non-price factors examined in market definition, may not be in 
themselves sufficient criteria in cases where consumers' responses to price changes 
are affected by other considerations also9. Conversely, differences in product 
characteristics are not in themselves sufficient to exclude demand substitutability, 
since this will depend to a large extent on how customers value different 
characteristics' 0. Moreover, from an economic-theory perspective, in the absence of a 
"marked gap between itself and its closest substitutes", all products with the same 
end-uses compete to some degree" and thus all have some constraining power. 
Another problem raised by economic theory concerns cases where multiple 
imperfect substitutes exist. If examined in isolation, such products have limited 
constraining effect, but if combined, that effect may be considerable. In such cases the 
use of cross-elasticity of demand, the basic analytical tool for calculating substitution 
between differentiated products, cannot be very useful, because it indicates the 
relationship of only two products and can show the existence of sufficient substitution 
only if the products are very close substitutes, which is not the case with imperfect 
substitutes12. Moreover, cross-elasticities of demand can be misleading when there is 
significant differentiation between an array of products13. In such cases many 
products that are interchangeable will not have a high degree of cross-elasticity of 
demand with each other. 
Further, supply substitution is often difficult to quantify because, due to the 
differentiation, it is difficult to determine from where supply response will come. For 
instance, in the market of beverage cans, where aluminium and steel cans, as the 
closest rivals, constitute the relevant product market, a merger between two firms 
controlling the dominant share in the production of these two products will give rise 
to anticompetitive effects in the relevant market, since competition between 
aluminium and steel will be eclipsed. Thus, hypothesising that the remaining 
aluminium and steel-can manufacturers are unable to sufficiently respond to an 
anticompetitive price increase and that high entry barriers exist in the beverage-can 
market, competition authorities will have to block the merger. However, this may not 
be the case if suppliers of more distant rival products, such as PET bottles, which 
I Ibid. Para 36. 
10 Ibid. 
See Joan Robinson, The Economic Concept of Imperfect Competition, (2nd Ed. ), Macmillan, 1969, at 17. 12 See also James A. Keyte "Market Definition and Differentiated Products: The Need for a Workable Standard" 
63 Antitrust L. J. 1995,697, at 702. 
13 Ibid. 
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were excluded from the relevant product market as imperfect substitutes, move fast to 
close the supply gap, caused by the lower aluminium/steel can output following the 
merger, by repositioning PET "closer" to beverage cans. From a merger control 
perspective, under such conditions, blocking the merger may be a wrong decision 
14. 
The adoption of the SSNIP test, which has become standard tool for market- 
definition purposes in the US and is broadly used also in Europe, addressed some of 
the difficulties. The test takes into account demand and supply substitution between 
more products and can, thus, deal with the issue of imperfect substitutes. It also helps 
to deal with issues of price discrimination at the stage of market definition. However, 
for applying the SSNIP test, estimates of multiple cross-price demand elasticities are 
required15 and this entails, though more limited, the abovementioned risks. Moreover, 
the selection of the appropriate price-increase level and time period for the test 
requires assessment of the specific market conditions, for which complex judgments 
using practical evidence are required 16. There are also markets where a small price 
increase of e. g. 10% can be unprofitable but a larger increase of e. g. 20% can be 
profitable'7. If the 10% level is used, then competition authorities will have to expand 
the relevant market to include the next best substitute. Thus, the finally defined 
market will be broad enough not to capture the market power of a firm capable of 
increasing its prices by 20%. Such a problem is more likely to arise in differentiated 
products where differentiation enables firms to exercise some degree of market power 
over their products. Furthermore, the application of the test, by using a predetermined 
price increase and starting with the basic product and its very closest substitutes, often 
results in the definition of relatively narrow product markets, which do not 
14 See also Simon Baker and Andrea Coscelli "The Role of Market Shares in Differentiated Product Markets" 20 
E. C. L. Rev. 1999,412, at 417-418. 
15 The test includes cross-elasticities and residual demand elasticities calculations. Cross-price elasticities are 
significant for determining the next best substitute product, while residual demand elasticities indicate if the price 
increase is profitable (see Joseph J. Simons and Michael Williams "The Renaissance of Market Definition" 
Antitrust Bull., 1993,799, at 825; also Gregory Werden "Demand Elasticities in Antitrust Analysis" 66 Antitrust 
L. J., 1998,363; Pietro Crocioni "The Hypothetical Monopoly Test: What it Can and Cannot Tell You" 23 
E. C. L. Rev.. 2002,354, at 355). 
16 See also George B. Shepherd, Helen S. Shepherd and William G. Shepherd "Sharper Focus: Merger Shares in 
the Merger Guidelines" Antitrust Bull. 2000,835, at 867. For the practical problems associated with the 
application of the SSNIP test in the US see Ky P Ewing Jr Competition Rules for the 21' Century: Principles from 
America's Experience, Kluwer, 2003, p. 188-190. 
17 This could happen when the largest fraction of firm's customers is relatively non-sensitive to price increases. In 
such a case a small price increase could be defeated by the switch of the minority of price-sensitive ("marginal") 
customers to other substitutes, but a larger increase might be large enough not to be defeated by the switch of all of 
the price-sensitive customers and an insubstantial part of non-sensitive customers. Thus, the large price increase 
could be profitable (see also James Langenfeld and Wenqing Li "Critical Loss Analysis in Evaluating Mergers" 
Antitrust Bull. 2001,299, at 309-311). 
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incorporate all possible substitutes, but only the closest ones18. In such cases the 
potential exercise of market power may be overstated. Lastly, the SSNIP test focuses 
largely on price competition and thus fails to consider other variables, such as product 
attributes'9. A merger, though, could potentially lead merging parties to supra- 
competitive profits also by reducing the quality and the cost of the product through 
appropriately varying its attributes without increasing prices20. Such attribute 
variation would be less visible to consumers in differentiated-product markets in 
which, due to the differentiation, there are already in existence differences in 
attributes. Thus, SSNIP by focusing on price competition fails to effectively deal with 
cases as the above. 
Economists have developed certain new tools, such as critical loss and critical 
elasticity of demand, which without solving all the problems help to render the 
application of the SSNIP test more reliable21. However, and despite the undeniable 
utility of the SSNIP test in market definition22, it might be more appropriate, 
particularly in differentiated products the results of the application of this test to be 
compared with the results of other tests and methods used in market definition as well 
as with market evidence. 
The problem of drawing the outer boundaries of the relevant product market in 
differentiated products has led some economists in the US to question even the need 
18 See James Keyte op. cit. 12, at 700; also Malcolm B. Coate and A. E. Rodriguez "Pitfalls in Merger Analysis: The 
Dirty Dozen" 30 N. M. L. Rev. 2000,227, at 237. 
19 See also Raymond S. Hartman "Price-Performance Competition and the Merger Guidelines" 18 Reulnd. Org. 
2001,53, at 62; also Crocioni op. cit. 15 at 362; cf Bishop and Walker who argue that non-price elements such as 
the product quality, physical characteristics and intended use are taken into account in the application of the SSNIP 
test. (Simon Bishop and Mike Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application and 
Measurement, Sweet & Maxwell, 2002, at 4.09). 
20 From para. 8 of the Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers it could be inferred that the 
Commission's policy is to deal also with mergers, which, apart from increasing prices, result also in reduced 
output, choice or quality of goods and services, diminished innovation or otherwise influence parameters of 
competition. 
21 The former test was proposed by Harris and Simons (see Barry C. Harris and Joseph J. Simons "Focusing 
Market Definition: How Much Substitution is Enough? " 12 Res. L. & Econ., 1989,207) and it estimates the amount 
of lost sales that would make a price increase unprofitable and then asks whether such a price increase would lead 
to such a loss of sales. Critical loss analysis has certain advantages, such as relative simplicity in application, and it 
is very useful in the evaluation of relatively large price increases. However, it is not without problems (for a 
review and critique on the method see Kenneth L. Danger and H. E. Frech III "Critical Thinking about `Critical 
Loss' in Antitrust" Antitrust Bull. 2001,299; also Langenfeld and Li op. cit. 16). 
As regards the critical elasticity of demand analysis, it usually compares an estimate of the elasticity of demand 
to the "critical" elasticity of demand needed to make a price increase profitable. In relation to the critical loss 
analysis critical elasticity of demand has some similarities in application, but it generally requires more 
information and is more complicated (see Langenfeld and Li op. cit. 16, at 309 and Gregory Werden "Demand 
Elasticities in Antitrust Analysis" 66 Antitrust L. J. 1998,363, at 387-391). 
22 For an assessment of the utility of the SSNIP test in the context of EC competition law see Alison Jones and 
Brenda Sufrin, EC Competition Law. Text, Cases and Materials, (2nd Ed. ), Oxford University Press, 2004, at 53-62; 
for a general assessment of the application of the SSNIP test in the US, where it was imported in merger control in 
1982, see Gregory Werden "The 1982 Merger Guidelines and the Ascent of Hypothetical Monopoly Paradigm" 
available at www. usdoi. nov/atr/hmercer. htm#papers 
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of market definition in such cases23. This, however, means that the calculation of 
market shares and concentration, which is based on market definition, is not needed 
either. Those economists argue that structural analysis based on market shares and 
concentration is problematic when differentiated products are involved because it 
entirely ignores the differences between those products24. Moreover, structural 
analysis often assumes that the only effective competitors are those firms that fall 
within the market boundaries, whilst those who have been excluded, have negligible 
impact on the suppliers being in the market25. Such a distinction, they argue, would 
misrepresent competition in differentiated products markets, where all products, 
regardless "in" or "out" of the relevant market, compete to some degree against each 
other26. Opponents of structural analysis also submit27 that under a pure market-share 
approach the firm's ability to exercise market power over its competitors and 
consumers is proportional to its market share, which they say for differentiated 
products does not hold, because the existence of differentiation allows firms with low 
market share to exercise disproportionate market power. This is possible because 
these firms are not significantly constrained by their competitors, or at least not as 
much as when the products are homogeneous. It is therefore suggested by the 
opponents that the focus should be on the possibility of individual price increases (the 
so-called "unilateral effects") rather than on general price increases through co- 
23 According to Keyte op. cit. 12 at 703, the relevant product market finally becomes underinclusive or 
overinclusive. See also infra. 
24 See Jerry A. Hausman and Gregory K. Leonard "Economic Analysis of Differentiated Products Mergers Using 
Real World Data" 5 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1997,321, at 338. Gregory Werden, another economist, argues that even if 
structural analysis defined the relevant product market very broadly taking into account to a large extent the 
differentiation, this would result in small market shares for the firms: "Shares of a very broad market do not 
indicate what really matters- how often consumers of the product(s) of either merging firm view a product of the 
other merging firm as their next-best substitute, and how close other substitutes are in such cases". (See Gregory 
Werden "Simulating The Effects of Differentiated Products Mergers: A Practical Alternative to Structural Merger 
Policy" 5 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1997,363, at 368-369). See also Baker and Coscelli op. cit. 13, at 412. 
25 According to Richard Schmalensee: "The market share approach depends on the implicit assumption that 
'marked gaps in the chain of substitutes' generally occur in convenient places. That is, the approach assumes not 
only that the gaps separating included from excluded products are sufficiently wide that all excluded products may 
be neglected in an analysis of market power, but also that all products within 'the relevant market' defined by 
those gaps are very close substitutes"... "When a sizeable number of differentiated products are involved 'marked 
gaps in the chain of substitutes' will seldom occur in convenient places, and the market share measure of market 
power is not likely to be reliable"... "A low market share does not necessarily establish that market power is 
negligible, for competition may be 'localised': a particular firm or brand may have only a few effective rivals even 
though a large number of generally similar brands are marketed, or firms may have long-term market power by 
virtue of membership in 'strategic groups' protected by 'mobility barriers'. A large share of differentiated products 
provides evidence of substantial market power only if the market definition is not excessively narrow" (See 
Richard Schmalensee "Another Look at Market Power" 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1982,1789, at 1799-1800; also Robinson 
2p. 
cit. 10, at 5,6). o 
See also Simon Baker and Lawrence Wu "Applying the Market Definition Guidelines of the European 
Commission" 19 E. C. L. Rev., 1998,273, at 277; also Schmalensee ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
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ordinated interaction. As a result, structural analysis, which is oriented mostly against 
risks of market coordination, is not necessary in differentiated products. 
The alternative method proposed by those economists28 is the adoption of 
quantitative merger simulation techniques that allow direct estimate of the 
competitive effects of the mergers. These techniques use various types of available 
data, such as pre-merger market prices and profit margins, to calculate post-merger 
price increases. Also, some require no market definition, which has led to arguments 
that the latter is needless29. In substance, the simulation models contain multiple own 
and cross-elasticities' estimates based on real world data. Such data are now more 
available than in the past and many proponents of simulation appear confident to 
effectively remove the obstacles for abandoning market definition identified by 
Richard Posner back in 1976: "[i]t is only because we lack confidence in our ability to 
measure elasticities, or perhaps we do not think of adopting so explicitly an economic 
approach, that we have to define markets 30%9 . 
However, despite the problems and limitations of structural analysis it is 
submitted that it is premature to abandon it in favour of merger simulation because the 
latter is not without problems either. For instance, the reliance on static econometric 
models deprives the technique of the ability to take into sufficient account all market 
dynamics31, while simulation is not particularly useful for issues of collusion32. 
Moreover, sufficient data are still not available for all markets, while the effectiveness 
of the technique has not yet been fully tested33. It, therefore, seems more appropriate 
28 See Gregory J. Werden op. cit. 24; also Carl Shapiro "Mergers with Differentiated Products" Antitrust, 1996,23; 
Jerry Hausman, Gregory Leonard and J. Douglas Zona "Competitive Analysis with differentiated Products" 34 
Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, 1994,159. 
29 See e. g. Werden op. cit. 24, at 384 ("Another possibility is that simulation be deemed to subsume structural 
analysis"); also Hausman op. cit. 24, at 338 ("But once these elasticities are estimated, the price effect of a merger 
can be determined directly and the structural approach of using market shares is totally redundant"). 
30 Richard Posner, Antitrust Law, An Economic Perspective" University of Chicago Press, 1976, at 125. 
31 See also James F. Rill "Practicing What they Preach: One Lawyer' s View of Econometric Models in 
Differentiated Products Mergers" 5 Geo. Mason L. Rev., 1997,393, at 401-403, citing also Shapiro op. cit. 28, at 27 
(indicating that the econometric "demand-side" analysis "invariably will lead to the inter-firm prediction that 
prices will rise after the merger, if indeed (the merging brands) compete with each other" and that product 
repositioning, entry, and synergies are crucial considerations against which the predicted price increase must be 
tested"); also Ben Dubow, David Elliott and Eric Morrison "Unilateral Effects and Merger Simulation Models" 25 
E. C. L. Rev. 2004,114). Lastly, according to Werden et al. "... the reliability of any particular application of merger 
simulation should be gauged by examining the modelling process, which is at least as much art as science. To 
make the myriad choices required, the modellers draw on prior belief as well as the available data, so any 
predictions from a model derive from a complex combination of beliefs qualitative evidence and data" (Gregory J. 
Werden, Luke M. Froeb and David T. Scheffman "A Daubert Discipline for Merger Simulation" Antitrust 
Summer, 2004,89, at 89). 
32 See also Bishop and Walker op cit. 19, at 10.31-10.33. 
37 See also James F. Rill op. cit. 31, at 401; also Timothy Muris "Economics and Antitrust" 5 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 
1997,303, at 311. 
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for now to consider merger simulation as an additional tool of structural analysis and 
not as an alternative to the latte? 4. 
However, it should be also noted that in the EU the Commission would face legal 
problems if it attempted to abandon market definition and thus structural analysis 
because the ECJ has ruled that market definition is essential for the competitive 
assessment35. 
In the context of structural analysis, the EU approach to market definition appears 
flexible, since the Commission does not follow the strict methodology of the US 
guidelines, which relies on the vigorous application of the SSNIP test. The 
Commission, instead, considers SSNIP as one method for defining markets and makes 
extensive use also of other methods, qualitative ones, such as functional 
interchangeability and product characteristics36. Results of merger simulation and 
other econometrics have also been examined in certain cases37. Moreover, the 
Commission follows an open approach to empirical evidence and has not established 
a rigid hierarchy of different sources of information or types of evidence38. 
Concerning differentiated products, such a policy could potentially enable the 
Commission to use all available sources of information to make effective market 
definition39 in these difficult cases. Regarding consumer products, in particular, the 
Commission in order to disclose consumer perceptions and preferences has often 
made use of consumer studies carried out by firms in the market or by interest groups 
and organisations and has also looked to consumption patterns and the way goods are 
34 See Rill and Muris ibid.; also according to Epstein and Rubinfeld the use of merger simulation techniques can in 
certain circumstances justify "renewed reliance on market shares as a pragmatic benchmark to assess competition" 
and that "market shares can be highly informative when combined with well-grounded economic principles". Roy 
J. Epstein and Daniel L. Rubinfeld "Merger Simulation: A Simplified Approach with New Applications" 69 
Antitrust L. J., 2002,883, at 912. 
35 Case 6/72 Europemballage Corp. and Continental Can Co Inc. v. Commission [1973] ECR 215 [1973] CMLR 
199 para. 32. See also in the analysis of the Commission's policy about market definition in Chapter 3. 
36 Even if the Notice on the relevant market in paragraph 36 considers functional interchangeability and product 
characteristics in themselves insufficient for defining markets it seems that the Commission uses them quite often 
particularly when it reviews mergers, which are cleared because they do not give rise to anticompetitive effects 
(see also C. J. Cook and C. S. Kerse, E. C. Merger Control (3d Ed. ) Sweet & Maxwell, 2000, at 5.3.2). 
37 Very recent cases where the results of merger simulation were examined in detail by the Commission were 
Oracle/Peoplesoft (Case COMP/M. 3216, Decision of 26 October 2004) Philip Morris/Papastratos (Case 
COMP/M. 3191, Decision of 2 October 2003), Volvo/Scania (Case COMP/M. 1672, Decision of 15 March 2000). 
In GE/Instrumentarium (Case IV/M. 3083 GE/Instrumentarium (Decision of 2 September 2003) the Commission 
conducted econometrics analysis on the likely impact of the merger on prices, while it also made extended 
reference to other relevant econometrics studies. 
According to a view, merger simulation can be also useful in the quantification of efficiency arguments (see 
Liam Colley "From 'Defence' to 'Attack'? Quantifying Efficiency Arguments in Mergers" 25 E. C. L. Rev. 2004, 
342) 
38 See para. 25 of the Notice. 
39 That is, market definition reflective of the competitive constraints as prescribed in paragraph 2 of the Notice on 
the relevant market. 
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displayed at the retail level40. Moreover, quantitative techniques, such as price 
elasticity, cross-elasticity of demand, and price correlation have also been used41. 
Many economists and competition lawyers42 have exerted pressure on the 
Commission to make more use of rigorous economic methods when defining markets. 
Regarding differentiated-product markets, it seems that the use of quantitative 
evidence, when sufficient market data are available, is necessary for determining the 
level of substitution between the products in question. However, qualitative 
assessments are also required in such cases and therefore a combination of the two 
may be the most appropriate solution. 
7.2.2 The relevant product market definition in Rexam/ANC 
The three stages of the Commission's definition will be examined separately: 
a. Cans versus plastic and glass bottles: issues and comments 
The Commission, as explained above, applied the SSNIP test and found that 
buyers (bottlers/fillers) would not shift away from cans towards PET and glass in 
response to a small but significant and not transitory price increase in cans. It also 
cited buyers' views that non-price factors played a crucial role in any decision to shift 
and not a price-increase in the cans43. 
The Commission's decision was in line with previous case-law, namely its 
decision in VIAG/Continental Can44. In the latter case, where similar conclusions had 
been reached, several factors45 affecting demand substitution had been examined: 
a. the specific beverage packaged: for beer virtually only glass and cans are accepted, 
while for carbonated soft drinks glass, plastic and cans are used; 
40 About these issues see also Belamy & Child, European Community Law of Competition, (P. M. Roth QC Ed. ), 
5'h Ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2002, at 6.107; also Navarro et al., op. cit. 6, at 5.49-5.55. 
4° See also Navarro et al., op. cit. 6, at 5.62-5.83. 
42 See e. g. Roger J. Van den Bergh "Modern Industrial Organisation versus Old-Fashioned Competition Law" 17 
E. C. L. Rev., 1996,75; Baker and Wu op. cit. 25; Baker and Coscelli op. cit. 13; Thomas Kauper "The Problem of 
Market Definition Under EC Competition Law" 20 Fordham Intl LJ. 1997,1682; Peter D. Camesasca and Roger 
J. Van den Bergh "Achilles Uncovered: Revisiting the European Commission' s 1997 Market Definition Notice" 
Antitrust Bull. 2002,143. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Case IV/M. 081 VIAG/Continental Can, decision of 6 June 1991. 
45 Ibid. para. 12. 
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b. Consumer preferences: within each beverage sector the shares of the differentiated 
packaging materials remain relatively stable, which seems to reflect preferences of 
consumers based on perceptions of taste, convenience and possibly other factors that 
change only in the medium or long term; 
c. Price differences: prices of the various packaging materials vary considerably 
indicating different product markets; 
d. Competition in the downstream market of filled products: the different drinks are 
not perfectly substitutable meaning that the impact of downstream competition on the 
packaging market depends in the short term on the cost share of the packaging 
product in the sales price of the final filled product; the cost share is generally small 
indicating that price changes in the packaging products will not cause significant 
changes in the price of filled products and thus there will be no significant switch by 
fillers from one packaging product to another; therefore there exists a relative price 
independence between the different packaging products and changes in the material 
depend on demand trends in the market including environmental aspects, such as the 
pressure against one-way packaging 
e. Filling equipment: except from tinplate and aluminium cans which can be filled 
with the same machines, each packaging material requires specific filling machinery. 
In VIAG/Continental Can the Commission had also examined supply- 
substitutability46 and had found that the use of different raw materials created 
different market structures for the suppliers of glass, plastic and metal packaging 
products, because the manufacturing technologies and equipment used differed 
substantially, thus making any switch from the production of one packaging product 
to another technically impossible. An exception was established only for tinplate 
(steel) and aluminium can, which use the same manufacturing technology and 
equipment. 
In looking at the Commission's analysis in Rexam/ANC this thesis will first focus 
on the application of the SSNIP test. The Commission did not explain which 
benchmark price and price-increase range it used in the test. This makes difficult the 
assessment of the Commission's argument that changes in can prices would not cause 
buyers' shift towards PET and glass. However, the market situation might have 
46 Ibid. para. 13. 
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indicated that SSNIP alone was not a very sufficient tool for defining the product 
market in this case. 
In more detail, the Commission's investigation about the geographic market of 
beverage cans found that can prices in the UK were 40% higher than in the rest 
Northern Europe47, while within Europe there were several distinct geographic 
markets for cans due to the existence amongst others of transportation costs48. In 
particular, transportation costs amounted to 5% of the can price for a distance up to 
500km and 10% for up to or above 1000km49. These findings indicated the existence 
of what is called "localised" competition5° between can manufacturers in some areas, 
which gives rise to certain questions about the application of the SSNIP test by the 
Commission. Was the test applied separately to each European country or at least to 
each distinct geographic markets' taking into account local prices? Or did the 
Commission use an average European price as the benchmark price for the test? And 
what price-increase rate was used? Further, if competition between can manufacturers 
was localised, this might mean that competition in certain local markets involved also 
PET and/or glass and not only can manufacturers. The examples of Germany and UK 
could be illustrative in this respect. 
In Germany, the biggest European market, cans generally face strong competition 
by glass and PET. In 2001, cans' share in the beer market was in Berlin 44%, whilst 
in Bavaria only 20%52. Glass is the prevalent material in Germany because it has the 
major advantage that it can be refilled. Environmental factors play a significant role in 
German consumers' choices and this allows glass to dominate the market. Also, in 
1999, a leading German tinplate (steel) producer Rasseistein Hoesch GmbH published 
a study53 about new can designs. The study took into account views by 22 breweries 
and producers of non-alcoholic beverages. Half of these breweries and 4 non- 
alcoholic beverage producers stated that they were keen on experimenting with the 
design of cans if it would not make production costs to go up by more than 5%. The 
47 See para. 19 of the decision. 
48 See the analysis of geographic market infra. 
49 See para. 20 of the decision. 
50 "Markets with localised competition are characterised by consumer diversity either through differences in 
consumer tastes for product attributes or differences in consumers' geographic locations" (See David T. Levy and 
James D. Reitzes "The Importance of Localised Competition in the 1992 Merger Guidelines: How Closely Do 
Merging Firms Compete? " 62 Antitrust L. J., 1994,695, at 698). 
51 As will be shown below, the geographic market for cans in Europe was regional and in certain cases national. 
SZ Source: Can Makers UK. 
53 See Christian Kohl "German Drink Makers Favour New Can Designs" American Metal Market, August 12, 
1999. 
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head of marketing department of Rasseistein Hoesch acknowledged that it was 
competition between materials that pushed the creativity of producers and that without 
pressure by PET bottles they would have never come up with new can designS54. The 
above market information shows that in Germany cans are facing strong competition 
by glass and PET. 
In the UK, another major European market, the situation is different. Apart from 
the can-price differential with Germany, the allocation of market shares between cans, 
glass and PET in the beer market is also different. In 2001 cans controlled a 68% 
market share followed by glass with 24% and PET, which entered into the beer 
_ market only in 1999, with 8%55 
Further, the presence of PET is even more significant in all European markets in 
the market segment of single-serve beverage packaging where many market analysts 
agree56 that the product gains market shares at the expense of glass and cans. 
According to ANC57, plastic bottles have attributes, such as resealability, clarity and 
shapability, which make them competitive against cans in the single-serve market. 
The fact that the market share of cans in many European countries is relatively 
unchanged or even increasing is because cans gain market share against PET in the 
market segment of multipacks where cans compete with big PET bottles. However, 
the single-serve market is relevant with the analysis in Rexam/ANC and in this market 
PET seems to exercise considerable constraining power on cans. 
The above references show some of the difficulties in applying the SSNIP in 
markets where different conditions and prices exist. But even if the price increase for 
cans proposed by SSNIP were profitable, would this be sufficient evidence for 
excluding PET and glass from the relevant product market? 
S° Ibid. 
53 Source: Can Makers UK 
56 Single-serve market, concerns sale of single products as opposed to multipack markets where cans are sold in 
packs of 4,6,12 or more cans. The general view of market analysts at the time of Rexam/ANC merger was that 
PET was gaining ground in single-serve markets, whilst cans in the multipacks. However, for the future analysts 
expected can and PET to find a stable medium. (See Paul Solman "European Can Take-up Advances" in Financial 
Times Survey: Aluminium 2000; Gillian O'Connor "Packaging: A growing Sector but at Slower Rate" in Financial 
Times Survey: Aluminium 1999; Kohl op. cit. 53; Myra Pinkham "Can Growth Expected Despite inroads by PET" 
American Metal Market, October 27,1999; Bob Regan "Plastic Beer Bottle Takes Aim at Cans" American Metal 
Market, March 30,1999; Bob Regan "ANC Sees Beer Can Comeback" American Metal Market, July 5,1999; 
Phillip Burgert "Cans Feel the Crunch of Slow Beverage Use" American Metal Market, January 26,2000; "Crown 
Cork & Seal Launches First Pasteurisable PET Beer Bottle" PR Newswire, October 15,2001). With regard to the 
UK market in particular, Can Makers UK cite a report by a market analyst that in 2001 PET bottles achieved 
modest market gains in the single-serve market. 
57 See the firm's report dated 28/7/1999 to the US Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), available at 
www. sec. p, ov/Archives/edizar/data/I 084304/0000950137-99-002666 txt 
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According to Herbert Hovenkamp58, the application of the SSNIP test, especially 
the selection of the appropriate price-increase rate, is a question of policy not one of 
economics per se. All depends on how much market power competition authorities 
want to squeeze out of markets given their capabilities and the costs of antitrust 
enforcement. Regarding differentiated products Hovenkamp's view is that "small" 
monopoly profits are "ubiquitous and... even... desirable": "... [M]arkets are 
differentiated because consumers want them that way, and these small monopoly 
profits are often nothing more than the consequences of a firm differentiating itself 
sufficiently from rivals to make its output more attractive to consumers. Likewise, 
firms innovate in order to capture returns above the competitive level and the 
incentive to innovate disappears when firms are permitted to earn only competitive 
returns". Hovenkamp suggests that this is one of the factors to be taken into account 
in the application of the SSNIP test. Thus, applying the above view to beverage cans 
one could say that finding through SSNIP that beverage-can makers are able to extract 
"smallsS9 monopoly profits through supra-competitive price increases in cans might 
not be in itself sufficient to justify the exclusion of PET and glass from the product 
market and that other market factors should also have to be taken into account. 
Regarding the Commission's analysis in VIAG/Continental Can, which offers 
additional information about the relationship between cans, PET and glass, some 
comments should also be made. 
First, the Commission in order to prove that consumer preferences concerning 
these materials were difficult to change argued that the market shares of these 
materials were relatively stable and changed only in the medium and long-term. 
However, compared with the market situation in 1991 when the VIAG/Continental 
Can decision was adopted, the market situation in 2000 when Rexam/ANC was 
reviewed could have been different. 
For instance, in the European market for beer the share of cans rose from 14.4% 
in 199160 to 25% in 200161 at the expense of glass. This meant that beer consumers 
had shifted away from glass towards cans during the 1990s. On the other hand, in the 
late 1990s a new category of can products, the so-called "contoured" cans -fluted 
08 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice, (2"d Ed. )West 
Group, 1999, at 84, citing also Hall "The Relation Between Price and Marginal Cost in US Industry" 96 
J. Pol. Econ., 1988,921, at 940-948,949. 
39 The term "small" obviously is subject to interpretation taking into account the market conditions. 
60 See commission's decision in VIAG/Continental Can at para. 10. 
61 Source: ANC 
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cans, and cans that look like bottles and kegs- appeared in that market. On the issue, a 
market report by packaging machinery producers62, referred to the opinion of a sales 
director for a packaging machinery-maker, who said that the beer industry was 
increasingly being driven by branding and marketing, shapes and contours. The 
introduction of these contoured cans was nothing else than the result of tough 
competition between cans, glass and PET and this could also indicate changing 
consumer preferences in the late 1990s. The Commission in its Rexam/ANC decision 
considered the developments with contoured cans marginal with no significant market 
impact without however providing any evidence in support of its views63. 
However, the views of Coca-Cola, the largest world bottler are also illustrative 
about competition between cans and PET in the soft-drink market. According to a 
firm's executive64 : "... [C]an makers must adapt to developing value-added products, 
which allow for a more flexible approach to size and appearance... Coca-Cola would 
like to introduce contoured cans that emulate the classic Coca-Cola bottle shape but 
the technology has not been developed with aluminium... [The technology] has [been 
developed] with PET, which is why that material has been increasingly important to 
[Coca-Cola] ... Aluminium 
has to give value added by offering such features as the 
ability to re-seal packaging that is now found with PET or it will follow the history of 
steel in the packaging drinks industry"65 . 
Regarding the existence of significant price differences between cans, glass and 
plastic, which in VIAG/Continental Can had been considered as indicating separate 
product markets, the situation in 2000 was as follows. According to the UK Can 
Makers, PET and glass were 53% and 77% more expensive to deliver than cans66. 
However, it has to be mentioned that these big price differentials could be partly 
attributed to the different volumes of beverage included in each packaging material. 
Cans contain 330m1, PET 500ml, while bottle 1000ml of beverage. 
The examination of price differences in product market definition seeks to 
distinguish between products, which may be "functionally substitutable, but in reality 
62 "rhirsty for Profits", Modern Materials Handling, May 2001. 
61 para. 24, footnote 9. 
64 See Phillip Burgert "Coke Exec Advises Can Makers", American Metal Market, Oct. 27,1998. Similar views 
about PET have been recorded in the Commission's market investigation in Tetra/Sidel (Case COMP/M. 2416 
Decision of 20/10/2001 in para. 101). 
65 The canned-drinks industry switched from steel to aluminium two decades ago after steel failed to respond to the 
needs of bottlers. 
66 Source: www. canmakers. co. uk 
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are not interchangeable"67 . Price 
differentials, even if commonly68 used by the 
Commission as indicators of separate markets, may not always be reliable especially 
when they reflect differences in quality. In such cases, it has been suggested that 
consumers may be able to make a trade-off between price and quality69. In any case, 
the examination of price differences in Rexam/ANC would have produced safer 
conclusions if it had been accompanied by parallel examination of price correlation70. 
Regarding switching costs of buyers between can and PET or glass, which were 
also mentioned in VIAG/Continental Can, it could be said that even if such switching 
costs really existed, this might not in itself exclude the possibility of switch between 
the packaging materials in the future. As already mentioned, in the Commission's 
decision in Rexam/ANC non-price factors affected the selection between the 
packaging solutions and, thus, one could say that if these factors indicated the need to 
switch from cans to, for instance, PET, then switching costs might not be a problem. 
On this issue a market report citing the views of market experts71 states that bottling- 
line upgrades today most often involve plastic containers. Fillers/bottlers shift from 
the cans to PET because single-serve soft drinks in PET bottles offer higher profit 
margins than those in cans. This report along with other information from the market 
mentioned above seem to strengthen the argument that PET and glass exercise 
constraining power over cans. 
As regards supply-substitution, the Commission in VIAG/Continental Can had 
found that there were in existence significant switching costs between cans, PET and 
glass and that therefore these products were in distinct markets. This view was 
implicitly confirmed in Rexam/ANC, where the application of SSNIP definitely took 
into account the reaction of suppliers in response to the imposition of a small but 
significant and non-transitory price-increase in cans. On the issue, therefore those 
mentioned above about the SSNIP test also hold. 
67 Christopher Jones and F. Enrique Gonzalez-Diaz, The EEC Merger Regulation, Sweet and Maxwell, 1992, at 
112. 
68 E. g. in Torras/Sarrio (Case IV/M. 166 [1992], 4 CMLR 341) one factor relied upon in putting coated and 
uncoated paper in different market was that coated paper prices were roughly 15% higher. Also in Nestle/Perrier 
(Case IV/M. 190 [1992] OJ L356/1, [1993] CMLR M17) price differences was one of the factors that played role 
for the inclusion of bottled source waters and soft drinks in separate product markets. See also Navarro et al. 
op. cit. 6, at 5.79-5.83. 
6 See Bishop and Walker, op. cit. 19 at 4.51. Areeda et at go further by arguing that products "can be near-perfect 
substitutes even when their prices or qualities differ" (Phillip E. Areeda et al., IIA Antitrust Law: An Analysis of 
Antitrust Principles and Their Applications, 1995,562c). 
70 See also Kauper op. cit. 42, at 1738. Price correlation method is also examined infra. 
71 See "Thirsty for Profits", Modern Materials Handling, May 2001. 
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In sum, the Commission's market definition in Rexam/ANC was based on the 
SSNIP test, which indicated the existence of a distinct product market for beverage 
cans. From its previous decision in VIAG/Continental Can, more evidence could be 
used to support this view, such as switching costs, consumer preferences and supply 
substitution. On the other hand, various market reports and other evidence, cited by 
this thesis, indicated that PET and glass competed vigorously against cans particularly 
in the single-serve market in which the former products had certain advantages, such 
as resealability and shapeability, and that therefore these products exercised 
constraining power over cans. The presence of such constraining power could be seen 
in the pressure on cans for the introduction of new shapes and contours and in the 
market-shares gains by PET in the single-serve market, while pressure on prices could 
not be excluded72. The Commission obviously considered the pressure from PET and 
glass as marginal and therefore did not include them in the relevant market. However, 
excluding PET and glass meant that some factors constraining the ability of the 
merged entity to exercise market power in the can market would be completely 
ignored in the competitive assessment of the merger thus overstating the market 
power of the merging frms73. 
A potentially more appropriate approach might have been a decision similar to 
that adopted by the Commission in Tetra-Laval/Side174 one year after the Rexam/ANC 
decision. In Tetra-Laval/Sidel the Commission's investigation found that carton and 
PET packaging systems were fiercely competing for market shares in the liquid food 
market but, nevertheless, the level of substitution between the two systems was not 
high enough to justify their inclusion in the same product market, a possibility which 
however, could not be excluded for the future. Therefore the Commission defined the 
relevant product market as including only the carton packaging systems, but decided 
to examine the constraining influence of PET upon carton at the stage of the 
competitive assessments. 
72 The firms' activity for the introduction of new products has been characterised as "differentiation over time" 
(see Jonathan Baker "Product Differentiation through Space and Time: Some Antitrust Policy Issues, Antitrust 
Bull., 1997,177, at 190). Innovation can also result in the improvement of the quality of existing products or in 
lower production costs, which are also beneficial to consumers. 
77 Valentine Korah has noted: "In order to decide whether a firm enjoys market power, it is necessary to analyse 
the market to see what competitive pressures constrain the ability of the firm to exploit its suppliers, customers or 
consumers... Competitive pressures on market decisions may come from the supply of goods that are not identical, 
even if some customers would not switch" (See Valentine Korah "The Michelin Decision of the Commission" 7 
E. L. Rev., 1982,130, at 130-1. 
74 Case COMP/M. 2416 Tetra/Sidel Decision of 20/10/2001. 
75 Ibid. paras. 162-164. 
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In any case, market definition for merger-control purposes is dependent upon the 
parameters used by competition agencies in the definition. The selection, for instance, 
of a long or short timeframe could have impact on the definition. By way of example, 
Scherer and Ross76 using data from the US market applied three different methods for 
determining if glass bottles and plastic containers (PET) were in the same market for 
merger evaluation purposes: SSNIP test, cross-elasticity of demand, and price 
correlation over time. The conclusions reached were as follows: in the short term and 
taking into account the price-differences between the two products, all methods 
suggested that the two products most likely were in separate and distinct markets. 
Conversely, if technological progress was more rapid for one commodity77 and if a 
relatively long timeframe was adopted, the three methods showed, that the two 
commodities were in the same market. The same conclusion was reached for the case 
where significant fluctuations over time in the supply conditions occurred for at least 
one commodity and were uncorrelated with those of the other commodity78. In 
Rexam/ANC the adoption of a different timeframe than that used by the Commission 
in the application of the SSNIP test might have resulted in different market definitions 
just as Scherer and Ross suggested. However it is difficult to say, which timeframe 
would be more appropriate in this case. 
Further, regarding the Commission's definition in Rexam/ANC a commentator 
should also have to take into account the applicable market test. The dominance test, 
which was applied in this case, relies on high market shares for establishing 
competitive harm and therefore a narrow relevant market would be useful because it 
would produce high market shares. On the other hand, the US SLC test or the new 
SIEC test of the ECMR, which can establish competitive harm also in situations 
beyond dominance and are therefore less reliant on market shares, a broad definition 
in Rexam/ANC would not have been a problem. This partly answers also the question 
raised above on the applicable methodology in market definition. 
Lastly, supposing that merger simulation had been applied in Rexam/ANC the 
situation would have been as follows: The simulation would have sought to estimate 
the price effect of Rexam/ANC merger on can, PET and glass prices using historical 
76 See F. M. Scherer and David Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, (3a Ed. ) Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1990, at 181-184. 
77 The rapid technological progress refers to the more expensive commodity, which in this case was plastic. Such a 
progress can lead to lower costs, and thus prices, for plastic, which in turn will bring it closer to glass. 8 The idea is that supply fluctuations affect product prices, which under certain circumstances can also bring the 
two products closer. 
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price data or other information79. The calculation would have taken into account the 
interaction between cans, PET and glass through the use of multiple own-price and 
cross-price demand elasticities. Thus, having calculated the "precise" price effect of 
the merger, the market definition would have little significance. If the merger had 
been found likely to raise prices, competition authorities would have had to take 
action to eliminate this risk through remedies otherwise they would have had to block 
the merger. 
However, as mentioned above, simulation has its own limitations, which include 
amongst others the reliance of the models on past data for predicting future prices, 
which entails some risks since it does not take into account all market dynamics80 
and/or imperfections81 that could arise out following the merger. Further, issues of 
data availability as well as the product and market parameters used in the model could 
raise additional obstacles for carrying out a reliable simulation82. In any case it is 
submitted that if the application of merger simulation in this case had confirmed the 
Commission's views, this would have been an additional strong argument in favour of 
the latter. Conversely, if the application of the simulation had shown that PET and 
glass sufficiently constrained can price-rises, then the Commission might have had to 
reassess its views, but taking also into account all the other available evidence. 
Merger simulation alone would not have been sufficient to justify the adoption of a 
different approach 83 . 
b. Can sizes 
The Commission's decision to include all can sizes in a single product market and 
exclude only slim cans will not be discussed further because it did not give rise to 
issues that are of interest here. 
79 Issues of merger simulation were discussed above. 
00 See also Rill op. cit. 31. 
81 A list of market imperfections could include amongst others the following situations: 1. Consumers may exhibit 
irrational behaviour, 2. Producers may exhibit irrational behaviour, 3. There may be large uncertainties, which 
interfere with rational and consistent decisions by consumers and/or producers, 4. Lags may occur in the decisions 
and/or actions of consumers or producers, 5. Consumer loyalties may exist, 6. The segmenting of markets may be 
accentuated and exploited, 7. Differences in Access to information, including secrecy, 8. Barriers against new 
competition, 9. Transactions costs and excess capacity may be significant, 10. Internal distortions in information, 
decision-making and incentives may cause x-inefficiency and distorted decisions (see George B. Shepherd, Joanna 
M. Shepherd and William G. Shepherd "Antitrust and Market dominance", Antitrust Bull., 2001,835, at 843-844). 82 See also Rill op. cit. 3I. 
83 As mentioned in the analysis for merger simulation above, it seems that the most appropriate use of merger 
simulation at the moment is as an additional tool of structural analysis rather than as an alternative to the latter (see 
also Epstein and Rubinfeld op. cit. 34). 
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c. Aluminium versus steel cans 
The Commission's decision to include aluminium and steel cans in the same 
product market was based on the following market factors amongst others: a high 
price correlation; almost identical end-users' and consumers' perceptions; a cost 
difference of producing aluminium and steel cans less than 2%84. 
This thesis will focus particularly on price correlation, which is another test 
proposed by economic theory for defining markets. The test is designed to measure 
the correlation of prices between two allegedly substitute products85. The higher the 
degree of correlation, the more likely is these products to be included in the same 
product market86. 
However, even when the prices of two products are perfectly correlated this does 
not mean that these products should necessarily be included in the same market for 
antitrust purposes. This is so because price correlation does not prove the existence of 
constraining influence of the one product on the other. In other words perfect price 
correlation does not indicate the existence of perfect substitutability between the two 
products87. 
However, the absence of any price correlation between two products is an 
indicator that these products are not in the same market88, but competition authorities 
should be cautious because the absence of any price correlation in the past does not 
preclude the existence of such correlation in the future89. In any case, price correlation 
is a useful test whose results should be examined along with the other evidence, and it 
is by no way conclusive about the extent of the market for antitrust purposes. 
84 Commission's decision para. 10. 
8$ See George Stigler and Robert Sherwin "The Extent of the Market" 28 J. L. & Econ., 1985,555; Bishop and 
Walker op. cit. 19, at 11.01-11.45; Joseph J. Simons and Michael A. Williams, "The Renaissance of Market 
Definition" Antitrust Bull., 1993,799, at 851,852. 
86 The method usually involves the estimation of a correlation coefficient of price movements, price changes or the 
length of price changes. The correlation coefficient by definition lies between -1 and +1. When the coefficient is 
+1,100% of the variation of the one product is explained by the variation of the other product. Conversely when 
the coefficient is -1,100% of the variation of the one product is explained by the inverse variation of the other 
product, while when coefficient is 0,0% of the variation of the one product is explained by the variation of the 
other product. See also Stigler and Serwin ibid.; Bishop and Walker ibid. 
a' See also Bishop and Walker ibid.; Simons and Williams, op. cit. 86, at 851-852. 
88 See European Commission's decision in Mannesmann! Vallourec/Ilva (Case No IV/M. 315 [1994] OJ L102/15; 
[1994] 4 CMLR 529, para. 32); also Simons and Williams op. cit. 86, at 852; also Stigler and Serwin op. cit. 86. 
89 Simons and Williams op. cit. 86. 
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The Commission has thus far examined the results of price-correlation tests in 
several merger cases90, but has not taken them into account in its final decision in all 
these cases. 
In Rexam/ANC price correlation analysis concerned the sets aluminium cans/steel 
cans, aluminium cans/aluminium sheet, steel cans/steel sheet91. Aluminium and steel 
sheet are the materials used for the production of the respective cans. The 
Commission examined price correlation for 33c1 and 50cl beverage can in several 
European countries and concluded that there existed a high level of correlation 
between aluminium and steel beverage cans and also between steel cans and steel can 
sheet, while the opposite was true for the third set aluminium can/aluminium can 
sheet. The lack of correlation in the latter set was due to the high volatility of the price 
of aluminium can sheet. The Commission considered that the inability of aluminium 
can suppliers to pass onto buyers increases in aluminium price indicated the existence 
of another product, which was actually competing in the same product market and 
which was having sufficient constraining power. This product was obviously steel, 
which was the closest to aluminium. However, price correlation could not exclude the 
existence of constraining power also by other products, such as PET and glass. 
In support of its price correlation results the Commission stressed that there 
existed only a limited number of situations where steel and aluminium were not good 
substitutes for one another. It also referred as shown to identical end-user's and 
consumers' perceptions. 
The Commission's decision to include aluminium and steel cans in the same 
market was fully reflective of the market realities, according to which there is a long- 
history of tough competition between the two products for market shares92. 
7.2.3 Conclusions about product market definition 
90 By way of example in UPM-Kymmene/Haindl (Case IV/M. 2498, Decision of 21-11-2001) the Commission used 
price correlation results to support its argument that wood-free coated reels (WFC) were not part of the overall 
magazine paper market. In Danish Stefj-Houlberg (Case IV/M. 2662, Decision of 14-2-2002) the parties presented 
price correlation analysis in support of their argument that the geographic market for the purchase of live pigs for 
slaughtering was not national but Northern European (including Denmark, Sweden, Northern Germany and the 
Netherlands). The Commission accepted that the data provided by the parties showed that correlation existed, but it 
stressed that at the same time, major differences occurred. Firstly, it considered that the amount of data was not 
robust for a correlation test. Secondly, that there were in existence big differences in correlation across Member 
States, which were making the analysis impossible to rely on. Case No IV/M. 315 Mannesmann! Vallourec//lva 
(1994] OJ L102/15; [1994] 4 CMLR 529. 
1 Paragraphs 11,12 of the decision. 
92 See also Solman op. cit. 56. 
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This thesis used Rexam/ANC to present and discuss some aspects of the problem 
of market definition when differentiated products are involved. What could be 
inferred as a conclusion from the discussion is that market definition in such cases is 
sensitive to the applicable methodology and therefore different methodologies could 
result in different definitions. Moreover, the applicable market test plays also an 
important role. The Commission's old dominance test was dependent on high market 
shares and therefore the Commission's relatively narrow definition in Rexam/ANC 
was explicable. However, the new substantive test of the Merger Regulation, which 
captures also situations of non-collusive oligopolies does not require high market 
share levels for finding competitive harm and thus the role of structural analysis based 
on market shares is inevitably weakened. This means that the need for narrow product 
markets will be reduced. The new test is better positioned against the competitive 
conditions arising from mergers involving differentiated products, where the market is 
broad but the existence of differentiation allows the exercise of unilateral market 
power. 
Regarding the Commission's methodologies in Rexam/ANC the application of 
the vigorous SSNIP test was a strong point in the Commission's definition. However, 
the use of SSNIP alone might not have been the most appropriate approach to the 
market definition in this case, since the test examines product substitution in response 
to price rises, whilst competition between cans, PET and glass, as the Commission 
itself found, was affected by non-price factors. For this reason it was submitted that 
along with the SSNIP test the Commission should have taken into account also non- 
price factors in its analysis. However, the Commission's decision referred also to 
previous case-law, namely the Commission's decision in VIAL/Continental Can, in 
which non-price factors had been examined and led to the same conclusion. 
Lastly, the use of econometrics through price-correlation estimates along with 
other market and product factors for including aluminium and steel can in the same 
product market offered credence to the Commission's decision, even if price 
correlation has its own limitations, which do not render it completely sufficient for 
defining markets. 
7.3 The relevant geographic market 
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The Commission, found that the geographic market was regional93 on the basis of 
the demand structure, which had strong regional aspect (flat demand growth in 
Northern Europe, but constantly increasing demand in Southern Europe; customer 
needs, which required relatively close geographic relationship with suppliers); the 
structure of supply (suppliers adapt to the needs of demand) and the existence of trade 
flows between areas also indicated regional markets. These findings were further 
reinforced by the existence of significant transportation costs for long distance 
deliveries (5% of the total beverage can price for a distance up to 500km and about 
10% or more for a distance up to or above 1000km) 
The Commission finally focused on two regional markets where anticompetitive 
effects, as a result of the merger, would arise: that of Southern Europe (Spain, 
Portugal, Italy, Southern France) and that of Northern Europe (Germany, Austria, 
Northern France, Benelux, UK). 
The Commission's decision on the geographic market did not give rise to 
significant issues. The argument that competition in the beverage can market was 
regional in nature seemed justified and this will become clear also from the analysis 
of the competitive effects below. What one could note on the Commission's definition 
is that it was not based on vigorous economic methodologies as the product market 
definition was (SSNIP and price correlation). 
7.4 Duopolistic dominance in the Northern European market of beverage cans. 
The Commission considered that the Rexam/ANC merger would result in a 
duopoly held by the merged entity and Continental Can Europe (CCE), in the 
Northern European market of beverage cans. 
The Commission relied on the following market factors94: 
a. Flat growth trend; 
b. Highly concentrated market (only four competitors ex ante); 
c. Generally homogeneous product in an industry that is not characterised by any high 
level of technical change and thus competition takes place only at the level of price; 
d. Transparent market; 
91 See paras. 14-20 of the decision. 
94 Paras. 23-24 of the decision. 
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e. The prices charged by Rexam, ANC and CCE were relatively similar; 
f. The overcapacity in Northern Europe was equally divided between the merging 
firms and CCE; 
g. Both firms had symmetrical market shares (35%-45% each) in terms of capacity 
and identical cost structures; 
h. The substantial and symmetric overcapacity limited the incentives for deviation and 
helped to maintain high collusive prices; 
i. The existence of spare capacity constituted a credible punishment threat against 
potential mavericks. The only existing competitor beyond the duopolists, Carnaud- 
Metallbox, was capacity-constrained and could not threaten the duopoly. 
j. There were in existence in the market significant entry barriers, which prevented 
any threat to duopoly by new entry 95. 
7.4.1 The doctrine of oligopolistic dominance in EC merger control: some 
observations. 
The Rexam/ANC merger resulted in a reduction in the number of competitors 
from four to three in Northern Europe. Another four-to-three merger was that of 
Airtours/First Choice96, whose review by the Commission resulted in controversy 
about the scope of the latter's collective-dominance doctrine and particularly about 
whether non-collusive oligopolies fall within the scope of that doctrine or not. The 
Airtours/First Choice decision was appealed by the parties to the CFI. The CFI, after 
clarifying the legal criteria for collective dominance and rejecting the Commission's 
analysis for failing to meet these criteria, annulled the latter's decision to prohibit the 
merger. The CFI decision became the main reason for the adoption of a new 
substantive test in the Merger Regulation, which seeks to deal more effectively with 
oligopolies, particularly the non-collusive ones which did not appear to be covered by 
the dominance test. The analysis of Rexam/ANC will therefore be used for discussing 
issues relating to collusive and non-collusive oligopolies -the two types of 
anticompetitive oligopolies- and their treatment in EC merger control. The analysis of 
the market criteria indicating risks of collusion (coordinated interaction) was made in 
detail in previous chapters. In this chapter the focus will be mostly on the legal test 
9S Paras. 27-28 of the decision. 
Case IV/M. 1524 OJ [2000] L93/1, [2000] 5 CMLR 494. 
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and on proving why the Commission's doctrine on oligopolies as applied under the 
dominance test needed reform. The analysis will also explore the changes imposed on 
merger analysis by the new substantive test of the Merger Regulation, which replaced 
the dominance test, as well as on issues of practical application of the new doctrine on 
non-collusive oligopolies. But first, some preliminary comments should be made: 
The CFI decision in Airtours v. Commission97 was particularly important for 
clarifying the legal criteria of establishment of tacit collusion under the concept of 
collective dominance. In particular, the Court set out three legal conditions for 
establishing a collective dominant position. These conditions were based on the 
conventional economic theory of tacit collusion98: 
a. Each oligopoly member must be able to monitor the behaviour of the other 
members, which requires sufficient market transparency; 
b. The situation of tacit coordination must be sustainable over time, which requires the 
existence of adequate retaliation to ensure that the oligopoly members do not deviate 
from the common policy; and 
c. The foreseeable reaction of current and future competitors and consumers must not 
jeopardise the results expected from the common policy. 
The Court's conditions were generally in line with its previous decisions in 
Kali&Salz99 and Gencor1 °°, in which tacit collusion had also been examined. In 
Kali&Salz the ECJ indicated that collective dominance was referring to the ability of 
the undertakings concerned to adopt a common policy on the market1°1, while it left 
the impression that proof of the existence of strong structural links between the 
undertakings was required for meeting the legal standard1°2. In Gencor the CFI went 
further by clarifying that structural links were not required and that the links between 
the firms could be `merely' economic meaning that they could be a consequence of 
the economic conditions holding in the market. As a result, collective dominance 
issues could arise from a merger likely to lead to a market structure conducive to tacit 
97 Case T-342/99 [2002] ECR 11-2585, [2002] 5 CMLR 494. 
98 Para. 62 of the decision. 
Cases C-68/94 and 30/95 France v. Commission [1998] ECR 1-1375, [1998] 4 CMLR 829. 
10° Case T-102/96 Gencor v. Commission [1999] ECR 11-753, [1999] 4 CMLR 971. 
101 Para. 221 of the Decision. However the Court in this case repeating its previous rulings in cases under Article 
82, particularly in "Italian Flatglass" (Joint Cases T-68,77 and 78/89 Societa Italiana Vetro Spi v. Commission [1 
992] ECR 11-1403 at [358], [1992] 5 CMLR 302) and in "Almelo" (Case C-393/92 Almelo v. NV Energebedof 
Ivsselimij [1994] ECR 1-1477 at [42]. 
102 See D. G. Goyder, EC Competition Law (4th Ed. ), 2003, at 366; All Nikpay and Fred Houwen "Tour de Force or 
a Little Local Turbulence? A Heretical View on the Airtours Judgment" 24 E. C. L. Rev. 2003,193, at 197. 
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coordination'03 . The 
decision in Airtours, by clarifying the relevant market criteria for 
establishing collective dominance, also confirmed this Gencor ruling. As a result, a 
basic contribution of the Airtours to the issue of collective dominance was that it 
synthesised existing case-law by making clear that tacit coordination constituted the 
essence of the collective dominance concept under the Merger Regulation and by 
setting out the relevant legal criteria of proof °. 
Further, the Court rejected the Commission's competition analysis of collective 
dominance in Airtours/First Choice 105 , which appeared to have been 
based not on 
tacit coordination but on unilateral behaviour by oligopolists, the so-called "non- 
collusive oligopoly". Central points of concern included the Commission's reference 
to individual actions by oligopolists rather than to tacit coordination and the fact that 
the Commission seemed to argue that a punishment mechanism was not necessary for 
collective dominance. 106 Although other views suggested that this case was not about 
non-collusive oligopoly and that tacit collusion instead had been the issue for the 
Commission 107, the Court's rejection of the Commission's analysis and its references 
only to tacit collusion, were seen as a denial of the possibility cases of non-collusive 
oligopolies falling within the scope of the collective-dominance doctrine of the 
Merger Regulation'08 . As a result, even 
if the issue of the treatment of non-collusive 
oligopolies in the context of EC merger control has never been directly debated in the 
Court, the decision in Airtours showed that there was a need this issue to be clarified. 
The Commission's initiative to amend the substantive test of Merger Regulation in 
order to remove the uncertainty and solve the problem was therefore something which 
had to be expected109. The new significant-impediment-to-effective-competition 
(SIEC) test without abandoning the dominance concept paves the way for the 
103 See also Richard Whish, Competition Law, (5's Ed. ) Butterworths, 2003, at 536. 
104 See also ibid. at 540; also Nikpay and Houwen op. cit. 102, at 198. 
'os Case IV/M. 1524 OJ [2000] L93/1, [2000] 5 CMLR 494. 
106 see also Whish op. cit. 103, at 536-538. According to Massimo Motta the Commission's analysis in this case 
extended the use of the collective dominance concept to capture a situation being closer to unilateral effects (non- 
collusive oligopoly) rather than coordinated effects (see Massimo Motta "EC Merger Policy and the Airtours 
Case" 21 E. C. L. Rev. 2000,199, at 207). 
107 See Peder Christensen and Valerie Rabassa "The Airtours Decision: Is There a New Approach to Collective 
Dominance? " 22 E. C. L. Rev. 2001,227, at 237; also Nikpay and Houwen op. cit. 103, at 202. 
108 According to Whish op. cit. 103, at 537, the CFI's decision indicated that the concept of collective dominance 
could not be stretched so far as to include non-collusive oligopolies. Similarly Motta op. cit. 106, at 207, stressed 
that the fact that Merger Regulation did not cover unilateral effects rendered the Commission's decision in 
Airtours, by relying on the concept of collective dominance, controversial. See also Sven B. Volker "Mind the 
Gap: Unilateral Effects Analysis Arrives in EC Merger Control" 25 E. C. L. Rev. 2004,395,408. 
109 This is clearly visible in the New Merger Regulation where in Recital 25 of the Preamble it is stated that 
"interests of legal certainty" required making clear that the Merger Regulation covers also "anticompetitive 
effects... resulted from the non-coordinated behaviour of undertakings which would not have a dominant position 
on the market concerned". 
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examination in the context of merger control also of non-collusive oligopolies, which 
are situations harmful to competition without giving rise to dominant positions I 10. 
The views of this thesis about the developments in the law are as follows: 
First, it is submitted that the Commission's initiative to adopt a new substantive 
test must be applauded not so much because the new test removes a legal uncertainty 
but because it makes clear that all cases of competitive harm arising from mergers are 
covered by the Merger Regulation and, thus, that no anticompetitive merger will 
escape scrutiny. It is submitted that since the ultimate objective of EC merger control 
is the protection of consumer welfare through the maintenance of effective 
competition in the Community"", the Commission should be given clear authority to 
deal with all types of anticompetitive effects arising from mergers. 
In this sense it is of only secondary importance whether the legal construct for 
achieving the objective of the protection of consumer welfare would be the 
dominance test, the SIEC, the SLC or any other test. It is well known that these legal 
constructs do not reflect any specific economic theories but only set the legal 
standards against which mergers are assessed. Thus, legislature and courts are always 
in position to expand or narrow the scope of these constructs by shifting the legal 
standards, so as to accommodate more or fewer categories of competitive effects 
112. it 
is therefore not so important that the Commission had to change the substantive test of 
Merger Regulation in order to include in the scope of the latter non-collusive 
oligopolies, which were not clearly covered by the dominance test, even if the 
interests of legal certainty, which were proposed as the basic reason for the change, 
could not be ignored. 
Further, economic theories on unilateral effects clearly suggest that in certain 
oligopolistic markets with low risk of tacit collusion firms are nevertheless capable of 
harming consumers by unilaterally raising prices above the competitive level' 13. Thus, 
effective merger control requires including also these cases within its scope. 
Second, it is submitted that the dominance test as applied by the Commission had 
insufficiently narrow scope even if Competition Commissioner Monti had once 
argued that that test, properly interpreted, was capable of dealing with the full range 
110 See Ibid. 
On this issue see also in the first chapter where the basic objectives of EU merger control are presented and 
analysed. 
112 See also in the chapter of the thesis dealing with the US decision about SGA market where comparisons 
between the dominance and the US SLC test are made. 
113 About unilateral effects see also below in the analysis of beverage can market. 
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of anticompetitive scenarios arising from mergers 114. In particular, the practical 
application of the test by the Commission seemed to raise barriers, which prevented 
substantive control not only of non-collusive oligopolies but potentially also of certain 
types of collusive oligopolies. The latter conclusion could be inferred from the fact 
that the concept of collective dominance has traditionally been applied to 
duopolies115. 
The exclusion of non-collusive and potentially of certain types of collusive 
oligopolies is not, however, surprising if it is taken into account that the standard of 
proof of competitive harm under the collective-dominance concept is high and 
therefore does not cover all types of oligopolies. In particular, according to the 
traditional interpretation of collective dominance by the Commission, the concept 
applies to cases where the merger results in a situation of tacit collusion between two 
(and rarely more than two) firms holding dominant market shares 116. However, 
proving tacit collusion is often a hard task, because the existence of monitoring and 
punishment mechanisms has to be shown"7, while the requirement of dominant 
market shares seems to exclude situations of tacit collusion involving also firms with 
"4 Mario Monti "Merger Control in the European Union: a Radical Reform', Speech in the IBA Conference on 
European Merger Control, Brussels, November 7,2002. 
115 The Commission has examined oligopolistic markets involving more than two firms in several cases (e. g. Case 
IV/M. 484 Krupp/Thyssen/Riva/Falck/Tadfin/AST [1995] OJ L251/18 (duopoly or five-firm oligopoly in cold- 
rolled stainless steel flat products); Case IV/M. 942 Veba/Degussa [1998] OJ L201/102 (three-firm oligopoly in 
diamines/polyamines). A rare case where the Commission considered collective dominance of between three and 
five players was Exxon/Mobil (Case IV/M. 1383, (1999) 5 CMLR 959) concerning the market of motor fuel 
retailing. In that case the Commission imposed conditions for clearing the merger. Also the Time Warner/EMI 
merger (Case IV/M. 1852) was abandoned after the Commission raised concerns about the establishment of 
coordinated effects in the market post-merger. The merger would reduce the number of competitors from 5 to 4. 
The Commission's hesitance in establishing collective dominance in situations involving broad oligopolies can 
be seen in its decision in Price Waterhouse/Coopers & Lybrand (Case IV/M. 1524 [1999] 4 CMLR 665) where the 
Commission stated: "From a general viewpoint, collective dominance involving more than three of four suppliers 
is unlikely simply because of the complexity of the interrelationships involved and the consequent temptation to 
deviate; such a situation is unstable and untenable in the long term". 
116 According to Navarro et al, op. cit. 6, at 7.58, prior to the Airtours/First Choice the Commission's prohibitions 
on grounds of collective dominance were referring to duopolies and their common feature was that the merged 
entity and a third firm had a joint market share of more than 50%-60% of the relevant market and the rest of the 
suppliers in that market had significantly lower market shares. 
11 See also Motta op. cit. 106, at 199. One recent Commission decision, which demonstrated the difficulties often 
associated with proving the existence of collusion mechanisms, was SONY/BMG (Case COMP/M. 3333, Decision 
of 19/7/2004). In that case the Commission found that the merger would reduce the number of major players in 
music industry from 5 to 4, while an analysis of a large amount of price data and third-party submissions in the 
recorded music markets of the different EEA countries indicated a relatively close price parallelism for CDs 
released by the five majors in some countries as well as certain features that could facilitate tacit collusion. 
However, and despite these finding, the Commission refrained from establishing collective dominance because it 
found that the level of transparency in the market was not sufficient to facilitate successful coordination. 
These problems of proof are according to a view also a basic reason behind the Commission's traditional 
preference to duopolies for establishinh collective dominance since it is easier to prove the existence of collusion 
mechanicms by two firms instead of three or more (see "The Airtours Judgment: A Welcome Lecture on 
Oligopolies, Economics and Joint Dominance" 10 Colum. J. Eur. L. 2004,105,115). 
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low or asymmetric market shares118 or situations of unilateral effects where the 
unilateral exercise of market power is possible without the existence of dominant 
market shares or monitoring and punishment mechanismsti9. 
The excluded cases, however, concern situations of competitive harm well- 
established in economic theory. The traditional Commission's unwillingness to 
effectively include them into the scope of merger control meant that the 
Commission's obligation to protect effective competition and consumers in the 
Community from harmful corporate reorganisations may not have been fully fulfilled. 
Third, the inclusion of non-collusive oligopolies in the scope of the market test of 
the ECMR was therefore a necessary step for closing an existing gap in the 
application of merger control, while the broadening of the scope of the substantive 
test of the ECMR will remove also certain inflexibilities in the application of the 
Commission's doctrine on tacit collusion 120. 
Lastly, the fact that the Commission's intervention in mergers will be increased 
after these developments should not in the thesis's view be seen as a hostile move 
118 The case of SGA market could be used as an example. As shown in chapters 4 and 5 Alcoa/Reynolds was a 
merger reducing the number of large competitors to five, while the market concentrated a number of factors 
indicating increased risk of collusion. Also, in that market the distribution of market shares between the 
oligopolists was uneven: there was one large firm, Alcoa, with market share above 40%, and four other firms with 
market share less than 12% each. For this market as shown the Commission focused only on single-firm 
dominance, while the US decision emphasised also the risk of collusion. 
In general, there has been thus far no case where the Commission established collective dominance on the 
basis of tacit collusion by four or five firms even if, as the case of SGA showed, economic theory has proved that 
the formation of such a collusive oligopoly is feasible and sensible (see also Navarro et al. op. cit. 6, at 7.62.7.63). 
119 The broadly-used example of unilateral effects is that of a merger which creates the second largest player in a 
market, which does not exhibit high level of concentration or other features that would facilitate the establishment 
of tacit collusion risk. 
One such case was that of Heinz/Beech-Nut (Case FTC v. H. J. Heinz Co., 246 F. 3d 708 D. C. Cir. 2001) in the 
US. The merger involved the number two and three producers of baby food and created the second largest firm 
behind Gerber the clear leader with 65% market share. A similar merger in Europe would not have been 
considered under the single-dominance test, while the possibility would have been only for collective dominance if 
the relevant market criteria had been met. 
120 Even if the Commission in its market investigations examines all types of oligopolies regardless of the number 
of the participating firms, this does not alter the thesis's view that the Commission's policy, which focuses mostly 
on duopolies, is insufficient. This is so because from a competition perspective the situation between a duopoly 
and a collusive oligopoly by, let us say, five firms is completely different: 
If the source of collusion lies only on the relationship between the duopolists, all that competition authorities 
have to do to restore competition is to sever ties between the two firms, mostly through divestitures, which intend 
to harm symmetry between them. If, on the other hand, collusion is possible for reasons relating, apart from the 
duopolists, also to the remaining three competitors, then competition authorities have to take broader measures to 
sever ties between all five firms even if the three of them have low market share. 
The Commission's preference, through duopolies, only to the market leaders is based on the idea that 
asymmetries in market shares between large and small firms undermines the stability of an oligopoly involving 
both large and small firms (see also Navarro et al. op. cit. 6, at 7.140) On the other hand, the existence of symmetry 
in market shares between the two leading firms makes collusion between these firms easier. This theory, as will be 
explained below, is valid, but, on the other hand, symmetrical oligopolies do not cover only cases with 
symmetrical market shares but also other factors, such as symmetrical costs and/or prices, and in this sense smaller 
firms could also be involved. 
For these reasons it is submitted that the Commission should consider cases involving oligopolies with open 
mind, without adherence to mechanistic policies, and having always in mind that its ultimate target is the 
protection of effective competition and consumers. 
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against mergers because it is motivated by the need to more effectively protect 
competition, which is in no way incompatible with merger activity. Besides, even 
under the new test, the EC merger control in terms of scope will still be generally in 
line with the merger-control regimes in other jurisdictions, particularly in the US 
where situations such as non-collusive oligopolies and all cases of tacit collusion are 
explicitly covered. 
7.4.2 Duopolistic dominance in Rexam/ANC 
The Commission's analysis in Rexam/ANC focused only on the creation of 
duopoly by the merged entity and CCE in the market of Northern Europe and 
excluded from the collusive oligopoly Carnaud-Metalbox, the only competitor 
remaining in the market apart from the duopolists. This thesis will show that it can be 
argued that Carnaud-Metalbox could have also been included in the collusive 
oligopoly and that, therefore, the Commission's decision was not fully appropriate. 
The thesis will also use the beverage can market to analyse in the next section of this 
chapter, the application of the new non-collusive-oligopoly doctrine and discuss its 
utility for EC merger control. 
For establishing collective dominance (duopoly) by the merged entity and CCE 
the Commission relied on the checklist of market factors normally used in such cases. 
For beverage cans these factors included, flat growth trend, homogeneous product, 
transparent market, symmetrical market shares, identical costs and prices, sufficient 
overcapacity for retaliation purposes, and inability by competitors outside the 
oligopoly to effectively challenge the duopolists. 
The Commission's analysis was not very detailed but nevertheless established the 
main conditions of tacit collusion, which were later confirmed by the CFI in 
Airtours121. In particular, the analysis proved the existence of sufficient market 
transparency to safeguard monitoring between the duopolists; the existence of a 
credible punishment mechanism (overcapacity equally shared between the 
duopolists), which safeguarded the sustainability of the duopoly; and the inability of 
the existing competitor, Camaud-Metalbox, and potential new entrants to threaten the 
duopolists. 
121 See in the previous section. 
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Regarding Carnaud-Metalbox, the Commission considered that the firm was not a 
source of competition to the duopoly because of its capacity constraints 122. However, 
the Commission's argument could not preclude the possibility that Carnaud-Metalbox 
could also become member of the collusive oligopoly. It is submitted that there was 
available market evidence supporting the inclusion of Carnaud-Metalbox in the 
oligopoly. 
In more detail, capacity constraints reduce retaliation capabilities, thus 
discouraging collusion but, on the other hand it has been proved that such constraints 
also limit deviation incentives thus helping the stability of the oligopoly' 23. In this 
context, capacity-constrained Carnaud-Metalbox, being unable to increase its sales 
through deviation, would have good reasons to seek the highest possible prices for its 
existing sales. Higher prices would be easier achieved through coordination with the 
duopolists rather than through unilateral action, particularly, since the duopolists by 
controlling considerable overcapacity would cancel any attempt by Carnaud-Metalbox 
to raise prices. 
In the duopolists' side, they would control post-merger a combined market share 
of approximately 80%, which along with their considerable overcapacity would 
enable them to act independently from Carnaud-Metalbox and to discipline each 
other. However, the duopolists, it is submitted, would not have good reason to 
compete aggressively against Carnaud-Metalbox because starting a price war to 
reduce the latter's market share or to force it to the exit would be very costly for the 
duopolists: the decrease in prices would squeeze their margins on the large market 
share they already possessed 124. Moreover, the results could be poor because Carnaud- 
Metalbox was not a weak firm, since it was controlled by the US Crown Cork&Seal, 
which, like Rexam/ANC, was one of the top can manufacturers in the world and was 
"ZZ See para. 24 of the decision. 
123 See also Marc Ivaldi, Bruno Jullien, Patrick Rey, Paul Seabright and Jean Tirole "The Economics of Tacit 
Collusion" Final Report for DG Competition, European Commission, 2003, at 41; Olivier Compte, Frederic Jenny 
and Patrick Rey "Capacity Constraints, Mergers and Collusion" 46 European Economic Review, 2002,1, at 2; 
Europe Economics "Study on Assessment Criteria for Distinguishing Between Competitive and Dominant 
Oligopolies in Merger Control" Final Report for the European Commission Enterprise Directorate General, May 
2001, at 34. 
124 Massimo Motta examines a similar market situation where a firm holding 70% of the market competes against 
a firm with 30%. He concludes that the large firm would have little interest to deviate for the same reasons. He 
further shows that the large firm would also be less keen on punishing after a deviation by the small firm, because 
again the loss from squeezed profits in the existing sales, would exceed the profits caused by the regained market 
shares after the punishment was successful. According to Motta, the small firm could exploit this opportunity for 
successfully deviating, thus capturing additional market share. (See Massimo Motta "Economic Analysis and EC 
Merger Policy" EU! Working Papers, 2000,1, at 21). However, concerning Camaud, such a strategy could not be 
successful because the firm was capacity constrained. 
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competing against the merging firms also in the US market 
125. Thus, Carnaud- 
Metalbox was capable of defending its market position. However, since the firm was 
capacity-constrained, it could not pose significant threat to the duopolists either and 
therefore it would be reasonable to believe that some form of consensus could be 
reached between the three firms. 
Further, symmetry, a factor generally facilitating collusion 126, concerns not only 
symmetry in market shares but also in areas such as costs and prices 
127, while, 
conversely, asymmetry in market shares is not in itself incompatible with tacit 
collusion 128. Thus, the existence of symmetry in market shares in terms of capacities 
and overcapacities between Rexam/ANC and CCE but not between these two firms 
and Carnaud-Metalbox, did not necessarily prove that the latter could not become a 
member of the oligopoly. 
Regarding symmetry in costs and prices, the Commission's analysis stressed that 
Rexam, ANC, and CCE pre-merger were selling cans at relatively similar prices, 
which along with similarities in capacity and capacity utilisation and the fact that 
these firms were profit maximisers, indicated also the existence of symmetrical 
costs129. However, Carnaud-Metalbox could have also been in the same situation as 
the other three firms. According to the thesis's investigation 
130, the typical operating 
margins in the consumer packaging industry, whose part is beverage can production, 
are generally within the range 8%-11% with a high level of sustainability. Also 
market reports collected by the thesis131 consider a single production cost for beverage 
cans meaning that there are no major cost differences between the producers, while 
the annual reports of Crown Cork&Seal132, the parent company of Carnaud-Metalbox, 
"ZS Crown Cork & Seal, Rexam/ANC and Ball, are the largest world players in beverage can market. 
'26 Case T-102/96, Gencor v. Commission [1999] ECR 11-753, para. 222. 
"' See also Massimo Motta op. cit. 124, at 21; Bishop and Walker op. cit. 19, at paras 7.41,7.42. The Commission' s 
Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers in para. 48 clearly state that symmetry between firms refers to 
factors, such as cost structures, market shares, capacity levels, and vertical integration. 
128 See the European Commission's decision in Exxon/Mobil decision (Case IV/M. 2383, Decision of 3.2.1999, 
para. 477); Ivaldi et al. op. cit. 123, at 15. 
The Commission, despite its often reliance on symmetrical market shares for establishing tacit collusion, has 
itself also recognised that this factor is not always so important (see OECD Report "Oligopoly of 19-Oct-1999, at 
218, where the Commission states: "... market shares do not need to be completely symmetric in order for 
oligopolistic dominance to take place. It is quite conceivable that a merger will lead to one or more oligopolists 
being stronger than the other members in the oligopoly. In some situations there will even be a leader of the 
oligopoly. The important issue in the assessment of the symmetry of market shares is whether the market shares 
indicate a sufficient degree of similarity in incentives and retaliation possibilities"). 
129 Para. 24 of the decision. 
130 See the Annual Report of Rexam for the fiscal year 2000, at page 42, available at www. rexam. com 
131 See e. g. the report of Can Makers UK where production costs of cans and PET are compared (available at 
http //www canmakers. co. uk/industrv/direct product reliability asp) 
132 The annual reports of the firm are available at www. crowncork. com 
283 
indicate that the firm's operating margins in Europe are nearly identical to those of 
Rexam. Lastly, according to the Commission, the industry does not demonstrate any 
high level of technological change meaning that all the firms use more or less the 
same technology and there are no cost differences on such grounds. All the above 
evidence indicate that symmetry in costs and prices existed not only between the 
duopolists, but also between the latter and Carnaud-Metalbox, which reinforces the 
potential of collusion post-merger by all three firms. 
On the issue of symmetry, the examination of efficiencies would also offer useful 
evidence because efficiencies can either increase or reduce symmetry between firms. 
For instance, if the efficiencies produced by the merger lead to lower costs and larger 
capacity thus giving to the merged entity cost advantages against its competitors, then 
the merging entity may have more interest in deviating from the collusive oligopoly 
than in following it'33. On the other hand, efficiencies may also lead to more 
symmetrical costs between the merging firm and its competitors and in this case the 
risk of collusion increases'34. 
In Rexam/ANC, the Commission did not refer to the efficiencies likely to be 
produced by the merger. However, as will be shown below, the merger was not 
expected to create significant efficiencies in Europe and therefore the symmetrical 
conditions between the merged entity and its competitors would not be harmed for 
this reason. 
Further, the Commission's analysis referred to the existence of sufficient 
transparency in the market to safeguard effective monitoring. In particular, the 
Commission said that all four firms pre-merger were taking part in several tens of 
tenders under which the majority of cans were sold 135. The contracts signed under 
these tenders were usually for a period of one year. According to the Commission, the 
frequency and regularity of the bids, coupled with the feedback that suppliers received 
from tendering customers, enhanced market transparency, because can manufacturers 
became aware of the winner of the bid, the proposed price, the identity of the 
purchaser and the quantities involved in the tender 136. However, Carnaud-Metalbox 
was also one of the firms taking part in the tenders and therefore it is reasonable to 
133 See also Bishop and Walker op. cit. 19, at paras. 7.49-7.50; also Motta op. cit. 125, at 22. This is also confirmed by 
the Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers in para. 82. 
114 See also Motta ibid. 
13s Para. 24. 
136 Ibid. 
284 
assume that the firm could be involved also in the process of exchanging information 
and monitoring. Thus, market transparency was facilitating the inclusion of Carnaud- 
Metalbox in the collusive oligopoly. 
Further, the level of concentration in the beverage can market would be 
significantly increased post-merger since the number of competitors would be reduced 
from four to three 137. Even if, according to the Commission's decision-making 
practice, there is no presumption of illegality based solely on market shares or 
concentration of supply 
138, these factors can nevertheless become important if 
combined with other market features indicating also collusion risks. Economic theory 
has well established that a highly concentrated market enhances interdependence 
between the firms thus making coordination easier139. Thus, the high concentration 
levels post-merger in the beverage-can market indicated high collusion risk, which 
also involved Carnaud-Metalbox. 
Lastly, another important detail, further strengthening the potential of tacit 
collusion involving all firms, is that beverage cans are not just homogeneous but also 
standardised products concerning their physical characteristics140 and potentially 
prices. Standardisation reduces the dimensions of competition between products 
141 
thus increasing product homogeneity and market transparency 142. 
About prices particularly, one form of their standardisation is through the adoption 
of identical pricing formulas by suppliers'43 or at least when suppliers have common 
knowledge of all the variables in the formulas. For instance, when firms have similar 
or identical costs all pricing formulas could have the form "cost plus a percentage" 
137 This impact of the merger on concentration will be analysed in more details in the analysis of non-collusive 
oligopoly below. 
138 See also Navarro et al. op. cit. 6, at 7.49. 
139 See also Europe-Economics op. cit. 123, at 21-22; Ivaldi et al. op. cit. 123, at 12-14. 
140 See ANC's SEC report op. cft. 57. 
141 Other areas of standardisation include the trade terms, freight formula etc. 
142 See also Europe-Economics op. cit. 123, at p. 43; Donald Clark "Price-Fixing Without Collusion: An Antitrust 
Analysis of Facilitating Practices after Ethyl Corp. " Wi. L. R.., 1983,887, at 935-936. According to Phillip Areeda 
product standardisation "might deprive some consumers of a desired product, eliminate quality competition, 
exclude rival producers, or facilitate oligopolistic pricing by easing rivals' ability to monitor each other's prices" 
(Phillip Areeda Antitrust Law, 1986, at para. 1503a). 
143 The Commission Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers (para. 47) provide two examples related to 
the establishment of simple pricing rules as a means to facilitate collusion. The first example concerns the 
establishment of a small number of pricing points, thus reducing the coordination problem. The second example is 
having a fixed relationship between certain base prices and a number of other prices such that prices move in 
parallel. 
Nestle/Perrier (Case IV/M. 190 [1992] OJ L365/1; [1993] CMLR M17) is an example of a merger where the 
Commission found that the major suppliers published standardised lists that could be easily compared and also 
implemented "a regular exchange of information on quantities sold each month, broken down by major brands". 
285 
and may differ only to the determination of that percentage, which in case of collusion 
could be determined through an agreement between the 144 . 
Standardisation, though, may have also positive effects upon consumers when, 
for instance, it is used to eliminate hazardous products, thus protecting consumer 
health and safetylas. Moreover, if products are standardised, price may be the only 
area of competition thus forcing suppliers to compete aggressively in that area. 
Consumers, then, could benefit from lower prices 146 . 
Regarding beverage cans, ANC in a document filed with the US Security and 
Exchange Commission147 stated that beverage cans are standardised concerning their 
physical characteristics, while from the other market information provided by that 
document and the Commission's and thesis's investigations, it could be inferred that 
the pricing formula for the product was potentially also standardised, since it was 
relatively easy for all firms to know all its basic parameters. In particular, the largest 
part of can production costs (60%-70%) refers to the raw material, namely aluminium 
and steel sheets148. The prices of steel are relatively stable, while those of aluminium 
are volatile but transparent, since they are determined in the transactions of London 
Metal Exchange. For limiting their exposure to the raw material all can producers 
include in the can contracts terms for price adjustments in accordance with the prices 
of the raw material 149. Given that the profit margins of all firms are as shown 
relatively similar, it is reasonable to believe that the terms for price adjustments in the 
contracts with their customers are also relatively similar'50. In addition, production 
costs are also identical, since there are no technological differences between firms. 
Lastly, the fact that all firms take part in several tenders annually and that the prices 
offered there, are relatively similar as the Commission's analysis showed, makes even 
stronger the argument that sellers know exactly all the variables of the pricing formula 
used in these tenders. 
141 See also Clark op. cit. 142. 
141 According to Herbert Hovenkamp, op. cit. 58, at p. 231 "[b]oth standard setting and rule making are generally in 
the best interest of consumers because they substantially reduce information costs, and therefore consumer search 
costs... The providers of certain products or services are experts and often are in a better position than anyone else 
to evaluate the quality of a competitor' s product". 




150 If the firms had offered significantly different terms, with respect to the price of the raw material, in the can 
contracts this would have affected their profitability in comparison with their competitors. Some would have 
achieved lower profits and some higher ones. 
286 
As a result, product standardisation in this case could be used to facilitate 
collusion between beverage can suppliers including Carnaud-Metalbox rather than to 
benefit consumers. 
7.4.3 Conclusions 
The CFI in Airtours required the Commission to show that the concentration 
would have the "direct and immediate" effect151 of creating or strengthening a 
collective dominant position by means of a significant and lasting impediment to 
effective competition in the common market. In other words the Commission must 
show a significant alteration to competition otherwise the merger must be 
approved 1S2. The Court required also the production of "convincing evidence" by the 
Commission153. 
In Rexam/ANC the substantial alteration to competition, which led to the 
establishment of the duopoly, was, according to the Commission, the creation of 
symmetry in market shares and overcapacity between the merged entity and CCE in 
the market of Northern Europe. This symmetry along with some other features 
existing in the market, such as transparency, product homogeneity, identical costs and 
prices, flat growth-trends and barriers to entry filled the list of convincing evidence 
used by the Commission in support of its decision. 
The discussion of the Commission's oligopoly doctrine above, considered the 
question of the inclusion also of Carnaud-Metalbox in the collusive oligopoly. The 
conclusion reached from the analysis is that such an inclusion would not have been 
unreasonable, since it was supported by market conditions. 
If Carnaud-Metalbox had been included, the substantial alteration of competition, 
as a result of the merger, would not have been the creation of symmetry but instead 
the reduction in the number of firms from four to three, which taking into account the 
favourable market conditions would significantly enhance the potential for collusion. 
The Commission Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers consider that the 
154 reduction in the number of firms may, in itself, be a factor facilitating collusion. 
151 Case T-342/99 Airtours v. Commission [2002] ECR II-2585, [2002] 5 CMLR 494, para. 58, citing also Case T- 
102/96 Gencor v Commission [1999] ECR 11-753, para. 94. 
152 Airtours v. Commission ibid. para. 58, citing also Case T-2/93 Air France v Commission [1994] ECR 11-323, 
aras. 78-79, and Gencor v Commission, ibid. paras. 170,180 and 193. ý53 
Airtours v. Commission ibid. at para. 63. 
1S4 Para. 42. 
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The issue has practical importance since it concerns also the decision on the 
remedies. The thesis will therefore revisit it by using as an additional analytical tool 
the theories on mavericks and by considering it in the context of the discussion of the 
remedies later in this chapter. 
7.5 Non-collusive-oligopoly consideration and the beverage can market 
7.5.1. Some comments on the Commission's new policy concerning non-collusive 
oligopolies 
Beverage cans, as an oligopolistic market 1S5, offers a good opportunity to discuss 
the new doctrine on non-collusive oligopolies of the European Commission and issues 
of its practical application. 
The new doctrine was presented by the Commission in its Guidelines on the 
appraisal of horizontal mergers, where non-collusive oligopolies along with the 
traditional concept of single-firm dominance were included in the section dealing with 
non-coordinated effects 156. In this section the Guidelines refer to certain market 
factors, which may indicate the existence of non-coordinated effects, without making 
specific reference to non-collusive oligopolies. However, in the relevant provisions, 
one could identify elements particularly relevant with the analysis of non-collusive 
oligopolies. 
In particular, in paragraph 25, situations of non-collusive oligopolies are 
described as follows: 
"... mergers in oligopolistic markets involving the elimination of important competitive constraints that 
the merging parties previously exerted upon each other together with a reduction of competitive 
pressure on the remaining competitors may, even where there is little likelihood of coordination 
between the members of the oligopoly, also result in a significant impediment to competition". 
All mergers meeting these criteria will be declared incompatible with the 
common market. 
Further, paragraphs 28-30 under the title "Merging firms are close competitors" 
refer to situations involving differentiated products. Regarding these products, the 
exercise of unilateral market power through higher prices is generally more likely to 
occur when the products supplied by the merging firms are closer substitutes with 
iss The Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers in footnote 29 define an oligopolistic market as a 
market structure with a limited number of sizeable firms. 
I" Paras 24-38 of the Guidelines. 
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each other than with the products of rivals. According to the Guidelines'57, the higher 
the degree of substitutability between the merging firms' products, the more likely is 
that the merging firms will raise prices significantly1S8. As for rivals, they are more 
likely to constrain the merging firms when they produce close substitutes to the 
products of the merging firms than when they offer less close substitutes 159. 
Therefore the Commission in cases involving differentiated products will seek to 
evaluate the level of substitutability between the products of the merging firms as well 
as between the products of these firms and their competitors in order to find out 
whether the merger is compatible with the common market160. 
In this context, the fact that rivalry between the parties has been an important 
source of competition in the market may be a central factor in this analysis 161. The 
existence of high pre-merger margins may also make significant price increases more 
likely162. The Commission will also take into account the possibility of repositioning 
or product-line extension by competitors or the merging firms, which could 
potentially influence the incentives of the merging firms to raise prices 163. 
Depending upon availability of adequate market data, the degree of 
substitutability will be evaluated through customer preference surveys, analysis of 
purchasing patterns, estimation of the cross-price elasticities of the products involved 
or diversion ratios164. 
The evaluation of how close the merging firms compete may be facilitated by an 
examination of the concentration levels in the market. Concentration generally is not 
considered as providing reliable evidence in cases involving differentiated products 
because it does not take into account the level of substitutability between the products 
and therefore could mislead. However, the presence of high concentration in the 
151 Para. 28. 
158 This is so because the competitive pressure that the two products were exerted upon each other prior to the 
merger does not exist any more. For a formal presentation of the relevant market models see M. Ivaldi, B. Jullien, 
P. Rey, P. Seabright, J. Tirole "The Economics of Unilateral Effects", Interim Report for DG Competition of the 
European Commission, IDEI, Toulouse, March 2003, at 27-61. 
1S9 Para. 28 of the Guidelines. 
160 Ibid. 
161 The Guidelines by way of example (para. 28) refer to situations where the merging firms were offering pre- 
merger products, which were considered by substantial part of consumers as their first and second choices. In these 
cases the merger could generate significant price increase. 
162 Para. 28 of the Guidelines. 
163 Para. 30 of the Guidelines. 
160 Para. 29 of the Guidelines. 
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market could potentially indicate that the firms compete close enough to increase 
prices 165. 
The Commission Guidelines do not directly relate the evaluation of 
substitutability between differentiated products with the level of concentration in the 
market but this can, nevertheless, be clearly inferred from other sections of the 
Guidelines where market shares and concentration are established as providing useful 
first indications of the market structure and the competitive importance of both the 
merging firms and their competitors and therefore are examined in all merger cases166. 
The Guidelines establish also concentration thresholds, which could be associated 
with the identification of competitive concerns and these thresholds are also relevant 
to the evaluation of substitutability between differentiated products 167. 
Also, regarding market shares, the Commission's practice for establishing single- 
firm dominance requires a market share of at least 40% and possibly 50% for the 
merged entity and it has also to be the market leader168. The non-collusive-oligopoly 
concept can now justify the establishment of unilateral market power for firms 
holding a market share below 40%, while the concept does not require the merging 
firm to be the market leader169. The lower market-share threshold for establishing 
anticompetitive effects according to the Guidelines is 25%, which however, does not 
apply to oligopolies 170. 
Lastly, another market scenario found in the Guidelines and which can be 
particularly relevant in cases involving non-collusive oligopolies is when the merger 
'6s See also Roscoe B. Starek III and Stephen Stockum "What Makes Mergers Anticompetitive? 'Unilateral 
Effects' Analysis under the 1992 Merger Guidelines" 63 Antitrust L. J. 1995,801, at 815-819. 
'" For more details about the Commission's use of market shares and concentration see in section III (paras. 14-21) 
of the Guidelines. 
167 The concentration levels established by the Guidelines were examined in details in previous chapter. 
See para. 17 of the Guidelines. 
This could be inferred from a combined interpretation of paras. l7-18 of the Guidelines. In particular, in para. 17 
it is stated that the Commission has in several cases considered mergers resulting in firms holding market shares 
between 4O% and 50% and in some cases below 40%, to lead to the creation or the strengthening of a dominant 
position. In para. 18 it is stated that there is an indication of compatibility for mergers which result in a combined 
market share for the undertakings concerned that does not exceed 25%. From the above provisions and taking into 
account the Commission's past practice, one could infer that mergers resulting in a combined market share of 
between 25% and 40% and which do not create a market leader could in appropriate circumstances also be 
declared incompatible with the common market. Such situations in the past were not dealt with under the 
dominance test mostly because the market shares of the parties were not reaching 40% or because the merger did 
not create a market leader. The basis for prohibition under the new policy cases can be seen paragraph 25 of the 
guidelines where it is stated that "... mergers in oligopolistic markets involving the elimination of important 
competitive constraints that the merging parties previously exerted upon each other together with a reduction of 
competitive pressure on the remaining competitors may, even where there is little likelihood of coordination 
between the members of the oligopoly, also result in a significant impediment to competition". In other words the 
requirement of high market shares that existed under the dominance test does not exist any more, since the focus 
now is on significant impediment to competition which is in principle unrelated to the market shares of the parties. 170 See in footnote 24 of the Guidelines. 
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eliminates an important competitive force, namely a firm, which is capable of 
influencing the competitive process more than its market share or similar measure 
would suggest'71. In such cases the merger will be considered by the Commission as 
anticompetitive and this will happen particularly when the market is already 
concentrated. 
In general, and apart from the above-described situations, the Commission's 
declared intention in the market test of the Merger Regulation is to capture all 
anticompetitive mergers and, in this context, it should be expected that all market 
scenarios giving rise to non-collusive oligopolies be covered by the non-coordinated 
effects doctrine of EU merger control. 
Another important point is that although the concepts of non-collusive and 
collusive oligopoly are distinct and mutually exclusive 172, one should not exclude that 
a merger could result in either of these effects173 or result in both of these effects 
occurring subsequently17A. Thus, competition authorities in mergers involving 
oligopolies will have to examine both scenarios and potentially end up with a decision 
establishing both unilateral and coordinated effects'75. 
The issue however is also related to the substantive test of merger control and its 
scope. In the US where the focus of the SLC test is on the reduction to competition as 
a result of the merger competition authorities can come up with a decision 
establishing both unilateral (non-collusive oligopoly) and coordinated effects (tacit 
collusion)176, as possible reasons for the reduction in competition. Conversely, in 
'" See in paras. 37-38 of the Guidelines. 
'n A non-collusive oligopoly refers to the overall detrimental welfare effects resulting from the individual changes 
or adjustments in prices and output that occur in the market following a merger in an oligopolistic market. A 
collusive oligopoly refers to a reduction in welfare caused when a merger enable a collusive equilibrium to emerge 
in the market. Also the two types of oligopoly have different equilibrium outcomes (see Europe-Economics 
op. cit. 123, at 49-50,62-63; also Alistair Lindsay, The EC Merger Regulation: Substantive Issues, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2003, at 3.06) 
173 The analysis of mergers looks to future competition developments and therefore it is possible for the market 
situation following the merger to concentrate features for which either of the two theories could apply. For 
instance, when competition authorities know that the merger will result in higher prices but the existing evidence 
indicating tacit collusion, as a source of the higher prices, is not strong enough they could rely on the non-collusive 
oligopoly doctrine for challenging the merger. That doctrine as explained above does not require proof of a 
collusion mechanism and therefore is easier to establish. On the issue, see also Europe Economics ibid. at 62-63. 
" Such a situation could occur, for instance, when the merger eliminates a maverick firm from the market. The 
elimination of the maverick will enable the merging firm, as a first step, to increase prices unilaterally and, as a 
second step, to seek agreement with the remaining competitors in order to achieve even higher profits (see also 
Lindsay op. cit. 172, at 3.07; Europe-Economics ibid. at 63). 
""From a real-market perspective non-collusive oligopolies are more likely to arise in markets where an explicit 
agreement could not be enforced or would create too large a risk of detection by competition authorities (see also 
Hovenkamp, op. cit. 58, at 161). Thus, competition authorities by examining both effects will not depart from 
market realities. 
17' Europe-Economics op. cit. 123, at 101, cite the view of a senior US official, which has justified the establishment 
of both unilateral and coordinated effects in the same case as follows: 
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Europe where the focus under the dominance test was narrower, by looking to the 
establishment of either single-firm or collective dominance, the potential of the 
establishment of both effects was rather impossible177. However, the new European 
SIEC test by looking to significant impediment to competition -a concept which 
involves both unilateral and coordinated effects- seems to allow for the establishment 
of both these effects. 
7.5.2. Non-collusive oligopoly in the beverage can market 
In oligopolistic markets, such as beverage cans, where a small number of sizeable 
firms participate, the behaviour of one firm has an appreciable impact on the overall 
market conditions, and thus on the situation of each of the other firms178. Thus, any 
merger in such a market by altering the behaviour of the merged entity influences also 
the behaviour of its competitors, which are forced to adjust to the new market reality. 
Competition authorities analysing non-collusive oligopolies, should therefore 
evaluate not only the impact of the merger on the behaviour of the merged entity, but 
also the extent of which the remaining competitors could be expected to react to the 
modification of the merged entity's expected actions 179. 
In this context, competition authorities should first look to the type of competition 
in the market. This is particularly important for assessing the ability of the merged 
entity to raise prices unilaterally and the ability of competitors to constrain that firm. 
When the market involves differentiated products competition refers to prices180 
and in such cases it often occurs that the prices are strategic complements where an 
increase in the price of one good will typically lead competing firms to increase their 
own prices though probably to a lesser extent. When a merger occurs in such a 
"We intended to argue that (a) there is a reasonable likelihood that the planned merger will create consumer harm, 
(b) we cannot predict with complete certainty/confidence how that harm will be manifested, and (c) given the 
structure and prevailing conditions in the industry, there is a risk of either a worsening of (independent) oligopoly 
pricing or tacit/explicit collusion. Either eventuality would be detrimental to consumers. This `pleading in the 
alternative' is not all that unusual, particularly in the context of predicting whether the merged firm will exercise 
its market power through price or quality effects (or other non-price discrimination)". 
"' See also Europe-Economics ibid. at 63. 
178 See also footnote 29 of the Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers. 
179 See also Ivaldi et al. op. cit. 158, at 7. 
ISO Differentiated products are imperfect substitutes, which means that the market price of each product will 
depend on the amount of the imperfect substitutes produced by other producers. This is so because a price-increase 
in one of these products could lead some buyers to switch to substitutes thus reducing or even eliminating the 
impact of the price rise. The level of substitutability between product will determine therefore their prices. This is 
in accordance with the Betrand model of oligopolistic interaction. For more details about price competition in 
differentiated products see Ivaldi et al. ibid. at 28-42. 
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market, it causes increases in the merged entity's prices, which in turn causes positive 
response from the other firms thereby further encouraging the merged entity to raise 
its own prices. Thus, the strategic complementarity of prices in differentiated-product 
markets could lead post-merger to higher equilibrium prices in the oligopoly. 
On the other hand, when the market involves homogeneous products competition 
refers to quantities181. The quantities of the competing firms are often strategic 
substitutes by means that a reduction in output by one firm typically leads competing 
firms to expand their own output, although not to the extent of fully compensating the 
initial output reduction. Thus, the merged entity in homogenous-product markets is 
discouraged from reducing output because such a reduction could trigger an opposite 
response from the other firms. A merger between homogeneous-product firms could 
therefore become unprofitable in the absence of significant efficiency gains. 
Beverage cans are standardised products, which enhances homogeneity and 
therefore the market scenario about homogeneous products could apply. This 
scenario, as shown above, indicates that mergers between firms selling homogeneous 
products may fail to raise prices post-merger high enough due to the reaction of 
competitors 182. However, the prices will finally increase, thus reducing consumer 
welfare. 
To understand why prices will finally increase, it is necessary to see in more 
details the reaction of competitors. In oligopolistic markets, due to the 
interdependence between the oligopolists183, an output reduction and the associated 
price increase by one of them will force some demand for its products to switch to 
competitors. These competitors, if they do not increase their supply to satisfy their 
new demand, will see the prices of their products also to increase, thus realising 
higher margins in their sales and thus extra profits184. On the other hand, if they 
18I This is so particularly in industries where production capacity is relatively fixed in the short-term or where there 
are no substitutes for the product. In such cases the level of available capacity and production will determine 
prices. This is in accordance with the Cournot model of oligopolistic interaction. See also Ivaldi et al. ibid. at 42- 
55. 
182 The fact that the merger will finally manage to raise prices is not incompatible with the fact that the merger may 
end up being unprofitable, which was mentioned above. 
The economic theory using the Cournot model for homogeneous products has proved that the response by 
competitors will always only partly offset the reduction in output by the merged entity, and thus higher prices will 
finally occur in the market. However, in respect of the merged firm, the price increase will not be high enough to 
justify the costs from the reduction in output (see also Europe Economics op. cit. 123, at 53). 
83 An oligopolistic market refers to a market structure with a limited number of sizeable firms. Because the 
behaviour of one firm has an appreciable impact on the overall market conditions, and thus indirectly on the 
situation of each of the other firms, oligopolistic firms are interdependent. (See footnote 29 of the Guidelines on 
the assessment of horizontal mergers). 
1B4 See also Ivaldi et. al. op. cit. 158, at 46. 
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increase their supplies to sufficient level to meet the whole new demand the prices of 
their products will remain unchanged but they will have realised extra profits from the 
additional sales they will have made. In this case, however, the profit margins could 
be lower 185. 
The choice therefore that competitors face is between high margin/low sales and 
low margin/high sales' 86. The result of this trade-off is that almost always the final 
reaction of competitors will generate both higher prices and higher sales for their 
products. This will happen because competitors will finally choose to supply more 
products but not to a level sufficient to offset the reduction in output by the merged 
firm187. Thus, apart from higher sales, the prices of their products will also increase 
since a fraction of the demand will remain unsatisfied. 
Taking also into account the counter-reaction by the merged entity and further 
responses by the competitors the final market equilibrium in an oligopoly involving 
homogeneous products will be typically as follows: the market prices of all products 
will increase, the sales of the merged entity will decrease, and the sales of competing 
firms will increase' 88. The increase in all prices is because the total supply in the 
market will be reduced post-merger 189. Thus, a merger in a homogeneous-product 
oligopoly typically reduces consumer welfare and Rexam/ANC, which is examined by 
the thesis, is such a merger. 
To understand why Rexam/ANC merger will produce similar results let us 
examine the behaviour of its competitors. Capacity-constrained Carnaud-Metalbox 
would be unable to expand its own output to respond to the output-reduction by the 
merged entity. Thus, Carnaud-Metalbox, according to those mentioned above, would 
prefer to earn higher profits from higher prices in its existing products. 
Regarding CCE, which possessed sufficient overcapacity to offset any output 
reduction by the merged entity, one would expect this firm to increase its sales to that 
level. However, economic theory, as presented above, suggests that CCE would 
finally increase its sales but not to a level sufficient to offset the results of the 
Rexam/ANC merger. Although there is not sufficient evidence available about how 
CCE could react to the merger, the fact that this firm, as Rexam/ANC, was profit 
I's The increase in production is often associated with significant costs, which may be sunk. For this reason the 
additional production could be high-cost thus harming profit margins. 
186 See also Ivaldi et al, op. cit. 158, at 45. 
ABT See ibid.. 
188 See also Ivaldi et al. op. cit. 158 at 52. 
189 See also ibid. 
294 
maximiser190 and that the profit margins in the industry were stable and almost 
identical for all firms 191, could indicate that CCE would prefer not to adopt radical 
steps but instead to follow the standard behaviour proposed by the economic theory, 
namely to increase both its supply and prices, which would enable it to improve both 
its profit margins and sales. 
As a result, the equilibrium prices of beverage cans would be higher thus 
harming consumer welfare. 
Further, the magnitude of the reduction in consumer welfare depends amongst 
other things on the level of concentration in the market. Mergers in highly 
concentrated markets and/or which substantially decrease competition should cause 
more concern than when the market is fragmented and/or when the change in 
concentration is negligible 192. 
In beverage cans the merger of Rexam/ANC reduced the number of competitors 
from four to three indicating a highly concentrated market, while the change in 
concentration was significant. In particular, the HHI index, which was calculated on 
the basis of available information about the market shares of the firms in the market, 
must have been around 3000 in the pre-merger levels of concentration, while the 
merger must have contributed an additional at least 600 points to the index193 thus 
. indicating risks of negative competitive effects194 
However, these effects could be prevented if the merger produced sufficient 
efficiencies. In such a case consumer welfare would not be threatened and the merger 
could be cleared. In respect of Rexam/ANC, as shown below, the merger was not 
190 According to the Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers (para. 28), the existence of high pre- 
merger profit margins would make significant post-merger price increases more likely. 
191 See also the analysis about the duopoly above. 
192 See also Europe Economics op. cit. 123, at 53 citing also J. Farrell and C. Shapiro "Profitable Ilorizontal 
Mergers and Welfare" in L. Phillips Applied Industrial Economics, Cambridge University Press, 1998,347, at 360. 
A wide range of economic theories on oligopolistic conduct suggests that fewer firms and more concentrated 
markets are associated with higher prices (See Jonathan B. Baker and Steven C. Salop "Should Concentration be 
Dropped from the Merger Guidelines? " 33 UWLA L. Rev., 2001,3; Richard Posner "Oligopoly and Antitrust 
Laws: A Suggested Approach", 21 Stan. L. Rev., 1969,1582). Empirical studies on industrial organisation also 
confirm the positive relationship between market concentration and prices (see e. g. Richard Schmalensce "Inter- 
industry Studies of Structure and Performance", in Handbook of Industrial Organisation, Richard Schmalensee & 
Robert Willig eds., 1989,988) 
193 According to the Commission's decision, the market share of the parties post-merger was 35%-45% for each of 
Rexam/ANC and CCE and 15%-25% for Carnaud-Metalbox. According to ANC, op. cit. 148, at 43, its market 
share in Europe in 1998 was 31%. This information was used for a fast calculation of the Hill index for prior and 
after the merger. The results are not precise but are nevertheless illustrative of the level of concentration and the 
impact of the merger in the market. 
194 These results fall outside the concentration thresholds set by the Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal 
mergers and which the Commission considers as unlikely to challenge a merger. Therefore the HHI levels for 
Rexam/ANC merger could offer a first indication for the competitive risks from the merger. However, the 
Commission will decide whether to finally challenge the merger or not only after taking into account also all the 
other evidence. 
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expected to create significant efficiencies in Europe and therefore efficiencies could 
not be used as an argument for approving the merger. 
The existence of non-collusive oligopoly following the merger could be also 
cancelled in the presence of sufficient entry. A merger by reducing supply of products 
typically attracts new entry by firms, which seek to cover the created deficit. In such 
cases the post-merger profitability of entry is higher than the pre-merger profitability 
of entry. Thus, in the presence of such an entry the negative impact of the merger 
could be reduced or even eliminated. 
Entry in the beverage can market is examined in more details below. However, as 
a preliminary comment it could be said that no sufficient new entry was to be 
expected in the market and therefore the oligopoly would not be threatened. 
7.5.3 Conclusions- Non-collusive oligopoly versus collusive oligopoly 
Even the discussion of non-collusive oligopoly and its application in Rexam/ANC 
above reveals why this doctrine is necessary for an effective merger control. 
A first reason is because this doctrine compared with tacit collusion is easier to 
prove since the focus is only on the possibility of higher prices post-merger and there 
is no need to prove the existence of collusion mechanisms. 
A second reason is because the doctrine reveals cases of competitive harm as a 
result of the merger and in this sense it is necessary for an effective merger control 
system. Compared with tacit collusion, non-collusive oligopoly results in lesser price 
increases but these increases are still above the competitive level. 
A third reason is that for firms in oligopolistic markets, which are normally under 
the scrutiny of competition authorities for the potential of tacit collusion, raising 
prices unilaterally is easier and safer, and therefore more likely to occur195. Therefore 
competition authorities should be prepared to deal, apart from tacit collusion also with 
these situations. 
The utility of the non-collusive-oligopoly doctrine for EC merger has already been 
proved in one of the first decisions made by the Commission under C. R. 139/2004. In 
Syngenta CP/Advanta196, which was cleared subject to commitments following a 
Phase-I investigation in August 2004, the Commission found that the mergers would 
res See also Hovenkamp op. cit. 58, at 161. 
'96 Case COMP/M. 3465 Syngenta CP/Advanta (Decision of 17/8/2004). 
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significantly impede effective competition in the common market or in a substantial 
part thereof "... by the creation of non-coordinated effects in an oligopolistic market 
for sugar beet seeds in Belgium and France"197. For these markets the Commission 
found that the merger would give the merging firms a market share of 50%-60% in 
Belgium and 40%-50% in France while the remaining market shares would be held 
almost entirely by another firm, the KWS. The Commission considered the reduction 
of competitors as a result of the merger from 3 to 2 sufficient to justify the 
establishment of non-coordinated effects (non-collusive oligopoly) in this case. 
The decision in Syngenta CP/Advanta demonstrates, as mentioned above, the 
utility of the non-collusive-oligopoly doctrine for merger control but it is still very 
early to say what form that doctrine will take. For instance, will the Commission 
continue the current practice established in collective-dominance cases and which 
focuses on tacit collusion by mostly two firms, also in the case on non-collusive 
oligopolies? The analysis in Syngenta CP/Advanta shows that mergers reducing the 
number of competitors from 3 to 2 will definitely fall within the scope of the doctrine. 
But what about cases such as the beverage cans where the merger reduces the number 
of competitors from 4 to 3? It is submitted that, where justified by the market 
conditions, should also fall within the scope of the doctrine. Other issues requiring 
clarification are related to which market factors will finally be crucial for establishing 
non-coordinated effects under the ECMR. All these issues will be clarified in future 
cases but the decision in Syngenta CP/Advanta shows that the Commission will make 
frequent use of the doctrine thus, giving new impetus to EC merger control. 
Regarding beverage cans, there is a basic difference between the Commission's 
analysis of tacit collusion and the analysis of non-collusive oligopoly above: while the 
Commission considered the symmetry created, as a result of the merger, as the source 
of the competitive problem, the analysis above argues that regardless of the symmetry 
beverage can prices would increase anyway because the merger would increase 
significantly the level of concentration in an already highly concentrated market. 
What should competition authorities do in such cases? It seems that since the 
effects of tacit collusion are more detrimental to competition than those of non- 
collusive oligopolies, the most appropriate solution would be to pay more attention to 
197 Ibid para. 52. 
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tacit collusion when there is strong evidence showing to that direction. Otherwise the 
focus should shift to non-collusive oligopolies'98. 
However, the new substantive test of the Merger Regulation, by emphasising the 
substantial impediment to competition, potentially allows for issuing a decision 
relying on both effects. Such a solution might be useful particularly when it is not 
absolutely clear from the analysis, which effects is more likely to occur. 
7.6 Competition in oligopolistic markets: the role of maverick firms 
The analysis of the SGA market gave the opportunity to discuss to some extent the 
issue of maverick firms. The analysis of the issue will be completed here where detail 
of the application of the relevant theories will be discussed. 
7.6.1 The concept of " mavericks" and their utility in merger analysis 
It was seen in chapters 4 and 5 that the concept of "maverick" refers to af irm that 
declines to follow the industry consensus and thereby constrains effective 
coordination199. Even if maverick firms are particularly relevant when issues of 
coordination are examined, they can also be useful in cases of non-collusive 
oligopolies where these firms may prevent unilateral price increases200. 
The basic feature of a maverick firm is that it is an aggressive competitor capable 
of exercising an important competitive role in the market, disproportionate to its size 
or market share201. 
According to the relevant theory 202, a merger resulting in the loss of a maverick is 
likely to facilitate coordination, unless another firm is well positioned to assume the 
role of maverick post-merger. Conversely, the loss of a non-maverick firm is unlikely 
198 This is the view also of Europe Economics op. cit. 123, at 122. 
199 For a review of the application of "maverick firm" theory by US authorities see William J. Kolasky 
"Coordinated Effects in Merger Review: From Dead Frenchmen to Beautiful Minds and Mavericks", April 2002, 
available at www. usdoi. pov/atr/public/speeches/11050. adf 
200 For instance, in the scenario about homogeneous products examined above, a maverick firm could be one with 
significant excess capacity, which in response to the output reduction caused by the merger, expands its sales to a 
sufficient level to eliminate the market impact from the output reduction, thus preventing prices from increasing. 
201 See also David T. Scheffman and Mary Coleman "Quantitative Analyses of Competitive Effects from a Merger, 
June 9,2003, at 6. The 1992 US Horizontal merger guidelines provide as an example a firm that has an "unusually 
disruptive and competitive" influence in the market. The Commission Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal 
mergers in paras. 37-38 refer to such a firm as an "important competitive force" 
202 For more details on the theory see Jonathan Baker "Mavericks, Mergers and Exclusion: Proving Coordinated 
Effects Under the Antitrust Laws" 771 V. Y. U. L. Rev., 2002,135. 
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to increase coordination. The merged entity may become a maverick if the merger 
generates substantial efficiencies. 
The maverick-centred approach promises to assist competition authorities in more 
effectively distinguishing between changes in market structure that improve industry 
coordination and those that do not. It is based on the assumption of incomplete 
oligopolistic coordination 203. According to Jonathan Baker204, a US economist and 
proponent of the theory, "the role of the maverick in the modern economic 
perspective on incomplete oligopoly coordination provides a theoretical connection 
between market concentration and more effective coordination: In the absence of 
specific evidence identifying a maverick, the fewer the number of significant sellers, 
the more likely it is that the loss of anyone would be the loss of a firm that constraints 
coordinated conduct". 
In merger control the most significant contribution of the theory is that it goes 
beyond "checklist" analysis, which focuses on general market features, and focuses 
instead on the role of individual firms. 
For the identification of mavericks three methods have been suggested205. The 
first method, termed "revealed preference", is based on observation of a firm's actual 
conduct for finding if that firm constrains industry pricing. If, for instance, the firm 
persistently refuses to follow the price increases imposed by the other firms thus 
forcing the latter to cancel the increase or reduce its magnitude, then that firm could 
be the market's maverick. The second method uses natural experiments to study what 
happens to industry prices when the firm's marginal costs rise or fall relative to other 
firms in the industry. If that firm is a maverick, market prices should change; if not, 
they will not. The third method, termed the a priori factors approach, relies on 
understanding the reasons for which a firm would prefer a high or low price in the 
particular market206. 
Regarding merger control, the 1992 US Merger Guidelines, which first established 
the term, define "mavericks" as firms that "have a greater economic incentive to 
203 Incomplete or imperfect coordination refers to situations where the oligopolists through coordination do not 
achieve monopoly profits but less than that. In such cases, which are very often in practice, a maverick firm 
constraining effective coordination is very likely to exist (see also Baker ibid. at 163-166). 
204 Baker Ibid. at 198. 
20$ Ibid at 173-176. 
206 For example, in US cigarette industry during the 1980s and 1990s, Liggett could have been a maverick in part 
because, uniquely amongst the major cigarette manufacturers, it had a primary commitment to the discount 
segment of the cigarette market. 
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deviate from the terms of coordination than do most of rivals" 207 and provide as an 
example a market situation where in the presence of capacity constraints for many 
competitors a firm may be a maverick "... the greater is its excess or divertible 
capacity in relation to its sales and its total capacity, and the lower are its direct and 
opportunity costs of expanding sales in the relevant markets208. A firm may also be a 
maverick "... if it has an unusual ability secretly to expand its sales in relation to the 
sales it would obtain if it adhered to the terms of coordination"209 . The guidelines 
consider that mavericks may effectively prevent or limit coordinated effects 210. us 
competition authorities make increasing use of mavericks in the analysis of 
coordinated effects211. 
In the EU, the Commission Guidelines, similarly to the US, recognise the 
competitive significance of mavericks212 and consider that a merger may increase the 
likelihood or significance of coordination if it involves a maverick firm with a history 
of preventing or disrupting coordination213. The Commission Guidelines also consider 
the removal of a maverick due to the merger along with the existence of high 
concentration in the market as evidence of possible anticompetitive effects214. Lastly, 
the Commission Guidelines include mergers involving a maverick in the special 
cases, which could force the Commission to identify competitive concerns, even if the 
level of concentration in the market post-merger would not justify the identification of 
215 such concerns. 
7.6.2 Maverick firms and competition in beverage can market 




211 See Kolasky op. cit. 199. 
212 Paras. 37-38 of the Guidelines. 
213 Para. 42 of the Guidelines. A recent Commission decision involving reference to mavericks was 
SYDKRAFT/GRANINGE (Case COMP/M. 3268, Decision of 30/10/2003). The case refers to the merger between 
two Swedish firms, which were active in the electricity market. The Commission examined whether Graninge had 
been the market's maverick, which would be eliminated by the merger, but concluded that the firm could not have 
been a maverick due to its capacity constraints. Also in France Telecom/Orange (Case COMP/M. 2016, Decision 
of 11/8/2000) the Commission considered that the acquisition of Orange by France Telecom was endangering the 
latter's role as a competitor disrupting the duopoly that existed in Belgian telecom market. 
214 Paras. 37-38 of the Guidelines. 
215 See para. 20 of the Guidelines. 
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For beverage cans, the application of the above-described methods for identifying 
potential mavericks in that market will be examined using available market evidence. 
The three methods do not guarantee success but are, nevertheless, useful. 
Regarding "revealed preference", the first method, which seeks to trace mavericks 
by observing the actual firms' behaviour, there is not sufficient market evidence for 
its application. All that is known is that pre-merger Rexam, ANC and CCE were 
charging relatively similar prices for their products, that all these firms were profit- 
maximisers and that for this reason all firms had relatively similar costs216. However, 
there is no available evidence from the past about what had happened when one or 
more of the firms in the market raised prices. Had the other firms followed by 
increasing their own prices or had any of them refused to follow? One could only 
assume that all firms followed similar policies because there were no differences in 
profit margins between firms. Thus, it could be assumed that no firm pre-merger was 
acting as a maverick. 
Regarding the second method, which refers to natural experiments, the issue is 
whether in case of a firm-specific change in costs that firm adjusts accordingly its 
prices. If this happens, and provided that the increase in costs does not concern also 
the other firms in the market, then that firm is the market's maverick. In beverage 
cans, Rexam had stated217 that it had been in position to maintain its profitability by 
acting as a raw material converter, namely by passing higher or lower raw material 
prices to its customers. According to the method of natural experiments, this could 
potentially indicate that Rexam was acting as a maverick pre-merger, because the firm 
was adjusting accordingly the price charged to its customers. However, this criterion 
requires also the changes in costs of the allegedly maverick firm to be firm-specific 
and not to affect also all its competitors, since in the latter case this could result in 
parallel price adjustments by all firms, which in turn may point to coordination 218. 
From the available evidence it seems that Rexam was not the only firm to adjust its 
prices according to price-changes in the raw materials. ANC was also, as shown, 
taking measures to protect itself from exposure to the raw material219. Further, taking 
into account that factors such as costs and profit margins were identical for all firms it 
216 See para. 24 of the Commission's decision. 
217 This is repeated in all annual reports of the firm to its shareholders (www. rexam. com) where Rexam bases its 
satisfactory level of profitability on its ability of passing the higher raw material prices to its customers. 
218 See Baker op. cit. 202, at 174-175. 
219 See the ANC reports to the US SEC cited above in the analysis. 
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could also be inferred that all firms were taking similar measures for can price 
adjustments in accordance with the prices of the raw materials. And provided that 
changes in the prices of the raw material were occurring at the same time -increases 
or decreases in aluminium prices were affecting all firms- it is reasonable to believe 
that all firms were adjusting the can prices nearly at the same time, which could mean 
that no maverick existed in the market. Additional support to this argument could be 
found in the fact that the merging firms and CCE pre-merger were charging relatively 
similar prices, which indicated that no firm-specific price rises occurred220. As a 
result, the application of the second methodology shows that likely none of the firms 
in the beverage can market was a maverick pre-merger. 
Regarding the third method, which involves examination of a priori factors, the 
1992 US Merger Guidelines recognise two such factors221: the first, is the existence of 
excess capacity in a firm, which could reinforce the potential this firm to be a 
maverick in a market where many competitors are capacity-constrained; and second, 
is the "unusual" ability of a firm to secretly expand its sales in relation to the sales it 
would obtain if it adhered to the terms of coordination. This ability might be related to 
expansion of captive production. According to the guidelines the above factors could 
potentially provide sufficient incentives for some firms to act as mavericks. 
In beverage cans, the second factor is difficult to apply since the firms are not 
vertically integrated and therefore secret expansions through captive production are 
not possible. 
The first factor, excess capacity, would exist post-merger in two of the three 
competitors but as the Commission rightly mentioned this could be more a tool for 
punishing deviators than for deviating from common policies222. The merged entity 
could potentially act as a maverick if the merger created sufficient efficiencies, which 
in turn would create cost advantages against its competitors. In such a case the merged 
entity could use its excess capacity to act as a maverick223. However, as will be 
explained below, significant efficiencies were not expected in Europe and therefore it 
was unlikely coordination to break on such grounds. 
7.6.3 Conclusions 
220 See para. 24 of the Commission's decision. 
221 §2.12. 
222 See para. 24 of the decision. 
223 This possibility is recognised in the revised section 4 of the US Merger Guidelines dealing with efficiencies. 
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The application of three methodologies on mavericks to the beverage can market 
seems to indicate that none of the players in the beverage can market pre-merger or 
post-merger would have been a market maverick. This, in turn, could mean that the 
market demonstrated already pre-merger risks of tacit collusion, which would be 
further strengthened after the Rexam/ANC merger, because the latter would further 
increase concentration. 
Although the theory on mavericks concerns mostly anticompetitive coordination, 
it can also prove useful for the assessment of non-collusive oligopolies. In such cases 
if there is no maverick in the market, there is indication that rivalry between firms is 
weak thus reinforcing the potential of unilateral price increases. Thus, the merger of 
Rexam/ANC by increasing significantly the level of concentration in an already highly 
concentrated market with weak competition increased also significantly the risk of 
unilateral price increases post-merger. 
7.7 Single dominance in the market of Southern Europe224. 
The Commission considered that the merger would create single dominant 
position in that market. The parties' post-merger market share would be 65%-75%, 
followed by Carnaud-Metalbox with 25%-30% and Tubettifico Lecco, an Italian firm, 
with less than 5%. In addition, the Commission found that the parties' overcapacity in 
that market was 5%-15%, which was considered as sufficient to assist them to 
implement, sustain and monitor a price increase. Carnaud-Metalbox was capacity- 
constrained and, thus, unable to challenge the parties' dominant position. Lastly, the 
market of Southern Europe was experiencing growing demand. 
This part of the Commission's decision did not raise significant issues for 
discussion, since the dominant market position of the merging firms was obvious. 
7.8 Bargaining power 
The Commission examined the parties' allegations that the market was dominated 
by a small number of very powerful buyers and, although it recognised that there were 
224 Para. 25 of the decision. 
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some large firms in the market, it concluded that they represented a low share of the 
parties' sales and therefore they could hardly be seen as having any considerable 
buyer power. 
The parties also claimed that many "sophisticated" buyers had developed a policy 
of dual sourcing. However, the Commission found that 50%-60% of Rexam's main 
customers had a single source of supply and that these customers could be 
discriminated against in prices by the firm, since they could not exercise arbitrage. 
The two issues, buyer power and price discrimination separately will now be 
examined. 
7.8.1 Buyer power 
7.8.1.1 The role of buyer power in merger control 
The Commission Guidelines define buyer power, as "... the bargaining strength 
that the buyer has vis-a-vis the seller in commercial negotiations due to its size, its 
commercial significance to the seller and its ability to switch to alternative 
suppliers"225. Buyer power is taken by the Commission into account if it is sufficient 
to prevent the merged entity from significantly impeding effective competition. 
One situation of countervailing buyer power exists, according to the Guidelines, 
when a customer can "... credibly threaten to resort within a reasonable timeframe to 
alternative sources of supply should the supplier decide to increase prices or to 
otherwise deteriorate quality or the conditions of delivery "226. This will be the case if 
the buyer can immediately switch to other suppliers, credibly threaten to vertically 
integrate into the upstream market, or sponsor upstream entry227. 
A buyer can also exercise countervailing buyer power by refusing to buy other 
products produced by the supplier or, particularly in the case of durable goods, delay 
purchases228. 
Buyer power can be also effective in cases involving coordinated effects, where 
buyers may offer a sufficient incentive to an oligopoly member to deviate from 
22$ Para. 64 of the Guidelines. 




parallel behaviour229. This can be particularly possible if buyers have the ability to 
break the sellers' policy by offering them long-term contracts230. 
Although buyer power usually requires large firms, this does not necessarily 
preclude small firms who can coordinate their orders through a buyers' cooperative 
231. 
However, in practice countervailing buyer power is often difficult to prove232 
because buyers often face several practical problems, such as the difficulty to 
recognise that supra-competitive pricing by sellers occurs233. Also, upstream entry by 
strong buyers may be deterred by the existence of sunk costs, while sponsoring of new 
entry entails for buyers business risks. Lastly, coordination between small buyers can 
prove in practice unworkable, especially when the number of these buyers is 
significant234. 
Further, the existence of buyer power pre-merger does not necessarily prove also 
for the post-merger situation, since the merger, by reducing the number of alternative 
suppliers by one, reduces also the ability of buyers to diversify their supplies235. 
Thus, for a successful buyer-power defence to be raised, it does not suffice that 
buyer side is concentrated. It has to be proved that buyers are able to apply specific 
strategies, which will eliminate the ability of the merging firms post-merger to 
increase prices236. Only if the parties prove by providing specific evidence the ability 
of buyers to prevent price increases will the Commission accept a buyer power 
claim237. 
7.8.1.2 Buyer power in the beverage can market 
229 See Navarro et al., op. cit. 6, at 7.162. One such case was MCI WorldCan/Sprint (Case COMP/M. 1741, (2000); 
[2000] 5 CMLR 198) in which the countervailing buyer power of buyers of global telecommunications services 
was an important argument used by the Commission to overcome its objections on the grounds of collective 
dominance. 
230 One such case was SNECMAIT! (Case IV/M. 368,1994) in which the three main manufacturers of aeroplanes, 
which were covering more than three-quarters of the world market of undercarriages for aeroplanes, maintained a 
purchasing policy for undercarriages based on long-term contracts aimed at breaking suppliers' coordination. The 
Commission considered the buyer power sufficient to present the establishment of dominance and cleared the 
merger. See also Mary Lou Steptoe "rhe Power-Buyer Defence in Merger Cases" 61 Antitrust L. J. 1993,493, at 
499. 
231 See also Steptoe ibid. at 502. 
232 For a detailed analysis on a successful buyer power defence in US merger litigation see Robert W. Pratt "The 
`Sophisticated Buyer' Defence in Merger Litigation Gains Momentum" 6 Antitrust. 1992,9-13. 
211 See also Septoe op. cit. 230, at 495-6. 
234 See also ibid. at 502-503. 
235 See also para. 67 of the Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers. 
236 See Bishop and Walker op. cit. 19, para. 7.80; also Europe Economics op. cit. 123, at 84-85. 
237 See also Europe Economics op. cit. 123, at 85. 
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Regarding beverage cans, the parties claimed that the market was dominated by a 
small number of very powerful buyers. The decision however, does not mention 
which these buyers were or what was their share in the annual sales of the merging 
parties. However, according to Rexam, in the list of its top ten customers in 2001238 
there were Coca-Cola, Philip Morris, Pepsi, Interbrew, Carlsberg, Heineken etc. All 
these firms accounted for 49.5% of Rexam's consumer packaging sales in 2001. 
Although these figures refer to the firm's worldwide turnover, the situation for the 
European market might not be very different. In any case, these figures are indicative 
about the balance between the firm and its customers. 
The biggest customer of the merging parties was Coca-Cola, which prior to the 
merger was absorbing more than 50% of ANC's annual can production worldwide239. 
Although the Commission recognised the existence of one large buyer it held that the 
other "big" buyers' shares in the parties' sales were low and they had no considerable 
market power. 
However, for assessing buyer power in this case information about can supply 
contracts would be required. According to the ANC240, over 60% of its net sales in 
Europe were made under long-term contracts of varying lengths. Pricing on most of 
these contracts was determined on an annual base. ANC was managing its exposure to 
aluminium price volatility by matching aluminium purchases to sales agreements for 
similar periods. ANC also stated that its manufacturing facilities were located close to 
major bottlers, while it was providing technical support within its customers' plant. 
The existence of long-term agreements and the fact that manufacturing facilities 
were located close to buyers could indicate that at least some of these buyers were 
exercising some buyer power. On the other hand, as shown in the analysis above, 
suppliers of beverage cans were generally all enjoying stable and satisfactory profit 
margins, which meant that they were not subject to significant pressure by buyers. 
However, since a complete analysis of the issue requires more information, which 
is not available, it is submitted that one can agree with the Commission that buyers in 
the beverage can market did not possess sufficient buyer power to prevent the exercise 
of market power by the merged entity. 
238 Source: Rexam's Annual Report for the fiscal year 2001. The information includes also ANC's sales. 
239 Source ANC; see also "Rexam Seals US Can Deal" of April 3,2000, available at money. cnn. com 
240 See the ANC's report to US Security and Exchange Commission op. cit. 54. 
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7.8.2 Price discrimination 
k 
Price discrimination is a controversial issue in antitrust because it is not always 
anticompetitive. From the existing economic studies, it follows that price 
discrimination often results in lower output than that produced in competitive 
markets241, but also, under certain circumstances, it may result in higher output242 than 
that produced when the prices are uniform but not at the competitive level. Moreover, 
it can lead to the exclusion of certain competitors (or potential competitors), which, as 
a consequence, can reduce the intensity of competition and thereby lead to an increase 
in the level of prices. 
In practice price discrimination works only if arbitrage is not possible or feasible. 
Arbitrage refers to the ability of customers charged with lower prices to sell to those 
charged with higher 243, thus cancelling discrimination. 
In Rexam/ANC, the Commission's reference to the ability of Rexam to 
discriminate against the 50-60% of its customers that followed a single-sourcing 
purchasing policy was not very detailed and did not explain, for instance, why 
discriminated customers could not follow also a dual-sourcing policy as the 
sophisticated ones or why other policies, such as the push for long-term agreements 
were not possible. Of course the merger with ANC deprived the discriminated 
customers of Rexam of a reliable alternative supplier but in the market there was still 
in existence at least another competitor with sufficient overcapacity, CCE, to supply 
these customers. However, it seems that according to the Commission the merger by 
creating symmetrical conditions between the merging firm and CCE would enable the 
two firms to reach a consensus on the issue and avoid price wars for these customers. 
In any case, the existence of price discrimination, which indicated that the merged 
entity possessed market power, could have been used as an additional factor 
facilitating the establishment of a non-collusive oligopoly in the market post-merger. 
The reason would have been that the merged entity without holding dominant position 
in the market was capable of price-discriminating against some of its customers and 
this ability would be enhanced by the merger because discriminated customers would 
be deprived from an alternative source of supply, that is ANC. 
241 See Hovenkamp, op. cit. 58, at 566. 
242 Bishop and Walker op. cit. 19, at 6.26-6.35, present some such cases. See also Whish, op. cit. 103, at 717-718. 
243 See also Jones and Sufrin op. cit. 22, at 410. 
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i 7.8.3 Conclusions 
Buyer power to be examined in the competitive assessment should be sufficient to 
reverse the anticompetitive effects of the merger. 
In Rexam/ANC, the Commission's analysis showed that buyer power was not 
sufficient to prevent the imposition of price discrimination by the merged entity 
against non-sophisticated buyers and thus to prevent the exercise of either unilateral 
or coordinated market power by that entity. 
7.9 Barriers to Entry 
Regarding entry in the beverage can market, the Commission's decision was 
laconic244: "With a E45 million requirement to set up a new line of production, costs 
of entry in the can manufacturing industry are significant. No new entry has occurred 
in the European markets for the last two decades, nor is it envisageable that any new 
entry would be made in the near future". 
The Commission also examined245 the competitive position of two small existing 
competitors, Canpack located in Poland, and Tubettifico located in Italy, but found 
that both had limited ability to act as potential competitors. This was in accordance 
with the opinion of the customers who had stated that these firms, apart from capacity 
limitations, were lacking accreditation and their products were of random quality. 
The Commission's analysis of entry should be assessed by reference to the three 
factors, which are relevant with any entry analysis, namely likelihood, timeliness and 
sufficiency246. The Commission considered that new entry was unlikely due to the 
existence of significant entry costs, which effectively prevented any entry potential. 
The decision seems to have been correct and this could be best seen in the 
situation in Southern Europe, particularly Spain and Portugal, where even if the 
market was experiencing sustainable growth trend, no new entry had occurred during 
the two decades prior to the merger or was expected to occur post merger. 
244 Para. 27 of the decision 
245 Ibid. para. 28. 
246 Paras. 68-75 of the Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers. 
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In particular, according to the thesis's investigation, Spain, the third largest market 
for cans in Europe, has been growing by around 10% rate each year, since 1997247, 
while in Portugal the increase in demand for cans only in 2001 was 32%248. However, 
even in such a favourable environment no new entry occurred. In contrast, it was only 
ANC and Carnaud-Metalbox, incumbent firms in these markets, which expanded their 
production capacity in Iberia. ANC, in 1999 announced249 an expansion in its Madrid 
plant, while Carnaud-Metalbox in 2001 announced250 the construction of a new, state- 
of-the-art plant in Seville. The latter expansion was the first new plant constructed in 
Europe, at least since the early 90s. What was important in this case was that the 
construction was completed within approximately 12 months251, which was not very 
long. 
The developments in Iberia raised the question why the increasing demand did 
not attract new entry. Three possible answers to this question could be given: first, 
there was a limited number of big firms at the international level, in particular only 
one, which had no presence already in Europe; second, the existence of localised 
competition in the beverage can market reduced the possibility of viable entry; and 
third, the other existing market conditions also did not favour large-scale entry. 
In more detail, regarding big international firms, the three major world beverage- 
can producers, which are far ahead of other competitors, are Rexam/ANC, Crown 
Cork and the US firm Ball. At the time of the merger Rexam and ANC were already 
in the European market, Crown Cork was the owner of Carnaud-Metalbox, since 1996 
and only Ball had no presence in the European markets. However, for the latter firm, 
due to the existence of localised competition in Europe, it might have been more 
profitable to enter into that market through merger with an incumbent player than 
though autonomous entry. 
As shown by the Commission in geographic market analysis, competition in the 
beverage can market is localised due to transport costs, which is generally a factor not 
favouring autonomous entry. In particular, localised competition can harm entry in 
three ways252: first, by making more difficult the recovery of sunk costs, since the 
147 Source: Can Makers UK 
248 Ibid. 
249 See "American National Can to Expand Capacity in Spain", Business Newswire, Sept. 24,1999. 
250 See Scott Robertson "Crown Building Steel Can Plant in Spain to Tap Growing Market" American National 
Can, August 9,2001. 
251 See ibid. 
252 See also Levy and Reitzes op. cit. 50, at 713.714. 
309 
ý! 
entrant, due to the existence of local constraints, may not be able to achieve sales 
sufficient to cover these costs; second, by making more difficult the repositioning of 
products by incumbent firms in order to accommodate entry and, thus, the entrant 
faces diminished sales opportunity and lower profits; third, the existence of localised 
competition makes customers of incumbent firms more loyal to these firms, which 
reduces the sales opportunities for the new entrant. 
The more profitable way for an outsider to gain entry in a market with localised 
competition could be through a merger with an incumbent player. Such a strategy 
offers direct access to the local markets and does not entail the risks posed by 
autonomous entry. In the beverage cans market, such a strategy was followed in 1996 
by Crown Cork, which acquired Carnaud-Metalbox and in 2002, two years after the 
Rexam/ANC deal when Ball acquired CCE (Schmalbach-Lubeca)253. These were the 
only cases of entry in the European market and in both the method of acquisition of an 
incumbent player was followed. 
Further, another conclusion that could be drawn from the Crown Cork's and 
Ball's movements was that any full-scale entry in the beverage can market would 
potentially require the acquisition of a critical mass in that market, which potentially 
translated into a market share of more than 10%-15% in the market254. Such an entry, 
however, would require the construction of plants in several local markets, which 
would mean high sunk costs. Also such a large-scale entry in Northern Europe, where 
significant overcapacity and flat growth trend exist, would negatively affect prices 
and profit margins of all firms including the new entrant, thus making the profitability 
of entry very doubtful. Even if the merger of Rexam/ANC led to output reductions, 
which could typically offer some entry opportunities, in reality it was very unlikely if 
these reductions would be large enough to attract a full-scale entry. Besides CCE the 
other duopolist was possessing sufficient overcapacity to close immediately any gap 
in beverage can supplies post-merger. 
As a conclusion, the conditions in the beverage can market did not favour entry 
by a new competitor post-merger and thus the anticompetitive effects of the merger 
would not be threatened. 
As regards capacity expansions by the two other competitors, Canpack and 
Tubettifico these firms were not, according to the Commission, reliable competitors 
253 For information about this merger see www. ball. com 2M This was also the Commission's view as will be shown in the analysis of the remedies for this case below. 
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due to the random quality of their products. Thus neither existing competitors could 
pose a threat to the merged entity in the foreseeable future. 
7.10 Efficiencies 
The Commission did not refer to efficiencies in Rexam/ANC. However, the 
merger, at least in its European part, was not intended to produce significant 
efficiencies. The acquisition of ANC by Rexam was aimed at boosting the latter's 
presence in the US market where ANC was a major player. In that market, there were 
some serious problems with overcapacity, which were exerting significant pressure on 
can prices and were harming producers255. In the US sector the merger probably 
produced some efficiencies because it helped the merging firms to reduce 
overcapacity and improve their profitability256. However, given that the Commission's 
analysis focused on the impact of the merger on the European market, in that market 
no significant efficiencies were expected and therefore the anticompetitive effects of 
the merger could not be reversed on such grounds. 
7.11 The Commission's assessment of Rexam/ANC merger: summary and 
concluding remarks. 
Rexam/ANC was a good case for examining and assessing the Commission's 
policies concerning oligopolies in the context of merger control. The Commission's 
decision in Rexam/ANC, by applying a conventional checklist methodology and 
establishing a duopoly, constitutes a classical example of a collective dominance case 
under the Merger Regulation and therefore its inclusion into this thesis has also helped 
to discuss the content and limitations of the collective dominance doctrine of the 
Merger Regulation. 
The Commission's analysis and assessment in Rexam/ANC was apparently 
without errors, since the Commission proved its argument for the establishment of 
255 See also Solman op. cit. 56. Also Rexam's annual reports of fiscal years 2000 and 2001 where the firm illustrates 
the problems in the US market and its efforts to deal with them. 
256 For more information on the policy that Rexam applied post-merger in order to improve efficiency and 
profitability in US see e. g. "Rexam Beverage Can Americas Takes Action to Balance Capacity and Demand" 
Business Wire, July 24,2001; "Rexam Takes Further Action to Balance Beverage Can Capacity and Demand" 
Business Wire, October 31,2001; Bob Regan "Rexam Plans to shut beverage can plant", American Metal Market, 
Nov. 5,2001. 
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duopoly through proof of the basic features of tacit collusion, namely establishment of 
the terms of collusion, monitoring and punishment of deviations, while in respect of 
the duopoly the reference to various areas of symmetry between the merged entity and 
CCE, were also strong arguments. 
However, it is submitted that the Commission's analysis, by focusing only on the 
creation of the duopoly may have ignored the, arguably real, potential of the collusive 
oligopoly to include also Carnaud-Metalbox, the third and only remaining competitor 
in the beverage can market post-merger. This thesis has sought to show on the basis of 
market evidence why Carnaud-Metalbox could have been included in the collusive 
oligopoly as well. 
The issue is of general interest, because, it is submitted that the Rexam/ANC 
decision is an example of the conventional Commission's policy concerning tacit 
collusion, which needs to be improved. In particular, the collective dominance 
doctrine of the EU, by relying almost exclusively on dominant duopolies, namely of 
duopolies comprising the two largest firms in the market, has an inappropriately 
narrow scope, since it ignores the potential of collusion by more than two firms none 
of which with dominant market shares. This issue became clearer in the analysis of 
the SGA market in previous chapter of the thesis and the analysis of this chapter 
sought to support the argument developed there. 
The Commission's preference for dominant duopolies in the context of the 
dominance test, which required large market shares as an essential prerequisite for 
establishing competitive harm was potentially justified. However, under the new 
substantive test of the Merger Regulation, which focuses on the impact of the merger 
on competition in the broader sense and beyond dominant positions, it may be not. In 
any case, the argument of this thesis is that the legal test of the Merger Regulation on 
collective dominance should cover all cases of tacit collusion, which can be proved by 
viable economic theories, and not only duopolies. The Commission's analysis of cases 
under the Merger Regulation is not prevented from using any viable theory of 
competitive harm but the usual culmination of the analysis, as the Rexam/ANC case 
shows, is the establishment of a duopoly. 
The issue has practical importance because it is related to remedies and thus to 
the effectiveness of merger control. For instance, a duopoly and a collusive oligopoly 
by, let us say, three firms require different remedies. In the former case breaking 
symmetry between the duopolists may be a sufficient remedy, but in the latter case 
312 
more radical steps, such as the creation of a new viable competitor may be required. 
Thus, any merger decision establishing duopoly whereas in the market there are in 
existence factors indicating broader collusion will fail to fully identify the competitive 
problems posed by the merger and effectively cure them. 
Further, the thesis has used the Rexam/ANC decision to discuss the utility of non- 
collusive-oligopoly doctrine for EU merger control. It is submitted that since non- 
collusive oligopolies are based on viable economic theories of competitive harm they 
must be included in the scope of the substantive test of the Merger Regulation as a 
57 means to more effectively protect competition in the Community, . In this context 
the thesis applied the non-collusive-oligopoly theory in the case of beverage cans as a 
means to clarify the utility of the theory as well as its main differences with the 
coordinated effects doctrine. 
Lastly, the concept of maverick firms was discussed above in the context of 
oligopolies. This concept, which finds increased application in the US helps 
competition authorities to assess whether a merger in an oligopoly increases the risk 
of coordination or not. The biggest utility of the theory is that it goes beyond the 
traditional checklist analysis of mergers by focusing on the individual behaviour of 
firms. The thesis is of the view that the Commission should make more frequent use 
of maverick firm theory in the analysis of competition in oligopolies. 
7.12. Commitments in Rexam/ANC and the decision in Schmalbach- 
Lubeca/Rexam 
The commitments submitted by the parties to the Commission258 included the 
divestiture of three beverage can plants in Europe. These were Rexam's La Ciotat in 
Southern France, and ANC's Runcorn in UK and Geslenkirchen in Germany. The 
divestiture of La Ciotat was aimed at eliminating the single-firm dominance in 
Southern Europe, while Runcorn and Gelserkirchen were aimed at breaking the 
duopoly in Northern Europe. 
257 As has been repeatedly argued throughout the thesis the ultimate goal of merger control in the EU is, and 
should be- the protection of effective competition. This was well presented by Richard Whish Op. cit. 103, at 787, 
"Merger control is not, or not only, about pre-emptively preventing a merged entity from abusing its dominant 
position in the future; its also about maintaining a market structure that is capable of delivering the benefits that 
follow from competition". 
258 Paras. 29-31 of the decision. 
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The divestitures comprised the factories, their equipment and raw materials, their 
employees and generally everything necessary for running the business. Moreover, 
the parties undertook for a period of 3 years after the completion of the divestments 
not to compete for any of the customers transferred along with the divested plants and 
for a period of two years following the divestiture, not to solicit staff working at the 
divested plants. Lastly, in order to help the potential acquirer to compete effectively in 
the market, the parties proposed to transfer to him additional customer contracts, 
unrelated to the plants in question. 
The Commission considered the proposed divestitures as sufficient to address the 
anticompetitive concerns identified in its competitive assessment and cleared the 
merger. 
The Commission justified its decision as follows259: 
a. The divestiture of Gelsenkirchen and Runcorn plants was sufficient to eliminate 
"doubts as to the creation of a duopolistic dominant position in Northern Europe". 
This would happen because the divestiture would break the symmetric configuration 
between the merged firm and Continental Can. Moreover, the Runcorn plant had a 
large over-capacity, which when divested to a new entrant, would make retaliation 
less credible and co-ordination less sustainable between the duopolists. Finally a "new 
entrant' 'with such capacity would be a credible competitor in the short-run as well as 
in the long run. 
The Commission also stated that the acquirer of the divested assets would need to 
acquire some critical mass enabling it both to compete and to pay back its investment. 
The Commission considered that the available overcapacity in the divested assets, 
particularly Runcorn, along with the additional customer contracts were sufficient to 
help the new entrant to establish itself in the market. 
As a result of the divestitures the market of Northern Europe would comprise four 
players: the merged entity would have [25%-35%] market share, CCE [35%-45%] 
Carnaud-Metalbox [15%-20%] and the purchaser of the divested assets [5%-15%]. 
b. The divestiture of La Ciotat plant was considered sufficient to restore pre-merger 
competition in the Southern European market because this was the only overlapping 
business in that area. 
259 Paras. 32-35. 
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The culmination of the divestiture process in Rexam/ANC can be seen in the 
Commission's decision in Schmalbach-Lubeca/Rexam, which was published on 
September 2001,14 months after the publication of Rexam/ANC decision. With the 
latter decision the Commission approved the acquisition of La Ciotat and Runcorn 
plants by Schmalbach-Lubeca, the new name for CCE. The thesis will not examine 
further the divestiture of La Ciotat, which refers to Southern Europe, but will focus on 
the sale of Runcorn, in Northern Europe. 
The Commission's decision to approve the sale of Runcorn to Schmalbach- 
Lubeca was justified on the basis that the sale would not result in a dominant position 
in Northern Europe: 
"In Northern Europe, the operation raises no concerns as to the creation of a 
dominant position by the merged firm. The addition of a market share following the 
proposed concentration is relatively low, that is [0-5%]. The combined market 
position of the merged entity [35-45%] is likely to be constrained by the existence of 
vigorous competitors such as Rexam and Carnaud-Metalbox, which can be viewed as 
a competitive alternative to customers in case of a unilateral price increase. These 
competitors are credible, as can be seen from their sales market shares ([25-35%] and 
[15-25%] respectively) and their spare capacity levels [... ]. In addition to Rexam and 
Carnaud-Metalbox, the pricing behaviour of the merged firm may be constrained by 
the presence of two smaller competitors, namely Gelsenkirchen ([0-10%]) and 
Canpack ([0-5%])". 
The decision requires closer examination because the Commission in Rexam/ANC 
had promised to sell the Northern Europe plants altogether to a single independent 
buyer, as a means to break the duopoly and this promise was not kept since Runcorn 
was finally sold by Rexam to the other duopolist. The Commission's decision to 
approve the sale raises therefore questions about its effectiveness. These issues will be 
discussed below and the discussion will cover also the possible remedial action under 
the other two scenarios examined above for the Rexam/ANC merger: the creation of 
tacit collusion by three firms and of a non-collusive oligopoly. 
7.12.1 Remedies for restoring effective competition in oligopolies: some observations 
As mentioned in other chapters of the thesis the main goal of remedies in EC 
merger control is to address all the competitive concerns identified by the 
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Commission in its competitive assessment of the merger thus restoring effective 
competition in the common market on a permanent basis. 
However, while in the case of unilateral effects the restoration of competition 
appears relatively easy since the competition problem refers to the behaviour only of 
the merged entity, the same is not true for collective dominance where the 
competition problem is more complex and concerns not only the merged entity but 
also other firms in the market. In addition, in oligopolistic markets competition may 
not be effective even before the merger, and in such cases the Commission should 
take measures at least to ensure that the merger will not deteriorate the situation. 
The Commission's view on the issue, as expressed in the well-known Airtours 
case is as follows: 
"... appropriate remedies in oligopoly cases can amount, in effect, to attempting to create (or recreate) a 
competing business capable of exerting sufficient competitive pressure. As such, it is particularly 
important to ensure that the divested assets, together with those (if any) of their ultimate acquirer(s), 
will prove sufficient to maintain competition at an acceptable level, given also that the market share 
and strength of the merged entity will also have increased as a result of the merger"260. 
From the above it could be inferred that the preferred remedy in oligopoly cases is 
the creation through divestiture of the merged entity's assets of a new viable 
competitor261, which could be either one of the existing players or a newcomer and 
which would ensure the maintenance of acceptable level of competition in the market 
post-merger. 
However the difficulties for restoring competition in oligopolies are many as can 
be seen from the indicative examples below: 
a. In very concentrated oligopolistic markets, there may be no suitable buyers for the 
divested assets if all possible buyers would themselves be members to the 
oligopoly 262 1) 
b. Even if a suitable buyer is found, the divestiture may prove ineffective if this buyer 
finds it more profitable to "join the club" and coordinate with the existing firms263. A 
move towards coordination could be also facilitated by the contacts that will 
260 See XXIXth Annual Report on Competition Policy, 1999, at para. 175. 
261 This was confirmed by Commissioner Monti who has stated that the preferred remedy is the divestiture of 
viable stand-alone business (see Mario Monti `The Commission Notice on Merger Remedies-One year After" 
Speech in CERNA, Paris, January 18,2002). The Commission Notice on Remedies (OJ 2001 C68/3) in para. 13 
expressly states that divestiture is the most effective way to restore competition apart from prohibition. 262 See also C. Rakovsky "Remedies: Finding the Right Cure-The Commission's Evolving Practice" paper 
presented to the EC Merger Control 10`" Anniversary Conference Brussels 14-15 September 2000. 
263 See also Lindsay op. cit. 172, at 9.48. 
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inevitably develop between the buyer and the merged entity during the divestiture 
process2M; 
c. If the divestiture of assets to a suitable buyer is considered as appropriate to make 
the latter an effective competitor by offering him certain competitive advantages, the 
question may arise why these assets did not make the party selling them an effective 
enough competitor to break the joint dominance265; 
d. If the divestiture assets were going to award any significant competitive advantage 
to their acquirer the question arising is why the merged entity would agree with their 
sale instead of the sale of less efficient assets266; 
e. The divestiture from one member of the oligopoly to the other may do nothing to 
break the oligopoly if the reasons that created the latter are not firm-specific but 
concern the broader market and thus will continue to exist post-merger267; 
f. If the divestiture assets are sold to a firm, which has no previous presence in the 
market, as a means to create a new viable competitor the problem may concern the 
competitive disadvantages that this firm may have due to the lack of experience in the 
business. In the case of a tight oligopoly where entry could face aggressive behaviour 
by the incumbent firms, the entrant could have additional problems if he was not a 
large firm. In that case the new entrant may find it more profitable to cooperate with 
the oligopolists268. 
The above examples reveal aspects of the problem in restoring competition in 
oligopolistic markets. Even if the use, apart from divestiture, of behavioural remedies 
also has been suggested for such cases269, a basic issue, which seems to remain 
unsolved even after the imposition of such remedies, is what will happen when 
coordination is also facilitated by the general market conditions and not only by the 
merger itself. For instance, the presence of similarity in cost structures or negative 
growth trend in the market will inevitably reinforce the interdependence between all 
firms. Competition authorities in such cases will not be able to do much to solve the 
problem, which refers to the market as a whole. 
264 See also Europe-Economics op. cit. 123, at 110. 
265See also John Temple Lang "Oligopolies and Joint Dominance in Community Antitrust Law" in International 
Antitrust Law and Policy, Fordham Corporate Law Institute, Juris Publishing, 2001,269, at 348. 
266 See also ibid. 
267 See also Europe Economics op. cit. 123, at 109. 
268 See also ibid. at 109-110. 
269 Behavioural remedies could include, for instance, the imposition of price caps (see also ibid. at 111). 
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In any case, the selection of the appropriate remedy in such cases depends on the 
specific market conditions and therefore the application of general rules is of limited 
importance. However, in the absence of remedies adequate to eliminate the identified 
competitive concerns competition authorities will have to prohibit the merger270. It is 
also necessary to stress that the restoration of effective competition in the market does 
not culminate with the approval of the remedies but with the implementation of the 
decision because if the decision is not implemented properly effective competition 
will not be restored271. 
7.12.2 Remedies in the beverage can market 
The discussion on the remedies is divided into two parts: the first part concerns 
the analysis of the Commission's decision in Rexam/ANC and the second with the 
analysis of the Schmalbach-Lubeca/Rexam decision. 
7.12.2.1 Remedies in Rexam/ANC merger 
The decision of the Commission to approve the sale of two plants of the merged 
entity in Northern Europe to "a new entrant" was from a first sight satisfactory: the 
divestiture decision would eliminate the symmetry between the duopolists created as a 
result of the merger, while the creation of a fourth competitor in the market through 
the acquisition of the divested assets by the new entrant would also prevent the 
increase of coordination in the market by maintaining the number of competitors that 
existed prior to the merger. 
In addition, the two plants in Runcorn, UK, and Gelsenkirchen, Germany, were 
covering a combined market share of 5%-15%, while the UK plant had large 
overcapacity (35%-45% of unutilised capacity), which would enable the acquirer of 
these assets to become a credible long-term competitor. The divested assets also 
constituted a critical mass enabling the acquirer both to compete and pay back its 
investment. 
270 See para. 31 of the Notice on Remedies. 
271 As Commissioner Monti op. cit. 261 has clearly stated: "The discussion and acceptance of remedies by the 
Commission is... only part of the story. An equally important role of the Commission is to closely examine the 
implementation of remedies previously accepted. Indeed, the competition concerns raised by an operation will only 
be eliminated if the remedies accepted are fully and properly implemented". 
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However, taking into account those mentioned above in the analysis of the 
competitive conditions in the market of beverage cans as well as in the references to 
the problems associated with the selection of appropriate remedies in oligopolies, the 
selection of a suitable buyer could be difficult. 
The first problem would relate to the fact that, as also the Commission implicitly 
recognised in its analysis, the market of beverage cans apart from the symmetry 
between the duopolists had general features facilitating coordination, such as product 
homogeneity, similar cost structures and prices, and flat growth trend. These features 
would remain in the market post-merger because they were not related to the merger 
and, therefore, any new entrant would have to deal with them. Would this entrant 
prefer to compete aggressively or would he choose to cooperate with its competitors 
to more effectively deal with these negative market features? Thus, the symmetry 
between the duopolists was not the only issue, which the Commission had to solve 
when selecting a suitable buyer. 
The second problem concerned the fact that the divested assets might not be 
sufficiently attractive for a new entrant even if the Commission claimed for the 
opposite. The fact that in the European beverage can market there had been no new 
entry for many years could indicate difficulties for finding a suitable buyer for the 
divested assets. The problem was not theoretical but rather practical, since the only 
new entry that occurred in the European beverage can market since the early 1990s 
was in 1996 through the acquisition of Carnaud-Metalbox by Crown Cork. Also, in 
2002 two years after the merger of Rexam/ANC the US firm Ball entered into the 
European market through the acquisition of Schmalbach-Lubeca. These methods of 
entry, namely through the acquisition of existing players, meant that either there was 
no space for an additional player in the beverage can market or that the only viable 
entry in that market could become through the establishment of control over 
significant market share potentially higher than that of the divested assets. Carnaud- 
Metalbox and Schmalbach-Lubeca, which were targeted for acquisition by the new 
entrants, had a market share in Europe of around 20% and more than 30% 
respectively. 
A third problem, it is submitted, was the solution concerning the non-collusive 
oligopoly. The analysis above showed that the merger of Rexam/ANC would lead to a 
highly concentrated market which, taking into account also the other market features, 
would allow for unilateral price increases in the beverage can market. The creation of 
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a new competitor through the sale of divested assets would restore the number of 
competitors to the pre-merger levels thus preventing significant increase in the 
concentration levels. On the other hand, the solution, to be effective, should also be 
sufficient qualitatively. For instance, given that the divested assets did not provide any 
cost or other advantage to the merged entity so as not to raise its prices, why would 
the new acquirer use these assets to adopt a policy of non-increase in prices? 
In any case, the identity of the buyer was crucial for solution to the above 
problems and therefore it had to be seen who that buyer might be. 
7.12.2.2 The decision in Schmalbach-Lubeca/Rexam 
The Commission's solution to these problems came through its decision in 
Schmalbach-Lubeca/Rexam which approved the sale of Runcorn and La Ciotat plants 
to Schmalbach-Lubeca, one of the duopolists. The decision made no specific 
reference to the conditions set in Rexam/ANC for the selection of a suitable buyer for 
the divested assets but only said that the acquisition of the two plants by Schmalbach- 
Lubeca would not give rise to any dominant position. 
Regarding Northern Europe, the Commission considered272 that the acquisition of 
Runcorn by Schmalbach-Lubeca, which would give the firm a market share of 35%- 
45% in that market, would not be sufficient to allow for unilateral price increases 
because the addition of a market share of 0-5% by Runcorn was relatively low, while 
the merged entity would be constrained by firms such as Rexam and Carnaud- 
Metalbox, which were credible alternatives due to the sufficient market share that 
each of the two firms possessed in the market, and also by the presence of two smaller 
competitors, Gelsenkirchen and Canpack, which would offer additional constraints. 
Compared with the Commission's analysis in Rexam/ANC the decision in 
Schmalbach-Lubeca/Rexam appears inconsistent. In particular, it should be recalled 
that in the former case the Commission had considered Carnaud-Metalbox not a 
source of competition due to its capacity constraints273. The Commission had also 
considered Canpack as a firm facing capacity limitation, lacking accreditation and 
selling products of random quality274. In respect of Gelsenkirchen, the Commission's 
nZ See in para. 17 of the decision. 
273 See in para. 24 of the decision in Rexam/ANC 
274 Ibid. in para. 28. 
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decision that approved its divestiture in Rexam/ANC had not referred to this plant as 
having significant overcapacity, but instead had stated that it was Runcorn plant 
important due to its overcapacity275. Thus, Gelsenkirchen was less important than 
Runcorn and given that the former did not have significant overcapacity it is not very 
clear how Gelsenkirchen would constrain Schmalbach-Lubeca. 
A second inconsistency in Schmalbach-Lubeca/Rexam decision was that 
Schmalbach-Lubeca was not the new entrant that the Commission had promised to 
create for restoring competition in the beverage can market after the Rexam/ANC 
merger. The Commission had also promised to sell Runcorn and Gelsenkirchen to a 
single buyer but did not keep its promise since it sold the two plants separately. The 
sale of the two plants altogether had been considered in Rexam/ANC decision as 
necessary for creating a "critical mass" that would enable the acquirer to effectively 
compete against the duopolists276. 
In terms of the effect on competition, the Commission's decision in Schmalbach- 
Lubeca/Rexam, however, could not be deemed inconsistent with its previous decision 
in Rexam/ANC. Given that the Commission in the latter case had considered as the 
main reason for the establishment of duopoly the symmetry in market shares and 
overapacity between Rexam/ANC and Schmalbach-Lubeca (CCE) this symmetry was 
completely broken after the second decision and therefore no competitive problem 
would remain in that market on such grounds. 
Also, in terms of non-collusive oligopoly such a risk would apparently also be 
reduced since in the market there would now be five players (including Canpack). 
However, if one accepts that the source of collusion in the beverage can market 
was not only the symmetrical market shares and overcapacities between Rexam/ANC 
and CCE but also other market features, then the Commission's restoration of 
competition was unsuccessful. This was so because no independent competitor to 
break the oligopoly was finally created -Gelsenkirchen and Canpack were unable to 
act independently to the extent of constraining the oligopolists- while the sale of 
assets from one oligopolist to the other could increase rather than decrease the risk of 
coordination because the exchange of assets associated with the development of the 
275 Ibid. in para. 35. 
276 Ibid. 
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necessary contacts between the two firms on the issue could help these firms to 
improve their cooperation 277. 
In respect of unilateral price increases, given that at least three of the five firms 
(Carnaud-Metablox, Gelsenkirchen and Canpack) had limited capabilities to compete 
against the two leaders, these firms would have more interest in following the leaders 
by raising prices than in keeping prices low. 
However, and given that the Commission in Rexam/ANC had clearly indicated 
that it would seek the establishment of a new player in Northern Europe in response to 
the merger, one could only speculate that such a firm was not possible to be found and 
therefore the Commission was "forced" to accept a solution that was not optimal but 
at least restored competition in terms of market shares. 
7.12.3 Conclusion on the remedies 
The merger of Rexam/ANC is an interesting illustration of the issues of selection 
and implementation of remedies in oligopolies. The analysis above shows that the 
restoration of effective competition in oligopolies faces difficulties particularly at the 
stage of its implementation where the creation of a viable competitor, which will 
replace the firm lost due to the merger, is not always easy. The problem is not related 
only to the selection of a suitable buyer for the divested assets, but also to ensuring 
that this buyer afterwards will not consider it as more profitable to join the oligopoly 
instead of competing against it. The issue, however, should not be seen isolated from 
the oligopoly problem as a whole, which constitutes one of the more difficult issues in 
antitrust and has no simple solutions. 
The fact that situations of tacit collusion are particularly difficult to deal with 
even ex post, has given rise to views that there should be a tighter ex ante control of 
mergers that are likely to result in such a situation278. In this context, it has been 
argued279 that remedies should not seek only to restore the status quo ante but also to 
go further by seeking to improve the status quo ante when issues of tacit collusion 
arise. 
277 On the issue see also Massimo Motta, Michele Polo and Helder Vasconcelos "Merger Remedies in the 
European Union: An Overview" in -Leveque Francois and Shelanski Howard (Ed. ), Merger Remedies in American 
and European Union Competition Law, Edward Elgar (Publ. ), 2003,106,113. 
278 See Europe Economics op. cit. 123, at 109. 
279 Ibid. 
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The thesis is of the opinion that such solutions, by seeking to cure future 
problems, which due to the always-unpredictable market developments are difficult to 
fully determine ex ante, have increased risk of failure and therefore little utility. For 
instance, even if competition authorities take all measures to open an oligopolistic 
market to new competitors through facilitating entry, it does not necessarily follow 
from that that the new entrants, once entering, will not end up cooperating with the 
oligopolists. Conversely, in a market where a collusive oligopoly appears very likely 
to arise in the future, one could not exclude unpredictable market developments to 
finally prevent this risk from materialising 280. In such a case any pre-emptive 
measures against collusion would be unnecessary. 
For these reasons it is submitted that the focus of competition authorities should 
be only on measures necessary to remedy the specific competitive problem caused by 
the merger and nothing more than that. 
The analysis of Rexam/ANC and Schmalbach-Lubeca/Rexam shows also how 
closely related is the selection of the appropriate remedies and the competitive 
assessment of the merger. Any decision on the remedies seeks to cure the specific 
competitive problem identified in the competitive assessment and therefore particular 
weight should be placed on the proper identification of the competitive problem. 
In respect of EC merger control, the adoption of the new market test of the 
Merger Regulation by expressly including non-collusive oligopolies in its scope helps 
to the more effective identification of the competitive problems in oligopolistic 
markets and in this sense also helps to improve the performance of competition 
authorities concerning remedies. 
280 For instance, an unexpected technological breakthrough in one firm, which would help that firm to acquire cost 
advantage against the other oligopolies, could be a good reason that firm to deviate thus breaking the oligopoly. 
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Chapter 8 
Summary, Conclusions and Proposals 
This thesis has reviewed certain important competitive issues arising out from the 
application of EC merger control in order to assess the effectiveness of the framework 
of the Merger Regulation and the Commission's practices. 
The objectives of the thesis as set out in its introduction were: 
a. To present certain difficult competitive issues, which, when arising in merger 
control, could result in failures in the competitive assessment; 
b. To analyse and assess the Commission's approach to these issues as a means to 
assess the effectiveness of the framework of the Merger Regulation and the 
Commission's performance; 
c. To discuss theories or methods of analysis potentially more effective than those 
employed by the Commission; 
d. To analyse and assess the new substantive test of the Merger Regulation; 
The ultimate aim of the thesis was to analyse and assess the framework of the 
ECMR and the Commission's practice and to put forward proposals for improving its 
effectiveness. 
To achieve its objectives the thesis has used three Commission decisions as tools 
for studying the application of merger control by the Commission and the framework. 
The three mergers were selected because they would facilitate the discussion of the 
relevant competitive issues. In particular, the three cases involved coordinated effects 
and situations of single-firm dominance. They also allowed for a discussion on the 
new Commission's doctrine of non-collusive oligopolies, which was incorporated into 
the scope of the Merger Regulation in the latest reforms. 
Other significant competitive issues examined include vertical aspects of 
mergers, merger remedies, issues of market definition, such as product differentiation 
and the treatment of captive production, and issues of strategic firm behaviour. 
The analysis and assessment of the frameworks and the competitive issues were 
based on the idea of the adoption of a flexible legal framework of merger control in 
the EU and for a flexible application of that framework. 
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In particular, in the introduction of the thesis, it was proposed that the application 
of merger control is a dynamic process, which to be effective requires a) a flexible but 
crystal-clear, in terms of scope and proceedings, legal framework that enables 
competition authorities to effectively deal with all the competitive issues arising from 
mergers in the complex global economic environment; and b) a flexible application of 
the framework by competition authorities in a manner that allows for maximum 
protection of the interests of the consumers in the Community without harming 
corporate reorganisation. 
The thesis has sought though the analysis of the examined cases in its chapters to 
clarify certain issues about the proposed flexibility and to prove why additional 
flexibility in the framework and its application would improve the effectiveness of the 
current EC merger control system. The examined issues and the conclusions reached 
are as follows: 
8.1 Procedural issues of EC merger control 
Although the focus of the thesis is on substantive issues reference to the 
procedure was deemed necessary because procedure is closely connected to the 
competitive assessment. Procedural issues were presented in chapter 2. 
The thesis has presented the basic procedural framework of EC merger control 
and discussed the recent developments in that area following the abandonment from 
the Merger Regulation of the old notification deadlines and the adoption of new more 
flexible deadlines for Phase-I and II investigations. 
The thesis considered that the additional flexibility offered by the new rules will 
improve the effectiveness of EC merger control but considered that even further 
flexibility may be required for Phase II. In particular, it was submitted that the 
adoption of the new market test of the ECMR, which has broader scope than the old 
dominance test, the ever increasing size of the examined concentration and the use of 
more sophisticated methods of analysis involving econometrics in merger analysis 
may render even the new deadlines for Phase II ineffective. 
To solve this problem it was proposed the adoption through incorporation of a 
special provision into the ECMR, of a further extension of Phase II beyond the 
existing deadlines and extensions. In particular, under the proposal, the Commission, 
at the request or with the agreement of the parties and where difficulties arise for 
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completing the market investigation within the existing deadlines and extensions, 
would be given the power to further extend Phase II for a period agreed between the 
two sides. Such a solution would help to produce more effective competitive 
assessments in Phase II particularly in these cases where disagreements between the 
parties and the Commission or the increased complexity of the investigation could not 
be effectively dealt with within the existing deadlines and extensions. This solution 
would help to reduce complaints about the Commission's investigations and decisions 
by the parties and would reduce the need for the latter to appeal to the ECJ, which 
causes financial costs and time loss to them. Thus, under this proposed solution, the 
merger control procedures in the EU would retain their current effective system of 
fixed deadlines, while for those few cases where there is need for more time in the 
investigation, the law would allow for extensions. In such a case, Phase II would 
become in effect open-ended as in the US. 
Lastly, the thesis has examined the role of judicial review in EC merger control. 
The thesis considered that the Court's involvement in merger cases, even if relatively 
rare, has been positive by helping to settle legal issues and checking the exercise of 
the Commission's decision-making discretion under the ECMR. However, regarding 
assessments of economic nature, it was submitted that while the Court has the power 
to check and should check the Commission's analyses and assessments of economic 
evidence in merger cases, it should nevertheless do it carefully so as not to undermine 
the Commission's authority under the ECMR. Economic assessments are in the core 
of the competitive assessments of mergers and are used to determine the competitive 
effects. The task is exercised by the Commission in all cases under the ECMR and 
entails difficult analysis of complex competitive conditions. The Court by checking 
the Commission's economic assessments necessarily reassesses the cases and finally 
either confirms or rejects the Commission's decisions. However, even if such 
reassessments fall within the Court's authority it is submitted that that they should be 
made relatively rarely and only when it is absolutely necessary and not in a way that 
challenges the Commission's authority under the ECMR. This must be so because the 
difficult nature of the competitive assessments, which involves the use of economics 
and econometrics, as well as the potentially insufficient resources available to the 
Court for carrying out this task do not safeguard that the Court's assessments will be 
more reliable than those of the Commission, which has more experienced and 
specialised staff and of course more available resources. On the other hand, the 
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frequent adoption of different decisions by the Court and the Commission could 
undermine the Commission's ability effectively to review mergers thus creating 
confusion and legal uncertainty to firms. For these reasons, it was submitted that the 
Courts interference with economic assessments should take place only where the 
Commission's errors are manifest. 
8.2 Substantive issues of EC merger control 
Substantive issues have been examined in detail. First, in chapter 3, the thesis 
presented the Commission's basic practice in the three basic stages of the competitive 
assessment, that is, market definition, analysis of the competitive effects and 
remedies. Then in the chapters to follow the thesis used four case studies on mergers 
related to aluminium industry in order to analyse and assess the Commission's 
practice with respect to the specific competitive issues targeted by the thesis as well as 
in order to discuss alternative theories and methodologies for more effectively dealing 
with these issues. 
The results of the analysis are briefly summarised below: 
8.2.1 Market definition 
Regarding product market the thesis examined the two basic market situations: 
homogeneous products and differentiated products. The focus was on the 
Commission's current practices and also on alternative theories and methodologies. 
As regards homogeneous products, the treatment of captive sales by integrated 
firms in market definition was examined. The definition of the SGA market in 
Alcoa/Reynolds was used as an illustrative example of the Commission's policy on 
the issue. The thesis taking into account the Commission's definition in 
Alcoa/Reynolds and other cases under the ECMR, the corresponding US policies and 
the views of competition scholars concluded that the Commission's traditional policy 
of excluding captive sales from the relevant product market, which thus includes only 
sales in the merchant market is not always illustrative of the competitive constraints. 
This is so because in certain markets captive sales can be used to affect prices in the 
merchant market and therefore have to be included in the relevant market. The SGA 
market, which was examined in chapter 4, was one such market. Also, in this case a 
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situation similar to that of captive sales was examined in the definition of the 
geographic market where the countries of the former Eastern world and China were 
excluded from the relevant geographic market of SGA, which thus included only the 
Western world due to the lack of SGA imports from the East to the West. However, it 
was shown in the analysis in chapter 4 that while there were no imports of SGA from 
the East to the West there were large imports to the West of aluminium, which 
contained SGA as a raw material. The thesis's argument for cases like the above was 
that the Commission should apply a more flexible approach towards captive sales and 
decide whether to include them into the relevant market or not taking into account 
only the conditions of the specific market. The issue concerns the effectiveness of the 
competitive assessment as a whole because inappropriate market definition in such 
cases could result in inappropriate decisions on the competitive effects of the merger. 
The analysis of the Commission's decision in Alcoa/Reynolds showed also that 
under the dominance test the Commission in certain cases might have used market 
definition to facilitate the application of that test and not to disclose the competitive 
constraints. In other words it was argued in chapter 4 that the Commission's 
definitions in certain cases may have been used to define artificially narrow relevant 
markets that would produce some "high" market share for the parties that would 
facilitate the establishment of market dominance, which requires high market shares. 
However, such a policy if existed could result in inappropriate assessment of the 
merging firms' market power. From Alcoa/Reynolds such a conclusion was reached 
because the Commission in the definition of the product market applied different 
criteria in the treatment of captive SGA sales and the long-term SGA contracts. These 
contracts were included in the product market even if the SGA production sold under 
these products would never be made available for sale in the merchant market. 
However, the lack of availability to buyers in the merchant market had been the 
reason for the exclusion of captive sales from the product market. Thus, the 
Commission seemed to apply different criteria for the definition even if it had to deal 
with the same market and it was argued in chapter 4 that this move might have been 
caused by the Commission's intention to define a narrow market that would facilitate 
the application of the dominance test, since the inclusion of long-term contracts would 
have produced lower market shares for the merging parties. 
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As regards differentiated products, which were examined in chapter 7, the thesis 
used the Commission's definition about beverage cans in Rexam/ANC to discuss 
certain problems in market definition when differentiated products are involved. 
Difficult issue with such products concerns the treatment of imperfect substitutes. 
The thesis examined the effectiveness of the SSNIP test, which is broadly used by 
competition authorities for defining markets in such cases and merger simulation, 
which is proposed by some economists as an alternative to conventional market 
definition in differentiated products. The thesis's conclusion was that while SSNIP is 
generally an effective tool for defining markets, in cases involving differentiated 
products this test alone may not be always sufficient to capture all the competitive 
constraints and therefore examination also of other methods and evidence will be 
required. In other words, the thesis argued for a qualitative approach to market 
definition. As regards simulation, it was argued that while this method offers useful 
evidence for identifying the competitive effects of the merger is not yet capable of 
replacing the traditional market definition task. 
In respect of geographic market definition, its relationship with economic 
globalisation was discussed in chapter 4. The thesis presented some basic competitive 
features of global markets and argued that since markets become increasingly global 
the Commission should take this into account when defining markets and also in the 
competitive assessments. Issues of globalisation affect amongst others the analysis of 
entry, while they require analysis of strategic behaviour, which goes deeper in the 
competitive process compared with structural analysis that relies on market shares and 
concentration. 
Lastly, about the Commission's practice when defining geographic markets under 
the ECMR the thesis noted the rarer use of quantitative evidence compared with 
product market definitions, which reduce the credibility of the Commission's 
decisions. 
8.2.2 Competitive assessment 
The market test of the ECMR has been central in the thesis. In chapter 5 it was 
examined whether the adoption of the US SLC test in the EU would help to improve 
the effectiveness of EC merger control. Following examination of the history of the 
application of the EU and the US tests it was concluded in chapter 5 that there was no 
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need for adopting the US test in the EU. The thesis's argument was that due to the 
existence of different public policy objectives and economic interests in the two 
sovereign jurisdictions it was more appropriate to preserve the current system of 
different market tests in the EU and the US, which safeguard more effective 
application of sovereign policies. However, as the history of the merger control 
systems in the two jurisdictions showed, the existence of different market tests did not 
prevent competition authorities in the EU and the US from converging on important 
competitive issues related to merger control and from developing fruitful cooperation. 
Further, the thesis in the four case studies about the aluminium markets (chapters 
4-7) carried out an in-depth analysis of the application of the market test of the 
ECMR, which covered situations of single and collective dominance as well as 
vertical aspects of mergers and the new Commission's doctrine on non-collusive 
oligopolies. The analysis sought to explore the boundaries and limitations of the 
substantive test of the ECMR and in this context extensive comparisons between the 
EU and the US market tests took place. 
In respect of non-collusive oligopolies (unilateral effects), the thesis after 
examining the developments in EC merger law that led to the incorporation of such 
oligopolies into the scope of the new market test of the ECMR concluded that since 
non-collusive oligopolies were based on valid economic theories of competitive harm 
they had to be included in the scope of the market test of the ECMR otherwise the 
basic scope of the creation of the latter, the protection of Community consumers from 
higher prices and lower quality products, would not be fulfilled. In this context it was 
submitted in chapter 7 that the abandonment in the recent reforms to the ECMR of the 
dominance test and the adoption of the new SIEC test, was a positive development 
because in that way it became absolutely clear that situations of non-collusive 
oligopolies, which under the dominance test were a disputed issue, were within the 
scope of the market test of the ECMR and that the latter can now deal with all 
anticompetitive scenarios arising out from mergers. 
In respect of coordinated effects, the thesis targeted certain inflexibilities in the 
Commission's collective dominance doctrine, which concerned mostly the 
Commission's traditional preference for duopolies. In particular in chapters 4,5 and 7 
situations of broad oligopolies including more than two firms were examined. The 
conclusion reached was that the collective dominance doctrine as applied under the 
dominance test had insufficiently narrow scope because is could not effectively deal 
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with oligopolies comprising firms that did not have dominant market shares as is the 
case with broad oligopolies and this put into doubt whether the competitive 
assessments in cases involving such oligopolies were fully effective. However, the 
new SIEC test of the ECMR facilitates the more effective treatment of such 
oligopolies. 
Further, in chapter 4 and 5 situations of mergers giving rise to risks of both 
unilateral and coordinated effects were examined. Although the two concepts are 
mutually exclusive, it is nevertheless often difficult, due to the complexity of market 
conditions, for competition authorities to decide ex ante which of the two effects is 
more likely to occur as a result of the merger. Under the dominance test, in such cases 
the Commission had to challenge the merger on grounds of either single or collective 
dominance, meaning that the Commission had to decide, which of the two effects was 
more likely to occur. Such a decision, however, meant that the Commission by 
choosing to deal with one of these effects and to ignore the other did not eliminate all 
the anticompetitive risks arising from these mergers. The new market test of the 
Merger Regulation by focusing on significant impediment of effective competition 
appears to allow for establishing both effects in the same merger and thus enables the 
Commission to eliminate risks of both these effects. This, it was submitted, is a very 
positive development helping to improve the effectiveness of EC merger control but it 
remains to be seen how the Commission and the Court will apply the new test. 
Further, in chapter 6 the thesis has discussed vertical aspects of mergers and in 
particular the practical application of the raising-rivals-costs (RRC) theories. Such 
theories constitute new developments in the area of vertical foreclosure and gradually 
acquire increasing role in the analysis of vertical mergers. Their basic feature is that 
they examine the potential of raising prices by raising the costs of rivals without 
forcing them to exit as was the case with traditional foreclosure. The thesis in chapter 
6 by presenting two forms of RRC showed the increased complexity of certain 
mergers whose assessment requires the use of both horizontal and vertical analysis 
and that horizontal analysis alone, which is used in most cases under the ECMR, is 
not always sufficient to identify all the competitive problems. It was also shown that 
newer economic theories that look deeper in the competitive process than the 
traditional structural analysis based on market shares could more accurately predict 
the impact of mergers on competition. 
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In the context of the presentation of newer theories and methodologies used in 
merger analysis the thesis has presented and discussed in chapters 5 and 7 the theories 
on mavericks, namely firms refusing to follow common policies with other firms in 
the industry thus cancelling the potential of the creation of collusive oligopoly. These 
theories are tools of dynamic merger analysis, which offer more in-depth analysis to 
oligopolies and were included into the thesis as a means to discuss methods for 
improving the effectiveness of EC merger control. 
Also, in chapters 4,5 and 7 the treatment of efficiencies in merger control was 
discussed. The thesis argument was that despite problems related to the substantiation 
and quantification of efficiencies the latter had to be formally incorporated in the 
analysis of mergers. In respect of the Commission's policy on the issue, it was argued 
that while under the dominance test of the ECMR the treatment of efficiencies was 
nebulous, the situation has seriously improved after the adoption of the new test of the 
ECMR and the issue of the Commission guidelines on the assessment of horizontal 
mergers, which formally incorporate efficiencies in merger analysis in the EU. This 
new approach is in accordance with a modern and effective merger control system, 
which requires examining all factors related to the competitive effects of mergers and 
efficiencies are between these factors'. 
Lastly, the thesis has carried out extensive analysis of the US framework of 
merger control and its practical application, which were then compared to the EU 
framework and the Commission's decision-making process. The US merger-control 
system has often been suggested to be a good alternative to that of the EU and the 
thesis used the comparison between the two systems in order to draw conclusions 
about the effectiveness of EC merger control. The basic conclusion reached from the 
comparison was that the US framework appears more flexible and in certain areas, 
such as the treatment of unilateral effects and efficiencies, more systematic than that 
of the EU. 
Another general conclusion about the Commission's analyses and decisions under 
the ECMR is that the Commission should incorporate into its competitive assessments 
more sophisticated methods of analysis involving econometrics (e. g. merger 
simulation, RRCs etc). These methods offer additional evidence enhancing the 
credibility and effectiveness of the competitive assessments and therefore they should 
It is well known that efficiency gains is the main reason behind the decision of firms to merge. 
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be used more often and when there are available market data. However, the 
competitive assessments of merger control will always be qualitative tasks and 
therefore the use of quantitative evidence even if very useful should not in the thesis's 
view replace qualitative decisions. 
8.2.3 Remedies 
The thesis has examined also remedies for curing anticompetitive effects of 
mergers. The remedies examined in the four case studies cover unilateral, coordinated 
and vertical effects. From the analysis of the Commission's decisions two basic 
conclusions are drawn: 
a. The remedies to be effective require valid competitive assessments meaning that if 
the latter assessments identify only some and not all the anticompetitive effects of the 
mergers then the remedies accordingly will cure only some of these effects. 
b. The Commission's responsibility does not cease to exist with the approval of the 
commitments proposed by the parties but with the culmination of the implementation 
of the relevant decision. 
8.3 EC merger control: the issue of flexibility. 
From the thesis's analysis and conclusions on the examined competitive issues in 
the preceding chapters it could be inferred as a general conclusion that maximum 
protection of consumers by a merger control system can be safeguarded only through 
the existence of a sufficiently flexible merger control framework capable of 
effectively dealing with all anticompetitive scenarios arising from mergers in the very 
complex and constantly changing global economic environment. 
The level of flexibility of the EC framework is largely reflected on the market test 
of the Merger Regulation. The old dominance test with its strict language and narrow 
scope was not adequately flexible. In particular, the dominance test, by establishing 
anticompetitive harm only in those mergers giving rise to dominant market positions, 
did not cover all possible anticompetitive scenarios arising from mergers, while the 
Commission in order to establish such positions had in certain cases to "manage" the 
competitive assessments in ways that potentially were not in full accordance with the 
market conditions. The practical problem arising out of these cases was not so much 
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that anticompetitive mergers finally escaped unharmed the Commission's review, but 
that the effects of those mergers on competition were potentially not fully identified 
and, thus, not fully dealt with. 
The application of the dominance test was also disrupted by the existence of legal 
barriers with respect to the exact content of the concept of "dominance". It is 
submitted that it is a failure that the exact scope of the dominance test, particularly 
regarding oligopolies, was for all 14 years of its life in the ECMR a contentious issue. 
' This thesis therefore considers that the new market test provides to the ECMR the 
broad scope and flexibility required and therefore gives the Commission a free hand 
to establish all possible competitive effects of mergers by applying the most 
appropriate economic theory in each case without having to worry about whether this 
theory is covered by the legal test of the ECMR or not as was the case under the 
dominance test. This, it is submitted, will help to significantly improve the 
effectiveness of EC merger control, which means better protection for the EU 
consumers. 
However, the adoption of a new more flexible test in the ECMR by itself will be 
of little significance if the Commission does not apply that test to its limits by 
systematically incorporating in its analysis a wide range of theories of competitive 
harm. The Commission has repeatedly stressed that the wording of the new test allows 
for effectively dealing with all anticompetitive scenarios arising from mergers, but it 
has still to be seen if these statements will be confirmed by practice. In the analysis of 
the thesis it was shown that the strict language of the dominance test was a basic 
reason for the insufficient treatment by the Commission of certain market scenarios 
while public policy considerations potentially also played a role2. By passing the 
recent reforms in the Merger Regulation, which expanded the scope of application of 
the latter, the Commission obtained the required political support for a more flexible 
merger policy for the benefit of consumers and therefore one should expect the 
Commission to make full use of this advantage. This, it is submitted, means that the 
Commission in practice should not hesitate to establish not only non-collusive 
oligopolies but also tacit collusion by more than two firms as well as both unilateral 
and coordinated effects in the same case where appropriate. 
2 See in particular, in chapter 5 of the thesis where the histories of the dominance test of the ECMR and the US 
SLC test were compared. 
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However, it should be noted that the new test should be used only for achieving 
more effective competitive assessments and not as a means of punishing mergers not 
favoured by the Commission for reasons unrelated to competition, such as economic 
or political ones3. In addition, efficiencies claims by the parties should be taken into 
account seriously by the Commission because the production of efficiencies is the 
basic reason behind the decisions of firms to merge, while efficiencies can also 
benefit consumers through, amongst others, lower prices or improved product quality. 
Further, apart from the market test and its application, flexibility should be 
demonstrated also in the selection of the appropriate methodologies for the analysis of 
mergers. The Commission should make less use of inflexible methods, such as the 
checklists in the assessment of oligopolies or the heavy reliance on market shares for 
establishing unilateral market power, and make more often use of dynamic methods, 
such as those about maverick firms or econometrics techniques, which offer evidence 
that is more close to the specific market conditions. Competition in the markets is a 
dynamic and not a static process and the Commission's methodologies should seek to 
identify and assess all these dynamic factors influencing that process. In that way, 
merger control becomes more effective and reliable and consumer welfare is better 
protected. The recent reinforcement of the Commission's staff with more economists 
and the appointment of a Chief Economist safeguards that the Commission's 
investigations in the future will become more sophisticated, since dynamic analysis 
requires use of sophisticated economic tools. However, while some positive trends on 
the issue have already been noted in recent Commission's decisions under the ECMR, 
it remains to be seen how far the Commission will go in terms of sophistication with 
the economic analysis of mergers. 
Further, the widening of the scope of merger control as a result of the 
developments in the law and the Commission's practice may raise fears that the 
Commission's interference with the competitive process will be increased in the 
future at the expense of firms. However, the experience from the application of the 
ECMR thus far shows that the Commission's stance has not been hostile towards 
mergers and therefore one should not expect this stance to change even under the new 
rules. One could also potentially argue that the increased intervention will benefit 
3 Such a risk was identified also by S. Voigt and A. Schmidt in a recent their Article. See S. Voigt and A. Schmidt 
"Switching to Substantial Impediments of Competition can have Substantial Costs-SICI" E. C. LRev, 2004,584, 
590. 
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firms by forcing them, for gaining the approval of the Commission, to examine more 
carefully the efficiencies and competitive effects of the merger. Such an examination 
may help to reduce the high rate of failures in mergers recorded by the economic 
literature. 
Another issue about flexibility concerns its relation with legal certainty and 
predictability. Legal certainty and predictability are particularly useful to firms 
because they help the latter to predict the likely reaction of the competition authority 
in their decision to merge4. This helps firms to decide ex ante whether to initiate 
administrative proceedings before the Commission for the approval of the merger or 
abandon the deal since merger prohibitions entail considerable financial and other 
costs for firms. Sufficient level of legal certainty and predictability can be achieved 
through the adoption of a crystal-clear framework of merger control, which 
establishes coherent criteria for the assessment of mergers and also though the 
application of that framework by the Commission in a predictable way. Flexibility 
and predictability are opposing concepts, since the more flexible a law and its 
application are the more unpredictable decisions will occur as a result. 
The system of the ECMR in the past by establishing explicit deadlines for the 
completion of merger review process and a dominance market test that had relatively 
narrow scope and clear content was generally predictable and therefore beneficial to 
companies. Therefore, the number of prohibitions was relatively small5. However, the 
adoption in the ECMR of a new test with broader scope and more flexible in 
application and with more flexible procedural deadlines necessarily raises concerns 
for less legal certainty and predictability thus potentially harming firms. In addition to 
the above this thesis proposes maximum use of flexibility by the Commission in the 
application of the framework, which could leave the impression that the thesis 
proposes even more harm for firms. 
However, in practice the situation may not be that unfavourable for firms for 
several reasons. First, the issue by the Commission, along with the new more flexible 
market test, of guidelines for the assessment of horizontal mergers and also the 
projected issue of similar guidelines for vertical and conglomerate mergers and 
remedies in the near future will help to clarify the Commission's policies in basic 
See also ibid. 
According to available Commission's statistics the rate of prohibitions were around or below 1% of the examined 
cases. 
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areas of the application of the market test thus increasing legal certainty. Of course 
there will necessarily be some transition period until the content and the application of 
the new rules become absolutely clear to everyone but it is submitted that this period 
may not be long given that every year the Commission reviews hundreds of cases, 
thus having the opportunity in these cases to explain its policies. Moreover, the 
Commission's past practice in the application of the ECMR generally did not 
demonstrate sudden and unexpected changes, and therefore it is reasonable to assume 
that also in the future the Commission will seek a gradual adoption of the new rules in 
order not to harm the predictability of the proceedings. 
Further, the establishment of `fast-track' procedures in the CFI will help to 
increase in the future the involvement of the Court in merger control not only for 
checking the exercise of the Commission's discretion but also for clarifying legal 
issues about the application of the new market test, thus increasing legal certainty. 
However, as already mentioned above, the Court's involvement should be careful 
when checking the Commission's economic assessments, because frequent Court 
interference with such assessments under certain circumstances could create 
confusion threatening the credibility of the entire EC merger control system6. On the 
other hand, the Commission should safeguard that its actions respect the rights of 
defence of the parties and that all measures are taken to ensure that the parties have 
fair hearings during the proceedings. In such a case, the parties would have fewer 
reasons to doubt about the Commission's decisions. 
Moreover, this thesis proposed the provision to the parties of the right to ask in 
difficult cases for further extension of Phase II beyond the existing deadlines and 
extensions through the insertion of a special provision in the ECMR. Such a solution 
would, it is submitted, work to the benefit of the parties by helping them to exhaust all 
the means to convince the Commission and avoid a Court appeal, which would cause 
them additional financial losses, and delays by several more months. 
Lastly, the formal incorporation in the new EU merger policy of efficiency 
defence could be an additional legal tool for firms helping them to deal with the more 
flexible new test thus increasing their legal certainty. 
6 There is still an issue whether the new 'fast-track' procedures in CFI are 'fast' enough to safeguard sufficient and 
above all timely judicial review of the Commission decisions (See Kenneth R. Logan, Ethan E. Litwin and Olivier 
N. Antoine "Two Comments: Is `Fast Track' Judicial Review Fast Enough? Are There, Based on the US 
Experience, Land Mines in the Modernisation Proposal? " in International Antitrust Law and Policy. Fordham 
Corporate Law Institute, 2002,115; Enrico Adriano Raffaelli "European Union Competition Policy Subsequent to 
Airtours Case" in International Antitrust Law and Policy. Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 2002,129. 
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In any case it is submitted that the increasingly complex and unpredictable 
competitive conditions in the markets, due to increasing economic globalisation and 
the advances in new technologies, inevitably force jurisdictions to adapt in the new 
reality by becoming more flexible in order to be capable of dealing with all market 
scenarios resulting from mergers. As the recent reforms to the ECMR show, policy- 
makers in the EU have well understood this need for more flexibility and have taken 
measures to that direction. However, given that the markets always run faster than the 
regulators it may soon become necessary the EC merger control system to become 
even more flexible in order to catch up with the market developments. 
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